People vs. Tomotorgo

A person who commits a felony is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his act, even if the resulting crime is more serious than that intended; Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply where the unintended graver offense befalls the same intended victim, and the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is treated only as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3).

The accused, Jaime Tomotorgo, and the victim, Magdalena de los Santos, were husband and wife residing in Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Siruma, Camarines Sur. For several months prior to the incident, Magdalena had persistently urged her husband to sell their conjugal home and relocate to her parents’ house in Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Tomotorgo refused, as he did not want to abandon their house or the land he farmed with its plants and improvements. On June 23, 1977, after the accused returned from his farm, he discovered his wife and their three-month-old infant missing. He found them on a trail, carrying a bundle of clothes. When his entreaties that she return home failed and she threw the baby onto the grass upon his attempt to take the child, the accused flew into a rage, picked up a piece of wood, and beat his wife until she collapsed. She died shortly after despite his efforts to aid her. Tomotorgo surrendered to the authorities and brought the weapon used.

• The Marital Discord: Magdalena de los Santos, wife of the accused, had for several months before June 23, 1977, persistently asked her husband to sell their conjugal home in Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Siruma, Camarines Sur, and move the family to the house of her parents in Tinambac, Camarines Sur. The accused refused, as he did not want to abandon their house or the land he farmed, which had many plants and improvements. The location of the husband’s in-laws’ house was far from the municipality of Siruma where he worked.

• The Fatal Incident: On June 23, 1977, at about seven o’clock in the morning, the accused left for his farm. When he returned at about nine o’clock, his wife and their three-month-old infant were gone. He searched for them and eventually found his wife on a trail about two hundred meters from their home, carrying the infant and a bundle of clothes. The accused pleaded with her to return home with their child, but she adamantly refused. When he attempted to take the infant, the wife threw the baby onto a grassy portion of the trail, causing the child to cry. The accused became enraged. Acting under uncontrollable anger, he picked up a piece of wood nearby and repeatedly struck his wife until she fell to the ground, complaining of severe chest pains. Realizing what he had done, the accused carried his wife to their home, returned for the infant, and took the child home. Despite his efforts to alleviate her pain, Magdalena de los Santos died soon after.

• Surrender and Admission: After changing his wife’s dress, the accused reported the incident to the Barangay Captain, who accompanied him to a police officer to whom he surrendered. The accused brought with him the piece of wood he used to beat his wife.

• Trial Court Findings: At trial, the accused pleaded guilty. The trial court found him guilty of parricide and appreciated in his favor three mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender, a plea of guilty, and that he acted under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. No aggravating circumstance was present. The trial court imposed reclusion perpetua and recommended executive clemency after service of the minimum of the medium period of prision mayor.

• Applicability of Article 49: Petitioner argued that he intended to commit only physical injuries, not parricide, and that the felony actually committed carried a higher penalty than the one intended. Thus, he invoked Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, contending that the penalty for the intended offense (qualified physical injuries) should be imposed in its maximum period, which would be reclusion temporal in its maximum period — a divisible penalty.

• Penalty Computation: Petitioner maintained that the guilty plea was improvidently made and should not be considered, leaving only two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance. Under Article 64, paragraph 5, the penalty should then be lowered by one degree. With a divisible penalty thus applicable, petitioner claimed entitlement to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Inapplicability of Article 49: Respondent countered that Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply where the more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act, because under Article 4, paragraph 1, any person committing a felony is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act, regardless of his intent. The lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is at best a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 3. Moreover, Article 49 applies only when the crime committed is different from that intended and the felony committed befalls a different person.

• Correct Penalty: Respondent argued that parricide under Article 246 is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death — two indivisible penalties. As the commission of the offense was attended by mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. Being an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply.

• Article 49: Whether Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code applies where the accused intended to commit physical injuries but his acts caused the death of his wife, giving rise to the crime of parricide.

• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, and whether the accused is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Article 49: Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code was held inapplicable. Under Article 4, paragraph 1, any person committing a felony incurs criminal liability for all the direct and natural consequences of his felonious act, even if the wrongful act done be different from that intended. The accused’s lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as parricide is, at best, a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 3. Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended and the felony committed befalls a different person, as established in People v. Albuquerque. Since the fatal harm befell the same intended victim, the accused could not invoke Article 49 to reduce his liability from parricide to physical injuries.

• Penalty: The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death — two indivisible penalties. With three mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and passion or obfuscation) and no aggravating circumstance present, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. Because the penalty is indivisible, the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply. The trial court’s appreciation of the mitigating circumstances and its imposition of reclusion perpetua were in accordance with law and established jurisprudence.

• Liability for unintended consequences under Article 4 — A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act, even if the resulting crime is more serious than that intended. The lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong serves only as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code and does not alter the nature of the crime committed.

• Scope of Article 49 — Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for the penalty where the crime committed is different from that intended, applies only when the felony committed befalls a different person. It does not govern situations where the same intended victim suffers a more serious harm than the offender contemplated.

• Penalty for parricide with mitigating circumstances — When the law prescribes two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) for parricide and the commission of the offense is attended by mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Being an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law has no application.

• “Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because, under Article 4, par. I of the same Code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is, at best mitigating (Article 13, par. 3).”

• “Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150).”

• “As the commission of the act was attended by mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed.”

• People v. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150 — Relied upon as controlling authority for the proposition that Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code applies only when the felony committed befalls a different person, and not when the unintended graver harm is suffered by the same intended victim.

• People v. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651 — Cited as an analogous case where the accused choked his mother in a fit of anger and was convicted of parricide, with the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong treated as a mitigating circumstance.

• People v. Laureano, et al. , 71 Phil. 530; People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 697; People v. Belarmino, 91 Phil. 118 — Summarily invoked as jurisprudence supporting the rule that when mitigating circumstances are present without aggravating circumstances, the lesser of two indivisible penalties shall be imposed.

• Article 4, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The provision served as the basis for holding the accused liable for parricide despite his claim that he intended only to inflict physical injuries.

• Article 49, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty where the crime committed is different from that intended. The Court confined its application to cases where the unintended felony befalls a different person, thereby rendering it inapplicable to the present facts.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty structure determined the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the lesser of two indivisible penalties.

• Article 13, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — The lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is a mitigating circumstance. This provision was applied to mitigate the penalty but not to downgrade the offense.

• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Where two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed. The provision was discussed but not applied to lower the penalty because the prescribed penalty consisted of two indivisible penalties, and the lesser indivisible penalty was already imposed.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred.