People vs. So

The justifying circumstance of self-defense is unavailing when unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has already ceased, and the exempting circumstance of insanity requires complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment at the very moment the act was committed.

Elyboy So was charged with murder for the fatal stabbing of Mario Tuquero in the early morning of June 3, 1991, in Manila. The prosecution alleged the attack was sudden and from behind, while the appellant claimed he acted in self-defense after Tuquero first attacked him with a knife. The appellant also invoked insanity as an exempting circumstance, citing a prior confinement for psychosis six years before the incident.

• Nature of the Action: Criminal prosecution for murder.
• The Drinking Session: On June 2, 1991, appellant Elyboy So met his cousins and the victim, Mario Tuquero (the common-law husband of his cousin Emy So), for a drinking session. An altercation occurred, during which appellant shouted loudly. Tuquero advised appellant to go home for disturbing the neighbors, and appellant ran off.
• The Stabbing: Around 4:00 a.m. on June 3, 1991, while Tuquero and Emy So were waiting for a taxi, appellant suddenly appeared from behind and repeatedly stabbed Tuquero with a fan knife. When Tuquero fell, appellant continued stabbing him on the front of his body despite Emy So's pleas. Tuquero sustained 18 stab wounds, four of which were fatal.
• Appellant's Version: Appellant claimed that during the drinking session, Tuquero and his cousins threatened him, causing him to flee. Later, at the street corner, Tuquero allegedly attacked him with a knife. He claimed he wrested the knife away and stabbed Tuquero in self-defense.
• Surrender and Investigation: Appellant hid in a nearby alley, surrendered to responding policemen, and was brought to the police station. The weapon was recovered.
• Defense of Insanity: Appellant presented evidence that he was confined for psychosis at the National Center for Mental Health in 1985, six years prior to the incident.

• Self-Defense: Appellant argued he acted in complete self-defense, claiming the victim, Mario Tuquero, was the initial unlawful aggressor who attacked him with a knife.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant contended that the testimony of prosecution witness Emy So was biased and unreliable due to her relationship with the victim and an alleged family grudge.
• Insanity: Appellant maintained he was insane at the time of the stabbing, as evidenced by his prior confinement for psychosis, and should be exempt from criminal liability.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: The prosecution countered that Emy So's testimony was credible and consistent with the physical evidence, and mere relationship to the victim does not automatically impair credibility.
• Failure of Self-Defense: The prosecution argued that appellant failed to prove the essential elements of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, as the aggression had ceased once appellant disarmed the victim.
• Treachery: The prosecution maintained the attack was treacherous, as it was sudden, unexpected, and from behind, leaving the victim no opportunity to defend himself.
• Insanity Not Proven: The prosecution argued that the evidence of insanity was insufficient, as it did not show complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant successfully proved the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.
• Insanity: Whether the appellant sufficiently proved the exempting circumstance of insanity.

• Self-Defense: The claim of self-defense was rejected. Even assuming the victim was the initial aggressor, the unlawful aggression ceased the moment appellant wrested the knife from him. After that point, there was no more aggression to repel, and the appellant's repeated stabbing of the victim was no longer justified. Furthermore, appellant's testimony was found incredible and inconsistent, and the numerous wounds inflicted on the victim belied a defensive stance.
• Treachery: The qualifying circumstance of treachery was present. The attack was sudden, unexpected, and from behind, ensuring its execution without risk to the appellant from any defense the victim might make. The victim was completely unaware of the impending assault.
• Insanity: The exempting circumstance of insanity was not proven. The law presumes sanity, and the burden to prove insanity rests on the defense. The evidence presented—a prior confinement for psychosis six years earlier and speculative medical testimony—failed to establish that appellant was completely deprived of reason or acted without discernment at the very moment he committed the stabbing. His detailed recall of events before and after the incident further negated a claim of complete insanity.

• Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression — For self-defense to be appreciated, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is an indispensable requisite. Once that aggression has ceased, the person making the defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The Court applied this to find that even if the victim initially attacked, the aggression ended when appellant took the knife.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim from behind exemplifies this circumstance.
• Burden of Proving Insanity — The accused who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance has the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The inquiry must focus on the mental state of the accused at the very moment the crime was committed. A history of mental illness, without proof of a complete deprivation of intelligence at the critical time, is insufficient.

• "It is sheer lunacy for the Accused to asseverate that Mario Tuquero stabbed the Accused in slow motion . . ." — The Court used this to highlight the incredibility of appellant's version of events.
• "After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor." — This succinctly states the controlling legal principle that defeated the self-defense claim.
• "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." — This underscores the high legal standard for the exempting circumstance of insanity, distinguishing between mere abnormality and complete deprivation of reason.

• People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801 (1993) — Cited for the rule that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
• People v. Gomez, 235 SCRA 444 (1994) — Cited to support the ruling that self-defense is negated when the accused obtains possession of the weapon and the aggression has already ceased.
• People v. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 (1974) — Cited to illustrate the principle that an appellant's selective memory loss regarding the crucial act of stabbing, while recalling other details, is not credible evidence of insanity.
• People v. Catanyag, 226 SCRA 293 (1993) — Cited for the rule that the presumption of sanity prevails and the burden to prove insanity lies with the defense.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The Court affirmed the conviction under this article, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The Court found its elements were not met.
• Article 12(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for the exempting circumstance of insanity. The Court held it was not sufficiently proven.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia). The Court found it present in the commission of the crime.

• Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
• Justice Jose C. Bellosillo
• Justice Ricardo J. Francisco (No part)
• Justice Jose A. R. Melo (No part)
• Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Ponente)
• Justice Florentino P. Feliciano (No part)
• Justice Regalado E. Maambong (No part)
• Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin (No part)
• Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero (No part)

(Note: The decision lists Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ. as concurring.)

N/A — The decision does not note any dissenting opinions.