People vs. Tamayo

Absent a previous conspiracy or common criminal design to kill, each participant in an altercation is criminally liable only for his own acts; a person who did not inflict the fatal injury cannot be held liable as principal or accomplice in homicide unless his participation in the slayer's criminal design is clearly proved, though concert of action at the moment of consummation may supply the inference of such participation for accomplice liability.

The five appellants—Jose, Ramon, and Hilario Tamayo, Federico Tibunsay, and Teodoro Caspellan—were residents of the barrio of Asingan who had traveled to a neighboring field in Binalonan, Pangasinan, to prepare land for cultivation. The deceased, Catalino Carrera, was a farmer working his own paddy in the barrio of San Felipe, Binalonan. No antecedent grudge or ill-feeling existed between the appellants and the deceased. The prosecution and appeal proceeded under the old Penal Code (Spanish Penal Code), the penal statute then in force.

On the morning of July 17, 1921, Catalino Carrera, accompanied by his brother Francisco Carrera and a thirteen-year-old youth named Juan Gonzales, went to a field belonging to the deceased in the barrio of San Felipe, municipality of Binalonan, Province of Pangasinan, to prepare the land for planting palay. To irrigate the paddy, the deceased intercepted the flow of water in a nearby irrigation ditch by constructing a dirt dam, diverting all the water to his own land. While the deceased worked at the ditch, Francisco leveled the soil nearby with a rake, and Juan Gonzales, mounted on a carabao, used a harrow a few rods away. At about this time, Basilia Orensia, the deceased's wife, arrived in the field bringing food for her husband and his assistants.

The five appellants, residents of the barrio of Asingan, arrived at an adjacent plot of land to begin their own agricultural work and found that no water was available because the deceased had diverted the entire flow to his paddy. Either Hilario or Ramon Tamayo asked the deceased to allow some water to flow through to their dry land; the deceased replied that they should wait for the rain of heaven. When the request was repeated, the deceased told them to await his pleasure. Angered by this refusal, Hilario Tamayo advanced toward the irrigation ditch with the intention of breaking the dam with his hands. The deceased resisted, and a struggle ensued. Hilario seized the deceased firmly by the neck and began choking him, rendering him incapable of effective resistance. Francisco Carrera ran to his brother's aid and pulled Hilario away by the belt; a minor altercation followed between Francisco and Hilario, and for the remainder of the affray Hilario remained separated from the deceased by a few meters.

As soon as Hilario was drawn away, Ramon Tamayo took his place and continued choking the deceased until the latter became visibly weak. At that moment, Jose Tamayo, a son of Ramon, ran up and delivered a blow with a bamboo stick on the side of the deceased's head just above the left ear. The deceased at once collapsed, but Ramon continued to choke him for a few moments until life was extinct. The five accused then departed, leaving the body where it had fallen. The physician who examined the cadaver found that the blow had broken through the skin and fractured and depressed the skull over a length of eight centimeters; death was caused by the direct shock of the blow, in connection with a cerebral hemorrhage. No other signs of violence were found on the body.

During the assault, Federico Tibunsay and Teodoro Caspellan stood close by. According to Francisco Carrera, Federico Tibunsay encouraged the assailants by exclaiming "Go ahead! Go ahead!" (¡Sigue! ¡Sigue!), though Basilia Orensia attributed this expression to five other laborers from nearby fields who had gathered around the combatants—persons who were initially included in the complaint but discharged by the trial judge for lack of evidence. Basilia also testified that Teodoro Caspellan struck blows with his fist on the back of the deceased while the latter was held by Hilario and Ramon, though Francisco corroborated this only partially and the proof was not entirely clear. After life was extinct, Federico Tibunsay approached the body and removed the large bolo with which the deceased had been provided; this bolo was later found in Hilario's possession and delivered by him to the justice of the peace, suggesting an attempt to fabricate a self-defense narrative. When arrested, Hilario exhibited a slight cut on his left forearm, which he claimed to have received during the struggle; the prosecution contended the deceased never used his bolo, and the cut may have been self-inflicted to support a claim of self-defense.

The trial judge observed that the prosecution witnesses had grossly exaggerated the facts in some respects, while the defense witnesses had falsely attempted to make it appear that only Jose and Hilario Tamayo were engaged in the assault. The truth lay somewhere between the extremes. No previous grudge or ill-feeling existed between the appellants and the deceased, and there was no evidence of prior conspiracy to commit aggression; the killing arose from a casual quarrel that culminated in violence.

