People vs. Sequiño, et al.

Robbery with homicide is established when the taking of personal property with intent to gain is accomplished through violence or intimidation and homicide results by reason or on occasion of the robbery; where conspiracy is proven, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, rendering identification of the specific shooter unnecessary. Evidence derived from an admission obtained during uncounseled custodial investigation following an illegal warrantless arrest is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree, but a conviction may stand on independent evidence untainted by the constitutional violation.

Hacienda Jose Ancajas Agricultural Corporation operated in Medellin, Cebu, employing workers whose wages were periodically withdrawn from the Medellin Rural Bank, located three kilometers from the hacienda, and transported to the hacienda for distribution. The accused-appellants had connections to the hacienda and its vicinity: Nenito Melvida and Ermelindo Sequiño had previously worked at the hacienda, while Vicente Tumangan's parents were neighbors of the hacienda overseer, Eugenio Godinez. The frequency of payroll money transports had reportedly become public knowledge among hacienda laborers and their relatives. At the time of the offense on April 24, 1991, the imposition of the death penalty had been suspended under the 1987 Constitution, and R.A. No. 7659 reimposing it had not yet taken effect.

At around noon on April 24, 1991, Eugenio Godinez, overseer of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw ₱50,577.17 for the wages of hacienda workers. The bank's cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank's motorcycles. Serafin drove, with Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez; Godinez carried the money in a bag hung over his left shoulder.

As the three neared the hacienda in Sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, three armed men attempted to block their path and ordered them to stop. Godinez recognized the men as Nenito Melvida and Ermelindo Sequiño, former hacienda workers, and Vicente Tumangan, whose parents were Godinez's neighbors. Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle passed the armed men, a gunshot rang out. Broniola fell from the motorcycle with a gunshot wound to the head. Serafin leapt off and fled, while the motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Tumangan, gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused along a single route toward Daang Lungsod.

Serafin reached the Broniolas' house nearby and informed Broniola's wife of the incident. SPO Elpidio Luna, at the Medellin police headquarters, received a report about the robbery and proceeded to the crime scene, where he found an abandoned motorcycle and a soiled bio-data sheet bearing the name "Melvida, Nenito," apparently used as toilet paper. A bystander led Luna to the house of Nenito's father, who directed Luna to Nenito's brother's house, where Luna found Melvida playing cards. Luna asked Melvida to accompany him to the barangay captain's house; when the captain was absent, Luna took Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was detained overnight and interrogated by Luna and other officers without counsel. During interrogation, Melvida admitted keeping his "share from the loot" in his house and turned over ₱9,000 to the police. In a subsequent interrogation by SPO3 Alfredo Mondigo, Melvida identified his companions as Tumangan and Sequiño, who were staying at the house of Juanito Hones in Daanlungsod. Mondigo and another officer proceeded to that house, found Tumangan and Sequiño on the porch, and noticed a bulge at Tumangan's waist. A pat-down revealed a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with four bullets, for which Tumangan admitted having no license. Both were brought to the station, where Tumangan was interrogated, also without counsel, and admitted being one of the holduppers.

Paraffin tests conducted the next day yielded negative results for Tumangan and Melvida, but Sequiño's left hand tested positive for gunpowder residue. Dr. Arturo Sormillon's post-mortem examination of Broniola revealed a single gunshot wound at the upper back of the head, with the bullet entering at the nape and exiting through the mouth along an upward trajectory; death was likely instantaneous. The defense interposed alibi and denial, with Melvida claiming he was at his brother's house at the time of the crime, and Tumangan and Sequiño claiming they had left Cebu City at 1:00 p.m. and arrived in Medellin at 5:00 p.m. to procure Sequiño's birth certificate for his wedding. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible, crediting Godinez's positive identification of all three accused—whom he knew beforehand and observed at close range in broad daylight—and rejecting the defense of alibi as weak and uncorroborated.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and in sentencing them to life imprisonment and ordering them to pay damages jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim and to the other robbery victims.
• Identity of the Shooter: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in convicting them despite the lack of identity of the person who fired the shot that hit and killed Pedro Broniola.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants maintained that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy, the prosecution not having proved any evidence showing conspiracy among the accused.
• Constitutional Rights During Investigation: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court failed to consider the non-observance of constitutional safeguards during police investigation, specifically the failure to remind the accused of their right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.

