People vs. Toring, Berdon and Berdin

Incomplete defense of a relative may be appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance where unlawful aggression by the victim and lack of provocation by the defender are present, but the defender's motive is tainted by revenge or a running feud rather than pure compassion for the relative defended. Mere knowledge of the location of a crime weapon, without proof of active concealment to prevent its discovery, does not establish liability as an accessory under Article 19(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Luis Toring was the president of the "kwaknit gang," a group known for drunkenness and provoking trouble at social gatherings in sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City. Samuel Augusto, the victim, was the son of the barangay captain and described as a "power to be reckoned with" in the locality. A running feud existed between the Augusto and Toring families: in 1979, Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother, shot Toring with a .22 caliber revolver, and after the incident in question, Edgar also shot Toring's brother Arsenio. Diosdado Berdon resided approximately one kilometer from the dance venue, and Carmelo Berdin was a frequent visitor to Toring's house and familiar with where Toring hid his weapons.

On the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City, for the final canvassing of votes for candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. Samuel Augusto attended with his family because his daughter was one of the candidates. Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble, led by their president, Luis Toring. The gang members stood outside the dancing area, which was ringed by benches.

At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner. Beer and softdrinks had been served to the parents of the candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel Association, and Samuel was tipsy when he stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature. According to the prosecution, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Toring, Carmelo Berdin, and Diosdado Berdon proceed to a dark area while whispering to each other, after which Berdon handed a knife to Toring. Toring then approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand, and stabbed the right side of his abdomen. Upon seeing Felix running toward them, Toring pulled out the knife and fled with Berdin and Berdon toward the dark. Maria Catalina Sorono, who was six meters away, corroborated that Berdon and Berdin were poised to deliver fist blows on Samuel just before the stabbing, and that Berdon gave the knife to Toring. Samuel was taken to the Opon Emergency Hospital, where he died on arrival. The necropsy report attributed death to massive hemorrhage secondary to a stab wound that incised the inferior vena cava, penetrating approximately 15 centimeters deep.

The death weapon, a stainless steel kitchen knife with a red handle, was recovered from Toring's house. When police confronted Carmelo Berdin, he led them to the house, entered, and handed the weapon to the officers. An information for murder was filed against Toring and later amended to include Berdon and Berdin, charging conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation, and nighttime. All three pleaded not guilty.

Toring testified that Samuel, a known tough guy, approached his group, held Venir Ybañez by the collar, thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of Joel Escobia, and hit Ely Amion's chest with the barrel. Reacting to what he saw, Toring took his kitchen knife from his waist, approached Samuel from the right side, and stabbed him once, claiming he did not intend to kill. He fled, hid the knife at home, and surrendered to Philippine Constabulary soldiers at 2:00 p.m. on May 26, 1980. Carmelo Berdin, a 17-year-old described by the court as "lilliputian," admitted witnessing the stabbing but said he ran because he feared being shot; he corroborated that Toring hid the bloodied knife under a trunk and that he was familiar with the hiding place. Diosdado Berdon claimed he did not attend the dance due to trouble the previous night and offered an alibi that he was at his father-in-law's residence in barrio Andaliw Ronda, Cebu, for fifteen days. The lower court discredited Toring's claim of defense of a stranger, found Toring motivated by revenge due to the running feud, ruled out conspiracy, and convicted Toring as principal, Berdon as accomplice, and Berdin as accessory, appreciating treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime as aggravating.

• Defense of a Relative: Toring contended that his assault on Samuel was justified under Article 11(3) of the Revised Penal Code as defense of a relative, since he acted to defend his first cousin, Joel Escobia, whom Samuel had struck with the butt of a shotgun and at whom Samuel had pointed the loaded firearm.
• Berdon's Alibi: Berdon maintained that he did not attend the May 25 dance due to trouble the previous night and that he was at his father-in-law's residence in Andaliw Ronda, Cebu, for fifteen days, making it impossible for him to have supplied the knife to Toring.
• Berdin's Lack of Criminal Liability as Accessory: Berdin's defense rested on his assertion that he merely witnessed the stabbing and ran away out of fear, and that his knowledge of the knife's hiding place was incidental to his frequent visits to Toring's house rather than constituting concealment of the weapon.

