People vs. Soliman

In prosecutions for online libel under Section 4(c)(4) in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10175, the penalty may be a fine only, imposed as a single or alternative penalty. The law does not mandate imprisonment exclusively; the penalty of fine is an alternative that may be increased by one degree in accordance with Article 75 of the Revised Penal Code, resulting in a range of ₱40,000.00 to ₱1,500,000.00. Where the trial court exercises sound discretion and imposes a fine within that range, a prosecution appeal seeking to substitute or add imprisonment places the accused in double jeopardy.

Private complainant Waldo R. Carpio held a position at the Bureau of Plant Industry and was allegedly responsible for releasing Sanitary and Phytosanitary Import Clearances (SPS Permits). Respondent Jomerito S. Soliman, an importer, accused Carpio of deliberately delaying the release of his SPS clearance for a rice shipment, which had a deadline of arrival on February 28, 2018. On January 23, 2018, Soliman posted on his Facebook account a lengthy denunciation containing profane language and allegations that Carpio was undermining his business, engaging in “backdoor activities,” and financing internet trolls. The post tagged several public officials, including then-President Rodrigo R. Duterte and Secretary Manny Piñol. The post was later deleted upon the intervention of the Department of Agriculture Secretary, and Soliman apologized to Carpio multiple times.

• Nature: The case stemmed from a criminal charge for Online Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012). The Information alleged that on January 23, 2018, in Quezon City, Soliman willfully and maliciously posted on Facebook defamatory remarks against Waldo R. Carpio, accusing him of deliberately delaying the release of Soliman’s SPS clearance and of engaging in corrupt activities, thereby exposing Carpio to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.

• The Facebook Post: Soliman’s Facebook post, written in a mix of Filipino and English, contained profane language and asserted that Carpio, who worked at the Bureau of Plant Industry, had “tarantado” (deceived) him, that the SPS clearance was intentionally held up, that Carpio was involved in “backdoor activities,” and that Carpio was a “financer of TROLL.” The post tagged the accounts of President Rodrigo R. Duterte, Secretary Manny Piñol, and Special Assistant to the President Christopher Bong Go, among others.

• Trial Court Proceedings: The RTC found that Soliman had indeed posted the libelous statements. However, it also found that the post was prompted by anger and a perception of provocation—Soliman believed Carpio was unjustly delaying his SPS permit. Immediately after the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture called his attention, Soliman deleted the post and apologized to Carpio several times.

• Penalty Imposed: In its Decision dated August 23, 2019, the RTC convicted Soliman of Online Libel and imposed a fine of ₱50,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. The RTC expressly invoked Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 (Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases) and prevailing jurisprudence authorizing a fine alone in lieu of imprisonment when the circumstances warrant. Soliman did not appeal his conviction and voluntarily paid the fine.

• Prosecution’s Challenge: The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the Court of Appeals, contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by imposing a fine only. The People argued that Section 6 of RA 10175 mandates a penalty one degree higher than that provided by the Revised Penal Code and that this necessarily meant imprisonment, not merely a fine.

• Mandatory Imprisonment under Section 6: Petitioner maintained that Section 6 of RA 10175 requires the imposition of a penalty one degree higher than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for crimes committed through information and communications technology. Since the RPC penalizes libel with prision correccional or a fine, petitioner argued that the increase by one degree compels the imposition of imprisonment—specifically, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period—and that a fine alone is not a penalty “one degree higher.”

• Inapplicability of AC 08-2008: Petitioner contended that Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 cannot govern online libel because RA 10175, a later enactment, does not adopt the Circular’s preference for fines. Furthermore, even if the Circular applied, the factual circumstances did not match those enumerated in the Circular where a fine alone was deemed appropriate.

• Certiorari as Proper Remedy to Correct an Illegal Penalty: Petitioner argued that a special civil action for certiorari lies to correct a penalty imposed with grave abuse of discretion because such an error is jurisdictional. It asserted that no double jeopardy attaches when the court that rendered the judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

• Double Jeopardy: Respondent countered that the petition for certiorari violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Having chosen not to appeal and having fully satisfied the judgment by paying the fine, he argued that the conviction had become final and executory, and any attempt to increase the penalty places him twice in jeopardy.

• Impropriety of Certiorari: Respondent maintained that the error alleged by petitioner—imposing a fine instead of imprisonment—is, at most, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari cannot serve as a substitute for a lost appeal.

