People vs. Talay

Treachery cannot qualify a killing as murder where the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to ensure the victim’s death without risk to themselves; the offense is simple homicide, and dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where the victim is killed in his own house.

Rodolfo and Vidal Talay are brothers. The victim, Leocadio de Castro, was the barrio captain of Communal, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The prosecution charged the brothers with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and because the trial court imposed the death penalty on Rodolfo Talay, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

On July 25, 1964, Pedro Dinglasan, a resident of Barrio Communal, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, lost two Texas cocks valued at ten pesos each. Having been informed that Rodolfo Talay stole them, he called the attention of Barrio Captain Leocadio de Castro. The barrio captain talked to Rodolfo and requested him to produce the two cocks. Rodolfo resented this and told the barrio captain that if he would be compelled to produce the missing cocks, he might be forced to kill a man. Despite the threat, the barrio captain instructed him to produce the cocks and return them to Dinglasan.

At about 10:00 p.m. on August 1, 1964, Juliana Umandal, wife of Leocadio de Castro, was awakened by a voice outside calling her husband’s name: “Ka Cadio, Ka Cadio ... Ka Duroy is calling for you.” She got up, lighted a lamp, and brought it by the window. She saw the brothers Rodolfo and Vidal Talay, both carrying guns. She woke her husband and informed him of their presence. Leocadio got up and opened the door. After he opened the door, a volley of rifle fire followed; Juliana heard the gunfire and her husband fell wounded on the floor. According to prosecution witnesses Damaso Cabral and Jose Atienza, they heard the shots, went toward the scene, and saw the appellants hurriedly walking away, both carrying guns. Juliana identified the appellants, whom she had known for about a year; their house was about one hundred meters from the victim’s house.

The victim was brought to the hospital and pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Ceferino Galvez, Provincial Health Officer of Oriental Mindoro, autopsied the body and reported a gunshot wound at the left chest, with perforation of the stomach, liver, diaphragm, and right lung, fracture of the sixth rib, and about 1,500 to 2,000 cc of blood in the thoracic cavity; the cause of death was shock due to extensive internal and external hemorrhage and severe injury to visceral organs secondary to gunshot wound, with death instantaneous. On the night of the incident, Lt. Mauro Bagus of the Calapan Police Force, with the Chief of Police and the Mayor, went to the hospital and then to the scene. Lt. Bagus found eight blank cartridges and a slug under the window sill of the deceased’s house; he identified the slug as belonging to the same caliber of carbine as that extracted from the victim’s body.

The defense presented a different account. Vidal Talay and his family had been residing at Pulang-lupa, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro since October 20, 1963, to work on his farm. On July 29, 1964, his wife was fetched by her mother-in-law to Communal to deliver their fourth child, expected in September 1964, and she brought their three children. Vidal was left alone at Pulang-lupa to attend to their farm animals and plants. From July 29, 1964, he slept in the house of his neighbor Nicasio Chavez until August 3, 1964, when he was arrested. On August 1, 1964, at around 6:00 p.m., he was in Chavez’s house; they slept at around 9:30, and he left Chavez’s house in the morning of August 2, 1964.

Rodolfo Talay, for his part, was staying with his sister-in-law Apolonia Gaa at Pulang-lupa, Naujan, working on his father-in-law’s farm. From morning until 4:00 p.m. on August 1, 1964, he gathered materials for a house he had been told to construct, took lunch in his own house, and at about 4:00 p.m. chopped firewood and attended to his animals. At about 7:00 p.m., after supper, his sister-in-law asked him to bring fish to his father-in-law Agapito Gaa and then to his brother-in-law Emilio Gaa, whose house was about 200 meters away. He stayed at Emilio Gaa’s house until about 9:30 p.m. listening to a radio broadcast, then proceeded to Apolonia Gaa’s house, slept beside his wife, and woke at about 6:00 a.m. on August 2, 1964. On August 3, 1964, policemen picked up both Rodolfo and Vidal at Pulang-lupa and brought them to the municipal building of Calapan, where, according to the defense, they were forced to admit that they were the culprits. Lt. Mauricio Bagus conducted the investigation; the accused denied knowledge of the crime and requested that the NBI be called and that they be subjected to a paraffin test, but the request was denied.

