People vs. Sinoc

The crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a homicide occurs by reason or on occasion of a robbery, even if the killing was not part of the original conspiracy — the conspirator who agreed only to the robbery is still liable for the homicide because he could have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm or death being inflicted on the persons targeted for robbery. However, a conspirator may not be held liable for a separate offense of frustrated murder committed on the occasion of the robbery when the evidence shows he agreed only to the plan to rob, not to any assault or killing, and the special complex crime of robbery with homicide absorbs all other crimes committed on the occasion of the robbery.

Danilo Sinoc was charged in two amended informations dated January 23, 1992, together with five other accused, for the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder (Criminal Case No. 3564) and kidnapping with frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 3565), under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The charges arose from an incident on September 20, 1991, where armed men identifying themselves as members of the New People's Army stopped a vehicle belonging to Taganito Mining Corporation, kidnapped the manager and driver, and shot them. Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, the other accused being at large; Salon was subsequently acquitted for lack of evidence of conspiracy.

On September 20, 1991, at about 6 o'clock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte to Surigao City, riding in a company Mitsubishi Pajero driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As they approached the public cemetery of Claver, several armed men identifying themselves as members of the New People's Army stopped the vehicle, boarded it, and ordered the driver to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them to a coconut grove some six meters from the road with their hands bound behind their backs, made them lie face down, and shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived; Guijapon died on the spot.

Two prosecution witnesses testified at trial: Marlyn Legaspi, a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, who heard gunshots and later saw a blue Pajero speeding away, and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, who found the slain driver and the wounded Viacrusis and brought the latter to the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital. In an affidavit executed on October 17, 1991, Viacrusis identified Danilo Sinoc, known as "Colot," as one of the malefactors, but he did not testify at trial for undisclosed reasons, and his affidavit was not formally offered.

The following day, September 21, 1991, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, a civilian asset named Boyet reported to the Police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen Pajero was parked behind the apartment of Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project. A police team went to the place, and after being told by Overa that the man who brought the vehicle would return that morning, they posted themselves to keep it in view. At about 10:30 o'clock, they saw a man approach the Pajero who tried to run away upon seeing them. The man, identified as Danilo Sinoc, had the key to the Pajero and was acting under instructions of companions waiting at the Star Lodge at Tagum. The police brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge but his companions were no longer there, and he was later turned over to the 459th Mobile Force.

Four months later, on January 21, 1992, SPO1 Roger A. Basadre and two other officers brought Sinoc to the Public Attorneys' Office at Butuan City, where Atty. Alfredo Jalad was asked to take Sinoc's statement. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit of confession. Jalad informed Sinoc of his right to choose his own counsel and to remain silent, but Sinoc insisted on making the affidavit with Jalad's assistance. The statement was taken in Cebuano/Visayan, a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar, and at its conclusion, Jalad read the contents to Sinoc from beginning to end. The statement was signed by Sinoc and witnessed by Jalad. Sinoc was then brought to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy, who told Sinoc the statement was "very damaging" and discussed its contents in Cebuano; Sinoc stood by his answers, and Brocoy administered the oath and certified that he was satisfied that Sinoc voluntarily executed and understood his statement.

In his sworn statement, Sinoc declared that he was formerly working at Taganito Mining Company; that in June 1991, he learned that Benjamin Espinosa, Jaime Jornales, Victorino Delegencia, and a certain "Ram" had been monitoring Viacrusis' activities and planned to kidnap him and rob him of his Pajero, making it appear to be an act of the NPA; that the plan was conceived by Vicente Salon, who provided funds and two hand guns; that he was offered P20,000.00 to join the operation and agreed "because of poverty"; that on September 20, 1991, he, "Ram," and Espinosa stopped the Pajero, brandishing two .38 caliber revolvers and a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the vehicle identifying themselves as NPA soldiers; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor, they picked up "James" and "Jun-gren"; that at San Vicente, Barobo, the victims, with hands tied behind their backs, were made to get down; that "James" shot Viacrusis four times and "Jun-gren" fired at Guijapon four times; that when Sinoc remonstrated at the shootings, he was told it was on Salon's orders; and that the malefactors left the Pajero at the Bliss Housing Project at Monkayo where Salon was supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinoc.

While under detention at the Provincial Jail awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two letters to the Trial Judge dated June and July 1992 asking to be transferred to the City Jail because he had heard that Salon, arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had planned to kill him. He sent a third letter dated August 11, 1993, which the Trial Judge described as "substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavit of confession."

Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi, claiming that on September 19, 1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with his wife preparing to sell tableya in Tagum, Davao del Norte; that on September 20, 1991, they were selling tableya in Tagum; that while there, they met a certain Darves who offered him P1,000.00 to accompany his driver, Ram, to get a vehicle at Moncayo; that he agreed and went with Ram to Moncayo on a bus; that when he reached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns at him and searched him, finding the key to the Pajero; and that he was brought to the Moncayo police station and investigated without being informed of his constitutional rights. He further testified that he was detained by the 459th Mobile Force until January 14, 1992, then brought to the CIS Compound at Butuan City where he was subjected to interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent; that when he refused to sign an affidavit, he was maltreated by having his head repeatedly submerged in a toilet bowl full of excrement and by being tied to a bed with his feet up and head down; that on January 21, 1992, after being interrogated the whole night, he agreed to sign the affidavit because the CIS officers told him they would kill or "salvage" him; and that when he told Atty. Jalad he had his own lawyer, Jalad remarked, "Never mind, all attorneys are just the same as long as it is attorney." Sinoc's wife, Jovita, and Efren Dak-ang testified in corroboration.

• Lack of Conspiracy: Sinoc argued that he was convicted of the offenses charged although conspiracy had not been independently proven to exist among him and the other persons named in the indictment, and that as far as he was concerned, the conspiracy was only to carnap the Pajero and did not include any killing or assault against persons.

• Illegal Arrest: Sinoc argued that the evidence obtained after his arrest should have been rejected because he was arrested without any warrant of arrest.

• Inadmissible Confession: Sinoc argued that his confession should have been rejected because he was illegally arrested and thereafter subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel of choice from September 21, 1991 to January 20, 1992, first by the Monkayo 459th Mobile Force and later by the CIS in Butuan City, and because he was allegedly maltreated and coerced into signing the affidavit.

• Validity of Arrest: The prosecution maintained that the warrantless arrest was justified under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court because an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Sinoc had committed it, given that he was found with the key to the stolen Pajero and was identified by Overa as the one who had brought the vehicle.

• Voluntariness of Confession: The prosecution presented the testimonies of Atty. Alfredo Jalad and City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy establishing that the confession was voluntarily given after Sinoc had been duly informed of his constitutional rights, and that no promises were made to induce the confession.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: Whether Sinoc's arrest without a warrant was lawful under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

• Admissibility of Confession: Whether Sinoc's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily executed and admissible despite his claims of custodial interrogation without counsel and maltreatment.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3564: Whether the crime committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 was kidnapping with murder or robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3565: Whether the crime committed in Criminal Case No. 3565 was kidnapping with frustrated murder or a separate offense of frustrated murder, and whether Sinoc could be held liable therefor.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: Yes. The warrantless arrest was lawful under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, because an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Sinoc had committed it, given his link to the stolen Pajero and his possession of its key.

• Admissibility of Confession: Yes. The confession was voluntarily executed under applicable safeguards, as attested by Atty. Alfredo Jalad and City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy, and was confirmed by Sinoc's own letter to the Trial Judge and by other evidence; no competent evidence substantiated the claim of torture or threats.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3564: No. The crime was not kidnapping with murder but robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, because the evidence showed the conspiracy was to steal the Pajero by violent means, and the killing of Guijapon occurred by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3565: No. Sinoc could not be held liable for the separate offense of frustrated murder as regards Viacrusis, because the evidence showed he agreed only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, not to any assault or killing, and the special complex crime of robbery with homicide absorbs all crimes committed on the occasion of the robbery.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: The Court applied Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which permits a warrantless arrest when an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The police officers were aware that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajero had been stolen and its driver and passenger shot, one fatally. An informer had reported that the stolen vehicle was at the Bliss Housing Project at Moncayo. When the officers reached the place, they were told by Paulino Overa that the man who had brought the Pajero would return, and when Sinoc appeared and was identified by Overa, he had the key to the stolen vehicle and was moving toward it to take possession. His link to the stolen vehicle and hence to the kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation was palpable, leaving the officers no alternative save to arrest him.

• Admissibility of Confession: The Court found that the initial interrogation of Sinoc without advising him of his rights was inconsequential because the prosecution never attempted to prove what he might have said on that occasion. As to the confession made at the Public Attorneys' Office, the Court accepted the account of Atty. Alfredo Jalad and City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy that the confession was voluntarily given after Sinoc had been duly informed of his constitutional rights, finding no reason for these government officials to give false evidence. The confession was confirmed by Sinoc's letter of August 11, 1993 to the Trial Judge, which was substantially identical in content, and by his own trial testimony admitting he had traveled from Tagum to Moncayo to get the stolen Pajero. The confession contained details improbable to have been conjured out of thin air, and was consistent with the testimony of Marlyn Legaspi and Barangay Councilor Jamero. No competent evidence substantiated the claim of torture; Sinoc made no such claim to either Jalad or Brocoy, his wife made no mention of it in her testimony, and the counsel he claimed to have wanted, Atty. Gavino Samontina, was never presented.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3564: The Court held that there was no kidnapping as defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential object of which is to "kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty." The evidence showed that the plan was not to capture Viacrusis and deprive him of liberty, but to steal his Pajero by violent means; the kidnapping was merely incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. The offense actually committed was robbery with homicide under Article 294, which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. The term "homicide" is used in the generic sense, including murder, and even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as important as the asportation, the kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide. Sinoc could not avoid liability for the homicide because it was committed on the occasion of the robbery, and he could not but have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm or death being inflicted on the persons in the Pajero targeted for robbery, since two of his companions were armed with guns. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed under Article 13(3) was credited in his favor.

