People vs. Santos

A conviction for qualified rape may rest on the victim's positive, categorical, and consistent testimony that the accused, armed with a deadly weapon, inserted his penis into her vagina, corroborated by a medico-legal report showing healed hymenal lacerations; inconsistencies and improbabilities in the complainant's testimony on matters collateral to the element of carnal knowledge do not impair her credibility, and the non-presentation of the weapon used does not preclude conviction under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

Private complainant AAA, a minor born on August 26, 1986, resided with her mother BBB and her stepfather in a house at XXX, Rizal, where appellant Ricardo Santos, a taxi driver, was a neighbor and a drinking companion of her stepfather. The charge was prosecuted under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and Article 266-B, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997), in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997), the Information alleging that the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon against a minor. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing rules, the real names of the victim and her immediate family were withheld and fictitious initials used to protect their privacy.

AAA was born on August 26, 1986 in Quezon Province and was thirteen years old when she was raped on October 15, 1999. In 1999 she was living with her mother BBB and her second husband in a house at XXX, Rizal, where appellant Ricardo Santos, a taxi driver, was a neighbor and a drinking buddy of BBB's second husband. AAA was no stranger to appellant, who lived a few houses down the street and was often invited by her stepfather for drinking sessions in their house.

On the afternoon of October 15, 1999, AAA was at home taking care of her younger brother when appellant came to the house and told her to go to his house because he had something to give her. She went, and as soon as she stepped through the door appellant closed it and poked a gun at her right temple, frightening her. He then brought her to a room and asked her to undress; when she refused, he undressed her himself, removing all her clothing including her undergarments, while she cried and begged him, saying "Huwag po, huwag po." He kissed the different parts of her body, kissed her lips going downward, and sucked her nipple. He then removed his shorts, laid her on a bed, positioned himself face down on top of her, and inserted his private part into hers, making an up-and-down motion. AAA felt pain, tried to push him away, and cried and trembled with fear; she felt something hot come out of him. Afterwards appellant stood up, told her to dress, and kept the gun he was still holding. AAA went home but did not immediately report the incident to BBB or to anyone else because she was afraid that appellant would carry out his threat against her and her family.

AAA had been staying in Caloocan City since January 16, 2000. In the evening of January 30, 2000, BBB was awakened by the arrival of a family friend, Bong Bautista, who informed her that appellant had molested AAA. The following day BBB went to see AAA in Caloocan City and asked her whether appellant had indeed molested her, but AAA did not answer. BBB then brought AAA back to XXX to be questioned by the Barangay Captain, and only then did AAA divulge that on October 15, 1999 appellant had raped her at gunpoint. Her narration was recorded in the barangay logbook. The Barangay Captain confirmed that on January 31, 2000 BBB and AAA went to see him at the barangay hall and that AAA narrated how she was raped by appellant in October 1999, and that at the time of the incident appellant was a neighbor of AAA, both being residents of XXX. On the following day, BBB accompanied AAA to the XXX Police Station where they filed a complaint for rape against appellant, and, as required by the police, AAA underwent physical and genital examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame.

Dr. Reynaldo Dave, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, conducted the examination on February 1, 2000 and issued a Medico-Legal Report finding no external signs of application of any form of trauma; the labia majora full, convex and coaptated; the labia minora dark brown and non-hypertrophied; the hymen with a shallow healed laceration at the 3 o'clock position and deep healed lacerations at the 7 and 9 o'clock positions; the posterior fourchette abraded and rounded; the external vaginal orifice offering moderate resistance to the examining index finger; and the vaginal canal narrow with prominent rugosities. He concluded that the subject was in a non-virgin state physically, with no external signs of application of any form of trauma. Dr. Dave explained that the shallow healed laceration meant a hymenal tear not more than one-half of the hymenal width, while the deep healed lacerations lacerated more than half of the hymenal width; that the lacerations were more than seven days old; that they were caused by the penetration of a blunt object, which could be an erected male penis; and that the age of the lacerations jibed with the incident of October 15, 1999, the victim having told him she was molested at 3:00 p.m. on that date.