The trial court refused to give credence to the defense evidence and convicted both accused of murder. It found no serious contradictions in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, which it considered not contrary to the natural course of things, and held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of the accused as the perpetrators. It also found conspiracy from the manner of the killing and held that the defense of denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, noting that the accused were only about thirteen kilometers away from the victim’s house and it was not physically impossible for them to have gone there and committed the crime.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in lending credence to the prosecution witnesses.
• Findings of Material Facts: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in its findings of material facts.
• Denial and Alibi: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in disregarding their denial of the charge and defense of alibi despite the alleged lack of positive identification.
• Conspiracy: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in holding that conspiracy was proved by the prosecution.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in holding that aggravating circumstances were proved without considering the existence of mitigating circumstances.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility and Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellee maintained that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, whose testimonies were not contrary to the natural course of things and had no serious contradictions; the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.
• Identification: Appellee argued that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the identities of the defendants as the perpetrators of the crime charged.
• Denial and Alibi: Appellee countered that the mere denial and alibi of the defendants cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, and that the defendants were only about thirteen kilometers away from the victim’s house, so it was not physically impossible for them to have committed the crime.
• Conspiracy: Appellee argued that conspiracy was evident from the manner the two defendants committed the crime: they are brothers, went together to the victim’s house, both carried guns, both fired shots, and both hurriedly walked away, mutually aiding each other.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in lending credence to the prosecution witnesses.
• Findings of Material Facts: Whether the trial court erred in its findings of material facts.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the appellants’ denial and defense of alibi despite the alleged lack of positive identification.
• Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution proved conspiracy.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing as murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether superior strength, craft, nighttime, evident premeditation, disregard of rank, and dwelling were properly appreciated.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether immediate vindication of a grave offense was a mitigating circumstance.
• Guilt and Penalty: Whether both appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt and what penalty should be imposed.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses; their testimonies were not contrary to the natural course of things and contained no serious contradictions.
• Findings of Material Facts: No. The trial court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.
• Denial and Alibi: No. The prosecution established the identities of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, and their denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses; the distance of about thirteen kilometers did not make it physically impossible for them to commit the crime.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was evident from the manner of the killing: the brothers went together to the victim’s house, both carried guns, both fired shots, and both hurriedly walked away, thereby mutually aiding each other.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established beyond reasonable doubt because there was no evidence on how the victim was shot, and the victim was not unaware of danger.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Only dwelling was properly appreciated. Superior strength, craft, nighttime, evident premeditation, and disregard of rank were not proved.
• Mitigating Circumstance: No. Immediate vindication of a grave offense was not established; the barangay captain’s investigation of the lost roosters was not a grave offense against the appellants.
• Guilt and Penalty: Both appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple homicide, not murder, with dwelling as the only aggravating circumstance; the penalty was seventeen years, four months and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The trial court did not err in crediting the prosecution witnesses. Their testimonies were not contrary to the natural course of things and had no serious contradictions. The widow, Juliana Umandal, testified that she heard someone calling her husband, went to the window with a lamp, saw the two defendants with guns, woke her husband, and that after he opened the door she heard one shot followed by successive shots and he fell. Damaso Cabral testified that while walking toward the victim’s house he heard successive gunshots and saw the two accused carrying guns and walking hurriedly away; he reported what he saw to Lt. Bagus the following morning. Jose Atienza testified that his house was near the victim’s, that he heard shots, went down to investigate, saw two persons holding guns walking hastily away, and recognized them as the defendants. These positive declarations supported the trial court’s credibility finding.

• Findings of Material Facts: The trial court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. The prosecution established the identities of the defendants as the perpetrators beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that they were not the persons who killed Leocadio de Castro had no merit.

• Denial and Alibi: The mere denial of the defendants and their alibi could not prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses that they were the perpetrators. Both defendants claimed they were elsewhere when the crime was committed, but they were only about thirteen kilometers away from the victim’s house. It was not physically impossible for them to have gone to the house and committed the crime.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was evident from the manner the two defendants committed the crime. They are brothers and were together in going to the victim’s house. Both were carrying guns. Both fired shots against the victim, and both hurriedly walked away after the shots were fired. The two defendants mutually aided each other in killing the victim.

