People vs. Soliva

Malversation under Article 217 is mala in se, requiring proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence, while failure of an accountable officer to render accounts under Article 218 is mala prohibita, punishable upon mere voluntary failure to liquidate within the period prescribed by law or COA regulations regardless of criminal intent. The prima facie presumption of malversation—arising from an accountable officer's failure to produce public funds upon demand—may be rebutted by evidence showing the funds were not put to personal use, but payment or restitution after the crime's consummation does not extinguish criminal liability and may at most affect civil liability or serve as a mitigating circumstance.

Teresita J. Soliva served as Municipal Mayor of Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte from 2001 to 2007. As mayor, she was an accountable public officer with custody and control of public funds of the municipality, including cash advances for travel, peace and order, and confidential and intelligence fund expenses. The liquidation of such cash advances is governed by COA Circular No. 97-002 and COA Circular No. 2003-03, which prescribe specific periods within which accountable officers must render accounts or return unutilized balances. Section 340 of the Local Government Code and Section 102 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines establish that municipal mayors are primarily responsible for public funds pertaining to their municipality.

Teresita J. Soliva served as Municipal Mayor of Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte from 2001 to 2007. During her tenure, she incurred numerous cash advances from the municipality's public funds for various purposes, including travel expenses, peace and order expenses, and confidential and intelligence fund expenses. These cash advances remained unliquidated long after the periods prescribed by COA regulations had lapsed.

On April 29, 2015, Municipal Accountant Jerry John D. Galan sent Soliva a demand letter informing her that she had unliquidated cash advances amounting to PHP 987,666.58 as of February 2015. The letter noted that the advances had remained outstanding for over seven years and that, at her monthly refund rate of PHP 1,000.00, it would take 82 years to settle the account. Soliva was directed to settle her obligations before the end of May 2015, but she failed to comply. On May 8, 2015, concerned citizens of RTR wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the alleged anomalous cash advances, reporting that PHP 991,668.00 remained unliquidated as of November 30, 2014. The Office of the Ombudsman referred the matter to COA-Region XIII for investigation.

Sally Y. Tiu-Ladaga, Audit Team Leader of COA-Region XIII, conducted an investigation and sent a second demand letter dated June 8, 2015, stating that Soliva's outstanding cash advance stood at PHP 984,666.58 as of May 2015. After this second demand, Soliva settled PHP 20,000.00 through payroll deduction, reducing her balance to PHP 971,668.58 as of September 30, 2015. On November 17, 2015, Tiu-Ladaga issued a third demand letter requiring settlement within 30 days, which Soliva received on November 20, 2015. Soliva made additional payments totaling PHP 15,000.00, reducing her unliquidated balance to PHP 956,668.58. Of this amount, only PHP 551,000.00 was supported by cash advance vouchers and other documents; the remaining vouchers could not be located.

Tiu-Ladaga submitted an Evaluation Report on May 16, 2016 covering the period from July 2, 2004 to March 9, 2007. On August 23, 2016, Galan issued a Certification stating that Soliva's total unliquidated cash advance was PHP 886,666.58 as of August 15, 2016. Following Soliva's continued failure to liquidate despite repeated demands, Tiu-Ladaga filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman on September 9, 2016, charging Soliva with malversation under Article 217 and failure to render accounts under Article 218. Soliva was directed to submit a counter-affidavit but failed to do so. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause and filed eleven Informations with the Sandiganbayan on January 24, 2018.

