People vs. Temblor

The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor, and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal. For an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor, also known as "Ronald," was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the shooting death of Julius Cagampang. The accused and his companion were admittedly members of the New People's Army (NPA), and the trial court opined that the accused's knowledge that the victim possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him, as killings perpetrated by NPA members for the purpose of acquiring arms and ammunition were prevalent in the region.

At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang, his wife Victorina, and their two children were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. The accused Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. Victorina, upon seeing her husband shot, shouted his name "Jul." Two persons, one of whom she later identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the main door and demanded that she bring out her husband's firearm, shouting "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!"). The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the suitcase where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver and fled.

In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by Station Commander Milan, where she saw and identified the accused as the man who killed her husband. The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the NPA, were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members-followers of the New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.

The accused's defense was alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan" until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980. The accused capitalized on the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name, allegedly rendering the identification insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the store, which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt fluorescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness, a tricycle driver named Claudio Sabanal, a long-time acquaintance of the accused who knew him as "Ronald." Sabanal saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1980, heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering away. Dr. Alfredo Salonga, who issued the post-mortem examination report, certified that the victim sustained three gunshot wounds.

Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga, and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol, showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal evidence.

• Positive Identification: The appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang, capitalizing on the fact that the victim's widow did not know him by name.
• Defense of Alibi: The appellant alleged that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of alibi, as he claimed to have been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980 until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the respondent-appellee beyond the prosecution's evidence presented at trial.

• Positive Identification: Whether the accused was positively identified as the killer of Julius Cagampang.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the accused's defense of alibi.

• Positive Identification: Yes. The accused was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, and the trial court's assessment of their credibility, being supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal.
• Defense of Alibi: No. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, as it was not demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.

• Positive Identification: The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor, and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal. The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and her testimony was corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony was credible, probable, and entirely in accord with human experience. The accused was positively identified by the widow who recognized him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the store, which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt fluorescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by Claudio Sabanal, a tricycle driver and long-time acquaintance of the accused who knew him as "Ronald."
• Defense of Alibi: The appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. The rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here, it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively identified him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi. Furthermore, the accused's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected, as the trial court opined that the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him, given the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified. The records further showed that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm, and their flight was an implied admission of guilt.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor, and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal. Minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony do not diminish credibility where the witness positively identified the accused and the testimony is corroborated by other witnesses.
• Defense of Alibi — For an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. A self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse the accused.
• Flight as Implied Admission of Guilt — The flight of the accused and his companion after the commission of the crime, hiding in the mountains, was an implied admission of guilt.
• Motive — Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified.

• "The settled rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on appellate review of trial court credibility findings, which formed the basis for affirming the conviction.
• "Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the defense of alibi and its requirement of physical impossibility, which is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime." — This passage explains why the alibi defense failed against the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses.

• People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is generally binding on the appellate court.
• People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232 — Cited in support of the rule that the testimony of witnesses who positively identified the accused could not be overcome by the defense of alibi.
• People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258 — Cited in support of the rule on the defense of alibi and the requirement of physical impossibility.
• People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615 — Cited for the rule that proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified.
• People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325 — Cited for the rule that flight is an implied admission of guilt.
• People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422 — Cited for the rule that flight is an implied admission of guilt.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder, under which the accused was charged and convicted for the killing of Julius Cagampang with treachery and intent to kill.
• Articles 41 and 42, Revised Penal Code — The provisions on the accessory penalties of reclusion perpetua, which were imposed upon the accused-appellant in addition to the principal penalty.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.