People vs. Sazon

Where the accused admits the killing but fails to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, self-defense cannot be appreciated; and where conspiracy is established by concerted acts toward a common purpose, the act of one is the act of all, but the killing is reduced from murder to homicide when neither evident premeditation nor abuse of superior strength is proven.

Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were charged with murder for the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias "Inday," on September 17, 1983, at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City. Only Sazon was arraigned and tried, Altejos having evaded apprehension and remained at large. The case originated from an amended information dated October 18, 1983, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, presided over by Judge Sixto R. Guanzon.

On September 15, 1983, at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, Gerardo Sazon accosted Ernesto Romualdez near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that Sazon and his companions were engaged in stealing. Sazon boxed Romualdez, causing him to fall. Wilfredo Longno, who was present, approached and helped Romualdez and pushed Sazon away. Angered, Sazon told Longno in his native dialect, "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid" ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you"), to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."

Two days later, on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 P.M., Sazon and his cousin Cornelio Altejos were drinking softdrinks at the store of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by. Sazon and Altejos left their drinks half-consumed and followed Longno. Longno reached a bench near the public faucet where Massulini Dullete, Samuel Canoso, and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting and joined their conversation. Shortly thereafter, Sazon and Altejos arrived; Sazon accosted Longno, pointed a gun at him, and said, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?"). Longno faced Sazon and replied, "Brod, tiruha lang" ("Brod, just shoot").

Irritated by the response, Sazon fired, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso, and Ramos scampered for safety as Sazon and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. While they were struggling, Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after which both Sazon and Altejos fled. Longno emerged shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto" ("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto"). He ran about thirty meters before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to him. Rushed to St. Paul's Hospital, Longno died; the cause of death was established as hemorrhage secondary to stab wound.

Sazon admitted shooting Longno but pleaded self-defense. He claimed that on September 17, 1983, he left his father-in-law's house at about 8:00 P.M. with Altejos, who had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver repaired and was taking it to a policeman friend. On their way, Sazon saw Longno, who allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson." Sazon claimed Longno had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw it. Sazon said he parried the gun, but it fired and hit one of his left fingers, which was later amputated. He then drew his own gun and shot Longno in the forearm. They grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate them but was brushed aside. During the struggle, Altejos shouted, "I stabbed Inday, run," and they fled.

The defense's version was undermined by inconsistencies between Sazon's testimony and that of his lone eyewitness, Jose Randera. Sazon testified that the victim's gun fell to the ground during the struggle, while Randera stated that Sazon and the victim were still grappling for the latter's gun — a physical impossibility, since Sazon was simultaneously alleged to be holding his own gun in his right hand. Randera's credibility was further damaged by the trial court's finding that he falsely testified that the victim was shot in the body and that blood came out below the right breast, when the physical evidence showed the only gunshot wound was on the left forearm. Randera also falsely claimed no other persons were present, when overwhelming evidence showed many others were at the scene.

The physical evidence further negated self-defense. A paraffin test on the victim's cadaver showed his hands were negative for gunpowder residues, indicating he did not fire a gun. Gunpowder residues were found on his forearm and abdomen, consistent with having been shot at close range by Sazon. Sazon's own hands tested positive for gunpowder residues, and a forensic chemist confirmed the nitrates were from gunpowder, not from fertilizer or other contamination. The trial court found that only one gun was involved during the incident and that it belonged to Sazon, the amputation of his finger having been caused when he and the victim grappled for possession of that gun at very close range.

• Self-Defense: Appellant argued that he acted in complete self-defense, claiming the victim drew a gun and fired first, hitting his left finger, whereupon he parried the gun and shot the victim in self-preservation.
• Absence of Conspiracy and Aggravating Circumstances: Appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy and the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and therefore his conviction for murder and the imposition of reclusion perpetua were erroneous.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellant acted in lawful self-defense such that he should be acquitted.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the killing was attended by evident premeditation and abuse of strength sufficient to qualify the crime as murder.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between Sazon and Altejos was sufficiently established to hold Sazon liable for the fatal stab wound inflicted by Altejos.

• Self-Defense: No. The plea of self-defense failed because the defense did not establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the primary element sine qua non of self-defense.
• Qualifying Circumstances: No. Neither evident premeditation nor abuse of superior strength was proven by competent evidence; the killing could not be qualified as murder.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established by the coordinated acts of Sazon and Altejos in following and jointly confronting the victim, demonstrating a concordance of action geared toward a common purpose.