Appellant denied the charge. He admitted that he was in XXX on October 15, 1999 but claimed that his activities that day were limited to washing his taxi in the morning up to noontime in front of his house, and, in the afternoon, drinking with neighbors at the house of Renato Fuentes, located in front of his own house, from about 1:00 o'clock to 6:00 o'clock, without leaving even for a single moment. He claimed that AAA and her mother filed the case to extort P1,000,000.00 from him. Renato Fuentes corroborated appellant's testimony, affirming that from 1:30 to 7:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 15, 1999 appellant was with him in his house drinking wine the entire time, although appellant occasionally went out to urinate but always immediately returned to their drinking session.

The RTC found that AAA positively identified appellant as the person who raped her and candidly recounted that appellant lured her into his house by saying he had something to give her, and that once she stepped inside, he pointed a gun at her temple and succeeded in molesting her. It held that AAA's testimony, corroborated by the medico-legal report, was highly credible, for she would not have borne the humiliation of a public trial for rape had she not been motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice, and it saw no indication that AAA or BBB was impelled by improper motives. The trial court rejected the defenses of denial and alibi, noting that the house of Renato Fuentes where appellant claimed to have been drinking was only in front of his own house where the rape occurred, so that he could easily go to his house without anyone noticing or under the guise of answering the call of nature, and that the claim of extortion was highly improbable considering that he was a mere taxi driver.

• Coaching and Leading Questions: Appellant argued that AAA's testimony was rehearsed and that she was coached by the public prosecutor throughout her direct examination, the latter having made an inordinately detailed offer of testimony that left AAA nothing to do but parrot what was mentioned in the offer; that at critical points the prosecutor rearranged the chronology of events, pointedly reminding AAA that appellant must have undressed himself at one point or that he must have also removed AAA's undergarments before consummating the rape; and that the prosecutor posed general questions to AAA, thereby supplying details to her testimony.
• Absence of Physical Evidence: Appellant contended that while Dr. Dave testified that AAA was in a non-virgin state, the witness did not categorically state that AAA was raped, and in fact confirmed that he found no external signs of trauma; that although AAA testified that she bled after the incident, her soiled clothing or undergarments were not presented by the prosecution, which could not even explain what became of that evidence; and that the failure to present the gun allegedly used cast doubt not only on the existence of the weapon but also on whether one was actually used to threaten AAA.
• Conviction Based on Weakness of the Defense: Appellant maintained that the conviction was improper for being based on the weakness of the defense evidence rather than on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant asserted that the trial court, taking into consideration all the foregoing points, failed to appreciate the existence of reasonable doubt.
• Material Inconsistencies and Improbabilities: Appellant identified eight matters in AAA's testimony which he claimed rendered it unworthy of credit: (a) her testimony on cross-examination that she did not go out of their house on October 15, 1999, which allegedly scuttled the charge that she was raped in appellant's house; (b) the variance between her sworn statements, where she claimed appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident, and her testimony, where she claimed the threat was directed at her family as well; (c) the discrepancy as to whether the gun was drawn only inside the room or right after she stepped inside the house; (d) the disparity between her statement that she could not do anything because she was too afraid and her testimony that she tried to push appellant away; (e) the inconsistency as to whether she saw appellant still holding the gun after the rape; (f) the supposed unnaturalness of her standing up, dressing, and walking home after the assault; (g) her inability to recall the full name of the friend whose birthday party she allegedly missed on October 14, 1999, from which she reckoned the date of the assault; and (h) the failure of the prosecution to present her grandmother, who was allegedly around when appellant told her to go to his house.
• Credibility of BBB and Ill Motive: Appellant assailed as incredible BBB's testimony that she came to know of the ordeal only when Bautista informed her that appellant had been spreading rumors that he had molested AAA, arguing that it was unnatural for appellant to spread word of the molestation after having threatened to kill AAA if she exposed him; and imputed ill motive to BBB and AAA, claiming they accused him of rape to extort P1,000,000.00.
• Non-Flight: Appellant argued that his non-flight was indicative of innocence.

• Leading and Misleading Questions: Whether a testimony marked by coaching, leading and misleading questions, fatal inconsistencies, and absurd, illogical and general allegations is entitled to faith and credit.
• Absence of Physical Evidence: Whether the absence of physical evidence should have been material in the consideration and decision of the trial court.
• Strength of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the conviction was improper for being based on the weakness of the defense evidence rather than the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
• Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court, taking into consideration all the foregoing points, failed to appreciate the existence of reasonable doubt.
• Propriety of the Monetary Awards: Whether the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages awarded in favor of AAA are proper.

