People vs. Tamani

An extrajudicial confession, corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti and containing circumstantial details only the accused could have supplied, is sufficient for conviction notwithstanding a subsequent repudiation and uncorroborated claim of torture, provided the investigating agents attest to its voluntariness.

The case arose from a political rivalry between Mayor Eduardo Domingo and Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani of Angadanan, Isabela. Domingo had been suspended from office, during which time Villamor Tamani served as acting mayor and appointed his second cousin, appellant Teodoro Tamani, as policeman. When Domingo was reinstated on June 10, 1953, the vice-mayor's tenure as acting mayor ended, and Teodoro Tamani lost his position as policeman. The shooting occurred the following evening. The investigation passed through multiple phases — initial complaints filed by the Constabulary against the mayor's followers, counter-complaints filed by the chief of police against the vice-mayor's group, and ultimately an investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) — reflecting the political complexion that complicated the evidence.

The case arose from the political rivalry between Mayor Eduardo Domingo and Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani of Angadanan, Isabela. Domingo had served as mayor since 1947 but was suspended from office by the Governor at some point prior to June 11, 1953. During his suspension, Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani functioned as acting mayor and appointed his second cousin, appellant Teodoro Tamani, then twenty-four years old, as policeman. Teodoro Tamani resigned as policeman shortly before June 11, 1953. On the afternoon of June 10, Domingo was reinstated and reassumed the office of mayor, terminating the vice-mayor's tenure as acting mayor.

The reinstatement was resented by Vice-Mayor Tamani. On June 10, Teodoro Tamani and Domingo Cadawan, also a former policeman, were summoned to the vice-mayor's house at Barrio Aniog, Angadanan, for a conference. Present were the vice-mayor and his men, Matias de la Fuente and Rufino de los Santos. It was decided at that meeting that Mayor Domingo should be liquidated. De la Fuente handed to Teodoro Tamani a carbine. Tamani and Cadawan spent the night in the vice-mayor's house. On the morning of June 11, Cadawan was sent to the poblacion to ascertain the whereabouts of Mayor Domingo. At around seven o'clock in the evening, Cadawan returned and apprised Tamani that Domingo was in front of the store of Pedro Pua at the town's commercial street.

Cadawan and Teodoro Tamani proceeded to the poblacion, making shortcuts through the yards of neighboring houses. Tamani carried the carbine. On entering the yard of the house adjoining Pedro Pua's store, Cadawan stumbled. The resulting noise attracted the attention of the house owner, Mrs. Juana Vittori Vda. de Ibarra, who focused a flashlight at Tamani and, recognizing him from childhood by his nickname "Doro," called out to him. Tamani answered "Tia" (Aunt). Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter Emiteria saw that Tamani was carrying a firearm. They watched as Tamani passed under the eaves, crossed the bamboo fence, and proceeded to the corner of the vacant lot near the gate of galvanized iron sheets fronting Pedro Pua's store. From the veranda, they saw the flashes of fire emitted by the carbine and heard eight or nine gun reports.

At that moment, Mayor Domingo was standing on the culvert bridging the canal in front of Pua's store, recounting his experience in Manila during his suspension to a group of listeners standing near the store wall. Jose Siyang, the town assistant sanitary inspector and a second cousin of both Teodoro Tamani and Vice-Mayor Tamani, was leaning against a post about two to three meters to Domingo's right, somewhat apart from the group. Cadawan opened a hole about three inches in diameter in the galvanized iron gate, through which Tamani inserted the barrel of the carbine. Tamani fired at Mayor Domingo, who was the target. When the first volley was fired, between seven and seven-thirty in the evening, Domingo had raised his right hand, and the palm of his right hand was hit. Jose Siyang was also hit. Domingo and his listeners dispersed and sought refuge inside Pua's store. While Domingo ran for cover, a second volley was fired. Inside the store, Domingo heard the moaning of someone in agony — Jose Siyang, who had sustained four through-and-through gunshot wounds following an oblique direction from entry to exit. Siyang died before eleven o'clock that same night. Domingo was confined at the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June 11 to 22, 1953.