• Jose Tamayo's Liability as Principal: Whether Jose Tamayo is guilty as principal in the homicide of Catalino Carrera.
• Ramon Tamayo's Liability: Whether Ramon Tamayo is guilty as principal or as accomplice in the homicide.
• Hilario Tamayo's Liability: Whether Hilario Tamayo is guilty of homicide or any lesser offense.
• Federico Tibunsay's Liability: Whether Federico Tibunsay is guilty as accomplice in the homicide.
• Teodoro Caspellan's Liability: Whether Teodoro Caspellan is guilty of any complicity in the homicide.

• Jose Tamayo's Liability as Principal: Yes. Jose Tamayo was correctly convicted as principal in homicide, he having delivered the fatal blow with a bamboo stick that fractured the skull and caused cerebral hemorrhage. No aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present.

• Ramon Tamayo's Liability: No as principal; yes as accomplice. Ramon Tamayo could not be held as principal because participation in Jose Tamayo's criminal design was not sufficiently proved to establish direct participation under Article 13(1) of the Penal Code. However, his continued choking of the deceased after the fatal blow was struck evidenced concert of action at the moment of consummation, sufficient to establish accomplice liability under Article 14.

• Hilario Tamayo's Liability: No, not guilty of homicide. Hilario had desisted from his own acts of aggression before Jose Tamayo intervened and did nothing to assist in the killing. He was guilty only of the misdemeanor of assault and battery (malos tratos de obra) under Article 589(1) of the Penal Code.

• Federico Tibunsay's Liability: No. The evidence that Federico Tibunsay uttered words of encouragement was contradictory and insufficient to establish complicity. Even assuming he said "Go ahead!" (¡Sigue!), such an excited exclamation during a mere assault, without proof of intent that the deceased be killed, does not fix criminal complicity in homicide.

• Teodoro Caspellan's Liability: No. His alleged participation was limited to doubtful blows on the back of the deceased during the earlier phase of the assault, and he had apparently desisted before Jose Tamayo intervened. The proof was insufficient to establish complicity in the homicide.

• Jose Tamayo's Liability as Principal: Jose Tamayo delivered the blow with a bamboo stick to the side of the deceased's head, fracturing and depressing the skull over eight centimeters and causing cerebral hemorrhage, which the physician identified as the cause of death. This direct participation in the killing established his liability as principal under Article 13(1) of the Penal Code. No aggravating or mitigating circumstances were proved, and the penalty of reclusion temporal (fourteen years, eight months, and one day) imposed by the trial court was correct.

• Ramon Tamayo's Liability: The Court examined whether Ramon could be held as principal under Article 13(1), which covers "those who take a direct part in the commission of the deed." Citing Viada, the Court noted that this provision requires participation in the criminal resolution of the slayer—i.e., the accused must have participated in the criminal design and personally executed acts directly tending to the same end. Three circumstances defeated principal liability: (1) no previous concert among the accused to commit aggression was shown; (2) at the inception of the encounter, there was no apparent intention to kill or inflict serious bodily harm; and (3) the fatal blow by Jose Tamayo was the act of a person suddenly entering the fight without prior involvement. The Court relied on United States vs. Manayao, United States vs. Magcomot, United States vs. Reyes and Javier, and United States vs. Macuti, all holding that absent a prearranged plan, criminal responsibility is individual, not collective. As to accomplice liability under Article 14, the Court recognized the same requirement of participation in the criminal design, citing Spanish Supreme Court decisions establishing that complicity requires knowledge of the criminal intent and cooperation with the intention of supplying material or moral aid. However, the Court distinguished accomplice from principal liability by noting that courts will sometimes infer guilty participation from concert of action at the moment of consummation and the form and manner of assistance rendered, where the same inference would not support principal liability—because in case of doubt, courts lean toward the milder form of responsibility. The critical fact was that both Basilia Orensia and Francisco Carrera testified that Ramon continued to hold and choke the deceased after the fatal blow was struck, until life was extinct. This demonstrated that Ramon approved of the blow struck by his son Jose, thereby showing participation in the criminal design sufficient for accomplice liability, making the case indistinguishable from the Spanish Supreme Court decisions of December 29, 1884, and January 5, 1909, where simultaneous acts of holding the victim during the killing established complicity.

• Hilario Tamayo's Liability: At the time Jose Tamayo intervened and delivered the fatal blow, Hilario had already been pulled away by Francisco Carrera and remained separated from the deceased by several meters. He did nothing to assist Jose in the commission of the homicide. His prior acts of choking the deceased were done without knowledge of Jose's criminal design, which had not yet been revealed. Accordingly, Hilario could not be held liable as either principal or accomplice in the homicide. He was, however, guilty of the misdemeanor of assault and battery (malos tratos de obra) under Article 589(1) of the Penal Code for his initial choking of the deceased.

