People vs. Sandiganbayan and Desembrana

A motion for reconsideration filed with the Office of the Ombudsman after the information has already been filed in court is no longer a matter of right but a privilege requiring leave of court, and the resolution thereof is not part of the "full and complete preliminary investigation" that the prosecution is mandated to conduct. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in relying on Sales vs. Sandiganbayan — which was based on the old Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure — to dispense with the leave-of-court requirement under the amended rules, and in dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of inordinate delay when the delay was attributable to the Sandiganbayan's own inaction rather than to the prosecution.

Private respondent Raul Y. Desembrana was an Assistant City Prosecutor of the Department of Justice assigned to the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, tasked with resolving and recommending action on cases submitted for preliminary investigation. The criminal charges against him arose from his alleged solicitation and acceptance of money from Dr. Alexis Montes, through counsel Atty. Ephraim B. Cortez, in consideration for the dismissal of a pending preliminary investigation case docketed as NPS Docket No. XV03INV14F-05695. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), conducted the preliminary investigation and ultimately found probable cause for direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, recommending the withdrawal of the original information charging violation of Section 7(d) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713 and the substitution of an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The procedural framework governing motions for reconsideration before the Office of the Ombudsman is found in Section 7, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15 dated February 16, 2000, which requires leave of court when an information has already been filed in court.

On November 15, 2014, two Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan charging private respondent Raul Y. Desembrana, an Assistant City Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, with two counts of violation of Section 7(d) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713. The charges alleged that on November 14, 2014, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, Desembrana, taking advantage of his position as a public officer tasked with resolving preliminary investigation cases, solicited ₱80,000.00 and actually accepted ₱4,000.00 placed on top of "boodle money" from Atty. Ephraim B. Cortez, counsel of Dr. Alexis Montes, in consideration for the dismissal of the case entitled "Rev. Col. (Ret) Reuben Espartinez vs. Dr. Alexis Montes and Dr. Connor Montes," docketed at the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office as NPS Docket No. XV03INV14F-05695, which was pending before him for preliminary investigation.

After posting bail, Desembrana filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment on November 21, 2014, to accommodate a Motion to Conduct Preliminary Investigation he had filed with the OSP the previous day. The Sandiganbayan heard the motion on November 28, 2014 and directed the OSP to file its Comment/Opposition, which the OSP did on December 4, 2014. On January 12, 2015, Desembrana filed a Motion to Admit Reply, which the Sandiganbayan granted on January 23, 2015. In its Resolution dated July 8, 2015, the Sandiganbayan directed the OSP to conduct a "full and complete preliminary investigation" within sixty days from notice, or until September 11, 2015, defining such investigation as inclusive of the opportunity for the respondent to file a motion for reconsideration against an adverse resolution.

In compliance, the OSP directed Desembrana to submit his counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Desembrana submitted his Rejoinder-Affidavit on September 3, 2015, the last pleading received by the OSP. On two occasions — September 9 and October 12, 2015 — the OSP filed motions for extension of time to terminate the preliminary investigation. On September 29, 2015, the OSP issued a recommendation finding probable cause against Desembrana for violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Direct Bribery) and requesting the withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0427 and the substitution of a new information charging violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved this recommendation on October 21, 2015. Desembrana filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the OSP on November 9, 2015.

On November 10, 2015, the OSP filed with the Sandiganbayan its "Compliance with Omnibus Motion (for Withdrawal of Information docketed as SB-14-CRM-0427) and for the Lifting of the Resolution, dated July 8, 2015," appending the Ombudsman's Resolution. The Sandiganbayan directed Desembrana to comment on November 24, 2015. On December 3, 2015, Desembrana filed his Comment, praying that the Sandiganbayan hold in abeyance any action on the prosecution's motion pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration before the OSP. The OSP filed its Reply on January 12, 2016, and Desembrana filed his Rejoinder on January 27, 2016. Thereafter, the matter remained dormant for nearly a year. On December 5, 2016, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Reply and Rejoinder and submitted the Compliance with Omnibus Motion for resolution. On January 20, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution sustaining Desembrana's position, holding in abeyance the resolution of the OSP's motion until after the OSP resolved Desembrana's motion for reconsideration, and directing the OSP to inform the court once the motion was resolved.

On February 6, 2017, Desembrana filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting that one year and two months had lapsed since he filed his motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman, and that two years and two months had lapsed since the Sandiganbayan's November 20, 2014 directive for the OSP to terminate the preliminary investigation. He claimed these twin delays violated his right to speedy disposition of cases. The OSP opposed, arguing that the assertion was a dilatory tactic, that Desembrana contributed to the delay, and that under Section 7(a), Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, leave of court was required before a motion for reconsideration could be acted upon in cases where the information had already been filed. On April 12, 2017, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Dismiss, finding the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violative of Desembrana's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The Sandiganbayan denied reconsideration on May 22, 2017.

