People vs. Sayaboc

An extrajudicial confession obtained during custodial investigation is inadmissible where the counsel assigned to the suspect remained silent throughout the proceedings, failing to provide meaningful advocacy, and where the constitutional rights advisement was a mere perfunctory recitation without a valid written waiver. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation must be proven as factually as the crime itself, and aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated under the retroactively applicable 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Joseph Galam owned and operated the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Marlon Buenviaje had a personal grudge against Galam stemming from a fistfight on 13 August 1994, during which Buenviaje was bloodied and publicly threatened to kill Galam. Benjamin Sayaboc was a Grade IV-educated individual who was a stranger to Nueva Vizcaya and had been in police custody for two days prior to the investigation for another offense. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating and qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the information, were pending and undetermined at the time of the appeal and were deemed beneficial to the accused, warranting retroactive application.

On 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard Tessie Pawid screaming "Enough, enough, enough!" from across the road. In front of her were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, engaged in a fisticuff. After Pawid separated the two, Buenviaje's face was bloodied and Galam's shirt collar was torn. As Buenviaje was leaving on a tricycle, he turned toward Galam, made a slicing motion across his throat with his right index finger, and shouted: "Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin kita." Galam retorted, but Buenviaje did not respond and departed.

More than three months later, on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at his Rooftop Disco and Lodging House in Barangay Quezon, Solano. According to waitress Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, at about 3:00 p.m. that day, a man later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell and asked whether a woman in a green t-shirt had checked in, and then inquired what time the "bosing" would arrive. Tessie Pilar, the caretaker, testified that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m., Sayaboc was seated in a swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked in his jacket pocket, ordered a bottle of beer, and grew angry at the delay in its delivery. Shortly after Galam's vehicle arrived, four gunbursts were heard from the ground floor. Jaramillo looked down and saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, who fell face up with blood spurting from his chest. Sayaboc then ran out and disappeared into the darkness.

Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. that same day, Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod of Barangay Quezon, was on his way to Kowloon Restaurant when he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and Diego Theater. Marlon was on the driver's seat, while Miguel and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. After Parungao got his order of pancit bihon and was leaving the restaurant, he heard four gunshots from behind the Rooftop building. He then saw a person later identified as Sayaboc walking briskly toward the tricycle, riding behind Marlon Buenviaje, after which the tricycle sped off toward the center of town. Galam was brought to a hospital and declared dead on arrival. Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted the autopsy, found four gunshot wounds — the first two inflicted from behind and the last two frontal.

That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police Station, sent investigators to the crime scene and later brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, where a cartographic sketch of the assailant was drawn. On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Sayaboc as the gunman at the PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong. That afternoon, SPO4 Cagungao took Sayaboc's statement after Sayaboc requested counsel but could not name one; Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO was brought in, conferred with Sayaboc briefly, and remained silent throughout the investigation. Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano, admitting to killing Galam at Marlon Buenviaje's behest for P100,000 and implicating Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. Sayaboc later retracted the confession, claiming police brutality and coercion.

At trial, after the prosecution rested, counsel for the Buenviajes and Escorpiso filed a demurrer to evidence on 12 July 1999 without first obtaining leave of court; the motion for leave was filed only the next day. The trial court denied the demurrer and ruled that the three had waived their right to present evidence under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Only Sayaboc was allowed to present his defense, which consisted of denial and alibi. The trial court found Sayaboc guilty of murder with treachery as a qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances, sentencing him to death. It found Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal of homicide, and Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices of homicide, since treachery could not be taken against them.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Appellants contended that the crime committed by Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of treachery because the eyewitnesses did not see the commencement of the shooting. They argued that treachery and evident premeditation were not specifically designated as qualifying circumstances in the information, and that the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward could not be appreciated because they were not alleged in the information. They maintained that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring aggravating and qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should be applied retroactively.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Appellants argued that Sayaboc's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer assigned during custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel — he remained silent throughout the proceedings and was allegedly formerly a judge in the National Police Commission holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
• Due Process for Co-Accused: Appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso claimed they were denied due process because they were unable to present evidence in their defense after their demurrer to evidence was denied, and asked the Court to relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional right to be heard by themselves and counsel.