• Defense of a Relative: Whether Toring's stabbing of Samuel Augusto was justified under Article 11(3) of the Revised Penal Code as defense of a relative, or whether mitigating circumstances should instead be appreciated.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery, conspiracy, evident premeditation, and nighttime were properly appreciated by the lower court.
• Berdon's Liability as Accomplice: Whether Diosdado Berdon's guilt as an accomplice was proven beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding his defense of alibi.
• Berdin's Liability as Accessory: Whether Carmelo Berdin's culpability as an accessory under Article 19(2) of the Revised Penal Code was established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Defense of a Relative: No, not as a complete justifying circumstance. Unlawful aggression by the victim was present, but Toring's motive was tainted by revenge arising from a running feud, precluding full justification; however, incomplete defense of a relative was appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was correctly appreciated as the qualifying circumstance. Conspiracy and evident premeditation were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Nighttime was deleted as an aggravating circumstance for lack of proof that it was purposely sought to insure commission of the crime or prevent its discovery.
• Berdon's Liability as Accomplice: Yes. Berdon's alibi was rejected for lack of physical impossibility and corroboration, and two prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the one who handed the knife to Toring, establishing his participation beyond reasonable doubt.
• Berdin's Liability as Accessory: No. Mere knowledge of the knife's hiding place did not constitute concealment under Article 19(2), and Berdin's willing retrieval and surrender of the weapon to the police was inconsistent with guilt.

• Defense of a Relative: Article 11(3) of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability one who acts in defense of relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided unlawful aggression exists and the person defending had no part in the provocation. Joel Escobia's sworn statement and testimony established that Samuel pointed a loaded shotgun at his chin and told him to "eat the bullet," constituting unlawful aggression. The prosecution failed to discredit Escobia's account or show any reason for him to prevaricate. However, Toring admitted that in 1979 he was shot by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother, and the record revealed a running feud between the Augusto and Toring camps. Toring could not be said to have been impelled by pure compassion or beneficence in attacking Samuel; rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment, or evil motive. Under these circumstances, full justification was unwarranted, as it would give free rein to lawlessness. Nonetheless, because unlawful aggression and lack of provocation by Toring were present but the requisite of motive born of lawful purpose was lacking, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative was appreciated under Article 13(1), together with the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was correctly appreciated because the suddenness of the assault from behind rendered Samuel helpless, even preventing him from using his shotgun. Conspiracy was not proven because there was no evidence of what the three accused were whispering about when seen by the barangay tanod, and no overt act showing a common design was established. Evident premeditation was not proven by any evidence. Nighttime was deleted as an aggravating circumstance because there was no proof it was purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or prevent its discovery, following the rule that nighttime is aggravating only when deliberately chosen or taken advantage of.
• Berdon's Liability as Accomplice: Berdon's alibi failed because his house was only a kilometer from the crime scene, a distance negotiable in minutes on foot, thus not establishing physical impossibility of presence. His alibi was also uncorroborated, resting solely on his own testimony and a self-exonerating affidavit. Two prosecution witnesses, Felix Berdin and Maria Catalina Sorono, positively identified Berdon as the one who handed the knife to Toring. Toring's own sworn statement likewise pointed to Berdon as the source of the weapon. Positive identification rendered motive immaterial. Berdon's participation as an accomplice was established under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, as he cooperated in the murder by supplying the death weapon, an act that was not indispensable to the commission of the crime but nonetheless facilitated it.
• Berdin's Liability as Accessory: Article 19(2) of the Revised Penal Code punishes as an accessory one who conceals or destroys the instruments or effects of a crime to prevent its discovery. The fact that Berdin knew where Toring hid the knife did not imply that he concealed it. Toring himself testified that after the stabbing he ran home and hid the weapon. Berdin's familiarity with the hiding place was explained by his frequent visits to Toring's house and Toring's practice of showing him where weapons were kept. Critically, Berdin readily acceded to the police's request to lead them to the knife, retrieved it, and surrendered it — conduct inconsistent with the intent to conceal. No proof of concealment was adduced, and accordingly, his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative (Article 13[1], Revised Penal Code) — Where some but not all requisites of defense of a relative are present — specifically, unlawful aggression by the victim and lack of provocation by the defender, but the defender's motive is tainted by revenge rather than pure compassion — the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is appreciated, reducing the penalty by one degree. The Court applied this by crediting Toring with the privilege despite finding his motive impure, because the objective requisites of unlawful aggression and lack of provocation were satisfied.
• Nighttime as an Aggravating Circumstance — Nighttime is aggravating only when it is purposely sought by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or to prevent its discovery. The Court deleted the lower court's appreciation of nighttime because no proof showed that the accused deliberately sought darkness or took advantage of it.
• Alibi Requires Physical Impossibility — For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate not merely that he was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The Court rejected Berdon's alibi because his residence was only one kilometer away, a distance easily traversed on foot in minutes.
• Positive Identification Renders Motive Immaterial — Where the accused is positively identified by credible witnesses as a participant in the crime, the prosecution need not prove motive. The Court applied this in sustaining Berdon's conviction despite the absence of established motive.
• Accessory Liability Under Article 19(2) Requires Proof of Concealment — Mere knowledge of the location of a crime instrument does not constitute concealment under Article 19(2). The prosecution must prove that the accused actively concealed or destroyed the instrument to prevent its discovery. The Court acquitted Berdin because his conduct — willingly leading police to the weapon and surrendering it — was inconsistent with concealment.