Tamani and Cadawan fled the scene, retracing their route to the house of Vice-Mayor Tamani in Barrio Aniog. Tamani stayed overnight. Cadawan reported to the vice-mayor that Mayor Domingo was dead, then proceeded to Barrio Clakcab and returned the murder weapon to Matias de la Fuente. On the following day, empty shells were found by Constabulary soldiers near the galvanized iron gate. Tamani sometime went into hiding at Cabagan and Santo Tomas, Isabela, where he was arrested by Mayor Domingo by virtue of a warrant of arrest.

More than three years later, on October 2 and 3, 1956, Tamani signed and thumbmarked two sworn statements before NBI agents, confessing that he shot Siyang and Mayor Domingo, that his companion was Domingo Cadawan, and that Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani, Matias de la Fuente, and Rufino de los Santos instigated him to liquidate Mayor Domingo. The statements were in English, a language Tamani understands. During trial, Tamani repudiated his confession, assailed its voluntariness, and set up the defense of alibi, claiming he was at the vice-mayor's house in Barrio Aniog on the night of June 11. Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang — the father of the deceased Jose Siyang and uncle of Vice-Mayor Tamani — he endeavored to prove that Jose Siyang was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor Tumaneng, followers of Mayor Domingo, allegedly upon a prearranged signal from the mayor. The trial court rejected this version, finding grave inconsistencies in Francisco Siyang's affidavits and testimony, crediting instead the eyewitness testimony of Mrs. Ibarra and her daughter, and concluding that Tamani's confession was voluntary and corroborated by corpus delicti.

• Alibi: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in disbelieving his alibi, maintaining that he was at the house of Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani in Barrio Aniog on the night of June 11, 1953, having gone there that afternoon to seek a job recommendation for the Angadanan Sawmill.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Petitioner assailed the voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession, claiming he was tortured and maltreated by convicts at the provincial jail and by NBI agents — including being boxed, submerged in a drum of human waste, and having his head pushed into a toilet bowl — before being forced to sign his sworn statements.
• Credibility of Defense Witness: Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of Francisco Siyang that Jose Siyang was shot by Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng upon a prearranged signal from Mayor Domingo.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in relying on circumstantial evidence to convict him.
• Alternative Characterization: Petitioner alternatively contended that he should be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones graves rather than murder and attempted murder.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed forty-seven days late, arguing that the reglementary period under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court is mandatory.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Respondent countered that certain details in the confession, which only Tamani could have supplied, were indications of its voluntariness and gave it spontaneity and coherence, and that Tamani's claim of maltreatment was uncorroborated.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the appeal should be dismissed for having been filed out of time, and if so, whether the Court should nevertheless review the case on the merits.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Whether Tamani's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily executed and sufficient, together with corpus delicti, to sustain conviction.
• Alibi: Whether Tamani's alibi precludes the possibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.
• Credibility of Defense Witness: Whether the testimony of Francisco Siyang that Jose Siyang was shot by Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng should be credited.
• Qualification of the Killing: Whether the killing of Jose Siyang constitutes murder qualified by treachery.
• Characterization of the Offense Against Domingo: Whether the offense against Mayor Domingo is attempted murder.
• Complex Crime: Whether the accused should instead be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones graves.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Dismissed. The notice of appeal was filed fifty-eight days late, but the Court exercised discretion to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice, considering the gravity of the penalties and counsel's inadvertence.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Yes. The confession was voluntary and corroborated by undisputed evidence of corpus delicti, containing details only Tamani could have supplied, which the NBI agents could not have manufactured.
• Alibi: No. The alibi was not tenable because Barrio Aniog was only two kilometers from the scene of the shooting, making it physically possible for Tamani to be present at the time of the commission.
• Credibility of Defense Witness: No. Francisco Siyang's testimony exhibited grave inconsistencies between his affidavits and his testimony, bearing the earmarks of untrustworthiness and deliberate perversion of the truth.
• Qualification of the Killing: Yes. The killing of Siyang constitutes murder qualified by treachery, the accused having deliberately employed a mode of execution ensuring the consummation of the killing without risk to himself; treachery may be appreciated even with mistake as to the victim.
• Characterization of the Offense Against Domingo: Yes. The offense against Mayor Domingo is attempted murder, the accused having performed acts of execution with intent to kill but failing to inflict a mortal wound, not by spontaneous desistance but because the mayor took refuge.
• Complex Crime: No. The injuries to Siyang and Domingo resulted from two separate volleys of gunfire, not a single act, and thus cannot be categorized as a complex crime.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or notice of the order appealed from. The word "must" connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. Applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis, "promulgation" refers to "judgment" and "notice" refers to "order." When the order denying the motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963, Tamani had only one day remaining within which to appeal, applying by analogy Section 3, Rule 41 governing appeals in civil cases. The notice of appeal filed on September 10, 1963 was fifty-eight days late. A rigorous application of Section 6 justifies dismissal. However, considering that Tamani's right to seek review was lost through his counsel's inadvertence and that briefs had already been submitted, the Court resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice, drawing analogy from Marbury vs. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall discussed the merits of a mandamus action although the Court held it had no power to issue the writ.

