People vs. Santos

Positive identification by a surviving victim and an eyewitness who had ample opportunity to observe the assailants at close range in broad daylight prevails over alibi and minor inconsistencies; no counsel is required at a police line-up absent custodial interrogation.

On 26 May 1989, at around 11:45 in the morning, Glicerio Cupcupin was driving a jeep along Estrella Street in Navotas, Metro Manila, with Alberto Bautista as passenger. At the corner of Estrella and Yangco Streets, as Cupcupin was about to make a right turn, two armed men approached the jeep and fired at them. Cupcupin was hit several times and died from multiple gunshot wounds; Bautista was hit in the left thigh, lower abdomen, back of the right foot, and back, but managed to run and take cover in a store. Bautista identified Raul Santos as the man firing at him and Mario Morales as the other gunman firing at Cupcupin. He saw Cupcupin hit on the left side near the waist and slump over the steering wheel. Bautista later picked out Santos from a line-up and Morales from another line-up, and gave a sworn statement.

Police Aide Victorino Bohol was on duty and directing traffic at the corner of Plaza Rizal and Estrella Streets when he heard gunshots. He saw two persons holding Cal. 45 pistols firing at persons on board a stainless steel owner jeep. Bohol was about twelve arm-lengths away from the ambush vehicle. He testified that there were no passing vehicles that blocked his view because the vehicles stopped some distance away from the jeep when the shooting began, and that he saw one of the gunmen take a wrist watch and a gun from Cupcupin’s lifeless body. He could not approach because he had no gun, so he ran to headquarters to call policemen; when he returned, he learned Cupcupin had been killed and Bautista was his companion. He also saw two other persons firing at the jeep but did not recognize them. After Santos was arrested, Bohol identified him through a one-way mirror at the police station and gave a sworn statement. On cross-examination, Bohol admitted he was at Jim Bread Store talking to someone when he heard the gunshots, and that he saw two persons holding guns firing at the same time at the jeep. He confirmed Bautista was being shot at while running away. The accused was arrested some months later in connection with another shooting incident wherein Santos was suspected of involvement.

Cpl. Sabino Patood of the Navotas Police declared that he was investigating a shooting incident which resulted in the death of one Abudl Rosas wherein the suspect was accused Santos when he was tipped by police intelligence operatives that Santos was involved in the ambush of Cupcupin. He conducted further investigation by calling for Bautista and Bohol. Patood also interviewed Santos who admitted his participation in the ambush to him. He did not take any written statement from accused Santos because there was no counsel available at that time and because Santos was not willing to give any written statement. Dr. Maximo Reyes of the NBI Medico Legal Division performed an autopsy on the cadaver of victim Cupcupin and found out that the latter sustained nineteen gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. The cause of death was gunshot wounds. Dr. Reyes added that the assailants were probably at the left side of the victim as they were shooting at the latter with the victim possibly seated at the time he was shot and hit. Lucia Cupcupin declared that P100,000.00 was spent in connection with the death of her husband who was earning P5,000.00 a month as a businessman dealing in junk materials and marble.

At the police station on 25 October 1989, Bautista and Bohol identified Santos. Santos denied the accusations and claimed alibi. He insisted that on the date and time of the ambush he was in Ibaan, Batangas, where he went on May 20, 1989 because his sister Teresita received a subpoena in a case involving Apolonio Nuguera and the subpoena was given to him by another sister, Isabel. He claimed he was surprised and confused by the subpoena and went to Batangas while his sisters verified the complaint against him. He maintained that from the time he left the place on June 12, 1989, he remained continuously in that place. His testimony was corroborated by Melinda David, in whose house he stayed, and by his sister Isabel Santos.

