People vs. Toro

Treachery cannot qualify a killing to Murder where the lone eyewitness only saw the stabbing itself and did not see the commencement of the aggression or how the attack began and developed, even if the victim sustained 33 stab wounds. Evident premeditation likewise requires proof of when the accused decided to commit the crime and a sufficient lapse of time for reflection, which the prosecution failed to show.

The case concerns the death of Pascualito Espiña, Sr., for which Danilo Toro y Diano @ "Oto" and Salvador Cahusay @ Adol were prosecuted. The prosecution's case rested principally on the eyewitness testimony of the victim's then 16-year-old son, Pascualito Espiña, Jr. The legal backdrop is the distinction between Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and Homicide under Article 249.

According to the prosecution, on March 21, 2004, Salvador Cahusay @ Adol invited Pascualito Espiña, Sr. to a drinking spree around 4:00 p.m., and the two drank inside Espiña, Sr.'s house until 7:00 p.m., when Danilo Toro y Diano @ "Oto" invited them to move to his own house about 900 meters away to continue drinking. The prosecution and defense stipulated that the incident happened on March 21, 2004 around midnight at Sitio Pinana-an, Barangay Calantiao, Bobon, Northern Samar, and that on March 22, 2004, Espiña, Sr. was found dead inside appellant's house.

Pascualito Espiña, Jr., the victim's then 16-year-old son, testified that by midnight he decided to fetch his father at appellant's house. There, he saw his father at the suy-ab being held by Cahusay by the arms while appellant was stabbing him. At that time, they were the only persons in the suy-ab. Since a gas torch illuminated the suy-ab, he clearly saw the attack on his father and the assailant's identity, and he was only two arms' length away from them. Though his father had a knife in a scabbard tucked on his waist, he had no chance to defend himself. Out of fear, Espiña, Jr. ran toward the house of their neighbor Barangay Tanod Dodoy and sought help, but he was refused; he then asked Dodoy to accompany him to his aunt at Barangay Trujillo, where they arrived around 2:00 a.m. The following day, his aunt sought assistance from the Barangay Council of Calantiao to retrieve Espiña, Sr.'s lifeless body. Inside appellant's house, they saw his father's lifeless body seated on the floor; appellant, his family, and Cahusay were nowhere to be found. They brought the cadaver to Bobon, Samar by boat. The victim's brother, Paquito Espiña, corroborated Espiña, Jr.'s testimony.

Municipal Health Officer Dr. Henry Novales testified that he conducted the postmortem examination of Espiña, Sr. His autopsy report showed that Espiña, Sr. suffered 33 stab wounds, ten of which were fatal and located in the left side of his body where his heart was, while three stab wounds in the right side punctured his lungs. The assailant and the victim were near each other, and the instrument used was a knife, but he could not say if there were more than one assailant.

Appellant, for his part, testified that Espiña, Sr. and Cahusay came to his house for a drinking spree around 7:00 p.m. on March 21, 2004. They brought one gallon of tuba, which they consumed at the suy-ab. He did not recall any verbal altercation with Espiña, Sr. because they only talked about their salaries. After two hours, Espiña, Sr. and Cahusay decided to go home as there was no more tuba left to drink. After his visitors left, he and his family went to sleep. The following morning, his wife was shocked when she saw Espiña, Sr.'s lifeless body at the suy-ab, and he noticed that Espiña, Sr. sustained several stab wounds. Afraid, he and his family went to their house in Barangay Salvacion and did not inform anyone of the incident. He intended to return to their house to check on other things but decided not to when he was informed that he was the suspect for Espiña, Sr.'s death and that the latter's brother was already looking for him for revenge.

The RTC found that Espiña, Jr.'s eyewitness account showed the victim being held by Cahusay while appellant stabbed him, but found no evident premeditation. The CA relied on the invitation to the drinking spree and the infliction of 33 wounds. Espiña, Jr.'s account was limited to the stabbing itself; he did not testify on how the aggression began or how the attack developed.