• Federico Tibunsay's Liability: The evidence that Federico Tibunsay encouraged the assailants was contradictory. Francisco Carrera attributed the exclamation "Go ahead!" (¡Sigue!) to him, but Basilia Orensia attributed it to the five nearby laborers who were discharged for lack of evidence, and she denied that Federico used the expression at all—though she admitted having said so at the preliminary hearing. Basilia's later testimony that Federico called out "Kill him" (matadle) was uncorroborated by Francisco and appeared for the first time on redirect examination, making it unsafe to credit. Even assuming Federico said "Go ahead!" during the assault, the Court cited a Spanish Supreme Court decision holding that excited exclamations by a person present at a quarrel—such as "there you have them," "strike them," "this is the time"—are insufficient to establish complicity in homicide absent proof that the words were spoken with intent that the person slain be killed. The Court further noted the distinction between words of command from a father to his sons, which may determine conduct, and excited exclamations by a stranger to whom obedience is not due. Since only a mere assault was in progress when the words were allegedly spoken, and it did not appear Federico intended more than a beating, complicity in the homicide was not established.

• Teodoro Caspellan's Liability: His alleged participation was limited to striking blows with his fist on the back of the deceased while the latter was held by Hilario or Ramon Tamayo. The proof on this point was not entirely clear, and even if such blows were delivered, Teodoro had apparently desisted from the attack before Jose Tamayo intervened and struck the fatal blow. On the same reasoning applied to Hilario and Federico, his acts did not demonstrate participation in Jose's criminal design, and he was acquitted.

• Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Absence of Conspiracy — In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against the same person is individual and not collective; each participant is liable only for the acts committed by himself. Applied here to hold that Hilario, Federico, and Teodoro could not be held liable for the homicide committed by Jose, absent proof of participation in his criminal design.

• Elements of Principal Liability by Direct Participation (Article 13[1], Penal Code) — "Those who take a direct part in the commission of the deed" means those who, participating in the criminal resolution, proceed together to perpetrate the crime and personally take part in its realization, executing acts which directly tend to the same end. Immediate participation in the criminal design of the slayer is essential to the responsibility of one alleged to have taken a direct part in the killing as principal but who has not himself inflicted an injury materially contributing to death. This guilty participation must be clearly deducible from all the circumstances taken together.

• Elements of Accomplice Liability (Article 14, Penal Code) — Criminal complicity as an accomplice requires not only a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the accomplice, but also that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. The principal element of every punishable complicity consists in the concurrence of the will of the accomplice with the will of the author of the crime, which presupposes mediate or immediate agreement to carry out the commission thereof. When such concurrence is lacking, although there may be participation by action, the person cannot be criminally responsible as an accomplice.

• Inference of Complicity from Concert of Action at Consummation — Although participation in the criminal design of the principal is essential for accomplice liability, courts may infer such participation from acts of concert at the moment of consummating the homicide and from the form and manner in which assistance is rendered, where the same inference would not be drawn to hold the accused as principal. This is because, in case of doubt, courts lean toward the milder form of responsibility. Applied here to hold Ramon Tamayo liable as accomplice, his continued choking of the deceased after the fatal blow showing approval of and participation in Jose Tamayo's criminal design.

• Insufficiency of Mere Words of Encouragement for Complicity — Excited exclamations by a person present at a quarrel, such as "go ahead," "strike them," or "this is the time," are insufficient to establish complicity in homicide absent proof that the words were spoken with the intention that the person slain should be killed. A distinction exists between words of command from a person in authority (e.g., a father to his sons) that may determine conduct, and excited exclamations by a stranger to whom obedience is not due.

• "It has been the constant holding, not only of this court, but also of the supreme court of Spain, that in the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a crime the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and that each of the participants is liable only for the acts committed by himself." — This passage, quoting United States vs. Macuti, articulates the foundational doctrine of individual criminal responsibility absent conspiracy, which controlled the disposition of all five appellants.

• "It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way." — This quotation from the Spanish Supreme Court, cited via Viada, provides the canonical formulation of accomplice liability under the old Penal Code, requiring both knowledge of the criminal intent and intentional cooperation.

• "The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed." — From United States vs. Bello, this passage defines the nature of criminal cooperation: it must be knowing and intentional, and cannot arise from mere presence or negligent omission without awareness of the criminal design.

• "in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility." — This principle explains why the Court was willing to infer accomplice liability from concert of action at the moment of consummation where it would not infer principal liability, and is a recurring theme in the Court's gradation of criminal participation.

