People vs. Tambis

Murder was qualified by outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse, but the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua because the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty attended the killing alongside the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Pablito Tambis and Leonardo Tagsa lived in the same barangay in Hagbuaya, Catigbian, Bohol, and had known each other for about ten years. Tagsa was physically handicapped, with a weak right arm and a crippled right leg, and also suffered from a mental disorder. R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, authorized the death penalty for heinous crimes and supplies the statutory backdrop for the penalty at issue.

At about 4:00 in the afternoon of December 25, 1994, Agapito Dano was on his way home after attending mass when he saw Pablito Tambis y Baliong carrying two bolos going up the stairs of Leonardo Tagsa's house in barangay Hagbuaya, Catigbian, Bohol. When a motorcycle approached, Tambis went down and ordered the driver to stop; after the motorcycle stopped, Tambis punctured its tires. Out of fear, Dano left and went to his house about one hundred twenty meters from the victim's house.

A few minutes later, Dano returned to the victim's house. From a distance of eighty meters, he saw Tambis carrying the severed head of the victim and shouting that it was the head of Leonardo Tagsa. Dano recognized the head because Leonardo was a first-degree cousin of his wife. The victim was physically handicapped, with a limp right arm and a crippled right leg, and was also suffering from a mental disorder.

Edgar Regis corroborated Dano. At about 4:00 in the afternoon of the same day, while driving his motorcycle, known as a "habal-habal," toward Hagbuaya, Catigbian, Bohol, Tambis flagged him down near Leonardo Tagsa's house. Tambis told Regis that he would not be killed; Tambis would just puncture the tires of the motorcycle so that Regis could not go to the police. After doing so, Tambis went back to the victim's house. Later, Tambis emerged from the house, and from about twenty meters away Regis saw him carrying the severed head of Leonardo Tagsa. While showing the head to people in the neighborhood, Tambis said, "here is the head of Leonardo Tagsa."

Policemen found the severed head about one hundred meters from the victim's house. The cause of death was irreversible shock secondary to homicidal decapitation. The victim's family spent about twenty thousand pesos for the wake and burial and eight thousand pesos for embalming.

Tambis was the sole witness for his defense. He admitted knowing the victim for about ten years because they lived in the same barangay, and described Leonardo Tagsa as tall, with a weak right arm and right leg. In the afternoon of December 25, 1994, Tambis was drinking with friends at his house in Hagbuaya, Catigbian, Bohol, and got drunk; he had been drinking since he was eighteen years old, was usually drunk once a month, and normally just slept when drunk. That afternoon, he did not just sleep; with his friends, he went to Leonardo Tagsa's house carrying a friend's bolo. A fight between him and the victim ensued, and he sustained minor injuries in his right knee and right side of the body near the pelvic bone. He did not submit himself to a medical examination.

On cross-examination, Tambis admitted killing the victim. Asked whether he decapitated Leonardo Tagsa, he answered: "Yes, I admit but I was about to realized [sic] what I did." He also identified a picture of the victim's body. After the incident, Tambis went to a vacant house in Hagbuaya, Catigbian, Bohol, where he rested and stayed for the night. The following day, he surrendered to the police authorities. He testified that he carried one bolo, but he surrendered two bolos; the other bolo was allegedly taken from the victim when the latter was already weak and injured. When asked why he killed and beheaded the victim, he said he was not aware of what he did, and he denied taking drugs that day.

Upon arraignment on October 10, 1995, Tambis pleaded guilty to the murder charge. Considering the gravity of the crime and the penalty, the trial court conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea, then received evidence to prove guilt and degree of culpability. Nobody witnessed the act of killing inside the victim's house, where the victim lived alone.

