People vs. Torrefranca

An erroneous discharge of a co-accused as a state witness does not affect the legal consequences of the discharge or the quality of his testimony, and the testimony will not be discarded solely because the witness lacks the qualifications under Rule 119, Section 9. A death penalty already imposed must be reduced to reclusion perpetua under Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.

The Diaganon spouses, Vivencio and Flaviana, were an elderly couple in Barangay San Vicente, Sagbayan, Bohol, whose plantation employed Benedicto Botohoy, one of the six persons charged. The prosecution's case rested heavily on Botohoy, who was discharged as a state witness under Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the provision allowing the discharge of a co-accused to testify for the state. The appeal was resolved after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, whose Article III, Section 19(1) barred the imposition of the death penalty absent a congressional re-imposition for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and reduced already-imposed death sentences to reclusion perpetua.

In the early evening of March 25, 1981, Benedicto Botohoy went to the store of Sofronio Gilbolingo at the junction of Barangay Libertad Norte, Sagbayan, Bohol, to take a ride to Batuan, Bohol, where his wife was harvesting palay. Inside the store he saw Antonio Torrefranca, Isaias Daro, Tirso Melecio, Olipio Arellano, and Gilbolingo. Gilbolingo approached him, took his sickle and bolo, and placed them on the shelves of the store. Botohoy observed that the group was drinking tuba and discussing something he could not hear because he was far from them. Gilbolingo and Torrefranca then forced him to go with the group to the house of the Diaganon couple.

On the way, Botohoy noticed that Gilbolingo carried a bolo and Botohoy's sickle, Daro carried a small bolo, Melecio had a piece of wood, Arellano carried a small bolo, and Torrefranca had a revolver. At about seven o'clock in the evening the group reached the Diaganon house, a kilometer away. Gilbolingo called for Flaviana Diaganon, who, upon seeing him, readily invited him in; the group then rushed up the stairs, and Torrefranca covered his head and face with a black cloth as he did so.

Once inside, Gilbolingo held Flaviana by the hair and hacked her neck with the sickle, and she fell to the floor, spattering blood all over Gilbolingo's blue t-shirt. Gilbolingo then hacked her forearms and took the bundles of money on her waist, which were rolled inside a stocking. Meanwhile, Torrefranca, who was holding a gun, positioned himself at the sala while Daro and Melecio entered the bedroom of Vivencio Diaganon. Botohoy heard Vivencio's voice pleading with Daro to stop assaulting him. Daro came out of the room carrying a blanket and trousers under his armpit and holding a bolo covered with blood, and Melecio also came out carrying a piece of wood covered with blood. Torrefranca ordered Daro and Melecio to hurry up and look for money; Daro opened the drawer of a sewing machine and brought out a bundle of money two centimeters thick, Torrefranca dug into a big bamboo basket of palay and placed a bundle of money in his pocket, and Arellano searched another room but was not able to get anything.

Torrefranca then announced to his companions that they should go down. Before leaving, he increased the volume of the radio set on a small table, removed his mask as he went down the house, and took custody of all the money taken from the victims. When the group returned to Gilbolingo's house, Torrefranca explained that they could not yet divide the loot because they might tend to spend it and direct suspicion on them, and he warned Botohoy not to report the matter to the police, otherwise he would kill Botohoy and his family.

The following morning, Alfonso Diaganon, a son of Vivencio by a previous marriage, went to the house of the victims after one of their farm hands informed him that something tragic had happened. He saw Flaviana lying on the floor leading to the kitchen with a large wound on her neck, and Vivencio lying prostrate on his bed in the bedroom with wounds on the forehead, left cheek, and the sides of his body. He also discovered P21,000 concealed among the palay, and he reported the matter to the police. On the same day, Dr. Estanislao Camacho, Municipal Health Officer of Sagbayan, Bohol, autopsied the bodies and reduced his findings to writing: Vivencio died of massive hemorrhage of the head and right chest, probably caused by a sharp pointed instrument, and Flaviana died of massive hemorrhage from the neck caused by a sharp instrument, possibly a sharp-bladed scythe.

On April 15, 1981, Botohoy was apprehended by the police and executed an extrajudicial confession revealing the details of the offense and identifying the appellants as the perpetrators. On April 16, 1981, Sgt. Amedio G. Cagata applied for and obtained a search warrant from Judge Andrew S. Namocatcat of the then Court of First Instance of Bohol to search the residences of the appellants; from Daro's house the police recovered a small blood-stained bolo, two bales of cloth, and a t-shirt, from Gilbolingo's house a blue blood-stained t-shirt, and from Melecio's house a white t-shirt. On April 20, 1981, Gilbolingo executed a Waiver of Rights expressing his desire to waive his rights to remain silent and to the presence of counsel during interrogation, and thereafter executed an extrajudicial confession admitting his participation and naming all the other accused except Arellano, his brother-in-law, as his co-conspirators; he subscribed and swore to both documents before Assistant Provincial Fiscal Daniel B. Bernaldez of Bohol. At trial, the appellants testified on their whereabouts at the time of the incident, their defenses amounting to a general denial and alibi, while Gilbolingo repudiated the voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession, claiming that he was merely forced to sign prepared documents. The defense also presented Epifanio Abano, who assumed full responsibility for the crime, allegedly with a certain Marlito Paca, a certain Cris, Cito Petalcorin, Junior Tutor, Junior Petalcorin, and Narding Abari. The trial court found Abano's testimony substantially inconsistent on material points and gave credence to Botohoy's testimony, which it found corroborated by the post-mortem findings and the results of the searches.