• "Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a 'running feud' between the Augusto and the Toring brothers." — This passage articulates the rationale for denying complete justification while appreciating incomplete defense of a relative, establishing that motive taints the justifying circumstance even where objective requisites are present.
• "There is no proof that it was purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or prevent its discovery." — This states the canonical formulation of the rule on nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, explaining why the Court deleted the lower court's appreciation of it.
• "The fact that he knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that he concealed it to prevent its discovery (Article 19 [2]). There simply is no proof to that effect." — This defines the boundary between mere knowledge and active concealment for purposes of accessory liability, the decisive ground for Berdin's acquittal.

• People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 419 — Cited for the proposition that while credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the lower court's province, the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether the lower court overlooked matters that may substantially affect the resolution of the case.
• People vs. Punzalan, G.R. No. 54562, August 6, 1987, 153 SCRA 1 — Cited in connection with the principle that a defender motivated by revenge, resentment, or evil motive cannot fully invoke defense of a relative.
• People vs. Beltran, L-38049, July 15, 1985, 137 SCRA 508 — Cited for the rule that nighttime is not aggravating absent proof that it was purposely sought to insure commission of the crime or prevent its discovery.
• People vs. Renejane, G.R. Nos. 76954-55, February 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 258 — Cited for the doctrine that alibi cannot be sustained absent proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.
• People vs. Santillan, G.R. No. 68331, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 534 — Cited for the proposition that a distance of one kilometer does not preclude the possibility of presence at the crime scene.
• People vs. Aquillano, G.R. No. 72318, April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 442 — Cited for the principle that motive becomes immaterial in the face of positive identification of the accused.

• Article 11(3), Revised Penal Code — Defines defense of relatives as a justifying circumstance, requiring unlawful aggression, lack of sufficient provocation by the defender, and, where provocation was given by the person attacked, that the defender had no part therein. Applied to assess Toring's claim of defense of his cousin Joel Escobia; found to be incomplete due to Toring's retaliatory motive.
• Article 13(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification, applicable when some but not all requisites of a justifying circumstance are present. Applied to reduce Toring's penalty by one degree.
• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as those who cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable. Applied to classify Berdon's act of supplying the knife as accomplice conduct.
• Article 19(2), Revised Penal Code — Defines accessories after the fact, including one who conceals or destroys the instruments of a crime to prevent its discovery. Applied to evaluate Berdin's liability; found inapplicable for lack of proof of concealment.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to death for murder. Applied as the base penalty, modified by the appreciated mitigating circumstances.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. Applied to determine Toring's imposable penalty.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to determine Berdon's penalty as accomplice.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalties imposed on Toring and Berdon.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., and Bidin, J., concurred. Feliciano, J., was on leave.