• Leading and Misleading Questions: No. The leading questions were properly allowed because AAA was a child of tender years who had difficulty giving intelligible answers, and appellant, having failed to interpose a timely objection and having cross-examined her on the very matters covered by the questions, is barred from challenging their propriety.
• Absence of Physical Evidence: No. The non-presentation of the gun and of the soiled undergarment is of no consequence, the weapon used in rape not being essential to conviction under Article 266-B, and the presence or absence of blood not determining the fact of rape; the medico-legal report and testimony sufficiently corroborate carnal knowledge.
• Strength of the Prosecution's Evidence: No. The conviction rested on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence — AAA's categorical testimony on carnal knowledge and the corroborating medico-legal findings — and not on the weakness of the defense.
• Reasonable Doubt: No. The inconsistencies and improbabilities pointed out by appellant pertained to collateral matters not directly related to the element of carnal knowledge, and the defenses of denial and alibi were weak and incredible.
• Propriety of the Monetary Awards: The awards are modified. Civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00 are affirmed, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are granted, pursuant to People vs. Cacayan.

• Leading and Misleading Questions: The offer of testimony made by the public prosecutor was delivered in English and directed at the trial court; it could not have been understood by a person like AAA, who reached only Grade 3, nor could it have influenced her testimony. The leading questions propounded were necessary because AAA was found to be uneducated, ignorant, timid and easily confused, and the questions were not objected to by appellant, hence allowed to be answered. It was too late for appellant to object to the formulation of the offer and the manner of questioning adopted by the prosecutor; he should have interposed his objections in the course of the oral examination as soon as the grounds therefor became reasonably apparent, and having raised not a whimper of protest and having subjected AAA to cross-examination on the very matters covered by the questions being objected to, he is barred from challenging the propriety thereof or the admissibility of the answers given. While leading questions are not allowed in direct examination, Section 10(c) of Rule 132 allows them to be asked of a witness who is a child of tender years, especially when the witness has difficulty giving an intelligible answer, as when the latter has not reached the level of education necessary to grasp the simple meaning of a question, more so its underlying gravity. This exception is now embodied in Section 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, and under Section 4 thereof a "child witness" is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of 18 years. When AAA testified on direct examination on December 6, 2000, she was only 14 years old and her level of education was that of a third grader, and she was being made to relive a harrowing experience; she was therefore a witness of tender age of whom leading questions were properly asked.

• Absence of Physical Evidence: The CA held, and the Court subscribed, that there is sufficient physical evidence of rape consisting of the medico-legal report and the testimony of Dr. Dave, which corroborate AAA's testimony on two crucial points: first, that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina signify that a blunt object, such as an erect male penis, had been inserted into it; and second, that the healed state of these lacerations indicates that the insertion took place more than seven days prior to February 1, 2000, the date of the examination. The report and testimony of a medico-legal officer that there are hymenal lacerations found on the vagina of a complainant is the best evidence that an object, such as an erect penis, has been inserted into it; such medical report and testimony, weighed with the positive testimony of the complainant that her assailant, armed with a gun, inserted his penis into her vagina, sufficiently establish the essential element of rape, which is carnal knowledge against her will. The non-presentation of the gun is of no consequence, for the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused under Article 266-B; it suffices that the rape victim truthfully testified that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon, and AAA categorically and repeatedly stated that appellant poked a gun at her at the time of the rape incident, establishing the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon. Neither is the soiled undergarment or clothing material, for it is not the presence or absence of blood thereon that determines the fact of rape. On the lack of signs of extragenital physical trauma, the same is easily explained by the fact that AAA was examined only on February 1, 2000, or four months after she was raped on October 15, 1999, by which time whatever traces of force appellant applied on her would have already disappeared.

• Strength of the Prosecution's Evidence: The Court framed the resolution of the appeal within the three fundamental principles governing rape prosecutions: first, while the accusation can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; second, as the crime of rape usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Within that framework, courts have consistently assigned full weight and credit to the testimony of a child-complainant, for no woman, much less one of tender age, would broadcast a violation of her person, allow an examination of her flesh, and endure a public trial of her remaining dignity unless she is solely impelled by the desire for redress. When her testimony is plausible, spontaneous, convincing and consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things, it can beget moral certainty of the guilt of her violator; what can overcome the weight of her testimony is inconsistency on the fact of carnal knowledge or any credible physical evidence of the lack of it. The RTC and the CA therefore had basis to conclude that the element of carnal knowledge was duly established based on AAA's testimony that on October 15, 1999 appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, and on the medical report and testimony of Dr. Dave that there are hymenal lacerations on her vagina which had already healed for more than seven days.