• Proper Remedy: The OSP argued that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan's dismissal, as the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
• Leave of Court Requirement: The OSP maintained that after the Informations had been filed, the Sandiganbayan assumed full control over the proceedings, and the OSP could not resolve Desembrana's motion for reconsideration without leave of court, which the Sandiganbayan only effectively granted on January 20, 2017. The OSP should not be blamed for the delay because it had to await leave from the Sandiganbayan.
• No Inordinate Delay: The OSP argued that there were no vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, as its compliance was not protracted. The Sandiganbayan merely relied on a mathematical computation and ignored the balancing test in determining whether there was delay.
• Sandiganbayan's Own Delay: The OSP pointed out that it filed its Compliance with Omnibus Motion on November 10, 2015, yet the Sandiganbayan only declared the matter submitted for resolution on December 12, 2016, and only directed the OSP to resolve the motion for reconsideration on January 20, 2017.

• Sandiganbayan's Discretion: Desembrana argued that it was perfectly within the Sandiganbayan's discretion to ascertain whether the OSP violated his right to speedy disposition of cases, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part.
• Inordinate Delay by the OSP: Desembrana contended that the fact that it took the OSP more than one year and six months to resolve his motion for reconsideration was the most glaring evidence of violation of the constitutional mandate to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials.
• Integral Part of Preliminary Investigation: Desembrana maintained that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, and the denial of such opportunity is tantamount to a violation of the right to a preliminary investigation.
• State's Duty: Desembrana invoked the principle that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of ensuring that the trial is consistent with due process.

• Proper Remedy: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan's order of dismissal of criminal cases.
• Leave of Court Requirement: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in relying on Sales vs. Sandiganbayan to dispense with the leave-of-court requirement for the OSP to resolve Desembrana's motion for reconsideration after the information had already been filed.
• Inordinate Delay: Whether the OSP committed inordinate delay violative of Desembrana's right to speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the criminal charges.
• Duty to Move Case Forward: Whether the Sandiganbayan was obliged to move the case forward by setting arraignment and directing the OSP to resolve the motion for reconsideration within a prescribed period, rather than dismissing the cases.

• Proper Remedy: Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of criminal cases when grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is alleged, as such abuse prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
• Leave of Court Requirement: Yes, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion. Under the amended Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, leave of court is required before a motion for reconsideration may be resolved when the information has already been filed in court; Sales vs. Sandiganbayan was based on the old rule and is no longer applicable.
• Inordinate Delay: No. The OSP completed the preliminary investigation within approximately 120 days, which was reasonable. The delay thereafter was attributable to the Sandiganbayan's own procrastination, not to the OSP. Desembrana did not assert his right during the impasse and suffered no prejudice.
• Duty to Move Case Forward: Yes. The Sandiganbayan was obliged to set a date for arraignment and direct the OSP to resolve the motion for reconsideration within a period not exceeding sixty days, and to proceed with arraignment and trial if the OSP failed to comply.

• Proper Remedy: The general rule is that orders granting motions to dismiss are subject to appeal or petition for review as they are final orders. However, in People vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), the Court declared that a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy against the Sandiganbayan's order of dismissal of a criminal complaint by reason of undue delay. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without placing the accused in double jeopardy, provided the court a quo acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Double jeopardy is not triggered when the order of acquittal is void, as an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion does not really "acquit" and therefore does not terminate the case.

• Leave of Court Requirement: The Sandiganbayan relied on Sales vs. Sandiganbayan to interpret "full and complete preliminary investigation" as inclusive of resolving a motion for reconsideration, and on that basis dispensed with the leave-of-court requirement. However, the Court had already restricted the Sales ruling only to the preliminary investigation of Ombudsman cases under the then Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. The old Section 7 barred the filing of a motion for reconsideration after the information had been filed in court. The amended Section 7, through Administrative Order No. 15 dated February 16, 2000, no longer bars the OSP from filing the Information with the Sandiganbayan and instead requires "corresponding leave of court in cases where information has already been filed in court." Under the amended rule, preliminary investigation as a matter of right is full and complete immediately after the opportunity to hear the parties and the finding of probable cause, since the Information may already be filed without awaiting the filing or resolution of any motion for reconsideration. Once the Information is filed, action by the OSP on the motion for reconsideration is no longer a matter of right but a privilege, requiring leave of court. The Sandiganbayan thus gravely abused its discretion in faulting the OSP for seeking leave of court.