• Sufficiency of the Information on Treachery: Appellant argued that he should only be convicted of Homicide because the prosecution failed to sufficiently allege treachery in the Information.
• Proof of Treachery: Appellant argued that treachery was not sufficiently proven because the lone prosecution eyewitness did not see how the alleged aggression commenced.
• Positive Identification: Appellant argued that only a gas torch illuminated the place of the incident, making it impossible for Espiña, Jr. to have positively identified him as the assailant.
• Witness Reaction: Appellant argued that Espiña, Jr.'s reaction after witnessing the incident ran counter to human experience; ordinarily, a son who witnessed his father being stabbed would run for help, but Espiña, Jr. ran to inform his aunt about the incident.

• Treachery and Identification: Respondent countered that the prosecution sufficiently established treachery; Espiña, Jr., then only two arms' length away, positively identified appellant as his father's assailant through the gas torch that illuminated the place of the incident.

• Positive Identification: Whether the prosecution's lone eyewitness positively identified appellant as the victim's assailant despite the alleged poor lighting from a gas torch and the witness's conduct after the incident.
• Waiver of Defect in Information: Whether appellant waived the alleged defect in the Information for failing to specify the acts constituting treachery when he did not file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before arraignment.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was sufficiently proven to qualify the killing to Murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was sufficiently proven to qualify the killing to Murder.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether appellant may be convicted only of Homicide and sentenced and held liable for damages accordingly absent qualifying circumstances.

• Positive Identification: Yes. Espiña, Jr. positively identified appellant as the one who stabbed his father; the gas torch illuminated the suy-ab, and his reaction after the incident did not destroy credibility because there is no standard human behavioral response to a startling experience.
• Waiver of Defect in Information: Yes. Appellant waived the defect in the Information by failing to file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before arraignment, following People vs. Solar.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the aggression or how the attack began and developed; the number of wounds alone does not establish treachery.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not proven because the records did not show when the assailants decided to kill and the lapse of sufficient time for them to reflect on their actions.
• Penalty and Damages: Yes. Appellant may be convicted only of Homicide; absent qualifying circumstances, the penalty is reclusion temporal, and the awards are modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages of P50,000 each, with 6% interest.

• Positive Identification: The SC applied the rule that positive identification by a credible eyewitness prevails over denial and alibi. It noted that the trial court and the CA uniformly gave credence to Espiña, Jr.'s clear, straightforward, and categorical account. With the light from the sirilya (gas torch), Espiña, Jr. identified appellant as the one who stabbed his father 33 times while Cahusay held the victim to ward off any form of resistance or retaliation. Against appellant's denial and alibi, the positive identification deserved greater weight. The SC rejected the argument that Espiña, Jr.'s reaction was contrary to human experience: he did run to Barangay Tanod Dodoy for help but was refused, so he asked Dodoy to accompany him to his aunt; there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, and frightful experience. With no ill motive to implicate appellant, Espiña, Jr.'s credibility was upheld.
• Waiver of Defect in Information: Section 9, Rule 110 requires the acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Information failed to specify the acts constituting treachery. But appellant did not file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before arraignment. Under People vs. Solar, failure to question the sufficiency of the Information by either motion waives objections to formal defects, including lack of particularity in the description of attendant circumstances; the accused is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him.
• Treachery: Article 248 defines Murder and lists treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might take. It requires (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (b) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. There must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed; where no particulars are known, treachery cannot be established from suppositions drawn from circumstances prior to the moment of the aggression. Here, the lone eyewitness saw the victim held by Cahusay while appellant stabbed him 33 times. The number of wounds revealed a determined intent to kill—ten fatal wounds near the heart and three that ruptured the lungs—but Espiña, Jr. did not witness the commencement of the aggression or the initial attack, did not account for how the attack resulted in death, and his account was limited to the stabbing itself. There was no showing that the attack was sudden and unexpected, leaving the victim unable to defend himself or run. Under People vs. Enriquez, Jr., treachery was not appreciated because the witnesses did not see how the attack commenced or how the events leading to death unfolded; they only saw events after the initial attack. At best, the prosecution proved abuse of superior strength and means to weaken the victim's defense, which would have qualified the killing if alleged, but could still support exemplary damages under People vs. Jugueta.
• Evident Premeditation: Article 248 lists evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Its elements are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. The CA erroneously appreciated evident premeditation. The eyewitness account failed to establish when the assailants decided to commit the offense and the lapse of sufficient time from such decision until the commission of the offense, necessary for them to reflect on their actions.
• Penalty and Damages: Under Article 249, Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the SC sentenced appellant to eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000 each under People vs. Jugueta. The presence of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and employing means to weaken the defense, though not alleged in the Information, warranted exemplary damages of P50,000 under People vs. Jugueta. Temperate damages of P50,000 were awarded under People vs. Racal. These amounts earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality until fully paid under Nacar vs. Gallery Frames.

• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might take. It requires (a) means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (b) deliberate or conscious adoption of those means. The SC did not appreciate treachery because the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the aggression or how the attack began and developed, even though the victim sustained 33 stab wounds.
• Evident Premeditation — Its elements are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision and execution enough to allow the accused to reflect on the consequences. The SC found no evident premeditation because the prosecution did not establish when the assailants decided to kill and the sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• Waiver of Defects in the Information — Under Section 9, Rule 110, the acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense and the circumstances. Failure to file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before arraignment waives objections to formal defects, including lack of particularity in attendant circumstances, as held in People vs. Solar.
• Positive Identification and Credibility — A credible eyewitness's positive identification, made under sufficient illumination and with no ill motive to implicate the accused, prevails over denial and alibi. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, and frightful experience; the witness's reaction after the incident does not necessarily destroy credibility.
• Abuse of Superior Strength and Means to Weaken Defense as Basis for Exemplary Damages — Even if not alleged in the Information, an aggravating circumstance proven during trial may support an award of exemplary damages under People vs. Jugueta. The SC found that the prosecution at best proved abuse of superior strength and means to weaken the victim's defense, which supported P50,000 exemplary damages.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law in Homicide — Absent qualifying circumstances, the killing is Homicide under Article 249, punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the SC fixed the minimum at eight years and one day of prision mayor and the maximum at fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take." — The SC used this definition before holding that treachery was not proven because the eyewitness did not see the commencement of the aggression.
• "There must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the victim's death began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery." — The SC applied this rule to reject treachery despite the 33 stab wounds.
• "The eyewitness account of the incident simply failed to establish when the assailants decided to commit the offense and the lapse of sufficient time from such decision until the commission of the offense, necessary for the assailants to have reflected on their actions." — The SC used this to reject evident premeditation.
• "At best, the prosecution merely proved that appellant and Cahusay took advantage of their superior strength and employed means to weaken the victim's defense - circumstances which would have qualified the killing to murder were they alleged in the Information." — The SC held these circumstances could not qualify the killing because they were not alleged, but they supported exemplary damages.

• People vs. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019 — Relied on for the rule that failure to file a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars before arraignment waives objections to formal defects in the Information, including lack of particularity in attendant circumstances.
• People vs. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019 — Relied on to reject treachery where the prosecution witnesses did not see how the attack commenced or how the events leading to the victim's death unfolded.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Relied on for the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, including exemplary damages for a proven aggravating circumstance not alleged in the Information.
• People vs. Racal, 817 Phil. 665 (2017) — Relied on for the award of temperate damages.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Relied on for the six percent (6%) interest per annum on monetary awards from finality until satisfaction.
• People vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. 220486, June 26, 2019 — Cited for the elements of Murder.
• People vs. Aquino, 396 Phil. 303 (2000) — Cited for the requisites of treachery.
• People vs. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 622 (2002) — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines Murder and lists qualifying circumstances, including treachery and evident premeditation. The SC applied it to determine whether the killing was qualified to Murder; it found no qualifying circumstance.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines Homicide and imposes reclusion temporal. The SC applied it after finding no qualifying circumstance, convicting appellant only of Homicide.
• Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires the acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense and circumstances. The SC applied it to the Information's failure to specify acts of treachery, but held the defect waived.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the Homicide sentence. The SC set the minimum at eight years and one day of prision mayor and the maximum at fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

• Justice Lopez (Concurring) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.