A hold-departure order was issued on June 4, 2019 and a warrant of arrest on June 6, 2019. Soliva voluntarily surrendered and posted bail. On August 27, 2019, she pleaded not guilty. She manifested an intention to pursue a plea bargaining agreement and repeatedly sought time to secure certifications from COA and the Municipal Accountant, but never produced the purported documents. The Sandiganbayan terminated preliminary conference proceedings on March 10, 2021. Despite multiple scheduled hearing dates for defense evidence presentation in September and October 2022, Soliva failed to appear or present any evidence, and she did not submit a judicial affidavit. On March 16, 2023, the Sandiganbayan deemed her to have waived her right to present evidence. The case was submitted for judgment based solely on the prosecution's evidence, which included the testimonies of Tiu-Ladaga and Galan and documentary exhibits. The Sandiganbayan found all elements of both crimes proven beyond reasonable doubt and convicted Soliva on June 16, 2023. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on July 20, 2023.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Soliva maintained that a Certification issued by the Municipal Accountant of RTR on March 14, 2023, showing that she paid PHP 219,622.03 from her outstanding balance through terminal leave credits, constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.
• Mala in Se Characterization: Soliva argued that violations of Articles 217 and 218 are mala in se, and since there was no evidence of malicious intent in her failure to render an accounting, she cannot be held criminally liable as "no crime has been committed."

• Intentional Commission: The prosecution countered that Soliva knowingly and intentionally committed the crimes charged, deliberately failing to liquidate her cash advances pursuant to COA regulations and failing to rebut the prima facie presumption of malversation.
• Article 218 as Mala Prohibita: The prosecution argued that the felony penalized under Article 218 is mala prohibita, such that Soliva's failure to liquidate her cash advances, while not wrong in itself, is punishable because it is a prohibited act under the Revised Penal Code.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether the Certification dated March 14, 2023, showing partial payment through terminal leave credits, constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.
• Nature of the Offenses: Whether Articles 217 and 218 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se or mala prohibita.
• Malversation (Article 217): Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Soliva of malversation of public funds.
• Failure to Render Accounts (Article 218): Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Soliva of ten counts of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
• Penalty: Whether the penalties imposed by the Sandiganbayan were proper, including whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: No. The Certification did not qualify as newly discovered evidence because Soliva failed to exercise reasonable diligence in securing it prior to trial, and it was not attached to her Motion for Reconsideration as she claimed.
• Nature of the Offenses: Article 217 (malversation) is mala in se, requiring criminal intent or criminal negligence; Article 218 (failure to render accounts) is mala prohibita, requiring only proof of voluntary failure to account within the prescribed period.
• Malversation (Article 217): Yes. All four elements were proven beyond reasonable doubt, and the prima facie presumption of malversation was not rebutted.
• Failure to Render Accounts (Article 218): Yes. All four elements were established, and as a mala prohibita offense, the mere failure to account within the prescribed period rendered Soliva criminally liable.
• Penalty: The Sandiganbayan's penalties for Article 217 were proper; the penalties for the Article 218 counts were modified to reflect the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which the Sandiganbayan had failed to appreciate.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the Revised Rules of Court are: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) it is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment. Soliva failed to satisfy the second requisite because she repeatedly sought time from the Sandiganbayan to obtain certifications from COA and the Municipal Accountant but never produced them, and her repeated absences demonstrated lack of diligence. She also failed the third and fourth requisites because the Certification, at most, evidenced partial payment affecting only civil liability and the imposable fines, not exculpating her from criminal liability. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan noted that no such Certification was actually attached to her Motion for Reconsideration.

• Nature of the Offenses: The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita turns on the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the act is immoral in itself, it is mala in se and criminal intent governs; if it is not inherently immoral but is prohibited by reason of public policy, it is mala prohibita and the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. Article 217 (malversation) is mala in se because it requires dolo or culpa—criminal intent or criminal negligence. Article 218 (failure to render accounts) is mala prohibita because the failure to liquidate is not inherently immoral but is penalized by reason of public policy, specifically the need for public funds to be duly accounted for. In mala prohibita, what must be proven is not criminal intent but the offender's intent to perpetrate the prohibited act—i.e., voluntariness in the commission.

