People vs. Tiozon

The prosecution bears the burden of alleging and proving the absence of a license as an essential ingredient of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866; failure to do so bars conviction for that offense, notwithstanding that the killing itself may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Treachery cannot be appreciated where no witness saw the commencement or manner of the assault, and the mere fact that the fatal wound was located at the back of the victim does not, by itself, establish treachery.

The accused, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid, and the victim, Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, were compadres residing in Kalookan City. The case arose under Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalizes unlawful possession of firearms and imposes an increased penalty when homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The 1987 Constitution had abolished the death penalty, so the maximum penalty under the decree was reduced to reclusion perpetua. The accused was charged in a single information with illegal possession of a .38 caliber revolver with three live ammunitions, alleging that the firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting the victim, which caused his death.

At around 11:00 in the evening of February 24, 1989, Rosalina Bolima and her husband Leonardo were sleeping inside their house in Kalookan City when they were awakened by loud knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door and saw their compadre, Eutropio Tiozon, whom they called "Pareng Troping." Tiozon appeared to be very drunk. He was invited inside, sat down, and exchanged pleasantries with Leonardo. Rosalina saw Tiozon showing a gun to her husband, and the latter even toyed with it. Irritated by her husband's playing with the firearm, Rosalina took a few steps away. When she looked back, the two had already left the house. About five minutes later, she heard two successive gunshots. Shortly after, Tiozon came knocking at the door, telling her: "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya." Frightened by Tiozon's bloodstained appearance, Rosalina pushed him away and immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima. Together they proceeded to the house of the accused, where they found the victim lying face up. Rosalina felt some warmth on her husband's body and sought help to bring him to the hospital. Tiozon initially helped carry the victim toward the main road but then put him down, saying the victim was already dead. Rosalina pushed Tiozon away and, without his help, reached the main road where neighbors arrived with lights. Kalookan policemen then arrived, and Rosalina caused the arrest of Tiozon. She spent about P100,000.00 in connection with the wake and burial of her husband.

Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Kalookan Police Force testified that he responded to the reported shooting incident and found the lifeless body of the victim and the accused, whose clothing was full of bloodstains. The cadaver was referred to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory, while Tiozon was turned over to the Homicide Section. The following evening, upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam, Valencia and other policemen accompanied Tiozon in retrieving the firearm, which Tiozon had thrown into a grassy area at the back of his house. They recovered a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with serial number 180169, two spent bullets, and three live ammunitions. NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay examined the firearm and confirmed that the evidence shells were fired from the same gun. NBI Forensic Chemist Edwin Purificando conducted paraffin tests on both the deceased and the accused; both yielded negative results for the presence of nitrates, though Purificando testified that a person who fires a gun does not necessarily test positive for nitrates due to several factors.