• Reasonable Doubt: The inconsistencies appellant claimed pertained to collateral matters not directly related to the element of carnal knowledge. The exact date of the incident and the place where it took place are not essential elements of the crime of rape, hence inconsistencies regarding this detail in AAA's statements and testimony do not detract from her categorical testimony on the witness stand that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. At what definite place appellant wielded his gun and against whom he made threats with it are matters too marginal to the fact of carnal knowledge to have any bearing on the outcome of the case, in light of the unwavering testimony of AAA that appellant poked a gun at her at the time of the rape incident. The disparity in AAA's statements on the manner and degree of her resistance is not significant, for vigorous physical resistance is not a requisite of rape carried out with intimidation or threat to the life or personal safety of the victim, especially one as vulnerable as AAA on account of her tender age and humble education. AAA herself clarified that some details were missed out in her sworn statements only because they slipped her mind at the time she executed them, and she remained categorical on further cross-examination and on redirect that she was lured into appellant's house and raped there, and that while she saw him holding a gun at the beginning of the assault, she could no longer see where the gun was when she was forced to lie on her back. The improbabilities pointed out are just as petty; there is no standard matrix by which to determine what constitutes normal behavior post assault, as different people react differently to trauma, so that AAA's testimony that she stood up, walked home, and hid her shame after the rape is not completely improbable. It is likewise not illogical that appellant should spread the rumor despite his alleged warning, for it takes only one person to state to another in confidence his dastardly act for a rumor to spread in the community; the circulation of such rumor cannot shield appellant from culpability, for otherwise all an assailant would need to do to escape punishment would be to spread word of his having raped a woman and, should she later file a complaint, wave his act of spreading the rumor as a banner of his innocence. The failure to name AAA's friend who celebrated a birthday before the incident is minor, and the failure to present the adult who was in AAA's house when appellant lured her is not a fatal omission, since the prosecution has the discretion to decide whom to call as witness and its failure to do so does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, simply because such witness is also at the disposal of the defense. As to the defenses, denial cannot overcome the categorical and positive testimony of AAA, and the alibi is weak and incredible: for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime, meaning that he was at such other place for such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene either before or after the time he was at such other place. Appellant admitted that in the morning of October 15, 1999 he was in his house in XXX and that in the afternoon he was in the house of Fuentes right in front of his house, and Fuentes confirmed that appellant occasionally went out to urinate; since AAA was raped in appellant's house, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene before or after he was at Fuentes' house or during the intervals when he went out to urinate. Non-flight is not a viable defense, for some culprits do not flee because they are complacent that there would be no evidence or witness against them. The claim of extortion is incredible: while some offer and counter-offer of compromise were discussed by the parties, the discussion could not have been intended to extort money, since it is unlikely that AAA made public the degradation of her honor just to extort money, and if that were her intention she could have blackmailed appellant right after the incident; moreover, there could not have been an extortion plot considering that Public Prosecutor Florante Ramolete, an officer of the law, was right in the middle of the discussion between the parties.

• Propriety of the Monetary Awards: In People vs. Cacayan, the Court held that, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be granted, and that civil indemnity awarded to victims of qualified rape shall not be less than P75,000.00, and P50,000.00 for simple rape. Applying that ruling, the Court affirmed the award to AAA of P50,000.00 as moral damages, modified her award of civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and granted her P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