The prosecution also presented the sworn statement of Ronaldo Guerrero (Exhibit EE), a witness in Criminal Case No. 8117 where Santos was charged with the murder of Daniel Nuguera, which had taken place at the same site as the Cupcupin-Bautista ambush, at the corner of Yangco Street and Estrella Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. When the prosecution first offered Guerrero’s statement to show criminal propensity, the defense objected and the trial court sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for that purpose. The trial court, however, admitted the statement as falling within the exceptions in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Santos complained that the affidavit was hearsay because Guerrero was not presented as a witness.

The trial court found that Santos had been positively identified by Bautista, the surviving victim, and by Bohol, the traffic aide who witnessed the shooting. It rejected the defense of alibi, supported by a friend and a sister, as weak and unavailing. The trial court concluded that Bohol had ample opportunity to observe the events and that Bautista had adequate opportunity to see Santos and retain his face in memory.

• Positive Identification: Santos argued that the trial court erred in holding that the prosecution witnesses positively identified him; Bautista and Bohol saw him for the first time at the crime and identified him five months later at the police headquarters, and the lapse of time coupled with a brief, limited, and obstructed view cast serious doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the identification.
• Alibi: Santos maintained that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of alibi.
• Right to Counsel at Police Line-up: Santos argued that he was not afforded his right to counsel during the police line-up and that, because he was already a suspect, the identification was tainted and inadmissible.
• Improper Suggestiveness: Santos contended that there was improper suggestiveness in the police line-up amounting to an uncounselled confession, claiming that Bautista and Bohol were induced by police investigators to point to him.
• Witness Credibility / Inconsistencies: Santos assailed the credibility of Bautista and Bohol by citing supposed inconsistencies between their affidavits and trial testimony, including Bohol’s failure to remember the kind of shoes Santos wore or the color of the guns, his alleged statement that he picked Santos from a seven-person line-up versus his testimony that Santos was with only one detainee, his initial statement that Bautista was driving versus his testimony that Cupcupin was driving, and his statement that he was directing traffic versus his testimony that he was taking his merienda.
• Similar Acts Evidence (Guerrero Affidavit): Santos argued that the trial court erred in admitting the sworn statement of Ronaldo Guerrero, which was hearsay because Guerrero was not presented as a witness during the trial.

• Positive Identification: The Solicitor General observed that Bohol’s view was not limited to the left side of the assailants because he was a little to the left of the persons firing and saw them move around the site after firing, including when one stripped Cupcupin of his gun and jewelry.
• Witness Credibility / Inconsistencies: The Solicitor General pointed out that whether the police line-up consisted of two or seven persons was immaterial since a police line-up is not essential to a proper and positive identification.
• Similar Acts Evidence (Guerrero Affidavit): The Solicitor General pointed out that the exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result because the conviction was essentially and adequately based on the positive identification of Santos by Bautista and Bohol.

• Positive Identification: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Santos was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses despite the five-month lapse and the claimed brief, limited, and obstructed view.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi should be credited over the positive identification of Santos.
• Right to Counsel at Police Line-up: Whether Santos was denied his right to counsel during the police line-up, rendering the identification inadmissible.
• Improper Suggestiveness: Whether the police line-up was improperly suggestive and amounted to an uncounselled confession.
• Witness Credibility / Inconsistencies: Whether the inconsistencies between the witnesses’ affidavits and testimony destroy their credibility.
• Similar Acts Evidence (Guerrero Affidavit): Whether the trial court erred in admitting the Guerrero affidavit as evidence of knowledge, plan, or scheme despite its being hearsay.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: Whether the penalty for murder and the civil indemnity should be modified.