• Inordinate Delay: The Court applied the guidelines from Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan for determining inordinate delay. Since the Sandiganbayan had set a 60-day time limit and the delay occurred beyond that period, the prosecution carried the burden of justifying the delay by proving (a) it followed prescribed procedure, (b) the delay was inevitable due to complexity and volume of evidence, and (c) the accused was not prejudiced. The timeline from July 8, 2015 to November 10, 2015 — approximately 120 days — was a reasonable period to complete a preliminary investigation. The OSP sought extensions on two occasions, which were neither opposed by Desembrana nor rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan, and Desembrana himself contributed to the delay by filing a Rejoinder-Affidavit as late as September 3, 2015. The subsequent delay from November 2015 to January 2017 was attributable to the Sandiganbayan, which left the OSP's Compliance with Omnibus Motion hanging for over a year despite the absence of complex issues. Desembrana did not assert his right during this impasse, sitting idly from November 2015 to January 2017, which smacked of bad faith as he "waited in ambush." He was out on bail, vigorously participated in the proceedings, and suffered no prejudice as defined in Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan — no oppressive pre-trial incarceration, no impaired defense, no anxiety that was not self-induced. Applying the Barker vs. Wingo four-fold balancing test (length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of right, prejudice), the factors weighed against dismissal.

• Duty to Move Case Forward: Under Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, from the filing of information, disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court, which takes full authority over the case. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman does not undermine or suspend the jurisdiction already acquired by the Sandiganbayan; the resolution of the motion and the conduct of proceedings before the Sandiganbayan may proceed concurrently. Under Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, if there is a pending motion for reconsideration, the court may suspend proceedings but should set the arraignment and direct the public prosecutor to submit the resolution within a period fixed by the court, not exceeding sixty days, otherwise the court should proceed with the arraignment. The Sandiganbayan was obliged to move the cases forward but instead procrastinated and dismissed them on the basis of inapplicable case law.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases vs. Right to Speedy Trial — The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. The latter may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law, while the former may be invoked before any tribunal as long as the respondent may already be prejudiced by the proceeding. The right to speedy disposition of cases is commonly invoked in fact-finding and preliminary investigations conducted by the Ombudsman, which is constitutionally committed to act promptly on complaints. In this case, the Court applied this doctrine to evaluate whether the OSP's conduct of the preliminary investigation violated Desembrana's constitutional right.

• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan Guidelines on Inordinate Delay — The Court en banc laid down definitive guidelines: (1) the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial; (2) for purposes of determining inordinate delay, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of preliminary investigation; (3) courts must determine which party carries the burden of proof — if delay is within prescribed periods, the defense bears the burden, but if delay occurs beyond the given period and the right is invoked, the prosecution must justify the delay by proving it followed prescribed procedure, the delay was inevitable due to complexity and volume of evidence, and the accused was not prejudiced; (4) determination of the length of delay is never mechanical and courts must consider the entire context, amount of evidence, and complexity of issues; and (5) the right must be timely raised, otherwise it is deemed waived. The Court applied these guidelines to find no inordinate delay attributable to the OSP.

• Barker vs. Wingo Balancing Test — Courts must approach cases on an ad hoc basis, weighing the conduct of both prosecution and defendant using four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. These factors are considered together. In this case, the balancing test weighed against dismissal: the delay was reasonable (120 days for the preliminary investigation), the reason for the subsequent delay was the Sandiganbayan's own inaction, Desembrana did not assert his right during the impasse, and he suffered no prejudice.

• Leave of Court for Motion for Reconsideration After Filing of Information — Under the amended Section 7, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure (Administrative Order No. 15, dated February 16, 2000), the filing of a motion for reconsideration requires "corresponding leave of court in cases where information has already been filed in court." Unlike the old rule, the amended rule no longer bars the OSP from filing the Information while a motion for reconsideration is pending. Thus, once the Information is filed, the resolution of a motion for reconsideration is no longer a matter of right but a privilege requiring leave of court. A motion for reconsideration is not inherent to due process but is a privilege that must be invoked only in the manner provided by the rules.

• Court's Authority Over Case After Filing of Information — From the filing of information, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court, which becomes the sole judge of what to do with the case. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman does not undermine or suspend the jurisdiction already acquired by the court. The resolution of the motion and the conduct of court proceedings may proceed concurrently. The court is obliged to move the case forward by setting arraignment and directing the prosecutor to resolve pending motions within a prescribed period.

• "There is no legal right to move for reconsideration beyond what the rule allows. A motion for reconsideration is not inherent to due process but is merely granted subject to the conditions for its exercise or availability. It is a privilege and must be invoked only in the manner so provided." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the nature of a motion for reconsideration as a privilege rather than a component of due process, and explains why the leave-of-court requirement under the amended Ombudsman Rules must be observed.

• "Clearly, unlike in the old Section 7 upon which Sales was based, the governing Section 7 no longer bars the Office of the Ombudsman or more properly the OSP from filing the Information with the Sandiganbayan. As a result, it stands to reason that preliminary investigation as a matter of right is full and complete immediately after the opportunity to hear the parties and the finding of probable cause, since at that stage the Information may already be filed with the Sandiganbayan, without awaiting either the filing or the lapse of the period for filing any motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation, or if one has been filed, the resolution thereof." — This passage defines the scope of a "full and complete preliminary investigation" under the amended Ombudsman Rules and distinguishes it from the old rule upon which Sales was based, forming the core of the Court's reversal of the Sandiganbayan's interpretation.