• Penalty: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court misappreciated the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and that he should be meted only reclusion perpetua, not death.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General contended that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender did not exist.
• Intoxication: The Solicitor General argued that there was no showing that accused-appellant was so drunk that his will power was impaired or that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether accused-appellant's guilt for the killing was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Whether treachery can be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance absent evidence of the manner of attack.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength attended the killing.
• Cruelty/Outraging the Corpse: Whether the killing was qualified to murder by cruelty or by outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance.
• Plea of Guilty: Whether voluntary plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance.
• Intoxication: Whether intoxication may be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed.
• Moral Damages: Whether moral damages may be awarded to the victim's heirs.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Accused-appellant admitted the killing, and strong circumstantial evidence independently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be presumed; the manner of attack must be proven, and no one witnessed the killing inside the victim's house.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. There was notorious inequality of forces: the victim had a weak right arm and a crippled right leg, while accused used two bolos.
• Cruelty/Outraging the Corpse: Yes. Decapitating the victim and parading and leaving the severed head in the neighborhood constituted outraging or scoffing at his corpse, qualifying the killing to murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Accused surrendered the day after the incident without being arrested and turned over the weapons; resting in a vacant house in the same barrio was not flight.
• Plea of Guilty: Yes. Accused pleaded guilty to the murder charge, and the trial court conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and consequences of the plea.
• Intoxication: No. There was no clear and positive proof that intoxication was habitual or intentional or that it impaired his will power; doubt must be resolved in his favor.
• Penalty: No. The death penalty was not proper; with two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
• Moral Damages: Yes. Moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, including death, and the victim's heirs suffered mental anguish.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The SC held that even if accused-appellant did not admit responsibility, his guilt was clearly proven by strong circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Prosecution witnesses positively identified Tambis going up the victim's house with bolos, puncturing the tires of a witness's motorcycle so that the witness could not report to the police, and later coming out of the house carrying the severed head. Tambis also admitted the killing.
• Treachery: The SC ruled that the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be taken into consideration absent evidence showing the manner of attack and what ensued inside the victim's house, where the victim lived alone. Nobody witnessed the act of killing. Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven; it cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The SC held that abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The prosecution proved that Tambis purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim. The victim had a weak right arm and right leg and was no match to the accused, who used two bolos; the victim had no means of defending himself against his well-armed assailant.
• Cruelty/Outraging the Corpse: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the killing is qualified to murder if attended with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Tambis did not just kill the victim; he decapitated him and showed the severed head to the neighborhood, shouting that it was Leonardo Tagsa's head. Afterwards, he left it lying around approximately one hundred meters from the victim's house. Such action constituted outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: The SC held that the trial court erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Contrary to the Solicitor General's contention, substantial evidence proved that Tambis voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. For voluntary surrender, it is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him. Resting at a vacant house in the same barrio where the crime was committed was not tantamount to flight. Though Tambis did not surrender on the same day, he voluntarily and spontaneously did so the following day; he did not wait for his arrest and surrendered not only his person but also the weapons used in the crime. The elements are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.
• Plea of Guilty: The SC held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty must be considered in favor of accused-appellant. Tambis pleaded guilty to the murder charge, and the trial court conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea before receiving evidence.
• Intoxication: The SC agreed with the Solicitor General that there was no showing that accused-appellant was so drunk that his will power was impaired or that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. In the absence of clear and positive proof that intoxication was habitual or intentional on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance. The prosecution must prove every aggravating circumstance as fully as the crime itself, and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused.
• Penalty: The SC affirmed accused-appellant's conviction of murder. Considering the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty, and the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The SC cited Article 63(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Moral Damages: The SC found it proper to award P50,000 as moral damages to the heirs of Leonardo Tagsa pursuant to Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code, which provides that moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; the term "physical injuries" includes death. No proof of pecuniary loss is required for such damages to be adjudicated, and assessment is left to the discretion of the court. The award is commensurate to the heirs' emotional suffering or mental anguish but is not meant to enrich them. Moral damages compensate for mental anguish, anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim or his family as the proximate result of the wrongful act, and they are recoverable where a criminal offense results in physical injuries culminating in death. Tambis decapitated the victim, paraded the severed head in the neighborhood, and later left it lying on the ground; this behavior severely shocked the victim's heirs and showed bravado and utter lack of respect for human life.

• Circumstantial evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; the circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The SC applied this rule because, even apart from Tambis's admission, witnesses saw him going up the victim's house with bolos, puncturing a motorcycle's tires to prevent a report to the police, and later carrying the severed head.
• Treachery — Treachery cannot be presumed; where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. The SC refused to appreciate treachery because nobody witnessed the killing inside the victim's house and there was no evidence of how the attack began or unfolded.
• Abuse of superior strength — Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The SC applied it because the victim had a weak right arm and a crippled right leg, while Tambis used two bolos, leaving the victim no means of defense.
• Outraging or scoffing at the corpse — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, killing is qualified to murder when attended with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. The SC held that decapitating the victim, parading the severed head in the neighborhood, and leaving it lying on the ground constituted outraging or scoffing at the corpse.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender is mitigating when: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that the surrender be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent to surrender unconditionally. The SC credited it because Tambis surrendered the following day without waiting for arrest and turned over the weapons.
• Voluntary plea of guilty — A voluntary plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance, especially where the trial court conducts a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The SC credited Tambis's plea of guilty to the murder charge.
• Intoxication — Intoxication is not aggravating absent clear and positive proof that it was habitual or intentional; the prosecution must prove every aggravating circumstance as fully as the crime itself, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. The SC refused to consider intoxication aggravating because there was no showing that Tambis's will power was impaired or that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.
• Moral damages in criminal offenses resulting in death — Moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, including death, under Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code; no proof of pecuniary loss is required, and assessment is left to the court's discretion. The SC awarded P50,000 moral damages because the victim's heirs suffered mental anguish and moral shock from the decapitation and the parading of the severed head.

• "Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime." — The SC used this rule to reject treachery because no one witnessed the killing inside the victim's house.
• "Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." — The SC applied this to the physically handicapped victim and the accused's use of two bolos.
• "For circumstance of voluntary surrender, it is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him." — The SC credited voluntary surrender despite Tambis's surrender occurring the day after the killing.
• "No proof of pecuniary loss is in order that such damages may be adjudicated, and assessment thereof is left to the discretion of the court." — The SC cited this in awarding P50,000 moral damages to the victim's heirs.

• People vs. Doro, 282 SCRA 1, 11 [1997] — Cited for the rule on circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction.
• People vs. Melchor de la Iglesias, 241 SCRA 718, 733 [1995] — Cited for the requirement that circumstantial evidence form an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion.
• People vs. Asis, 286 SCRA 64, 74 [1998] — Followed for the rules on treachery and abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Cañete, 287 SCRA 490, 503 — Followed for abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, 517-518 [1998] — Followed for the requisites of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Medina, 286 SCRA 44, 62 [1998] — Followed for the elements of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Wilfredo Bañez, G.R. No. 125849, January 20, 1999 — Followed for the rule that intoxication must be clearly proven to be considered aggravating.
• People vs. Baxinela, 342 Phil. 875, 892-893 — Followed for the award of moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in death.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines murder and lists qualifying circumstances; the SC applied it to hold that outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse qualified the killing to murder.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Took effect on December 31, 1993 and authorized the death penalty for heinous crimes; the SC used it as the statutory framework for the murder charge and penalty.
• Article 63(4), Revised Penal Code — Governs the penalty when mitigating and aggravating circumstances attend; the SC applied it to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death.
• Article 2219(1), Civil Code — Allows moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; the SC applied it to award P50,000 moral damages because the offense resulted in death.
• Article 2216, Civil Code — Leaves the assessment of moral damages to the court's discretion and requires no proof of pecuniary loss; the SC cited it in awarding moral damages.