People vs. Terrado

When an act is punishable both as falsification of public documents under the Revised Penal Code and as perjury under a special law, and the special law carries a lighter penalty, the prescriptive period of the lesser offense must be applied in favor of the accused, and if that period has lapsed, the criminal action must be dismissed.

The accused—Mariano Terrado, Remedios Gundran, and Gertrudes Obo—were applicants for free patents over parcels of land in Barrio Paculago, Ragay, Camarines Sur, allegedly forest land and therefore not disposable. Pedro Terrado was a licensed private land surveyor, Casimiro Flores a public land inspector of the Bureau of Lands, and Bruno Gundran the District Land Officer of District No. 10 of the Bureau of Lands. The charges arose from the alleged preparation and submission of false documents—free patent applications, notices, final inspection reports, and indorsements—representing that the applicants possessed the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements for free patents. The legal framework included Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (falsification of public documents), Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (perjury for false statements in public land applications), and Act No. 3326, as amended (prescriptive periods for violations of special laws).

In November 1951 and May 1952, Gertrudes Obo, Remedios Gundran, and Mariano Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Barrio Paculago, Ragay, Camarines Sur, each containing more than 23 hectares, identified as Lots 7, 8, and 9 of Plan Psu-125902, respectively. The land was allegedly forest land and therefore not disposable.

On March 13, 1962, the three applicants were charged before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in three separate informations for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7613, 7614, and 7615. They were charged together with Pedro Terrado, a licensed private land surveyor; Casimiro Flores, a public land inspector of the Bureau of Lands; and Bruno Gundran, the District Land Officer of District No. 10 of the Bureau of Lands. The informations alleged that the accused conspired and cooperated through false and fraudulent misrepresentations in preparing or causing the preparation of documents containing false narrations of facts—specifically, the applications for free patent, notices of application for free patent, final inspection reports, and first indorsements of District Land Officer Bruno Gundran—wherein they made it appear that the applicants possessed all necessary qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements for free patents, when in truth they had not. The informations further alleged that Casimiro Flores and Bruno Gundran took advantage of their respective official positions.

Before arraignment, the defendants filed separate motions to quash the informations on the ground that the crimes charged did not constitute falsification of public documents and that the offenses had already prescribed. After proper hearing, the trial court dismissed the informations on April 15, 1963, ruling that the crimes committed were either perjury under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or offenses relating to unlawful occupation and destruction of public forest under Section 2751 of the Revised Administrative Code, and that they had prescribed. The Solicitor General appealed, maintaining that the facts charged constituted falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code and that the criminal actions had not yet prescribed.

The offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953 (Criminal Case No. 7613); from May 28, 1952 to August 18, 1952 (Criminal Case No. 7614); and from November 16, 1951 to February 21, 1952 (Criminal Case No. 7615). The informations were filed only on March 13, 1962, more than eight years after the offenses were allegedly committed.

• Classification of the Offense: The Solicitor General maintained that the facts charged in the informations constituted the crime of falsification of public documents defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, not perjury or offenses relating to unlawful occupation of public forest.
• Prescription: The appellant argued that the criminal actions had not yet prescribed, since falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty that prescribes in fifteen years under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, and the informations were filed well within that period.

• Motion to Quash: The defendants-appellees filed motions to quash the informations on the ground that the crimes charged did not constitute the offense of falsification of public documents and that the offenses had already prescribed.

• Proper Classification of the Offense: Whether the acts charged in the informations constitute falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, or perjury under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or offenses relating to unlawful occupation and destruction of public forest under Section 2751 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Prescription: Whether the criminal actions had already prescribed, and which prescriptive period should apply.

• Proper Classification of the Offense: The acts charged, while sufficient to allege falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, are also punishable as perjury under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which penalizes the presentation of false applications, declarations, evidence, or affidavits in support of any petition or claim respecting lands of the public domain.
• Prescription: Yes, the offenses had prescribed. Applying the prescriptive period for perjury as a violation of a special law under Act No. 3326—eight years—the informations filed on March 13, 1962 were filed beyond the prescriptive period, as the offenses were committed more than eight years prior.