• Positive Identification: No. The trial court did not err; Bautista and Bohol had ample opportunity to observe Santos under favorable conditions, and their positive identification was credible.
• Alibi: No. Alibi, established mainly by Santos and his relatives, cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses, especially the victim.
• Right to Counsel at Police Line-up: No. A police line-up does not require counsel absent custodial interrogation, and no admission or confession was elicited from Santos.
• Improper Suggestiveness: No. The phrase “iyan po” was too cryptic to constitute improper suggestion, and the record did not show coaching.
• Witness Credibility / Inconsistencies: No. The supposed inconsistencies were non-existent or minor and did not impair the witnesses’ credibility.
• Similar Acts Evidence (Guerrero Affidavit): No. The trial court properly admitted the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose of showing knowledge, plan, or scheme; Santos also waived the hearsay objection, and its exclusion would not change the result.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: Yes. The SC changed life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua as the proper penalty under the Revised Penal Code and increased civil indemnity to P50,000.

• Positive Identification: The SC upheld the trial court’s factual finding that Bohol was about twelve arm-lengths from the ambush vehicle and that the shooting occurred at 11:45 in the morning, in good weather, with the sun almost at its zenith. There were no passing vehicles that blocked his view, and he saw the gunmen move around the site after firing, including one stripping Cupcupin of his gun and jewelry. Bautista, the surviving victim, had every reason to remember the faces of those firing at the jeep and at him; he saw Santos firing at him from about two arm-lengths away and Morales firing at Cupcupin from half an arm-length away. The SC found no basis to overturn the trial court’s conclusion that both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe Santos. The five-month delay in identification did not weaken the prosecution’s case; it showed only that police procedures were not always efficient and that witnesses were often reluctant to volunteer information.
• Alibi: The SC reiterated that alibi is weak, especially when established exclusively or mainly by the accused himself and his relatives and not by independent and credible persons. It cannot prevail over positive identification made by credible witnesses, especially where the witness is the victim-complainant himself. Santos’s alibi was corroborated only by Melinda David, in whose house he stayed, and his sister Isabel Santos; the trial court rejected it as weak and unavailing. The SC affirmed that rejection.
• Right to Counsel at Police Line-up: The SC held that the argument assumed the police line-up was custodial investigation, which it was not. In Gamboa vs. Cruz, reiterated in People vs. Loveria, the SC said there is no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at a police line-up. The witness, not the accused, is investigated or interrogated during a line-up. The SC noted the caveat in Gamboa that counsel is required once investigators seek to elicit admissions or confessions, but the record showed no attempt to extract any admission or confession from Santos; the investigators did not interrogate him during the line-up, and he remained silent after being identified by Bautista and Bohol.
• Improper Suggestiveness: The SC rejected the claim that the line-up was improperly suggestive. The record did not show that the police investigators coached Bautista. The phrase “iyan po” cited from Bohol’s cross-examination was too cryptic to constitute improper suggestion, especially where Santos was identified successively by Bautista and Bohol from a group of persons. The warning in People vs. Acosta against an identification process that was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence when there was none, activated visual imagination, and subverted reliability was not shown to apply.
• Witness Credibility / Inconsistencies: The SC found the supposed inconsistencies either non-existent or minor and inconsequential. Bohol’s failure to remember the kind of shoes Santos wore or the color of the guns was inconsequential. The record did not show that Bohol had picked Santos from a seven-person line-up or that Santos was alone with only one detainee; whether the line-up had two or seven persons was immaterial because a police line-up is not essential to proper and positive identification. Whether Bautista or Cupcupin was driving and whether Bohol was directing traffic or taking his merienda when the shots rang out were not critical and did not detract from the basic facts that Bohol was in a position to see and Bautista saw both assailants and victims. The SC applied the principle that minor inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility because they erase suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
• Similar Acts Evidence (Guerrero Affidavit): The SC held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose of proving knowledge, plan, or scheme, specifically that Santos knew the particular corner of two streets in Manila was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Santos also waived the hearsay character of the evidence by failing to seasonably object; it was too late to raise the hearsay rule in his memorandum after both sides had presented their cases and made their offers of evidence. In any case, the exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not change the result because the conviction was essentially and adequately based on the positive identification of Santos by Bautista and Bohol.
• Penalty and Civil Indemnity: The SC modified the trial court’s judgment by changing the penalty of life imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 8517-MN to reclusion perpetua, which it stated is the proper imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code. It also increased the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of Glicerio Cupcupin to P50,000.