Tiozon gave a different account. He testified that on his way home from work at about 11:30 in the evening, he passed by the house of the victim, who called him from inside. As he was about to enter, Leonardo poked a gun at him from behind the door. He grabbed the gun, and at that moment Rosalina emerged from her room and saw him holding it. He returned the gun to Leonardo, who tucked it in his waistline. He was served beer, and after consuming about two bottles, the two went out to buy more. Leonardo carried the beer and walked ahead; Tiozon stayed behind to answer the call of nature. While urinating, he heard two successive gunshots. He followed the victim and found him sprawled on the ground. He asked what happened, and Leonardo, gasping for breath, replied "Pare, binaril ako." Tiozon saw a gun near the body and picked it up, intending to bring it to the widow, but then feared the policemen might see him holding it and threw it into the grassy area. He ran to the victim's house to inform the wife, then returned to find the body gone — townspeople had carried it to the main road. He denied ever telling Rosalina that he accidentally shot her husband. The trial court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict, relying on the widow's testimony, Tiozon's being the last person seen with the victim, his retrieval of the gun, and the admission attributed to him, which it treated as part of the res gestae.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession with murder under Section 1 of P.D. 1866.
• Possession of the Gun: Petitioner maintained that he was not the one holding the gun immediately before the shooting, since the victim's wife herself admitted that her husband also "toyed or played with the gun."
• Last Person Seen with Victim: Petitioner argued that the wife's testimony that he was the last person seen with the victim was unreliable because she was left in the house when the victim and accused went out to a store about 145 to 150 meters away.
• Retrieval of the Gun: Petitioner contended that pointing out where the gun was recovered should not create an unfavorable inference that he purposely hid it; his act was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation rather than guilt.
• Res Gestae: Petitioner asserted that the wife's testimony about his alleged statement that he accidentally shot the victim should not have been considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae.
• Ownership of the Gun: Petitioner argued that the trial court's reasoning about the improbability of his testimony that the deceased owned the gun was baseless, since the deceased was walking ahead carrying a case of beer, making it possible for a third person to have grabbed the gun and shot him. He also noted that the paraffin test on his hands yielded negative results for nitrates.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The People, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the prosecution established the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and argued that the trial court's decision should be affirmed in toto.
• Last Person Seen with Victim: Respondent stressed that the accused himself admitted he and the victim went out together to buy beer and separated only when he had the urge to urinate seconds before the incident; the widow did not testify about what happened in the street but only that the two went out together and five minutes later she heard two shots.
• Hiding of the Gun: Respondent argued that the trial court's conclusion was based on the evidence on record, as the accused himself testified that he threw the gun into a grassy area.
• Improbability of Third-Party Theory: Respondent contended that the accused's theory that another person may have grabbed the gun from the victim was highly improbable, since the accused was behind the victim and could have seen a third person; he did not testify that he saw one.
• Paraffin Test: Respondent argued that the negative result of the paraffin test cannot be singled out to absolve the accused-appellant from liability.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused-appellant for the killing of the victim.
• Illegal Possession of Firearms: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had no license or authority to possess the firearm, an essential element of the offense under Section 1 of P.D. 1866.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly established to sustain a conviction for murder rather than homicide.
• Res Gestae: Whether the accused-appellant's statement to the victim's wife that he accidentally shot the victim was properly admitted as part of the res gestae.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The first through sixth circumstances found by the trial court were duly established and constitute an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other, shot and killed the victim.
• Illegal Possession of Firearms: No. The prosecution failed to present any evidence that the accused-appellant was not authorized to possess the firearm; the absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense that the prosecution must allege and prove, and the burden cannot be shifted to the accused.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be appreciated where no witness saw how the shooting was committed, and the mere location of the wound at the back of the victim does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery.
• Res Gestae: No. The statement was an oral confession by the accused-appellant, not part of the res gestae, since the witness testified on what the accused himself told her — not what an unavailable third party said — and the accused could be cross-examined on it.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Under Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with any other hypothesis. The trial court's first through sixth circumstances — the widow seeing the accused holding the gun before the incident, the accused being the last person with the victim, the accused having gone to the victim's house, the accused guiding policemen to the gun's location, the accused's admission to the widow, and the improbability of the accused's version — were all duly established and formed such an unbroken chain. The seventh circumstance was disregarded as haphazardly formulated due to a clerical error in the trial court's decision.

• Illegal Possession of Firearms: Section 1 of P.D. 1866 penalizes unlawful possession of firearms. The lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense. Under Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the burden of proof in criminal cases lies on the prosecution, and a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. The trial court erroneously shifted the burden to the accused to prove he had a license. Citing People vs. Pajenado, the Court reaffirmed that the prosecution must prove the negative averment of lack of license, at least prima facie, using the best evidence obtainable. Since the prosecution presented no evidence whatsoever on this point, conviction for illegal possession of firearms could not stand. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review, including errors not assigned by the parties, so the Court properly considered this issue notwithstanding the accused's failure to raise it in his brief.

• Treachery: Treachery requires that the offender employ means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its accomplishment without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. It cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Where no particulars are known as to how the aggression began or developed, treachery cannot be established from mere suppositions drawn from circumstances prior to the moment of aggression. In this case, no witness saw the commencement of the assault. The mere fact that the fatal wound was at the back of the victim does not compel a finding of treachery; the means, method, or form of attack must be shown to have been deliberately adopted by the assailant. Absent such proof, treachery could not be appreciated, and the accused could only be liable for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Res Gestae: The rule on res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 is an exception to the hearsay rule, applicable when a witness testifies to statements made by a person during a startling occurrence. The exception assumes the testimony is hearsay — i.e., the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. In this case, the widow testified to what the accused-appellant himself told her. The accused-appellant was available for cross-examination and in fact denied making the statement. His statement was therefore an oral confession, not part of the res gestae. Citing People vs. Tulagan, the Court held that a statement made by an accused to a witness, which the witness repeats in court, is an oral confession and not res gestae. Moreover, even if the testimony were hearsay, the accused was barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object at the time it was given.