• Treachery: The trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The only person present when Leocadio de Castro was shot was his wife, Juliana Umandal. She testified that she was awakened by the barking of dogs and someone calling her husband; she rose, brought a lighted lamp by the window, saw two persons she recognized as the defendants, both carrying guns about two feet long; she woke her husband, who rose and opened the door; after he opened the door, she heard one shot and then successive shots; her husband was hit and fell on his face; he uttered “hospital” and was brought to the hospital but was dead on arrival. However, Juliana did not actually see how her husband was shot. She testified that her husband proceeded to the door while she went to the other door, about three meters away, and that from where she stood she could not see a person outside. There was therefore no evidence on how the two defendants killed the victim. Treachery cannot be presumed from her testimony that after her husband opened the door she heard one shot followed by successive shots. The widow admitted that she already knew the two defendants were angry with her husband because of the incident regarding the loss of two roosters belonging to Pedro Dinglasan. When she looked out of the window that night, she saw the two defendants carrying guns. The suspicion of a normal person could have been aroused by that fact, and Juliana must have told her husband that the two defendants were carrying guns. The natural reaction of Leocadio de Castro would have been to open the door with caution. It cannot be said that he was unaware of danger when the shots were fired at him. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suddenness of an attack is not enough to constitute treachery where it does not appear that the accused had consciously chosen the method of attack directly and specially to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. The defendants did not make any effort to disguise themselves or to conceal the two guns they were carrying. Thus, the crime is simple homicide, not murder.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The trial court also erred in considering abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. The mere fact that there were two aggressors cannot constitute per se abuse of superior strength in the absence of evidence in the record of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Guns were used to commit the crime; each of the two defendants had a gun. It was not necessary for them to take advantage of superior strength to accomplish their purpose of killing Leocadio de Castro. There is no evidence that the two defendants employed craft as a means to commit the crime; the mere fact of calling the victim is not craft, and the defendants did not use deception or guile to kill him. However, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated. The victim was asleep in his house and opened the door upon being called by the defendants. In People vs. Alcala, dwelling was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance although the victim was killed on the staircase of his house. The trial court also erred in appreciating nocturnity. There is no evidence that the two defendants precisely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the crime and to hide their identities; they called for the victim and did not attempt to disguise themselves or conceal their weapons. There is no showing of evident premeditation. It does not appear that the two defendants planned to kill Leocadio de Castro for some time during which they could sufficiently reflect on the serious consequences of their action and that they persisted in their plan. In People vs. Beralde, this Court held that to appreciate evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. None of these requisites was proved. Disregard of the rank of the victim who was a barangay captain cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. There is no proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the defendants disregarded the respect due to the offended party; it does not appear that they deliberately intended to insult the rank of Leocadio de Castro as barrio captain.

• Mitigating Circumstance: The submission that the defendants are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be sustained. There is no evidence that Leocadio de Castro committed a grave offense against the two defendants. His actuations in investigating the loss of two roosters can hardly be considered a grave wrong committed against the two defendants.

• Guilt and Penalty: In view of the foregoing, the two defendants are guilty of the crime of simple homicide aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling without any mitigating circumstance. The penalty imposed was imprisonment of seventeen years, four months and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Leocadio de Castro P12,000 and the costs.

• Treachery — proof beyond reasonable doubt — Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suddenness of an attack is not enough where it does not appear that the accused consciously chose the method of attack directly and specially to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. In this case, the widow did not see how the victim was shot, and the victim was aware of danger because he had been told the appellants were armed; treachery was therefore not appreciated.

• Abuse of superior strength — The mere fact that there were two aggressors does not per se constitute abuse of superior strength in the absence of evidence of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Because both appellants used guns, superior strength was not necessary and was not appreciated.

• Evident premeditation — requisites — To appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. None of these requisites was proved.