• Voluntariness of Confession: Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that an extrajudicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Tamani's confession was corroborated by undisputed evidence of corpus delicti — the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and the wound on Domingo's right hand. Although Tamani repudiated his confession and claimed torture, NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza testified that the sworn statements were freely executed, and Tamani's testimony on the alleged maltreatment was uncorroborated. The confession contained twelve specific details that only Tamani could have supplied — including the conference at the vice-mayor's house, the handing of the carbine by De la Fuente, Cadawan's reconnaissance mission, Cadawan's stumbling in Mrs. Ibarra's yard, the return to the vice-mayor's house, Jose Siyang's position along the line of fire, the familial relationship between Siyang and the vice-mayor, and the three-inch diameter of the hole in the gate. These circumstances could not have been known if the confession had been executed under duress, and the NBI agents could not have manufactured all these details. Additionally, a significant inconsistency impaired Tamani's credibility: he claimed not to understand Tagalog as of October 3, 1956, yet was able to repeat verbatim Tagalog words spoken by Agent Almeda to prisoner Pedro Tamayo during his testimony.

• Alibi: The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable, must preclude the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Tamani claimed he was at the vice-mayor's house in Barrio Aniog on the night of June 11, but Barrio Aniog was only two kilometers from Pedro Pua's store where the shooting occurred. It was physically possible for him to be at the scene and return. Moreover, the alibi was not corroborated by Vice-Mayor Tamani or any other person. Its concocted character was manifest.

• Credibility of Defense Witness: Francisco Siyang's testimony exhibited grave inconsistencies. In his 1953 affidavit, he declared that Policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng shot his son, with Ibarra firing first. In his 1956 affidavit, he alleged that only Tumaneng shot his son. On direct examination, he testified that Ibarra fired first, followed by Tumaneng. On cross-examination, he reversed himself, declaring that Tumaneng fired first and Ibarra second. NBI Agent Almeda found Siyang's theory incredible, concluding that Siyang merely suspected certain persons as the killers but could not positively identify them, as the assailant was behind the fence. Siyang's testimony was squarely refuted by Martin Caniero and Teodoro Colobong, and it should be underscored that Siyang was the uncle of the vice-mayor.

• Qualification of the Killing: The act of shooting Siyang at a distance, without the least expectation on his part that he would be assaulted, is murder because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). Tamani deliberately employed a mode of execution which tended directly and specially to ensure the consummation of the killing without any risk to himself arising from the defense the victim could have made. Siyang, unarmed and without any intimation that the gunshots intended for Mayor Domingo would hit him, was not in a position to defend himself against the unseen assailant. Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim, as held in People vs. Mabug-at and People vs. Guillen.

• Characterization of the Offense Against Domingo: As to Mayor Domingo, the accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would consummate the killing, not because of his spontaneous desistance but because he failed to inflict a mortal wound. The mayor was able to avoid the second volley by taking refuge in Pua's store. There was no doubt that the accused was animated by the intent to kill and that the shooting was perpetrated in a treacherous manner. Hence, the offense is attempted murder, as held in People vs. Kalalo.

• Complex Crime: The alternative contention that Tamani should be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones graves is not well-taken. The killing of Siyang cannot be characterized as homicide; it was qualified by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the mayor, so the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a mere physical injury. Moreover, the infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and the wound on the mayor's right hand was not the result of a single act but the consequences of two volleys of gunshots. The assaults therefore cannot be categorized as a complex crime. To convict of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder would result in the imposition of the death penalty, which would be worse for the accused.