• Proper Crime in Criminal Case No. 3565: The Court held that the acts in Criminal Case No. 3565 — robbery and frustrated murder — did not fall within the ambit of Article 294, which treats of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons but not robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide. Neither did the crimes come within Article 48 on complex crimes, because the two crimes did not result from a single act, nor was either offense a necessary means for committing the other; the shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the carnapping, which had already been consummated at the time the victim was shot. Sinoc could not be held liable for the separate offense of frustrated murder because the evidence showed he agreed only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, not to any assault or killing, and conspirators may only be held accountable for acts embraced in the criminal agreement. Nor was it logical to convict him twice of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances.

• Robbery with homicide under Article 294, Revised Penal Code — The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is committed when a homicide occurs by reason or on occasion of a robbery. The term "homicide" is used in the generic sense, including murder, and the nature of the offense is not altered by the treacherous character or the number of killings in connection with the robbery. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the killing of Guijapon, although not agreed to or expected by Sinoc, was committed on the occasion of the robbery of the Pajero, making Sinoc liable for robbery with homicide.

• Absorption of crimes in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide — The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed, since all homicides committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite integrated whole. This concept applies to other crimes committed because or on the occasion of the robbery, such as rape, serious physical injuries, and multiple frustrated homicides. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Sinoc could not be convicted of a separate offense of frustrated murder in addition to robbery with homicide.

• Conspiracy and liability of conspirators — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspirators may only be held accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; as regards felonious acts not included, only the author thereof would be liable. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Sinoc, who agreed only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, could not be held liable for the separate offense of frustrated murder of Viacrusis.

• Warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court — A peace officer may effect a warrantless arrest when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the validity of Sinoc's arrest, given that the officers had personal knowledge of the recent commission of the offense and of Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle.

• "The 'kidnapping' was not the principal objective; it was merely incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion of the seizure of the 'Pajero' — and (as far as the proofs demonstrate) without fore-knowledge on Sinoc's part — its driver was killed, and the lone passenger seriously injured." — This passage states the Court's finding that the evidence did not establish kidnapping as the principal objective, but rather robbery of the vehicle, which is central to the reclassification of the crime.

• "There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code — the essential object of which is to 'kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty.'" — This passage defines the essential element of kidnapping under Article 267 and explains why the crime charged was not committed.

• "For unfortunately for him, there is no avoiding the fact that a homicide — although not agreed to or expected by him — was committed on the occasion of the robbery of the 'Pajero;' and he could not but have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm, even death, being inflicted on the person or persons in the 'Pajero' targeted for robbery, since two of his companions were armed with guns." — This passage articulates the basis for holding Sinoc liable for robbery with homicide despite the killing not being part of the original conspiracy.

• "In this case, the two crimes of 'carnapping' and frustrated murder did not result from 'a single act.' Nor was either offense a 'necessary means for committing the other.' The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the 'carnapping;' indeed at the time the victim was shot, the 'carnapping' had already been consummated." — This passage explains why Article 48 on complex crimes did not apply to Criminal Case No. 3565.

• People vs. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 — Cited for the proposition that a conspirator who agreed only to a robbery may be held liable for homicide committed on the occasion of the robbery, since he could have anticipated the possibility of serious harm or death.

• People vs. Sumayo y Bersebal, 70 SCRA 488 — Cited together with Espejo for the same proposition regarding liability for homicide committed on the occasion of robbery.

• People vs. Cabuena, 98 Phil. 919 — Cited for the doctrine that the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is not multiplied with the number of persons killed, since all homicides committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite integrated whole.

• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Cited in the footnote regarding the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 and its application to carnapping cases committed after December 31, 1993.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines kidnapping and serious illegal detention; the Court held that the essential object of this crime is to "kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty," which was not the principal objective of the conspiracy in this case.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder; cited in the informations but found inapplicable because the crime committed was robbery with homicide.

• Article 294, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; the Court applied paragraph 1, imposing reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes; the Court held it inapplicable because the crimes of carnapping and frustrated murder did not result from a single act, nor was either a necessary means for committing the other.

• Article 13(3), Revised Penal Code — Defines the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed; the Court credited this in favor of Sinoc.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

• Section 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court — Permits warrantless arrest when an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; the Court applied this in upholding the validity of Sinoc's arrest.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.