• Treachery: The OSG maintained that Sayaboc's extrajudicial confession stating he shot the victim in the back was adequate proof of treachery. Citing People vs. Aquino, the OSG argued that treachery need only be specifically alleged in the information and does not have to be preceded by the words "qualifying" or "qualified by."
• Aggravating Circumstances: The OSG conceded that craft and price or reward, even if proved, could not be appreciated because they were not specifically alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
• Admissibility of Confession: The OSG asserted that Sayaboc's extrajudicial confession was admissible because it was made after he was informed of and accorded his constitutional rights, particularly the right to independent counsel of his own choice. It argued that no evidence was adduced during trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo was formerly connected with NAPOLCOM, and that this claim was made for the first time on appeal, based on hearsay information.
• Demurrer to Evidence: The OSG countered that no exceptional circumstance existed warranting relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to evidence carries with it a waiver of the accused's right to present evidence.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether Sayaboc's extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence given the alleged deficiencies in the competence and independence of the counsel assigned and the manner of advising constitutional rights.
• Qualification of the Crime: Whether Sayaboc is guilty of murder or only homicide, specifically whether treachery and evident premeditation were sufficiently proved.
• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward may be appreciated despite not having been alleged in the information.
• Due Process of Co-Accused: Whether the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were denied their constitutional right to be heard when the trial court disallowed them from presenting evidence after they filed a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje, and whether Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso may be held liable as conspirators or accomplices.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: No. The confession was inadmissible because the assigned counsel was not competent and independent — he remained silent throughout the investigation — and the constitutional rights advisement was a mere perfunctory recitation lacking a valid written waiver.
• Qualification of the Crime: Homicide only. Neither treachery nor evident premeditation was sufficiently proved, no witness having testified to the inception of the attack, and the time of Sayaboc's determination to kill was not established absent the excluded confession.
• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstances: No. Craft and price or reward cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically alleged in the information, as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is retroactively applicable as beneficial to the accused.
• Due Process of Co-Accused: No violation. The filing of a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court constitutes an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
• Conspiracy: Yes as to Marlon Buenviaje; No as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. Conspiracy between Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje was established by circumstantial evidence. Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, their mere presence near the crime scene being insufficient to establish conspiracy.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The presumption of voluntariness of extrajudicial confessions is conditioned on strict compliance with constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused's rights during custodial investigation. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that any person under investigation be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, and that these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The confession here contained only a perfunctory recitation of rights — the stereotyped "advice" that assumes the nature of a legal form, lacking the spontaneity and understanding required for a valid waiver. There was no express written waiver. Moreover, Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the investigation, failing to satisfy the standard that counsel must ensure the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering questions. The trial court's attribution of this silence to Sayaboc's "garrulous" nature was rejected as immaterial; what is required is a faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make the suspect aware of the consequences of his actions. The claim that Atty. Cornejo was formerly connected with NAPOLCOM was not ruled upon for lack of substantiation, but the silence alone sufficed to render the confession inadmissible.

• Qualification of the Crime: Treachery requires two conditions: (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. Treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack; where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. Here, no witness testified as to how the aggression began. The trial court's inference of stealth from the absence of any shout or conversation before the attack was merely speculative. The autopsy showing two wounds from behind and two frontal wounds, while plausible, was insufficient to establish treachery. Evident premeditation requires proof of (1) the time the accused determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time to allow reflection. Without the excluded extrajudicial confession, the testimony that Sayaboc waited at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. did not prove when he decided to kill Galam. Accordingly, the crime was homicide only, punishable by reclusion temporal, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances appreciated.

• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstances: Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to the accused and may be given retroactive effect. Since craft and price or reward were not alleged in the information, they could not be appreciated even if proved during trial.

• Due Process of Co-Accused: The filing of a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence. The rationale is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that the evidence is insufficient to convict, negating any need to present evidence. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints. The trial court correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the co-accused cannot now claim denial of their right to be heard.

• Conspiracy: Price or reward as evidence of conspiracy was not established by competent proof, as the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible and the newspaper reports were hearsay. However, conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence. The concatenation of circumstances — Marlon Buenviaje's prior fistfight with and threat to kill Galam, Sayaboc's lack of discernible motive, Sayaboc's joining Marlon in the waiting tricycle immediately after the shooting, the tricycle's flight, Marlon's prolonged fugitive status, and the attempt by Marlon's relatives to bribe a prosecution witness — satisfied the requisites for circumstantial evidence: more than one circumstance, proven facts, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, mere presence near the crime scene or in the tricycle was insufficient. Knowledge, acquiescence, or approval without cooperation and agreement to cooperate does not establish conspiracy. They were accordingly acquitted.