• "For one, the Sandiganbayan is responsible for the delay. It could have easily said what it ruled on January 20, 2017 on November 10, 2015 or at the latest November 24, 2015. There was nothing complex about the issues presented in the 'Compliance with Omnibus Motion' to justify a timeline of more than a year to resolve it." — This passage identifies the Sandiganbayan, not the OSP, as the party responsible for the delay, undermining the basis for the dismissal of the criminal cases.

• "From November 2015 to January 2017, he sat idly by, which to us in hindsight smacks of traces of bad faith, because he waited in ambush." — This passage addresses the third factor of the Barker balancing test — the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right — and characterizes Desembrana's failure to invoke his right during the impasse as indicative of bad faith, negating his claim of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

• Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 176 (2001) — Distinguished and effectively limited. The Sandiganbayan relied on this case to interpret "full and complete preliminary investigation" as including the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. The Court held that Sales was based on the old Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, which had since been amended by Administrative Order No. 15 (February 16, 2000), rendering its application erroneous.

• People vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019 — Followed. This case established that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy against the Sandiganbayan's order of dismissal of a criminal complaint by reason of undue delay, and that double jeopardy does not attach when the dismissal is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 229656, August 19, 2019 (En Banc) — Applied as the controlling framework. The Court applied Cagang's definitive guidelines on inordinate delay, including the rule that when delay occurs beyond the prescribed period and the right is invoked, the prosecution bears the burden of justifying the delay, and that the determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.

• Barker vs. Wingo — Applied as the balancing test for determining violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, requiring consideration of four factors: length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of right, and prejudice to the defendant.

• Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899 (2004) — Applied to assess prejudice to the accused, using the three interests protected by the right to speedy trial: prevention of oppressive pre-trial incarceration, minimization of anxiety and concerns, and limitation of the possibility of impaired defense.

• Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 205904-06, October 17, 2018 — Applied to establish that from the filing of information, the court takes full authority over the case, and the pendency of a motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman does not suspend the court's jurisdiction.

• Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, 755 Phil. 536 (2015) — Applied for the directive that when a motion for reconsideration is pending, the court should set arraignment and direct the prosecutor to submit the resolution within a prescribed period not exceeding sixty days, otherwise the court should proceed with arraignment.

• Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the principle that undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected and that the underlying principle of the right to speedy disposition of cases is the prevention of delay and oppression of the citizen.

• Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan — Cited by the Sandiganbayan for the proposition that it is the Ombudsman's duty to expedite the prosecution of cases and that the right to speedy disposition seeks to afford the accused freedom from anxiety and expense of litigation. The Supreme Court did not dispute this principle but found it inapplicable given that the delay was attributable to the Sandiganbayan.

• Section 7, Rule II, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, dated February 16, 2000) — This provision governs motions for reconsideration before the Ombudsman. As amended, Section 7(a) requires "corresponding leave of court in cases where information has already been filed in court" before a motion for reconsideration may be filed or resolved. Section 7(b) provides that the filing of a motion for reconsideration shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in court. The Court applied this provision to hold that the OSP could not resolve Desembrana's motion for reconsideration without leave of court, and that the Sandiganbayan erred in dispensing with this requirement based on the old, unamended version of the rule.

• Section 7(d) in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — The original charges against Desembrana were for violation of this provision, which prohibits public officials from soliciting or accepting gifts in exchange for performing or refraining from performing an official act. The OSP later recommended substituting these charges with a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Article 210 of the RPC.

• Article 210, Revised Penal Code (Direct Bribery) — The OSP found probable cause to charge Desembrana with direct bribery under this article, which penalizes any public officer who agrees to perform an act in connection with official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present. The OSP recommended withdrawing the original information under RA 6713 and substituting it with a charge under this article.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The OSP recommended filing an information for violation of this provision in lieu of the original charge under RA 6713. Section 3(e) penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Cited in connection with the proper remedy. The Court noted that while orders granting motions to dismiss are generally subject to appeal or petition for review under Rule 45, certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy when grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is alleged, as established in jurisprudence.

• Constitutional Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The constitutional guarantee invoked by Desembrana. The Court applied the Cagang guidelines and the Barker balancing test to evaluate whether this right was violated, ultimately concluding it was not.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Reyes, J. Jr., and Lopez, JJ. concurred in the decision. Caguioa, J. filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, the contents of which are not provided in the source text.

• Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa — The source text indicates that Justice Caguioa filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, but the text of that opinion is not provided, precluding a summary of the points of disagreement or alternative reasoning.