• Credibility of the Child-Complainant's Testimony — Full weight and credit is consistently assigned to the testimony of a child-complainant, for no woman, much less one of tender age, would broadcast a violation of her person, allow an examination of her flesh, and endure a public trial of her remaining dignity unless she is solely impelled by the desire for redress. When such testimony is plausible, spontaneous, convincing and consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things, it can beget moral certainty of the guilt of her violator. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding AAA's testimony notwithstanding the alleged inconsistencies raised on appeal.
• Three Fundamental Principles in Rape Prosecutions — In ascertaining with moral certainty the existence of carnal knowledge, every court must abide by three principles: (a) while the accusation can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) as the crime of rape usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The Court used this framework to reject appellant's claim that his conviction rested on the weakness of his defense.
• Inconsistencies on Collateral Matters — For as long as the complainant remains steadfast in her testimony on the essential element of carnal knowledge, inconsistencies or discrepancies on any other detail will not impair, but rather buttress, the veracity of her testimony, for lapses in her recollection of peripheral details are only to be expected for she is made to relive a harrowing experience. This rule holds especially true when the minor inconsistencies are between sworn statements and testimony in open court, since ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and therefore inferior to the testimony given in open court. The exact date and place of the incident, the precise point at which the gun was wielded, and the manner and degree of resistance are collateral to carnal knowledge.
• Leading Questions to a Child Witness — While leading questions are not allowed in direct examination, Section 10(c) of Rule 132 allows them to be asked of a witness who is a child of tender years, especially when the witness has difficulty giving an intelligible answer, as when the latter has not reached the level of education necessary to grasp the simple meaning of a question. This exception is embodied in Section 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, under which the court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice; Section 4 of the same Rule defines a "child witness" as any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of 18 years.
• Timely Objection and Waiver — A party who fails to interpose an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and who cross-examines the witness on the very matters covered by the questions being objected to, is barred from challenging the propriety of the questions or the admissibility of the answers given.
• Medico-Legal Evidence in Rape — The report and testimony of a medico-legal officer that there are hymenal lacerations found on the vagina of a complainant is the best evidence that an object, such as an erect penis, has been inserted into it. Such medical report and testimony, weighed with the positive testimony of the complainant that her assailant, armed with a gun, inserted his penis into her vagina, sufficiently establish the essential element of rape, which is carnal knowledge against her will.
• Non-Presentation of the Weapon — The weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused under Article 266-B; it suffices that the rape victim truthfully testified that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the crime. The non-presentation of the gun does not cast doubt on the existence of the weapon or on whether one was actually used to threaten the victim.
• Non-Presentation of the Soiled Undergarment — It is not the presence or absence of blood on the undergarment or clothing that determines the fact of rape; the absence of such evidence casts no doubt on the complainant's testimony.
• Absence of Extragenital Physical Trauma — The lack of signs of extragenital physical trauma is easily explained by the lapse of time between the rape and the medical examination, by which time whatever traces of force the accused applied would have already disappeared.
• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. "Physical impossibility" means that the accused was at such other place for such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene, either before or after the time he was at such other place.
• Non-Flight as Defense — Non-flight is not a viable defense, for some culprits do not flee because they are complacent that there would be no evidence or witness against them.
• Review of Trial Court Findings on Credibility — When a trial court finds a complainant credible and her testimony truthful, its factual findings are reviewed according to the following parameters: (a) the reviewing court will not disturb such factual finding unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; (b) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of the witness are entitled to great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to examine the latter's demeanor when testifying; and (c) a witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. These parameters are even more stringently applied when the factual findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the appellate court.
• Damages in Qualified Rape — In addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be granted, and the civil indemnity awarded to victims of qualified rape shall not be less than P75,000.00, and P50,000.00 for simple rape.