• Proper Classification of the Offense: The informations sufficiently alleged the commission of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the same acts—preparing and submitting false affidavits and documents in support of free patent applications over public land—also fall within the scope of Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which expressly punishes as perjury any person who presents or causes to be presented, or cooperates in the presentation of, any false application, declaration, or evidence, or makes or causes to be made or cooperates in the making of a false affidavit in support of any petition, claim, or objection respecting lands of the public domain. The Court thus recognized that the conduct charged was punishable under both the Revised Penal Code and a special law, with the special law carrying a lighter penalty.

• Prescription: Falsification of public documents under Article 171 is punishable by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00; prision mayor is an afflictive penalty prescribing in fifteen years under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Perjury under Article 183, on the other hand, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period—four months and one day to two years and four months—a correctional penalty that prescribes in ten years under Article 90. However, because perjury under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a violation of a special law, Act No. 3326, as amended, governs the prescriptive period: offenses punished by imprisonment for two years or more but less than six years prescribe after eight years. The maximum imposable penalty for perjury (two years and four months) falls within this category, yielding an eight-year prescriptive period. The Court applied the established rule that penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural, are strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Since the application of Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and Act No. 3326 was more favorable to the accused, those provisions were applied. The offenses were committed between November 1951 and February 1953, and the informations were filed only on March 13, 1962—more than eight years later. The lower court therefore correctly ruled that the crimes had prescribed.

• Strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused — Penal statutes, whether substantive or remedial/procedural, must be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. When an act is punishable under both the Revised Penal Code and a special law, and the special law provides a lighter penalty with a shorter prescriptive period, the provisions more favorable to the accused must be applied. The Court relied on this principle to apply the prescriptive period for perjury under Act No. 3326 (eight years) rather than that for falsification under the Revised Penal Code (fifteen years).

• Prescriptive periods under Act No. 3326 for violations of special laws — Act No. 3326, as amended by Acts Nos. 3585 and 3763, provides graduated prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special laws: (a) one year for offenses punished only by fine or imprisonment not exceeding one month; (b) four years for imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years; (c) eight years for imprisonment of two years or more but less than six years; and (d) twelve years for imprisonment of six years or more, except treason which prescribes after twenty years. Perjury under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, punishable by four months and one day to two years and four months, falls under category (c), prescribing after eight years.

• "Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that determined the outcome: when two penalties are available for the same act, the one more favorable to the accused governs prescription.

• "As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326, as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same should be applied." — This is the operative application of the strict-construction doctrine to the facts, selecting the special-law prescriptive period over the RPC period.

• People vs. Elkanish, 90 Phil. 53 — Cited as authority for the rule that penal statutes are strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. — Cited jointly with People vs. Elkanish for the same strict-construction principle.

• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes falsification of public documents, punishable by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00. The informations were charged under this provision, but the Court held that the lighter penalty for perjury should govern prescription.
• Article 183, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes perjury, punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (four months and one day to two years and four months). This penalty determined the applicable prescriptive period under Act No. 3326.
• Article 25, Revised Penal Code — Classifies penalties by nature; prision mayor is afflictive, while arresto mayor and prision correccional are correctional.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Sets prescriptive periods based on the nature of the penalty: afflictive penalties prescribe in fifteen years; correctional penalties in ten years.
• Section 129, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Punishes as perjury the presentation or making of false applications, declarations, evidence, or affidavits in support of any petition, claim, or objection respecting lands of the public domain. The Court held that the acts charged fell within this provision.
• Act No. 3326, as amended by Acts Nos. 3585 and 3763 — Governs prescriptive periods for violations of special laws. Under category (c), offenses punished by imprisonment of two years or more but less than six years prescribe after eight years; this was applied to the perjury charge under Section 129 of CA 141.

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concurred.

• Aquino, J. — Justice Aquino dissented, arguing that perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is a correctional penalty prescribing in ten years under Article 90 of the Code, and that this ten-year period—not the eight-year period under Act No. 3326—should govern. Under his view, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7613 and 7614, filed on March 13, 1962, were filed within the ten-year prescriptive period (the offenses having been committed from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, and from May 28 to August 18, 1952, respectively), and only the crime in Criminal Case No. 7615 (committed from November 16, 1951 to February 21, 1952) had prescribed.