• Constitutional Rights: Whether the admissions and evidence obtained during the uncounseled custodial investigation of the accused are admissible, given the absence of counsel and the alleged illegal warrantless arrest.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was sufficiently established to hold all three accused liable for the killing regardless of who fired the fatal shot.
• Identity of the Shooter: Whether the prosecution must identify the specific accused who fired the shot that killed Pedro Broniola to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the accused were proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
• Damages: Whether the trial court's awards of moral and exemplary damages were proper.

• Constitutional Rights: No. The admissions and the ₱9,000 recovered from Melvida were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree, the arrest being illegal and the custodial investigation conducted without counsel in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. The conviction was nonetheless sustained on independent evidence.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established from the concerted acts of the accused in blocking the motorcycle, commanding the victims to stop, and fleeing together along a single route.
• Identity of the Shooter: No, identification of the specific shooter is not required. Once conspiracy is established, the criminal act of one is attributable to all.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The accused were proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: Partially modified. The awards of ₱10,000 each to Godinez and Serafin were deleted for lack of factual basis; the ₱10,000 to the widow was treated as moral damages only; exemplary damages were deleted for absence of aggravating circumstances.

• Constitutional Rights: Melvida's "invitation" by Luna constituted an arrest, as it involved submission to custody for the purpose of holding him to answer for an offense. The arrest was warrantless and did not fall under any of the lawful warrantless arrest scenarios in Section 5, Rule 113: Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida's guilt, the bio-data sheet being insufficient to establish probable cause since it could have been obtained by anyone and left at the scene. The subsequent custodial investigation was conducted without informing Melvida of his right to remain silent and to counsel, in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, and the same violations attended Tumangan's interrogation. Consequently, Melvida's admission was inadmissible, and the ₱9,000 recovered as a result was excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree—the rule being that once the primary source is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence derived from it is also inadmissible. Nevertheless, the conviction rested on independent evidence: the positive identification by eyewitnesses, the paraffin test results, and the physical evidence, none of which was derived from the illegal investigation.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be shown by proof of a prior agreement for an appreciable period; it is sufficient that at the time of the offense, the accused shared the same purpose and were united in execution. The agreement may be inferred from the mode and manner of the offense or from acts demonstrating joint purpose, concerted action, and community of intent. The three accused were one in blocking the motorcycle and commanding the victims to stop, and they were unanimous in fleeing the crime scene along a single route to Daang Lungsod. These concerted acts indicated a community of criminal intent, which is the essence of conspiracy.
• Identity of the Shooter: Because conspiracy was proven, it is immaterial which of the three accused fired the fatal shot. The killing is attributable to all. The paraffin test result pointing to Sequiño as the likely gunman was corroborative but not essential to the conviction.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The elements of robbery—taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another through violence or intimidation—were satisfied: Tumangan, armed and after having shot Broniola, took the money from the defenseless Godinez while the latter was pinned under the motorcycle. Intimidation was present because the display and actual use of firearms naturally impaired the victim's free will. The killing of Broniola on the occasion of the robbery elevated the crime to robbery with homicide under Article 294(1), "homicide" being understood in its generic sense. The positive identification by Godinez, who knew all three accused beforehand and observed Tumangan at close range in broad daylight, outweighed the defense of alibi and denial, which are weak defenses made weaker by positive identification.
• Damages: Moral damages of ₱10,000 were awarded only to the widow Presentacion vda. de Broniola, who testified to her "worries" from her husband's death; Godinez and Serafin neither claimed nor testified to moral damages, so their awards were deleted. Exemplary damages require proof of one or more aggravating circumstances under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, none of which was proven, so the exemplary damages component was deleted and the ₱10,000 to the widow was recharacterized as moral damages only. Additionally, the accused were ordered to indemnify Hacienda Jose Ancajas ₱50,577.17, the full amount taken, since no portion was proven recovered by admissible evidence—the ₱9,000 from Melvida and the ₱22,526 whose recovery was unexplained both being inadmissible.