• Discretion to Impose Fine: Respondent contended that under Article 355 of the RPC, the penalty for libel is prision correccional or a fine, or both, meaning imprisonment and fine are alternative penalties. The RTC, therefore, had the discretion to impose a fine only, a discretion neither removed by RA 10175 nor by its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Respondent underscored that Section 5 of the IRR of RA 10175 itself states that online libel shall be punished with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period “or a fine” ranging from ₱6,000.00 up to the maximum amount determined by the Court, or both.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent argued that the RTC acted judiciously, taking into account the mitigating circumstances—his act was done in the heat of anger, he promptly deleted the post, and he apologized. These considerations placed the case squarely within the situations contemplated by the Court in the precedents underpinning AC 08-2008.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari: Whether the People’s petition for certiorari seeking to increase the penalty from a fine to imprisonment violated respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
• Alternative Penalty of Fine for Online Libel: Whether Section 6 of RA 10175, in mandating a penalty one degree higher than that provided in the Revised Penal Code, eliminates the alternative penalty of fine and compels the imposition of imprisonment for online libel.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it imposed a penalty of fine only, rather than imprisonment, upon a conviction for online libel.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari: The petition did not violate double jeopardy only because the Court ultimately found no grave abuse of discretion. Under People v. Celorio, a special civil action for certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion does not, by itself, place the accused in double jeopardy because the writ, if issued, ousts the lower court of jurisdiction, rendering the first judgment void. If, however, the appellate court finds no grave abuse of discretion and therefore does not nullify the first jeopardy’s jurisdiction, any increase of the penalty would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Here, since the RTC acted within its jurisdiction and sound discretion, the penalty could not be increased.

• Alternative Penalty of Fine for Online Libel: Section 6 of RA 10175 does not mandate imprisonment as the exclusive penalty for online libel. Article 355 of the RPC, as amended by Section 91 of RA 10951, penalizes libel with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from ₱40,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, or both. The use of the disjunctive “or” signifies that imprisonment and fine are alternative penalties. Article 26 of the RPC recognizes that a fine may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty. Section 6 of RA 10175 directs that the penalty “shall be one (1) degree higher” but does not specify that only imprisonment may be increased. Article 75 of the RPC expressly governs the increase or reduction of the penalty of fine by degrees. Consequently, the penalty of fine for online libel, increased by one degree, ranges from ₱40,000.00 (minimum unchanged under Article 75) to ₱1,500,000.00 (maximum of ₱1,200,000.00 plus one-fourth thereof, or ₱300,000.00). The fine of ₱50,000.00 imposed by the RTC is within this lawful range.

• Conflict Between RA 10175 and its IRR: Section 5 of the IRR of RA 10175 retained the outdated fine range from the pre-RA 10951 version of Article 355, creating a variance with the statute. Following the settled rule that implementing rules cannot expand or contradict the law they implement, the express provisions of Section 6 of RA 10175 and Article 355 of the RPC as amended by RA 10951 prevail over the inconsistent IRR.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The trial court found that Soliman acted in the heat of anger and perceived provocation, promptly deleted the libelous post upon being called out, and apologized multiple times. These circumstances are analogous to those listed in AC 08-2008, where the Court had sustained the imposition of a fine alone—namely, when the libel was committed in reaction to a perceived provocation, in the heat of anger, and without prior record. The Circular, which does not remove imprisonment as an alternative but guides the court’s discretion, applies equally to online libel.

• Alternative Penalty Principle under the RPC — Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty for libel in the alternative: imprisonment or a fine, or both. The disjunctive “or” renders the penalties mutually exclusive alternatives. Article 26 of the RPC confirms that a fine may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty. This alternative character is carried over to online libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, because Section 6 merely raises the penalty by one degree without altering its nature.

• Increasing Fine by Degrees under Article 75 of the RPC — When it is necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, the fine shall be increased or reduced, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without changing the minimum. The minimum remains constant. For online libel, the fine is one degree higher than the amended Article 355: maximum of ₱1,200,000.00 plus ₱300,000.00 (one-fourth of ₱1,200,000.00) equals ₱1,500,000.00; minimum remains ₱40,000.00. For each subsequent reduction by one degree, the maximum is reduced by another one-fourth of the original maximum (i.e., ₱375,000.00), yielding a range of ₱40,000.00 to ₱1,125,000.00 for one-degree reduction, and ₱40,000.00 to ₱750,000.00 for two-degree reduction.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari in Penalty Appeals — Under People v. Celorio, an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase a valid penalty places the accused in double jeopardy. A special civil action for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of penalty does not per se violate double jeopardy because it challenges the court’s jurisdiction. However, if the reviewing court finds no grave abuse of discretion and the original court acted with jurisdiction, the writ may not issue, and any modification of the penalty would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

• Primacy of Statute over Implementing Rules — Where a conflict exists between a law and its implementing rules and regulations, the law prevails. The IRR cannot restrict, expand, or contradict the legislative mandate. The penalty range in the IRR of RA 10175 that retained the pre-RA 10951 figures was thus ineffective to override the statutory penalty computed under Section 6 of RA 10175 in relation to Article 355 as amended by RA 10951.