• Credibility of the State Witness: The appellants assailed the credibility of the testimony of their co-accused Botohoy, arguing that it was biased and unreliable because he harbored ill-feelings against them: Gilbolingo had mauled Botohoy in 1979 and they had been enemies since then; Daro had testified against Botohoy in a case for malicious mischief, as had Arellano's wife; Melecio had reprimanded Botohoy's son for stealing corn; and Torrefranca was responsible for Botohoy's arrest as a suspect in the case.
• Improper Discharge of a State Witness: The appellants contended that Botohoy's discharge to become a state witness violated Rule 119, Section 9, because he appeared to be the most guilty — he had been working in the plantation of the deceased spouses and had known the extent of their earnings — and had been a fugitive from justice for attempted rape, a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Involuntariness of Gilbolingo's Confession: Gilbolingo claimed that his extrajudicial confession was secured through force and intimidation, that Sgt. Cagata maltreated and coerced him into signing prepared documents, and that the confession, made in the absence of his attorney, had no evidentiary value.

• Credibility of the Discharged Co-Accused: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Botohoy despite the alleged bias and ill-feelings against the appellants.
• Discharge of a Co-Accused as State Witness: Whether the discharge of Botohoy as a state witness, despite his being the most guilty and lacking the qualifications under Rule 119, Section 9, invalidates his testimony.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether the appellants' defenses of denial and alibi can overcome Botohoy's positive testimony.
• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether Gilbolingo's extrajudicial confession was admissible despite his claim of force and intimidation and its execution without counsel.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution.

• Credibility of the Discharged Co-Accused: No. The SC found no plausible reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of Botohoy's credibility, his testimony having been corroborated by the post-mortem findings and the results of the searches.
• Discharge of a Co-Accused as State Witness: No. An erroneous discharge of a co-accused does not affect the legal consequences of the discharge or the quality of his testimony, and the testimony is not discarded solely because the witness lacks the Rule 119, Section 9 qualifications.
• Denial and Alibi: No. Mere denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Botohoy.
• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: The conviction does not depend on the confession; even excluding it, the other evidence suffices to convict all the appellants.
• Penalty: The death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua under Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution, and the indemnity is increased to P30,000 for each victim.

• Credibility of the Discharged Co-Accused: The SC examined the records and found no plausible reason to alter the trial court's appreciation of Botohoy's credibility. Botohoy's testimony in court confirmed the material allegations of his extrajudicial confession pointing to the appellants as the perpetrators. The post-mortem findings of Dr. Camacho corroborated his testimony on the injuries sustained by the victims, and the results of the searches in the appellants' respective residences substantiated his description of the t-shirts they wore, the weapons they used, and the articles that formed part of the loot. On the alleged motives, the SC held them too frivolous and shallow to induce Botohoy to testify falsely at the risk of confessing participation in such grave offenses, quoting People vs. Tatlonghari that where the reasons for the alleged individual grudges of a witness are so flimsy and uncertain, it is incredible that they could constitute sufficient motive for an average individual to conjure up so serious a charge and send an otherwise innocent man to a long stretch of prison terms. The SC also rejected the testimony of Epifanio Abano, who assumed responsibility for the crime, as substantially inconsistent on material points: he testified that on the date of the incident he and his companions waited for nighttime at the public market in Barangay San Vicente, Sagbayan, Bohol, but it was established that there was no public market there on March 25, 1981, and he claimed the victims' bodies were lying side by side on the floor of the room, when the bodies were in fact found in different places where the victims were respectively killed. Mauricio Petalcorin, one of Abano's alleged co-conspirators, denied any participation and testified that Abano was always asking for money and that Gilbolingo was used to giving him money. The SC concluded that Abano's narrations were last-minute concoctions to exculpate the appellants, and reiterated that conclusions of the trial judge on credibility command great respect, especially when supported by the evidence of record.
• Discharge of a Co-Accused as State Witness: The SC held that in the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may reasonably be expected to err, but where such error is committed, it cannot affect the legal consequences of the discharge, citing US vs. Mendiola. Neither can the error affect the testimony and the quality of the testimony. Even if the discharged witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded, citing US vs. Abanzado and People vs. Jamero. The trial court therefore correctly gave credence to Botohoy's testimony in court.
• Denial and Alibi: The SC held that the appellants' mere denial and stories of alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Botohoy that the appellants killed the Diaganon spouses and ransacked their house.
• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: The SC found Gilbolingo's claim that his confession was secured through force and intimidation deserving of scant consideration. Although he claimed that Sgt. Cagata maltreated and coerced him into signing prepared documents, he did not complain of the alleged maltreatment when he was brought before Provincial Fiscal Bernaldez, before whom he swore to the truth of the confession, nor did he file a complaint against Cagata thereafter. The trial court also found the confession replete with details that could have been furnished only by the appellant, citing People vs. Nillos. On the argument that the confession was made without his attorney and therefore had no evidentiary value, the SC held that even assuming the waiver of the right to counsel was void, the evidence presented excluding the confession would still suffice to convict all the appellants.
• Penalty: Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted, that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless Congress thereafter provides for it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, and that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. In view of this provision, the SC reduced the death penalty to reclusion perpetua and increased the indemnity to the victims' heirs from P12,000 to P30,000 for each victim.