• "Thus, to ascertain with moral certainty the existence of this element, every court must abide by three fundamental principles: first, while the accusation can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; second, as the crime of rape usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and third, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense." — This passage states the canonical three-fold framework governing the evaluation of rape prosecutions and supplies the ratio for rejecting appellant's claim that his conviction rested on the weakness of his defense.
• "But for as long as she remains steadfast in her testimony on the essential element of carnal knowledge, inconsistencies or discrepancies on any other detail will not impair, but rather buttress, the veracity of her testimony, for lapses in her recollection of peripheral details are only to be expected for she is made to relive a harrowing experience." — This is the controlling formulation on the treatment of inconsistencies in a rape complainant's testimony, and it disposes of the eight alleged inconsistencies raised on appeal.
• "The non-presentation of the gun is of no consequence for it is a settled rule that the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused under Article 266-B." — This passage defines the evidentiary treatment of the deadly weapon in qualified rape and explains why the prosecution's failure to produce the gun did not create reasonable doubt.
• "For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime." — This states the two requisites of alibi and the quantum of proof required, which appellant failed to satisfy given that the house where he claimed to be drinking stood directly in front of the locus criminis.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Procedural basis for the transfer of the appeal from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, conformably with the Court's Resolution dated October 18, 2004.
• People vs. Cacayan, G.R. No. 180499, July 9, 2008 — Controlling precedent on the monetary awards; the Court applied its ruling that exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should be granted in addition to P50,000.00 moral damages, and that civil indemnity for qualified rape shall not be less than P75,000.00.
• People vs. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 495 — Cited as authority for the three fundamental principles governing the ascertainment of the element of carnal knowledge in rape prosecutions.
• People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 118423, June 16, 1999, 308 SCRA 264 — Cited for the rule that objections to the manner of questioning must be raised at the earliest opportunity, failing which the party is barred from later challenging the propriety of the questions.
• People vs. Seneris, No. L-48883, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 92 — Cited for the waiver of objections arising from a party's failure to object and its cross-examination of the witness on the matters covered by the objected questions.
• People vs. Daganio, G.R. No. 137385, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 365; People vs. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 651 — Cited for the allowance of leading questions to a witness who is ignorant, of tender years, or of feeble mind.
• People vs. Licanda, G.R. No. 134084, May 4, 2000, 331 SCRA 357 — Cited in support of the propriety of leading questions addressed to a child witness of tender age.
• People vs. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 597 — Cited for the rule that the medico-legal officer's report and testimony on hymenal lacerations constitute the best evidence of penetration.
• People vs. Degamo, G.R. No. 121211, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 133 — Cited for the rule that the weapon used in rape is not essential to conviction under Article 266-B.
• People vs. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 620 — Cited for the sufficiency of the victim's truthful testimony that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon.
• People vs. Dela Pena, G.R. Nos. 138358-59, November 19, 2001, 369 SCRA 369 — Cited for the recognition of rape with the use of a deadly weapon as qualified rape.
• People vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. 130610, October 16, 2000, 343 SCRA 250 — Cited for the rule that the presence or absence of blood on the undergarment does not determine the fact of rape.
• People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 358 — Cited for the explanation that the absence of extragenital physical trauma is accounted for by the lapse of time between the rape and the medical examination.
• People vs. Batiancila, G.R. No. 174280, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 434 — Cited for the rule that vigorous physical resistance is not a requisite of rape committed through intimidation or threat.
• People vs. Torio, G.R. No. 122109, June 25, 2003, 404 SCRA 623 — Cited for the rule that the prosecution has the discretion to determine whom to present as witnesses, and its failure to present a witness available to the defense does not give rise to the presumption of willful suppression.
• People vs. Buban, G.R. No. 166895, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 500 — Cited for the requisites of alibi and the meaning of "physical impossibility."
• People vs. Faigano, G.R. No. 113483, February 22, 1996, 254 SCRA 10 — Cited for the rule that non-flight is not a viable defense, since some culprits do not flee because they are complacent that there would be no evidence or witness against them.
• People vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419 — Cited, together with the Supreme Court Resolution dated September 19, 2006, as the basis for withholding the real names of the victim and her immediate family members and using fictitious initials.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Defines rape as committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation, among other circumstances. The Court held that the element of carnal knowledge was duly established by AAA's testimony that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and by the medico-legal findings of healed hymenal lacerations.
• Article 266-B, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Provides that whenever rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The Court held that AAA's categorical and repeated testimony that appellant poked a gun at her established the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, and that the non-presentation of the gun is of no consequence since the weapon is not essential to conviction under this provision.
• Section 10(c), Rule 132, Rules of Court — Provides that leading questions, though generally not allowed, may be asked when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute. The Court applied this exception in holding that the leading questions propounded to AAA were proper.
• Section 20, Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (effective December 15, 2000) — Provides that the court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice. The Court cited this provision as embodying the exception to the rule against leading questions.
• Section 4, Rule on Examination of a Child Witness — Defines a "child witness" as any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of 18 years. The Court applied this definition to AAA, who was 14 years old when she testified on December 6, 2000.
• Republic Act No. 7610 and Section 5(a), Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) — The Information charging appellant was filed under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 and Article 266-B, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to these statutes; the RTC convicted appellant under the same provisions.
• Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing rules — Cited as the basis for withholding the real names of the victim and her immediate family or household members and for using fictitious initials to protect their privacy.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur. Justice Velasco, Jr. sat in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated October 8, 2008.