• Dwelling as aggravating circumstance — Dwelling is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when the victim is killed in his own house. It was applied here because the victim was asleep in his house and opened the door upon being called by the appellants; People vs. Alcala was cited as authority even though the victim there was killed on the staircase of his house.

• Craft — Craft requires evidence that the accused employed deception or guile to commit the crime. The mere fact of calling the victim is not craft. No evidence showed that the appellants used craft to kill Leocadio de Castro.

• Nocturnity — Nocturnity is not appreciated absent evidence that the accused precisely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the crime and to hide their identities. The appellants called for the victim and did not attempt to disguise themselves or conceal their weapons, so nighttime was not considered.

• Disregard of rank — Disregard of the rank of the offended party requires proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the accused disregarded the respect due to the victim. There was no showing that the appellants deliberately intended to insult Leocadio de Castro’s rank as barrio captain.

• Conspiracy — inference from manner of commission — Conspiracy may be inferred from the manner in which the crime was committed. It was established because the appellants, who are brothers, went together to the victim’s house, both carried guns, both fired shots, and both hurriedly walked away, thereby mutually aiding each other.

• Alibi and denial — Denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive declarations of prosecution witnesses. Alibi must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene; the appellants were only about thirteen kilometers away, so their alibi was rejected.

• Immediate vindication of a grave offense — Immediate vindication of a grave offense requires evidence that the victim committed a grave offense against the accused. The barangay captain’s investigation of the loss of two roosters was not a grave wrong, so the mitigating circumstance was not appreciated.

• "Treachery as a qualifying circumstance should be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, mere suddennes of an attack is not enough to constitute treachery where it does not appear that the accused had consciously chosen the method of attack directly and specially to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer." — This states the ratio for rejecting treachery as a qualifying circumstance and explains why the killing was reduced to simple homicide.

• "The mere fact that there were two aggressors cannot constitute per se abuse of superior strength in the absence of evidence in the record of the relative physical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted party. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." — This defines abuse of superior strength and explains why it was not appreciated despite the presence of two armed aggressors.

• "To appreciate the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning." — This sets out the requisites of evident premeditation, which the prosecution failed to prove.

• People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285 — Cited for the rule that treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that mere suddenness of attack is insufficient absent proof that the accused consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to himself from the victim’s defense.
• People vs. Alcala, 46 Phil. 739 — Cited to support the appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance even though the victim was killed on the staircase of his house.
• People vs. Beralde, 91 SCRA 125, 150 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation, which the prosecution failed to prove.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The information charged murder under this provision, with treachery as a qualifying circumstance and several generic aggravating circumstances. Because treachery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court held that the killing was not murder under Article 248 but simple homicide, with only dwelling appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., filed a separate concurring opinion. Barredo, J., took no part.

Justice Teehankee concurred with the dissenting view of Justice Makasiar that the crime committed is murder; however, since the penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal imposed by the Court’s judgment properly falls within the imposable range for murder, he concurred in the result.

• Justice Aquino — Dissented: the accused committed murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by dwelling; hence, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.

• Justice Makasiar — Dissented: the accused should be convicted of murder, qualified by treachery, aggravated by evident premeditation and disregard of rank of the victim who was a barangay captain, aside from dwelling, and should therefore be sentenced to death. Treachery was demonstrated by the fact that the two appellants, who are brothers, each carried a gun of about two feet long; when the victim’s wife woke him, she only told him that the two defendants were calling for him without telling him that they were armed; she was holding a lighted lamp about three meters away from the door; because of the darkness, the victim could not see the faces of the appellants or the guns they carried; both appellants carried firearms and precisely sought nighttime to ensure the successful commission of the crime. Abuse of superior strength and nighttime are absorbed in treachery. Evident premeditation was proven by the July 25, 1964 complaint that Rodolfo stole two Texas cocks, the victim’s request as barangay captain that Rodolfo produce them, Rodolfo’s threat that he might be forced to kill a man, and the killing on August 1, 1964, about seven days later, giving sufficient time to deliberate and reflect. Disregard of rank was present because the appellants knew the victim was the barangay captain who instructed Rodolfo to restore the cocks.