• Malversation (Article 217): The four elements of malversation are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender has custody or control of funds by reason of office duties; (3) the funds are public funds for which the offender is accountable; and (4) the offender appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented through abandonment or negligence to the taking of such funds. The first three elements were stipulated by the parties during pre-trial. Soliva was a public officer under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, and as municipal mayor she was an accountable officer pursuant to Section 340 of the Local Government Code and Section 102 of the Government Auditing Code. For the fourth element, the last paragraph of Article 217 establishes a prima facie presumption: the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds upon demand by a duly authorized officer constitutes prima facie evidence that the funds were put to personal use. Demand is not an element of malversation but is a requisite for the presumption's application. Soliva failed to rebut this presumption because she offered no evidence to explain her inability to account for the missing funds. Her claim of partial restitution was unsupported by trial evidence, and even if payment were made, payment or reimbursement after the crime's consummation does not extinguish criminal liability and may at most affect civil liability or serve as a mitigating circumstance.

• Failure to Render Accounts (Article 218): The four elements are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender is an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or a provincial auditor; and (4) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. The first two elements were established as discussed above. For the third and fourth elements, COA Circular No. 2003-03 requires liquidation of cash advances charged against intelligence and confidential funds within one month from accomplishment of the purpose; COA Circular No. 97-002 requires liquidation of travel cash advances within 60 days for foreign travel or 30 days for local travel, and requires that cash advances no longer needed or unused for two months be returned, with all cash advances fully liquidated at the end of each year. The records showed that 11 years had passed from the last day of the prescribed liquidation period to the filing of the cases. As a mala prohibita offense, the mere failure to account within the prescribed period rendered Soliva criminally liable. Her receipt of three demand letters and her clear disregard of her obligation to liquidate demonstrated voluntariness. Her incomplete payments through payroll deduction after the prescribed period had already elapsed did not constitute a defense.

• Penalty: Republic Act No. 10951, enacted during the pendency of the cases, amended the penalties for Articles 217 and 218 and, being favorable to the accused, was given retroactive application. For Article 217, where the amount involved exceeds PHP 40,000.00 but does not exceed PHP 1,200,000.00, the penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, with perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount malversed. The Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. Soliva voluntarily surrendered after the warrant was issued, without law enforcement needing to find and capture her. For Article 217, with one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan's imposed penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum to six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum was in accord with law. For Article 218, with one mitigating circumstance offset by no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty is taken from the minimum period of prision correccional (six months and one day to one year, one month, and 10 days), and the minimum from arresto mayor maximum (four months and one day to six months). The penalty was modified to four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to six months and one day of prision correccional as maximum, with a fine of PHP 40,000.00 for each count.

• Distinction Between Mala in se and Mala Prohibita — Crimes mala in se are acts wrong in themselves, where criminal intent governs; crimes mala prohibita are acts not inherently wrong but prohibited by positive law for reasons of public policy, where the only inquiry is whether the law has been violated. The determination depends on the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. Not all crimes under the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, and not all offenses under special laws are mala prohibita. In mala prohibita, the essence is voluntariness in the commission of the act constitutive of the crime; what must be proven is not criminal intent but the offender's intent to perpetrate the act.

• Prima Facie Presumption of Malversation — Under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Demand is not an element of malversation but is a requisite for the application of the presumption. The presumption is only prima facie and may be overcome by proof to the contrary. An accountable officer may be convicted even without direct proof of misappropriation, as long as there is evidence of shortage which the officer is unable to explain.

• Payment Does Not Extinguish Criminal Liability in Malversation — The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on, the amounts malversed or misappropriated after the commission of the crime does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability. At best, it may affect only the offender's civil liability and may be credited as a mitigating circumstance.

• Requisites for Newly Discovered Evidence — A new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence when: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The movant bears the burden of showing compliance with all four requisites. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant has acted reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence in light of the totality of circumstances.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to submit to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of custody.

• "Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?" — This passage, quoted from Dungo vs. People, articulates the canonical formulation of the mala in se/mala prohibita distinction as applied to determine whether Article 218 requires proof of criminal intent.

