People vs. Ting

A judgment of acquittal rendered upon a demurrer to evidence may no longer be reviewed or reversed on appeal, even if the lower court erred in its appreciation of the facts or interpretation of the law, absent a showing that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

Respondents Randolph S. Ting and Salvacion I. Garcia were the City Mayor and City Treasurer of Tuguegarao City in 2004. They were charged under Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code for issuing a treasury warrant during the 45-day election ban period as payment for land to be used as a public cemetery. The prohibition under Section 261(w)(b) penalizes any person who issues, uses, or avails of treasury warrants or similar devices undertaking future delivery of money chargeable against public funds within the prohibited period.

In 2004, Randolph S. Ting, as City Mayor of Tuguegarao City, and Salvacion I. Garcia, as City Treasurer, entered into a contract of sale with Dr. Anselmo D. Almazan, Angelo A. Almazan, and Anselmo A. Almazan III for the purchase of two parcels of land to be used as a public cemetery. The purchase price was P8,486,027.00. As payment, Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated April 30, 2004, which falls within the 45-day election ban period preceding the May 10, 2004 elections. On May 5, 2004, the City Government caused the registration of the sale and the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in its name. The dorsal side of the treasury warrant bears the date "May 18, 2004" as the date of payment annotated by the drawee bank.

A complaint was initially filed against the respondents for violation of Section 261(v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code, but the COMELEC dismissed it, finding that the issuance was not for public works. In Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, et al., the Supreme Court set aside the COMELEC's resolution and ordered the filing of the appropriate criminal information, finding probable cause that Section 261(w) was violated. Consequently, an Information was filed against the respondents. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty. At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated to the execution of the contract of sale, the issuance of the treasury warrant, and the registration of the sale.

After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its evidence, the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence. The RTC granted the demurrer and acquitted the respondents, holding that the date on the instrument is not necessarily the date of issue under the Negotiable Instruments Law and that the prosecution failed to prove delivery within the prohibited period. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, adding that the issuance of a check is not payment until encashed, which occurred on May 18, 2004, beyond the prohibited period. The OSG then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts erred in applying the Negotiable Instruments Law instead of the Omnibus Election Code.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that it duly established beyond reasonable doubt that respondents violated Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, and the RTC had no clear legal and factual basis to grant the demurrer to evidence.
• Statutory Construction of "Issue": Petitioner maintained that the term "issues" in Section 261(w)(b) should not be construed in its restricted sense under the Negotiable Instruments Law, but in its general meaning to give, send, or deliver, in keeping with the intent of the law penalizing those who "issues, uses or avails" of treasury warrants.
• Evidentiary Value of Notarization: Petitioner argued that the notarization of the deed of sale on May 5, 2004, within the prohibited period, evidenced the formal execution of the deed and the receipt of the treasury warrant by the sellers on or before that date.

• Propriety of Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the RTC erred in granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the respondents.
• Statutory Construction of "Issue": Whether the term "issues" in Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code should be construed under the Negotiable Instruments Law or in its general meaning.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the petition may be granted without violating the respondents' right against double jeopardy.

• Propriety of Demurrer to Evidence: No. The RTC should not have granted the demurrer to evidence because the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established a violation of Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Statutory Construction of "Issue": Yes. The term "issues" should be construed in its general meaning to give, send, or deliver, not in the restricted sense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, as the Omnibus Election Code penalizes a person who "issues, uses or avails" of treasury warrants.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The petition must be denied because the RTC's grant of the demurrer to evidence is a judgment of acquittal, and absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, its reversal would violate the right against double jeopardy.

• Propriety of Demurrer to Evidence: The elements of the offense under Section 261(w)(b) were satisfied: the treasury warrant was dated April 30, 2004, within the 45-day election ban, and was chargeable against public funds. The warrant is deemed prima facie to have been drawn and made on said date, and delivery naturally precedes acceptance. Furthermore, the deed of sale was notarized on May 5, 2004, which is evidence of its execution and the receipt of the treasury warrant on or before that date. Actual payment or encashment on May 18, 2004, is not an element of the offense, which penalizes the issuance, use, or availment of the device undertaking future delivery.
• Statutory Construction of "Issue": The issue does not concern the negotiability of the instrument but the violation of an election offense. The Omnibus Election Code penalizes a person who "issues, uses or avails" of treasury warrants. Under statutory construction, where a general word follows an enumeration of specific words of the same class, the general word includes things of the same class. Thus, "issues" should be construed in its general meaning to give, send, or deliver, not strictly under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
• Double Jeopardy: The elements of double jeopardy are present: a valid information, a court of competent jurisdiction, a plea of not guilty, and an acquittal based on a demurrer to evidence. While an acquittal via demurrer may be reviewed via certiorari under Rule 65, it cannot be reviewed via Rule 45, and even under certiorari, it can only be reversed if the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or denied due process. Here, the RTC gave the prosecution ample opportunity to present its case. Any error in the RTC's appreciation of evidence or interpretation of law is a mere error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, and cannot be corrected without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional right against double jeopardy protects an accused who has been acquitted from being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It attaches when there is a valid information, a court of competent jurisdiction, a plea, and an acquittal or dismissal without the accused's consent. An acquittal based on a demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal, barring any appeal or review that would place the accused in double jeopardy.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion Exception to Double Jeopardy — An acquittal may be reviewed only when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as when the prosecution was denied the opportunity to make its case or the trial was a sham. Mere errors of judgment in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law do not constitute grave abuse of discretion and will not defeat a plea of double jeopardy.
• Ejusdem Generis / Statutory Construction of "Issue" — Where a general word follows an enumeration of particular specific words of the same class, the general word is construed to include things of the same class as those specifically mentioned. The term "issues" in Section 261(w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, which penalizes a person who "issues, uses or avails" of treasury warrants, should be construed in its general meaning to give, send, or deliver, rather than in the restricted sense of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

• "Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double Jeopardy." — This passage states the controlling rule on the finality of an acquittal based on a demurrer to evidence.
• "To the Court, this is more in keeping with the intent of the law for basic statutory construction provides that where a general word follows an enumeration of a particular specific word of the same class, the general word is to be construed to include things of the same class as those specifically mentioned." — This explains the ratio decidendi for interpreting the term "issues" in the Omnibus Election Code broadly, rather than strictly under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
• "Indeed, errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of autrefois acquit." — This encapsulates the principle that mere errors of judgment do not constitute grave abuse of discretion sufficient to overcome the bar of double jeopardy.

• Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, et al. — Set aside the COMELEC's dismissal of the complaint and ordered the filing of the criminal information, finding probable cause that Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code was violated.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. — Explained that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and is reviewable only through certiorari under Rule 65, and the CA's ruling thereon is reviewable by the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
• Asistio vs. People, et al. — Ruled that decisions of the CA may be appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45, as a continuation of the appellate process.
• Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan — Cited for the elements of double jeopardy and the exceptions when a dismissal is considered final.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (2012) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion in the context of reviewing an acquittal.

• Section 261(w)(b), Batas Pambansa Bilang R81 (Omnibus Election Code) — Prohibits the issuance, use, or availment of treasury warrants or similar devices undertaking future delivery of money chargeable against public funds during the 45-day period preceding a regular election. The Court interpreted "issues" broadly and found that the offense is committed upon issuance, use, or availment within the prohibited period, regardless of actual encashment.
• Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Protects the right against double jeopardy, providing that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
• Section 191, Negotiable Instruments Law — Defines "issue" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. The Court held this definition inapplicable to the election offense.
• Section 23, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence — Provides that public documents are evidence of the facts giving rise to their execution and the date of execution. Applied to the notarized deed of sale to establish the date of execution.

Del Castillo, Leonen, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.