• Erroneous Discharge of a Co-Accused as State Witness — A trial court may reasonably be expected to err in discharging a co-accused to become a state witness, but such error cannot affect the legal consequences of the discharge, nor the testimony and quality of the witness's testimony. Even if the discharged witness lacks some of the qualifications under Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not for that reason alone be discarded or disregarded. The SC applied this to sustain Botohoy's testimony despite the appellants' claim that he was the most guilty and disqualified.
• Credibility of Witnesses — Conclusions of the trial judge regarding the credibility of witnesses command great respect and consideration, especially when supported by the evidence of record. The SC deferred to the trial court's assessment of Botohoy and rejected Abano's inconsistent testimony.
• Denial and Alibi — Mere denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. The SC applied this against the appellants' defenses.
• Frivolous Motives Do Not Induce False Testimony — Where the alleged individual grudges of a witness are flimsy and uncertain, they cannot constitute sufficient motive for an average individual to conjure up a serious charge and send an innocent man to prison. The SC applied this to reject the appellants' bias argument against Botohoy.
• Extrajudicial Confession and Waiver of Right to Counsel — Even assuming that a waiver of the right to counsel is void and the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, a conviction may still stand on the other evidence presented. The SC applied this to hold that the conviction did not depend on Gilbolingo's confession.
• Reduction of Death Penalty under the 1987 Constitution — Under Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The SC applied this to modify the trial court's sentence.

• "In the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may reasonably be expected to err. Where such error is committed, however, the error of the court in discharging such accused cannot affect the legal consequences of his discharge." — The core ruling on the effect of an erroneous discharge of a state witness; it insulated Botohoy's testimony from the appellants' Rule 119, Section 9 challenge.
• "Even if the discharged witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded." — The canonical formulation that the qualifications of a state witness go to the discharge, not to the admissibility or weight of his testimony.
• "Indeed, appellants' mere denial and stories of alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Botohoy, that the appellants killed the Diaganon spouses and ransacked the latter's house." — States the rule on the relative weight of denial and alibi against positive testimony.
• "Assuming this to be so, still the evidence presented in this case excluding said confession, will suffice to convict all the appellants." — The SC's harmless-error treatment of Gilbolingo's confession, which made the voluntariness and counsel issues non-dispositive.

• US vs. Mendiola, 82 Phil. 740 — Controlling precedent for the rule that an error in discharging a co-accused does not affect the legal consequences of the discharge.
• US vs. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658 — Followed for the rule that the testimony of a discharged witness is not discarded solely because he lacks the Rule 119, Section 9 qualifications.
• People vs. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206 — Followed for the same rule on the testimony of a discharged co-accused.
• People vs. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726 — Quoted and followed for the rule that flimsy and uncertain motives cannot induce a witness to testify falsely.
• People vs. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 — Followed for the rule that a confession replete with details that could have been furnished only by the accused is credible.

• Rule 119, Section 9, Rules of Court — Governs the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. The appellants invoked it to attack Botohoy's discharge, but the SC held that the witness's failure to meet its qualifications does not by itself render his testimony inadmissible or without weight.
• Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless Congress provides for it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, and mandates that any death penalty already imposed be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Applied to reduce the sentence and to justify the modification of the RTC decision.
• Article IV, Section 20, 1973 Constitution and Article III, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Cited in Justice Cruz's separate opinion as the basis for excluding Gilbolingo's extrajudicial confession for violation of the Bill of Rights.

• Justice Cruz (Concurring) — He opined that Gilbolingo's extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted because it was obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights and existing applicable jurisprudence (Art. IV, Sec. 20, 1973 Constitution; Art. III, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution; People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Sison, 142 SCRA 219), but concurred in the result because, as the majority observed, even disregarding the confession, the other evidence sufficed to convict all the appellants.