People vs. Tejada

A qualifying circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; absent such allegation, or where the relationship does not fall within the third civil degree, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape.

Charisse Mendoza, born May 19, 1982, frequently stayed at her paternal grandmother's house in Barangay Quibaol, Lingayen, Pangasinan, where her cousin Sandra Tejada and Sandra's husband, PO1 Allan Tejada, also resided. On April 3, 1995, and May 16, 1995, while Charisse slept in the sala, Allan raped her, using his superior strength and threatening to shoot her and her father if she reported the incidents. The abuse resulted in pregnancy, discovered via ultrasound in October 1995, prompting Charisse to reveal Allan as the father.

• The Parties: Charisse Mendoza, a 12-year-old girl, stayed at her grandmother's house where her cousin Sandra and Sandra's husband, PO1 Allan Tejada, lived.
• First Rape (April 3, 1995): Charisse slept on a sofa on the ground floor. Allan arrived home late. At dawn, he pinned her legs, held her hands, covered her mouth, threatened to shoot her and her father, removed their clothes, and had sexual intercourse with her against her will.
• Second Rape (May 16, 1995): Charisse and her siblings slept at the house. At dawn, Allan pulled her blanket, held her hands, covered her mouth, threatened her, and raped her again.
• Discovery: In October 1995, an ultrasound revealed Charisse was 20 weeks pregnant. She identified Allan as the father. She gave birth to a boy on February 23, 1996.
• Defense Version: Tejada admitted sexual contact but claimed a "sweetheart" relationship, asserting Charisse initiated the acts. He also claimed alibi, stating he was stationed in Ilocos Norte in April and Ilocos Sur in May, corroborated by his wife and military superiors.

• Credibility of Complainant: Petitioner argued that material contradictions between Charisse's court testimony (raped twice in April and May) and her sworn statement (raped once in June) discredit her and indicate deliberate distortion of facts.
• Alibi: Petitioner maintained that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of alibi, which was supported by official military records and the testimonies of his platoon leaders.
• Imposition of the Death Penalty: Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.

• Credibility of Testimony: Respondent countered that discrepancies in dates are inconsequential since the date of rape is not an essential element, and affidavits are often incomplete or inaccurate due to the affiant's nervousness and lack of searching inquiries by investigators.
• Rejection of Alibi: Respondent argued that the alibi was uncorroborated by impartial witnesses—only his wife confirmed his presence—and it was not physically impossible for him to travel from his assigned stations to the crime scene.
• Upholding the Conviction: Respondent pressed that the victim's candid and straightforward testimony, coupled with the medical evidence of pregnancy, sufficiently proved the commission of rape.

• Credibility of Testimony: Whether discrepancies between the complainant's sworn statement and her court testimony discredit her accusation of rape.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi prevails over the positive identification by the victim.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed given the failure to allege PNP membership as a qualifying circumstance and the degree of relationship between the parties.

• Credibility of Testimony: Discrepancies between an affidavit and open court testimony do not necessarily discredit a witness, especially since affidavits are often incomplete and taken under less than ideal circumstances; the exact date of rape is not an essential element of the crime.
• Alibi: Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the victim, especially where it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene and the alibi is corroborated only by his wife.
• Qualifying Circumstances: The death penalty was improperly imposed because the qualifying circumstances were either legally insufficient or procedurally deficient; the relationship of cousins-in-law is within the fourth civil degree, which does not satisfy the third-degree requirement of R.A. 7659, and the PNP membership was not specifically alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance, violating the accused's right to be informed of the charge.

• Right to be Informed of the Charge — A qualifying circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; absent such allegation, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape, as convicting of qualified rape when charged with simple rape would be a prosecution without a valid accusation and a denial of due process.
• Superiority of Open Court Testimony over Affidavits — Inconsistencies between testimony in open court and sworn statements do not necessarily discredit a witness, as ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete or inaccurate due to the lack of searching inquiries by investigating officers and the affiant's mental state at the time of execution.
• Weakness of Alibi Corroborated by Relatives — Where an accused's alibi can only be confirmed by relatives, the denial of culpability deserves scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accused.

• "To charge appellant with rape in one of its simple forms and then try and convict him of rape in one of its qualified forms would be a prosecution without a valid accusation."
• "It is a settled doctrine that discrepancies in the testimony of a complainant regarding the exact dates she was allegedly raped are inconsequential since the date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape, what is material being the occurrence of the rape, not the time of the commission thereof."

• People vs. De la Cuesta, 304 SCRA 83 (1999) — Followed. Held that a qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information; otherwise, it cannot be appreciated to impose the death penalty.
• People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 — Followed. Cited for the principle that the fact of relationship must be alleged in the information to qualify the rape.
• People vs. Brandares, 311 SCRA 159 (1999) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that when a minor says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659 — Defines rape and imposes the death penalty when committed with attendant circumstances, such as when the victim is under 18 and the offender is a relative within the third civil degree, or when committed by a member of the PNP. Applied to determine that the relationship of cousins-in-law (4th degree) did not qualify, and the PNP membership was not properly alleged.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.