• Corpus delicti and extrajudicial confessions — Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession is not sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. In this case, Tamani's confession was corroborated by the undisputed evidence of the four gunshot wounds on Siyang and the wound on Domingo. The Court further held that where the confession contains circumstantial details only the accused could have supplied, this spontaneity and coherence are indications of voluntariness that rebut a subsequent claim of torture, especially where the claim is uncorroborated and the investigating agents attest to the confession's voluntary execution.

• Requirements for a tenable alibi — An alibi, to be tenable, must show that the accused was at some other place for such period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. The alibi must preclude the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity. In this case, the two-kilometer distance between Barrio Aniog and the scene of the shooting made it physically possible for Tamani to be present, and the alibi was uncorroborated.

• Treachery (alevosia) with mistake as to the victim — Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim. The accused deliberately employed a mode of execution ensuring the consummation of the killing without risk to himself. Siyang, though not the intended target, was unarmed and without intimation of the assault, and was not in a position to defend himself against the unseen assailant.

• Reclusion perpetua versus life imprisonment — The use of the term "life imprisonment" is not proper; the correct penalty for murder under Articles 64(1) and 248 of the Revised Penal Code, absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, is reclusion perpetua.

• Reddendo singula singulis — The rule of construction "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object" was applied to construe Section 6, Rule 122: "promulgation" refers to "judgment" and "notice" refers to "order," thereby clarifying the period for perfecting an appeal.

• "An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." — This quotation reproduces Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court as cited in the decision, stating the controlling rule on the evidentiary sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions.

• "The accused must show that he was at some other place for such period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the alibi doctrine as quoted from People vs. Lumantas, defining the requisites for a tenable alibi defense.

• "Those circumstances might not have been known if the confession had been executed under duress. NBI Agents Almeda and Mendoza could not have manufactured all these details." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for upholding the voluntariness of the confession: the presence of details only the accused could have supplied serves as an indicium of voluntariness that rebuts a claim of coercion.

• "Treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim." — This passage states the doctrine that treachery qualifies the killing even where the victim was not the intended target, directly applying to the facts where Siyang was hit by gunfire aimed at Mayor Domingo.

• People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 2 SCRA 764 — Followed. Cited for the established rule on the requisites of a tenable alibi: the accused must show physical impossibility of presence at the scene of the crime.

• People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that treachery may be appreciated even if there was a mistake as to the victim.

• People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 — Followed. Cited alongside Mabug-at for the same doctrine on treachery with mistake as to the victim.

• People vs. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715 — Followed. Cited for the characterization of the offense against Mayor Domingo as attempted murder, where the accused performed acts of execution with intent to kill but failed to inflict a mortal wound.

• People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the proper penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua, not "life imprisonment."

• Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 135, 2 L. ed. 60 — Cited by analogy. The Court drew upon Chief Justice Marshall's approach of discussing the merits of an action despite holding that it lacked power to issue the writ, to justify reviewing the record notwithstanding the late appeal.

• Section 6, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or notice of the order appealed from. Applied to determine that Tamani's appeal was filed fifty-eight days late, using the rule of reddendo singula singulis to construe "promulgation" as referring to "judgment" and "notice" as referring to "order."

• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that an extrajudicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Applied to uphold the sufficiency of Tamani's confession, which was corroborated by undisputed evidence of the gunshot wounds on both victims.

• Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governs appeals in civil cases. Applied by analogy or in a suppletory character to determine the remaining period for appeal after service of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

• Article 14, Paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as a qualifying circumstance. Applied to qualify the killing of Jose Siyang as murder, the accused having deliberately employed a mode of execution ensuring the killing without risk to himself.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted felonies. Applied to characterize the offense against Mayor Domingo as attempted murder, the accused having performed acts of execution but failing to inflict a mortal wound.

• Articles 64(1) and 248, Revised Penal Code — Provide the penalty for murder absent mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applied to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua, correcting the trial court's use of the term "life imprisonment."

Zaldivar, Fernando, and Fernandez, JJ., concurred.

Antonio, J., concurred separately, stating that the dismissal of the appeal should rest on the ground that the judgment of the laws must become final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, citing Section 7, Rule 120.