• "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses." — This is the statutory presumption from Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, central to the conviction for malversation where no direct proof of misappropriation was presented but the accountable officer failed to produce the funds upon demand.

• "The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability." — This principle, drawn from Venezuela vs. People, establishes that post-offense restitution cannot serve as a defense to malversation charges, at most affecting civil liability or serving as a mitigating circumstance.

• "To correct a common misconception, We must stress that not all crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code are mala in se. In the same way, not all offenses punishable under special laws are mala prohibita." — This clarification corrects the assumption that the Revised Penal Code exclusively governs mala in se offenses and special laws exclusively govern mala prohibita offenses, directing courts to examine the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act.

• Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194 (2005) — Cited for the principle that the threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proffered evidence could not have been discovered by due diligence. Followed.
• Dungo vs. People, 762 Phil. 630 (2015) — Cited for the canonical distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. Followed and applied to classify Article 218 as mala prohibita.
• Sarion vs. People, 899 Phil. 346 (2021) — Cited for the proposition that mayors are accountable officers for all government funds and property pertaining to their municipality. Followed.
• People vs. Pantaleon, Jr., et al., 600 Phil. 186 (2009) — Cited for the holding that a municipal mayor, as chief executive, is deemed an accountable officer responsible for all government funds within his or her jurisdiction. Followed.
• Venezuela vs. People, 826 Phil. 11 (2018) — Cited for the principle that malversation is committed from the moment the accountable officer misappropriates public funds and fails to satisfactorily explain the inability to produce them, and that payment after the crime does not extinguish criminal liability. Followed.
• People vs. Ramoy, 920 Phil. 656 (2022) — Cited for the principle that not all crimes under the Revised Penal Code are mala in se and not all offenses under special laws are mala prohibita, and that the essence of mala prohibita is voluntariness. Followed.
• People vs. Talaue, 893 Phil. 554 (2021) — Cited for the principle that in cases of failure under Article 218, the intent to fail cannot be immediately inferred from the mere occurrence of a failure, and whether a violation exists must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Followed.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 10951) — Defines and penalizes malversation of public funds or property. The last paragraph establishes the prima facie presumption of malversation when an accountable officer fails to produce public funds upon demand. Applied to convict Soliva of one count of malversation for PHP 551,000.00 in unliquidated cash advances supported by vouchers.
• Article 218, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 10951) — Penalizes the failure of an accountable officer to render accounts within two months after such accounts should be rendered. Applied to convict Soliva of ten counts, one for each cash advance voucher she failed to liquidate within the prescribed COA periods.
• Article 203, Revised Penal Code — Defines who are public officers for purposes of the Revised Penal Code's provisions on crimes committed by public officers. Applied to establish that Soliva, as municipal mayor elected by popular election, was a public officer.
• Section 340, Local Government Code — Provides that any officer of a local government unit whose duty permits or requires possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof. Applied to establish Soliva's accountability as municipal mayor.
• Section 102, Government Auditing Code of the Philippines — Provides that the head of any government agency is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his or her agency. Applied to establish Soliva's primary responsibility for municipal public funds.
• COA Circular No. 97-002 — Governs the liquidation of cash advances, requiring liquidation within 60 days for foreign travel, 30 days for local travel, return of unused cash advances within two months, and full liquidation at the end of each year. Applied to establish the prescribed liquidation periods for Soliva's travel and peace and order cash advances.
• COA Circular No. 2003-03 — Requires liquidation of cash advances charged against intelligence and confidential funds within one month from accomplishment of the purpose. Applied to establish the prescribed liquidation period for Soliva's confidential and intelligence fund cash advance.
• Rule 121, Section 2(b), Revised Rules of Court — Provides the ground for new trial based on newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence and which would probably change the judgment. Applied to deny Soliva's motion for new trial.
• Republic Act No. 10951 (2017) — Amended the penalties for violations of Articles 217 and 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Given retroactive application as favorable to the accused.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.