People vs. Sarmiento

Any unauthorized person who sells, delivers, gives away, distributes, or acts as broker in the transfer of a prohibited drug is criminally liable under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, without need to prove pecuniary advantage, recovery of the drug from his person at arrest, or presentation of the marked money where the transfer itself was proved by eyewitness testimony and the accused's own admissions.

Allan Sarmiento y Largo, then less than sixteen years old, and Alberto Moore were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. On September 20, 1984, Sarmiento was at a billiard hall in the City of Tagbilaran when agents of the PC Narcotics Command arrested him shortly after he passed four marijuana sticks to a PC informant posing as buyer. He had obtained the cigarettes from Moore, to whom he also gave the marked money paid by the buyer. Moore initially escaped although apprehended later.

Following arrest, Sarmiento was taken to the NARCOM headquarters for investigation, where he signed a sworn confession that he would later repudiate at trial. The prosecution presented Sgt. Renato Remetiera, Sgt. Alejandro Binan, and Agent Teodosio Rosaroso to establish the entrapment and arrest. It also introduced the PC Crime Laboratory chemistry report, admitted by the defense at pre-trial, confirming the seized cigarettes were positive for marijuana, together with the cigarettes, other exhibits, and the confession.

Testifying as lone defense witness, Sarmiento practically admitted that a person he identified as John Tagalog approached him for marijuana cigarettes, that he said he would ask Moore, that he got the narcotics from Moore after paying him the money received from Tagalog, and that he then gave the four sticks to Tagalog. According to him, he was forced to sign the confession, did not know its contents, and was without assistance of counsel or even his parents when it was taken. There was no evidence of his physical maltreatment.

• Coerced Confession Without Counsel: Petitioner maintained that his sworn confession was involuntary, its contents unknown to him, and taken without assistance of counsel or presence of his parents.
• Absence of Pecuniary Benefit: Petitioner argued that he did not benefit from the transaction and therefore disclaimed criminal responsibility.
• Lack of Possession and Marked Money: Petitioner argued that none of the sticks was found in his possession at arrest and the marked money was never presented in evidence.
• Non-Presentation of Poseur-Buyer: Petitioner argued that the failure to call the buyer to testify undermined the prosecution's case.

• Non-Presentation of Poseur-Buyer: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that the defense had every right to call the buyer if it wanted to and could not fault the prosecution for not doing so, the prosecution having the right to present its case as it saw fit.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the sworn confession signed at NARCOM headquarters is admissible where obtained without advice of counsel.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Sale, Delivery and Brokerage: Whether guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 was established despite alleged absence of profit, lack of possession at arrest, non-presentation of marked money, and non-presentation of the poseur-buyer.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: No. The confession was rejected, it having been obtained from the accused without advice of counsel and without a valid waiver made with assistance of counsel.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Sale, Delivery and Brokerage: Yes. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt was established by the officers' narration of the actual transfer, the laboratory finding of marijuana, and the accused's own admissions, Section 4 requiring no proof of profit, possession at arrest, or presentation of marked money and buyer.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Although no physical maltreatment was shown, rejection was required because the record showed the confession was obtained without advice of counsel. The ruling doctrine, despite reservations of some members, requires that waiver of assistance of counsel be made with assistance of counsel.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Sale, Delivery and Brokerage: Rejection of the confession notwithstanding, the remaining prosecution evidence, not to mention the accused's own testimony, sufficed for conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The narration of the actual commission by prosecution witnesses was unrefuted and in fact supported by the defendant himself, whose brief spanning little more than one double-spaced page did not deny passing the four sticks from Moore to the poseur-buyer. Under Section 4, as amended by PD 1675, liability attaches to any unauthorized person who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or act as broker; no pecuniary advantage need be proven, actual physical possession at arrest is unnecessary and incompatible with acts involving transfer of possession, presentation of marked money was unnecessary in light of admission of receipt and delivery to Moore, and non-presentation of the buyer could not be faulted to the prosecution.

• Waiver of right to counsel in custodial investigation — A waiver of the assistance of counsel must itself be made with the assistance of counsel. Applied to reject Sarmiento's sworn confession, which was obtained without advice of counsel, even absent proof of physical maltreatment.
• Liability for sale, delivery, distribution and brokerage of prohibited drugs under Section 4, R.A. No. 6425 — Criminal liability attaches to any unauthorized person who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or act as broker in any such transaction. Applied to hold Sarmiento liable for obtaining marijuana from Moore and passing it to the poseur-buyer while transmitting payment, with no need to prove pecuniary advantage.
• Possession and corroboration in drug transfer offenses — Actual physical possession at the time of arrest is not an element where the punished acts involve transfer of possession, and presentation of marked money or testimony of the poseur-buyer is not indispensable where the transfer was proved by other eyewitnesses and the accused's own admissions. Applied to sustain conviction despite absence of drugs on Sarmiento's person, non-presentation of marked money, and non-presentation of the buyer.
• Treatment of drug dependents under Section 31, R.A. No. 6425 — A co-accused found to be a drug dependent may be committed to rehabilitation instead of being tried and punished. Applied to explain why Moore, who owned and sold the cigarettes, was committed to the NBI Treatment and Rehabilitation Center while the non-addict Sarmiento faced imprisonment for life.

• "But the law is the law. As judges, we have the duty to apply it, for all its seeming harshness, notwithstanding considerations of compassion that can at best only mitigate but not entirely condone the punishment." — States the justification for affirming life imprisonment despite the offender's minority, framing the dura lex, sed lex approach of the decision.
• "No pecuniary advantage need be proven. Actual physical possession at the time of arrest is not necessary and is in fact incompatible with the various acts punished, which involve precisely a transfer of possession." — Defines the elements of liability under Section 4 and rejects the defenses of lack of profit and lack of possession.
• "Despite the reservations of some members of this Court, including the writer of this opinion, the ruling doctrine still requires that the waiver of the assistance of counsel should be made with the assistance of counsel." — Articulates the controlling custodial-investigation rule applied to exclude the confession.
• "dura lex, sed lex." — Summarizes the rationale for imposing the severe statutory penalty on a youthful non-dependent offender not entitled to suspension under the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

• Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 — Cited as source of the ruling doctrine requiring waiver of counsel with assistance of counsel, applied to exclude the confession.
• People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 — Cited as reiteration of the counsel-waiver doctrine supporting exclusion.
• People vs. Hon. Luis Sison, 142 SCRA 219; People vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362; People vs. Pecardal, G.R. No. 71381, November 24, 1986 — Cited as further reiterations of the same counsel-waiver doctrine.

• Section 4, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. 1675 — Imposes life imprisonment to death and fine of P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 on any unauthorized person who sells, administers, delivers, gives away, distributes, dispatches in transit or transports any prohibited drug, or acts as broker; applied as basis for Sarmiento's criminal liability for passing marijuana and brokering payment.
• Section 31, R.A. No. 6425 — Provides for commitment of a drug dependent to treatment and rehabilitation on recommendation of an accredited Dangerous Drugs Board doctor; applied to explain Moore's commitment to the NBI Treatment and Rehabilitation Center without trial.
• Article 192, last paragraph, P.D. 603, as amended by P.D. 1179 — Denies suspension of sentence to the youthful offender under the Child and Youth Welfare Code; applied to hold that Sarmiento, sentenced to life imprisonment, was not entitled to suspension and could only hope for executive clemency.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.