People vs. Trigo

The positive and credible testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for parricide, and motive need not be proved where the identity of the accused is positively established by such testimony. Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance requires that the accused surrender voluntarily, not merely report the incident or seek police protection.

Bertito Trigo and Alicia Dequiña Trigo were married by the parish priest of Panitan, Capiz on January 19, 1972. The spouses were estranged at the time of the killing. Marcos Fuentes, the prosecution's principal eyewitness, knew the spouses personally, having purchased their house in Sitio Umigon, Barangay Tincupon, Panitan, Capiz in 1982.

Bertito Trigo and Alicia Dequiña Trigo were married on January 19, 1972 by the parish priest of Panitan, Capiz. At the time of the events in question, the spouses were estranged. On May 30, 1983, at about nine o'clock in the morning, the spouses were at the market in the town of Pontevedra, Capiz. According to the prosecution's principal witness, Marcos Fuentes, who knew the spouses personally having purchased their house in 1982, he was at the Pontevedra market that morning and met Alicia Trigo, greeting her. Shortly thereafter, a commotion erupted. When Fuentes stood up, he saw Bertito Trigo stabbing Alicia, with blood spurting from her left chest. Trigo was in front of Alicia and holding her with one arm. Fuentes was approximately fifty meters from where the incident occurred. No other persons were near Alicia when he saw her bleeding, and she later fell to the ground.

The victim was examined by Dr. Ma. Roselle B. Gedang, resident physician of the Provincial Hospital at Bailan, Pontevedra, Capiz. The medical certificate, dated February 4, 1984, documented multiple stab wounds: a through-and-through wound on the right arm, a wound on the left arm, a through-and-through wound on the left forearm and left side of the chest near the nipple, a penetrating wound perforating the heart through the fourth intercostal space, a superficial wound on the right hypogastric area, and a superficial wound on the right lumbar area. The cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage.

For his part, Trigo denied killing his wife. He testified that while he and his wife were walking at the market to buy goods for their store, he saw Orline Buaco draw a weapon from his waist. Buaco tried to stab him, but he was able to evade the blow, and it was his wife who was hit instead. After she was struck, Buaco successively stabbed her. Trigo further claimed that Buaco, also a resident of Barangay Tincupon, had previously fired shots at the Trigo family's house on November 19, 1982, because Trigo had not paid a debt of ₱1,000 owed to Buaco. That incident had been recorded at the police department, and a complaint had been filed by Trigo against Buaco with the Municipal Court of Panitan.

After the stabbing, Trigo went to the police station, where he reported that his wife had been stabbed by Buaco and sought protection, claiming he feared Buaco would also stab him. He did not return to attend to his wife or ascertain whether she received medical attention at the provincial hospital. The trial court found the testimony of Marcos Fuentes to be clear, positive, and straightforward, and rejected the appellant's defense as belied by the circumstances surrounding the incident.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Appellant argued that the trial court should not have relied on the testimony of prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes because of inconsistencies and improbabilities in his testimony.
• Lack of Motive: Appellant asserted that there was no evidence in the records to show that he had a motive to kill his wife.
• Third-Party Perpetrator: Appellant maintained that it was not he but a certain Orline Buaco who stabbed and killed his wife, and that Buaco had a prior grudge against him over an unpaid debt.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution witness Marcos Fuentes and in disregarding the evidence for the defense.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. The trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are accorded the highest degree of respect by appellate courts, and no strong and cogent reason was found to depart from this rule.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The direct and circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was improperly appreciated.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The well-established rule is that in criminal prosecutions on the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by appellate courts because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The testimony of Marcos Fuentes, who stated that he saw the appellant stab his wife, was clear and positive. There was no showing of any ulterior motive on his part to falsely charge the accused. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. The trial court found that even though Fuentes wavered at the outset, his declaration was straightforward even on cross-examination and was a reiteration of his sworn statement supporting the complaint.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove motive, but motive is relevant only where the identity of the accused is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. Here, the identity of the accused was positively proved by the eyewitness, rendering motive irrelevant. The appellant's defense that Orline Buaco stabbed his wife was rejected based on several significant circumstances: the improbability that Buaco's alleged first attack aimed at the appellant would hit his wife instead; the greater improbability that the deceased would sustain multiple stab wounds if Buaco's target was the appellant, since Buaco would have aimed all subsequent thrusts at the appellant; the appellant's failure to shield his wife or retaliate during the next five attacks; the appellant's departure from his seriously wounded wife after Buaco had fled and there was no longer any danger; and the appellant's failure to return to attend to his wife or check on her medical treatment. These circumstances bolstered the conclusion that the appellant was estranged from his wife and that it was he who killed her. The trial court's appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was found erroneous, because the appellant went to the police station to report that his wife was stabbed by Buaco and to seek protection — not to surrender. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was nevertheless correctly imposed. The civil indemnity was increased from ₱12,000 to ₱30,000.

• Credibility of Trial Court's Findings on Witnesses — In criminal prosecutions, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by appellate courts, the trial court being in a better position to decide the question having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The Court found no strong and cogent reason to depart from this rule.

• Sufficiency of Single Witness Testimony — The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the conviction based solely on the eyewitness testimony of Marcos Fuentes.

• Irrelevance of Motive Where Identity is Established — Motive is relevant only where the identity of the person accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. Where the identity of the accused is positively proved by an eyewitness, motive is irrelevant.

• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary surrender requires that the accused surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Going to the police station to report the incident and to seek protection out of fear does not amount to voluntary surrender. The Court removed the mitigating circumstance improperly appreciated by the trial court.

• "The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict" — This passage articulates the doctrine that a single credible eyewitness can sustain a conviction, a principle frequently invoked in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• "The law is well-settled that motive is relevant only where the Identity of the person accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons." — This defines the controlling rule on the relevance of motive in criminal cases, clarifying that motive need not be proved where identity is positively established by an eyewitness.

• "Clearly, his action cannot in any manner be considered as amounting to voluntary surrender." — This passage establishes that reporting a crime and seeking police protection does not constitute voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, distinguishing the requisites of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Kintuan, G.R. 84100, December 3, 1987, 156 SCRA 195 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded the highest degree of respect by appellate courts.

• People vs. Luces, L-60744, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 813 — Cited in support of the doctrine that the testimony of a single credible witness is sufficient to convict.

• People vs. Dueño, G.R. No. L-31102, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23 — Cited for the proposition that motive is irrelevant where the identity of the accused is positively established by an eyewitness.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of parricide. The accused was convicted under this article for killing his wife, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. The trial court cited this provision in imposing reclusion perpetua.

• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Governs the computation of the duration of penalties and the allowance for preventive imprisonment. The accused was given the benefit of this article.

• Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Governs mitigating circumstances, including voluntary surrender. The Supreme Court found that the requisites of voluntary surrender were not met because the accused went to the police station to report the incident and seek protection, not to surrender.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.