• United States vs. Manayao, 4 Phil. 293 — Followed. Held that a person who took sides in a quarrel but who did not join in the killing, either as principal or accomplice, and against whom no concerted action with the slayer was shown, was not responsible for the homicide. Cited to support the proposition that absent concerted action, criminal responsibility is individual.

• United States vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 — Followed. Held that two persons who overpowered the deceased but did not concur in the will of the actual slayer were not responsible for the homicide, because simultaneity of acts does not itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose. Cited to establish that concurrence of will is the fundamental source of criminal liability.

• United States vs. Reyes and Javier, 14 Phil. 27 — Followed. Held that a person who held the deceased during a fight, without concert with the actual slayer who intervened suddenly, was not responsible for the homicide. Cited to illustrate that without concerted action or voluntary cooperation, holding the victim does not establish liability for the killing.

• United States vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. 170 — Followed. Held that in the absence of a prearranged plan to kill, criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. Cited as decisive authority for the proposition that each participant is liable only for his own acts.

• United States vs. Guevara, 2 Phil. 528 — Followed. Quoted with approval the Spanish Supreme Court's formulation that accomplice responsibility is determined by acts of aid and assistance rendered knowingly for the principal, not by mere presence at execution. Cited to establish the knowledge and intent requirements for accomplice liability.

• United States vs. Bello, 11 Phil. 526 — Followed. Held that a sentry who permitted convicts to go at large without knowledge of their criminal intent could not be convicted even as an accomplice. Cited for the principle that criminal cooperation requires knowing and intentional assistance.

• United States vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408 — Followed. Cited as further illustrating the doctrine that criminal complicity as an accomplice necessarily rests on knowledge of the criminal design of the principal and participation therein.

• Article 13(1), Penal Code (old Spanish Penal Code) — Defines principals as "those who take a direct part in the commission of the deed." Applied to Jose Tamayo, who delivered the fatal blow, establishing him as principal. Not applied to Ramon Tamayo, because his participation in Jose's criminal design was not sufficiently proved for principal liability.

• Article 14, Penal Code — Defines accomplices as those who cooperate in the commission of the deed by previous or simultaneous acts. Applied to Ramon Tamayo, whose continued choking of the deceased after the fatal blow constituted simultaneous cooperation in the criminal design, establishing accomplice liability.

• Article 59, Penal Code — Specifies the accessories of the penalty for principals. Applied to Jose Tamayo's conviction as principal.

• Article 61, Penal Code — Specifies the accessories of the penalty for accomplices. Applied to Ramon Tamayo's conviction as accomplice.

• Article 125, Penal Code — Governs subsidiary liability for civil indemnity between principals and accomplices. Applied to the relationship between Jose Tamayo and Ramon Tamayo for satisfaction of the indemnity imposed on each.

• Article 589(1), Penal Code — Punishes the misdemeanor of assault and battery (malos tratos de obra) with arresto menor. Applied to Hilario Tamayo, who was sentenced to five days of arresto menor for his initial choking of the deceased, which constituted assault and battery but not homicide.

• Araullo, C.J. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Villamor, J. — Concurred in the majority opinion.
• Avanceña, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Agreed with the principle enunciated in the majority opinion but disagreed with the findings of fact regarding Ramon Tamayo, believing it was not sufficiently proven that Ramon continued strangling the deceased after Jose struck the fatal blow. Avanceña believed Ramon Tamayo was responsible only for the misdemeanor punished by Article 589 of the Penal Code.
• Romualdez, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Joined Avanceña's concurring and dissenting opinion.

• Johnson, J. — Dissented. No separate opinion was provided in the text.

• Ostrand, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Concurred in the sentence imposed upon Jose Tamayo and reluctantly agreed with the disposition as to Ramon Tamayo, but emphatically dissented from the acquittal of the remaining accused. Ostrand argued that the deceased was on his own land, irrigating with water he had the right to use, when the defendants came from another municipality with the evident purpose of taking water by force. Upon refusal, the deceased was assaulted by as many defendants as could reach him, beaten and choked into exhaustion, and killed. Ostrand contended that although there was no conspiracy or premeditated design to kill, there was a common design to assault and beat the deceased, and as a result of that assault the deceased died; therefore all who took part in the unlawful assault should suffer punishment for the death, with responsibility varying in degree. He noted the deceased was a robust man armed with a bolo who could have defended himself against two assailants but was unable to do so against a mob attacking from all sides.

• Malcolm, J. — Concurred with Ostrand's concurring and dissenting opinion.

• Johns, J. — Concurred with Ostrand's concurring and dissenting opinion.