• Fruit of the Poisonous Tree — Evidence derived from an illegally obtained primary source is inadmissible. Where an admission is obtained during uncounseled custodial investigation in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, both the admission and any derivative evidence—such as money recovered as a consequence of the admission—are excluded. The Court applied this to exclude Melvida's admission and the ₱9,000 recovered from him, citing People vs. Alicando, which in turn cited Nardone vs. U.S. and People vs. Salanga.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. No prior agreement for an appreciable period is required; it is sufficient that at the time of the offense, the accused shared the same purpose and were united in execution. Conspiracy may be inferred from the mode and manner of the offense or from acts demonstrating joint purpose, concerted action, and community of intent. Once established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, making identification of the specific perpetrator unnecessary.
• Warrantless Arrest — A warrantless arrest is lawful only under Section 5, Rule 113: (a) the offense is committed in the officer's presence; (b) the offense has just been committed and the officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating the arrested person committed it; or (c) the person is an escaped prisoner. A mere "invitation" to accompany the police, when the officer believes the person is a suspect, constitutes an arrest requiring compliance with these conditions. The bio-data sheet found at the crime scene did not constitute personal knowledge of facts indicating guilt, rendering the arrest illegal.
• Alibi and Denial vs. Positive Identification — Alibi and denial are weak defenses, weaker still when faced with positive identification by credible witnesses. Where the accused were known to the eyewitnesses and identified in broad daylight at close range, alibi cannot prevail.

• "Since the 'recovery' of P9,000.00 from Melvida was due to his 'admission' in the course of the custodial interrogation made in violation of paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence pursuant to paragraph (3) of the said section then the P9,000.00 cannot also be admitted in evidence as a 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" — This passage articulates the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to evidence derived from constitutionally infirm custodial investigation, linking the exclusionary rule under Section 12(3) to derivative evidence.
• "Conspiracy having been established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed Pedro Broniola, for that criminal act is attributable to all three accused." — This states the principle that once conspiracy is proven, the specific identity of the perpetrator among the conspirators becomes immaterial, resolving the issue of the unidentified shooter.
• "Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter's 'invitation' was a submission to Luna's custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense." — This defines what constitutes an arrest, rejecting the "invitation" fiction sometimes employed by law enforcement to evade constitutional safeguards.

• People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995] — Cited for the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, establishing that derivative evidence from an illegally obtained admission is inadmissible. The Court followed this doctrine to exclude the ₱9,000 recovered from Melvida.
• Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983] — Cited for the rule on an investigator's duties prior to and during custodial interrogation, reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases including People vs. Galit, People vs. Lumayok, People vs. Albofera, People vs. Marquez, People vs. Penillos, and People vs. Basay. The Court found these duties were deliberately disregarded.
• People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992] — Cited for the proposition that "homicide" in robbery with homicide is understood in its generic sense, encompassing murder or slight physical injuries committed during the robbery.
• People vs. Canillo, 236 SCRA 22 [1994] — Cited for the definition and requisites of conspiracy, particularly that it may be inferred from acts demonstrating joint purpose and community of intent.

• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery with homicide, imposing reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of robbery. Applied to convict the accused, with reclusion perpetua imposed because the death penalty was suspended at the time of the offense under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• Section 12(1) and (3), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel during custodial investigation, and renders inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of these rights. Applied to exclude Melvida's admission and the recovered money as inadmissible.
• Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Governs lawful warrantless arrests, enumerating three circumstances where a peace officer may arrest without a warrant. Applied to determine that Melvida's arrest was illegal, as Luna lacked personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida's guilt.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in criminal cases only when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied to delete the award of exemplary damages for absence of any proven aggravating circumstance.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.