• Self-Defense: When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in defense of himself, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non; without it, self-defense — complete or incomplete — cannot exist. The defense failed to establish unlawful aggression on the victim's part. The testimonies of Sazon and his eyewitness Randera were inherently inconsistent regarding whether the victim's gun fell to the ground or was still being grappled for — a material contradiction, since establishing a second gun would have supported the defense theory of unlawful aggression. Randera's credibility was further destroyed by his false testimony about the location of the gunshot wound and his claim that no other persons were present. The physical evidence was decisive: the paraffin test on the victim's cadaver showed his hands were negative for gunpowder residues, indicating he never fired a gun, while Sazon's hands were positive for nitrates confirmed to be from gunpowder. The trial court found only one gun was involved and that it belonged to Sazon. The defense's character evidence — unconvicted, dismissed criminal charges against the victim — established only a probability and could not prevail over the prosecution's physical evidence negating unlawful aggression. The issue being factual and the trial court having heard the witnesses, its findings were accorded great weight.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Evident premeditation requires proof of three elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating the culprit clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The first and second elements were absent. Sazon's angry warning two days earlier — "I will kill you" — was a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado, not a studiedly conceived homicidal premeditation, and was publicly announced. The chance encounter at the store when the victim passed by could not be taken as manifestly indicating Sazon had clung to a determination to kill; no evidence showed he purposely waited for the victim or that the victim frequently used that route. The meeting may have been accidental, and the assault was more likely precipitated by the victim's belligerent and defiant demeanor when confronted. Abuse of superior strength could not be appreciated absent clear evidence of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength; no such evidence was presented. Circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.

• Conspiracy: Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not essential to establish conspiracy; it is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. The coordinated acts of Sazon and Altejos — immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him — revealed a concordance and unity of thought. After Sazon shot the victim and they grappled for the gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicating closeness and coordination of action geared toward a common purpose: to kill the victim. The absence of evident premeditation did not negate conspiracy, since conspiracy does not require the time element necessary for premeditation. Where conspiracy is proven, a showing of who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction; the act of one becomes the act of all. References to Altejos were obiter, however, since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — Where the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself admitted the killing.

• Unlawful Aggression as Condition Sine Qua Non — The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.

• Elements of Evident Premeditation — To justify the attendance of evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted or publicly announced.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime only if it is clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it. In the absence of evidence of such deliberate intent, the circumstance cannot be appreciated.

• Conspiracy by Concerted Action — Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely essential to establish conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Where conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction; the act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all.

• Proof of Qualifying/Aggravating Circumstances — The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner, as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.

• "It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself." — This passage states the fundamental rule on self-defense and the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly announced." — This formulation distinguishes genuine premeditation from a spontaneous expression of anger, articulating the qualitative standard for the first element of evident premeditation.

• "Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement." — This passage defines the mode by which conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts without proof of prior agreement, a canonical formulation in Philippine conspiracy jurisprudence.

• "The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense." — This states the standard of proof required for qualifying and aggravating circumstances, ensuring they are not presumed but established with the same certainty as the crime itself.

• People vs. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, June 28, 1989 — Cited for the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, and that even weak prosecution evidence cannot be disbelieved after the accused admits the killing.
• People vs. Batas, et al., G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989 — Cited for the doctrine that unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense.
• People vs. Talla, et al., G.R. No. L-44414, January 18, 1990 — Cited for the three elements of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Salcedo, et al., 172 SCRA 78 (1989) — Cited for the rule that abuse of superior strength requires proof of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.
• People vs. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622 (1986); People vs. Cantre, et al., G.R. No. 70743, June 4, 1990 — Cited for the principle that proof of a previous agreement is not essential to establish conspiracy; concerted action toward the same objective suffices.
• People vs. Custodia, et al., 97 Phil. 698 (1955); People vs. Arcamo, etc., et al., 105 SCRA 707 (1981) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy does not require the time element necessary for evident premeditation.
• People vs. Tala, et al., 141 SCRA 240 (1986) — Cited for the rule that where conspiracy is proven, a showing of who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction.
• U.S. vs. Balagtas, et al., 19 Phil. 164 (1911) — Cited for the principle that the death of the victim must be the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection to sustain evident premeditation.
• People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984); People vs. Atienza, 148 SCRA 147 (1987) — Cited for the rule that qualifying or aggravating circumstances must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.

• Section 51, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Allows the bad moral character of the offended party to be proven in evidence to establish in reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, e.g., the quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression. The Court noted, however, that such evidence establishes only a probability and cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred. Paras, J., was on leave.