• Burden of proving negative averment in illegal possession of firearms — The lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866. The prosecution must allege and prove this negative fact; the burden cannot be shifted to the accused. At minimum, the prosecution must establish a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit the accused of illegal possession, the prosecution having presented no evidence on the absence of a license.

• Circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction — Circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction when: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with any other hypothesis. The Court found the first through sixth circumstances established by the trial court satisfied this test.

• Treachery must be proved, not presumed — Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Where no witness saw the commencement or manner of the assault, treachery cannot be appreciated. The mere location of the wound at the back of the victim does not, by itself, establish treachery; the means, method, or form of attack must be shown to have been deliberately adopted by the assailant.

• Res gestae vs. oral confession — The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule applies only when the testimony is genuinely hearsay — i.e., the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination. A statement made by the accused himself to a witness, which the witness repeats in court, is an oral confession, not res gestae, because the accused can be cross-examined on it and can deny it.

• Appeal opens the whole case for review — An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review, including errors not assigned by the parties, and this includes review of the penalty, indemnity, and damages. The Court relied on this doctrine to consider the prosecution's failure to prove lack of a license even though the accused did not raise the issue in his brief.

• "There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a firearm." — This statement articulates the ratio decidendi for the acquittal on the illegal possession charge, establishing that the prosecution's failure to prove the negative averment of lack of license is fatal to a conviction under P.D. 1866.

• "The fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must be based on some positive proof and not merely an inference drawn more or less logically from hypothetical facts." — This passage defines the standard for proving treachery and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence for the principle that treachery requires positive proof of the manner of attack, not mere inference from wound location.

• "In the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented. Absent the quantum of evidence required to prove it, treachery cannot be considered against the accused-appellant." — This encapsulates the Court's ruling that treachery cannot be appreciated without direct evidence of how the killing was executed, directly resulting in the reduction of the conviction from murder to homicide.

• "The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code." — This clarifies the relationship between P.D. 1866 and the Revised Penal Code provisions on murder and homicide, establishing that the killing is not absorbed by the statutory offense and may be prosecuted separately.

• People vs. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970) — Controlling precedent on the burden of proving the negative averment of lack of license in illegal possession of firearms. The Court followed this case to hold that the prosecution, not the accused, bears the burden of proving the absence of a license as an essential ingredient of the offense.

• People vs. Domiguez, 24 SCRA 163 — Cited for the rule that double jeopardy cannot be invoked where two different laws define two crimes arising from the same facts, if each crime involves some act not essential to the other. Applied to explain that illegal possession under P.D. 1866 and murder/homicide under the RPC are distinct offenses that may be separately prosecuted.

• People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621 — Cited in support of the same double jeopardy principle, illustrating that a single act may offend two different provisions of law and conviction or acquittal under one does not bar prosecution under the other.

• People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 — Cited for the doctrine that the location of fatal wounds at the back of the victim does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery, and that treachery must be based on positive proof of deliberate adoption of the means or method of attack.

• People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107 — Cited for the distinction between res gestae and oral confession, holding that a statement made by an accused to a witness and repeated in court is an oral confession, not part of the res gestae.

• People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702 — Cited for the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review, including errors not made the subject of assignments of error.

• U.S. vs. Perdon, 4 Phil. 141 — Cited for the principle that where no particulars are known as to how the aggression began or developed, treachery cannot be established from mere suppositions drawn from circumstances prior to the moment of aggression.

• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Penalizes unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms or ammunition with reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, and imposes the death penalty (reduced to reclusion perpetua after the 1987 Constitution) if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The Court held that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense that the prosecution must allege and prove.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal. The Court convicted the accused under this article, having found that treachery was not proven and thus the killing could not be qualified as murder.

• Article 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The Court held that treachery was not established because no witness saw how the shooting was committed and the mere location of the wound at the back did not suffice.

• Section 5, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Sets forth the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction: more than one circumstance, proven facts from which inferences are derived, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found these requisites satisfied as to the killing but not as to illegal possession.

• Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — Defines statements as part of the res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the accused's statement to the widow was an oral confession, not hearsay.

• Section 2, Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that in criminal cases the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if it is an essential ingredient of the offense. Applied to require the prosecution to prove the absence of a license.

• Section 4, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court — Allows conviction for a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The Court relied on this provision to convict the accused of homicide, a lesser offense than murder, under the information.

• Section 19(l), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Abolished the death penalty, reducing the maximum penalty under P.D. 1866 to reclusion perpetua.

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concurred.