• Competent and Independent Counsel During Custodial Investigation — The right to competent and independent counsel under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that counsel satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering questions. Counsel must provide meaningful advocacy, not perfunctory advice. A lawyer who remains silent throughout the custodial investigation is neither competent nor independent. The duty of counsel includes conferring with the client, explaining the nature of the questions, halting the investigation when necessary, and ensuring the suspect is aware that the right to remain silent may be invoked at any time. Counsel need not prevent a confession, but must ensure the suspect's awareness of consequences at each stage.

• Perfunctory Rights Advisement — The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than a ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions that are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form, and its tired, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or understanding. The advisement must allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. Treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack; where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, treachery cannot merely be supposed.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow reflection upon the circumstances of the act. When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before the plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.

• Demurrer to Evidence Without Leave of Court — The filing of a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court constitutes an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused. The rationale is that the accused, by moving for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, implicitly asserts that no defense is needed. An accused cannot wager on the outcome of proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints. This rule also prevents the dilatory practice of filing demurrers and then claiming the right to present evidence after denial.

• Conspiracy by Circumstantial Evidence — Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when: (1) there is more than one circumstance established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proved; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Mere presence near the crime scene, or knowledge, acquiescence, or approval without cooperation and agreement to cooperate, is insufficient to establish conspiracy.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Rules Beneficial to the Accused — Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information, is beneficial to the accused and may be given retroactive effect to cases pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.

• "The right to be informed requires 'the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.'" — This passage defines the constitutional standard for the right to be informed during custodial investigation, distinguishing meaningful advisement from mere ceremonial recitation, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions.

• "The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired." — This quotation from People vs. Deniega, as adopted in the decision, articulates the canonical formulation of what constitutes competent and independent counsel during custodial investigation.

• "For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed." — This passage states the rule on the evidentiary requirement for proving treachery, requiring eyewitness testimony of the inception of the attack, and is a standard citation in cases involving the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• "The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused." — This passage states the controlling rule on the procedural consequences of filing a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court, establishing the waiver doctrine under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

• People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) — Cited for the doctrine that the stereotyped "advice" in extrajudicial confessions assumes the nature of a legal form and does not create an impression of voluntariness or understanding. The Court relied on this case to invalidate the perfunctory rights advisement in Sayaboc's confession.
• People vs. Deniega, 321 Phil. 1028 (1995) — Cited for the principle that the desired role of counsel in custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice rather than meaningful advocacy. The Court applied this standard to find Atty. Cornejo's silence constituted ineffective assistance.
• People vs. Aquino, 386 SCRA 391 (2002) — Cited for the rule that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" in the information. The Court acknowledged this rule but still found treachery unproven on the facts.
• People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 (1993) — Cited for the proposition that the right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than a ceremonial recitation. The Court applied this standard to the rights advisement in Sayaboc's confession.
• People vs. Loterono, 391 SCRA 593 (2002) — Cited for the rule that treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. The Court applied this to find that treachery could not be appreciated because no witness testified to how the aggression began.
• People vs. Turingan, 282 SCRA 424 (1997) — Cited for the doctrine that filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence. The Court applied this to uphold the trial court's disallowance of the Buenviajes and Escorpiso from presenting evidence.
• People vs. Mandao, G.R. No. 135048 (2002) — Cited for the principle that mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence, or approval without cooperation and agreement to cooperate is insufficient to establish conspiracy. The Court applied this to acquit Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso.

• Section 12, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of any person under investigation for the commission of an offense to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and provides that any confession obtained in violation thereof is inadmissible in evidence. The Court applied this provision to exclude Sayaboc's extrajudicial confession for failure to provide competent and independent counsel and for lack of a valid written waiver.
• Section 8, Rule 110, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime. The Court applied this provision retroactively, as beneficial to the accused, to preclude appreciation of craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances because they were not alleged in the information.
• Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Provides that when a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment. The Court applied this provision to uphold the trial court's ruling that the Buenviajes and Escorpiso waived their right to present a defense.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 249 (Homicide) — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal. The Court applied this provision after downgrading Sayaboc's conviction from murder to homicide, imposing the penalty in the medium period absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.