• Applicability of AC 08-2008 to Online Libel — Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 applies to online libel cases. It does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty but vests trial judges with sound discretion to determine, given the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. When the accused acts in the heat of anger, upon perceived provocation, and demonstrates remorse, a fine alone may be imposed.

• “[T]he Court finds that there is no legal basis for petitioner to argue that: (a) a penalty of fine may not be imposed in the case of Online Libel; and (b) Section 6 speaks only of imprisonment when it provided for a penalty one degree higher than that provided in the RPC. Clearly, Articles 26, 75, and 355 of the RPC provide that the penalty of fine may be imposed instead of imprisonment and it may be increased or decreased by degrees.” — This passage encapsulates the core holding that fine is a viable sole penalty for online libel and may be elevated by degrees.

• “For double jeopardy to apply, the judgment in the first jeopardy must have been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, the very issue in a certiorari petition, which seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. When the writ is issued, the court is ‘vacated of its jurisdiction’ and ‘its judgment takes no effect.’ Thus, there is no double jeopardy if the court handing down the sentence in the first jeopardy is ousted of its jurisdiction.” — This defines the interplay between certiorari and double jeopardy as applied to penalty modifications.

• “In case of a conflict between the law and its IRR, the law prevails.” — Succinctly states the controlling status of the statute over its administrative elaboration.

• “[B]oth the RPC and RA 10175 prescribe the penalty of imprisonment or a fine for the crimes of Traditional Libel and Online Libel, depending on the circumstances present in each case. Both statutes did not alter the character of the penalties of imprisonment and fine as alternatives to each other, or as concurrent penalties, in cases of Online Libel or Libel.” — Confirms the continuing alternative character of the penalties across both regimes.

• People v. Celorio, G.R. No. 226335, June 23, 2021 — Followed and applied. Established that an appeal seeking to increase a valid penalty violates double jeopardy, but certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion challenges jurisdiction and does not per se place the accused in double jeopardy.

• De los Angeles v. People of the Philippines, 103 Phil. 295 (1958) — Applied. Established the method for increasing or reducing fines by degrees under Article 75 of the RPC: each degree corresponds to one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law.

• Sazon v. CA, 325 Phil. 1053 (1996); Mari v. CA, 388 Phil. 269 (2000); Brillante v. CA, 511 Phil. 96 (2005); Buatis, Jr. v. CA, 520 Phil. 149 (2006) — Cited as the jurisprudential foundation of AC 08-2008, illustrating circumstances where a fine alone was upheld: defense of honor, heat of anger and perceived provocation, election-season passions, and first-time offense motivated by perceived moral duty.

• Limkaichong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 792 Phil. 133 (2016) — Cited for the rule that implementing rules and regulations must not go beyond the law they implement and that in case of conflict, the law prevails.

• Article 355, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 91 of Republic Act No. 10951 — Punishes libel by means of writings or similar means with prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from ₱40,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, or both. This provision is the baseline penalty whose fine range was increased by RA 10951 and which Section 6 of RA 10175 elevates by one degree for online libel.

• Article 26, Revised Penal Code — Classifies fine as an afflictive, correctional, or light penalty that may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty, supporting the imposition of a fine without imprisonment.

• Article 75, Revised Penal Code — Governs the increase or reduction of the penalty of fine by degrees: each degree equals one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without changing the minimum.

• Section 4(c)(4), Republic Act No. 10175 — Defines the crime of online libel as the unlawful acts of libel under Article 355 of the RPC committed through a computer system or similar means.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 10175 — Provides that crimes defined and penalized by the RPC, if committed through information and communication technologies, shall be punished one degree higher than that provided by the RPC.

• Section 5, IRR of RA 10175 — Found partially inconsistent with the statute insofar as it retained the pre-RA 10951 fine range for online libel; the statutory provision prevails over the inconsistent regulation.

• Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 — Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. Declared applicable to online libel, reminding courts that imprisonment remains an alternative but that a fine alone may be imposed in the sound discretion of the judge, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo (with a separate concurring opinion), Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez, and Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh.
Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa filed a separate opinion.
Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ricardo R. Rosario were on leave.

None. The decision was unanimous on the denial, with only separate concurring and separate opinions filed, neither dissenting from the result.