People vs. Tayaba

An attempted crime exists when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts that logically lead to a definite crime, which is not attained by reason of a cause or accident other than the actor’s own spontaneous desistance; acts that are merely the means to rape, persisted in after unjust vexation would already have been consummated, constitute attempted rape when defeated by an extraneous cause.

Jose Tayaba, a young man 17 years of age, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for attempted rape. The offended party was a married woman who was alone in her house on the night of the incident. According to the uncontradicted evidence recited in the appealed judgment, between 9 and 10 o’clock that night, Tayaba entered the house and placed himself on top of the woman while she was asleep. Upon waking up, she immediately cried for help, and Tayaba, holding her right shoulder with his left hand, threatened her if she did not keep quiet.

As she continued to shout and offer resistance, Tayaba possibly touched her with his knife, inflicting slight injuries upon her body. The chemise and dress she wore were torn in the fore part of the neck. Attracted by her cries, her neighbor Pedro Martinez came to her rescue; upon entering the house, Martinez recognized Tayaba in his under-garments. Upon noticing Martinez, Tayaba hastily left the house and ran away. The defense presented no evidence.

At trial, the offended party testified that Tayaba “tried to raise the flap of her dress,” while the appealed judgment stated that he “raised the offended party’s dress.” When Martinez arrived and asked what happened, the offended party answered that Tayaba wanted to rape her; Tayaba remained silent and hastily left the house.

• Factual Discrepancy on Raising Dress: Appellant Jose Tayaba argued that the appealed judgment erred in affirming that he “raised the offended party’s dress” when the complainant’s testimony was only that he “tried to raise the flap of her dress.”
• Unjust Vexation, Not Attempted Rape: Appellant contended that the series of acts committed by him did not constitute attempted rape and amounted, at most, to unjust vexation.

• Factual Discrepancy: Whether the variance between the judgment’s statement that the accused “raised the offended party’s dress” and the testimony that he “tried to raise the flap of her dress” alters the juridical qualification of the crime.
• Attempted Rape vs. Unjust Vexation: Whether the series of acts committed by the accused constituted attempted rape rather than unjust vexation.

• Factual Discrepancy: No. The discrepancy does not alter the juridical qualification; an attempted crime exists when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts that logically lead to a definite crime, not attained by a cause other than spontaneous desistance.
• Attempted Rape vs. Unjust Vexation: Attempted rape. The acts transcended unjust vexation and were means to ravish the complainant through force and intimidation; the attempt was defeated by the neighbor’s timely arrival, an extraneous cause.

• Factual Discrepancy: The SC acknowledged the discrepancy between the appealed judgment’s statement that Tayaba “raised the offended party’s dress” and the complainant’s testimony that he “tried to raise the flap of her dress.” It held that the discrepancy did not alter the juridical qualification. If the accused committed rape because he raised the dress, he would not cease to be guilty merely because the evidence showed that he tried to raise it. Under the Code, an attempted crime exists when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts, without the necessity of their arriving at a more or less advanced stage, provided the commencement logically leads to the commission of a definite crime not attained by reason of some cause or accident other than the actor’s own spontaneous desistance. The SC therefore found no merit in the assignment of error.
• Attempted Rape vs. Unjust Vexation: The SC rejected the contention that the acts constituted at most unjust vexation. Unjust vexation is a consummated crime in which the acts performed constitute the very end pursued by the actor; attempted rape is merely an attempted crime in which the acts are means to an end the actor seeks to attain. In unjust vexation nothing is left for the actor to do; in attempted rape the actor continues to advance through adequate processes of action to attain his final objective but fails not by voluntary desistance but by an extraneous cause. Had Tayaba abandoned his design after the acts, the crime would have been unjust vexation. But he persisted, and his purpose could not have been to vex the complainant because that objective was already attained; his acts could not lead to any other end than to ravish her through force and intimidation. His attempt was defeated by the timely arrival of Pedro Martinez, who came to the complainant’s rescue upon hearing her cries. The SC also inferred intent to rape from Tayaba’s silence when the complainant told Martinez that Tayaba wanted to rape her, and from his hasty departure; if the imputation were false, he should have protested. The SC found the facts similar to United States vs. Garcia, where the accused was convicted of attempted rape after entering a married woman’s house at night, using violence, and persisting despite resistance until assistance arrived. Finally, the SC held that an essential condition of an attempted crime is that the overt acts constituting it lead directly, with constant intent, to the commission of another act punishable by law, and that Tayaba’s overt acts were of that nature and extent.

• Attempted Crime — An attempted crime exists when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts, without the necessity of their arriving at a more or less advanced stage, provided the commencement of execution logically leads to the commission of a definite crime that is not attained by reason of some cause or accident other than the actor’s own spontaneous desistance. The SC applied this to Tayaba’s acts of entering on top of the complainant, threatening and injuring her, and persisting until a neighbor rescued her, holding him guilty of attempted rape.
• Unjust Vexation vs. Attempted Rape — Unjust vexation is a consummated crime in which the acts performed constitute the very end pursued by the actor; attempted rape is an attempted crime in which the acts are merely means to an end the actor seeks to attain. If the actor abandons his design after the acts, the crime is unjust vexation; if he persists toward rape and fails only because of an extraneous cause, the crime is attempted rape. The SC applied this distinction because Tayaba persisted after the point of vexation and was stopped by the neighbor’s arrival.
• Intent in Attempted Rape — Intent to rape may be inferred from the accused’s overt acts and from his silence when the complainant, in his presence, told a rescuer that he wanted to rape her, followed by his hasty departure. The SC used Tayaba’s silence and flight, together with his prior acts, to conclude that he intended to ravish the complainant.

• “In order that an attempted crime may exist, it is sufficient, according to the Code that 'the offender commences the commission thereof directly by overt acts', without the necessity of their arriving at a more or less advances stage, provided the commencement of such execution logically leads to the commission of a definite crime, which is not attained by reason of some cause or accident other than the actor's own spontaneous desistance.” — Defines attempted crime and rejects the discrepancy argument.
• “In one case, the acts performed constitute the very end pursued by the actor; in the other, they merely constitute the means to an end which the actor seeks to attain.” — Distinguishes unjust vexation from attempted rape.
• “Had the accused in this case abandoned his design after performing the acts committed by him, according to the evidence and the appealed judgment, the crime committed would be unjust vexation. But he persisted in his purpose, which could not have been to vex the offended party because this objective was already attained, but to ravish her through force and intimidation, inasmuch as his acts under the circumstances of the case could not lead to any other end.” — Applies the distinction to Tayaba’s acts.
• “His attempt, however, was defeated by the timely arrival of a neighbor who came to the rescue of the offended party upon hearing her cries for help.” — Identifies the extraneous cause that prevented consummation.

• United States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 — The SC found the facts similar and relied on this precedent, where the accused was also convicted of attempted rape after entering a married woman’s house at night, using violence, and persisting despite resistance until assistance arrived.
• Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 7, 1890 — Cited for the essential condition of an attempted crime: the overt acts must lead directly, with constant intent, to the commission of another act punishable by law.

• The Code (as referred to in the decision) — The SC applied the Code’s definition of an attempted crime: the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts, without the necessity of their arriving at a more or less advanced stage, provided the commencement logically leads to a definite crime not attained by reason of a cause or accident other than the actor’s own spontaneous desistance. The SC used this provision to reject the argument that the acts were only unjust vexation and to affirm attempted rape.