• Positive Identification — Where conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear biased, the witness’s assertions as to identity should normally be accepted, especially where the witness is the victim or a near-relative, because such witnesses usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. The SC applied this to Bautista and Bohol, who observed Santos at close range in broad daylight.
• Alibi — Alibi is weak when established exclusively or mainly by the accused and his relatives and not by independent and credible persons; it cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses, especially the victim-complainant. The SC rejected Santos’s alibi for this reason.
• Right to Counsel at Police Line-up — There is no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at a police line-up because the witness, not the accused, is investigated or interrogated at that stage; counsel is required once investigators seek to elicit admissions or confessions. The SC found no custodial interrogation or attempt to extract an admission from Santos.
• Improper Suggestiveness in Identification — An identification process is invalid if it is pointedly suggestive, generates confidence when there was none, activates visual imagination, and subverts the reliability of the eyewitness. The SC found the phrase “iyan po” too cryptic and no coaching shown.
• Similar Acts as Evidence — Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time, but it may be received to prove a specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom, or usage, and the like. The SC admitted the Guerrero affidavit for knowledge, plan, or scheme.
• Waiver of Hearsay Objection — A party who fails to seasonably object to evidence on hearsay grounds waives the objection and cannot raise it for the first time in a memorandum after both sides have presented their cases and made their offers of evidence. The SC applied this to the Guerrero affidavit.
• Minor Inconsistencies — Minor inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. The SC applied this to Bohol’s and Bautista’s testimony.
• Penalty for Murder — Reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty for murder under the Revised Penal Code. The SC changed the trial court’s life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.

• “there is ‘no real need to afford a suspect the serivce of counsel at police line-up,’” — The SC relied on Gamboa vs. Cruz to reject Santos’s claim that the absence of counsel at the police line-up tainted his identification.
• “We consider that the phrase ‘iyan po’ is too cryptic.” — The SC held that the phrase cited from Bohol’s cross-examination did not amount to improper suggestion in the identification process.
• “a police line-up is not essential to a proper and positive identification.” — The SC used this to dismiss the alleged discrepancy over whether the line-up had two or seven persons.
• “The netrenched principle is that minro inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness tend to strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.” — The SC applied this principle to reject Santos’s attack on the witnesses’ credibility based on minor inconsistencies.

• People vs. Jacolo, et al., G.R. No. 94470, December 16, 1992 — Relied on for the rule that identification should be accepted where visibility is favorable and the witness is not biased, especially if the witness is the victim or a near-relative.
• Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 643 (1988) — Relied on for the rule that there is no real need to afford a suspect counsel at a police line-up.
• People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 (1990) — Reiterated Gamboa vs. Cruz on the absence of a right to counsel at a police line-up.
• People vs. Acosta, 187 SCRA 39, 45 (1990) — Cited for the warning against pointedly suggestive identification; the SC found its warning not shown to apply.
• People vs. Salviero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991) — Cited for the rule that a police line-up is not essential to proper and positive identification.
• People vs. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 447 (1991) — Cited for the principle that minor inconsistencies strengthen rather than weaken witness credibility.
• People vs. Nebreja, 203 SCRA 45 (1991) — Cited in connection with the waiver of the hearsay objection to the Guerrero affidavit.
• People vs. Mecias, 199 SCRA 20 (1991) — Cited for the rule that alibi is weak when established mainly by the accused and his relatives.

• Section 34, Rule 130, Rules of Court — The SC applied the similar-acts rule, admitting the Guerrero affidavit not to prove propensity but for the limited purpose of showing knowledge, plan, or scheme; it also held that Santos waived the hearsay objection by failing to seasonably object.
• Revised Penal Code — The SC applied the proper imposable penalty for murder, changing life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.