People vs. Sandiganbayan

The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused because it is equivalent to an acquittal, and such appeal violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. The recognized exceptions are: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law, and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which must be assailed through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not an appeal under Rule 45.

Private respondents Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David, and Rogelio L. Luis were high-ranking public officers serving as Chairman and President/Chief Executive Officers of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), Clark Development Corporation/Clark International Airport (CDC/CIAC), and Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), respectively. They were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for entering into contracts for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and Clark Perimeter Road without public bidding and at allegedly inflated prices. The construction projects were governed by P.D. 1594, as amended, which generally requires competitive public bidding for construction projects, with negotiated contracts allowed only in exceptional cases.

On November 23, 1999, private respondents Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David, and Rogelio L. Luis were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, before the Sandiganbayan. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 25752, alleged that between November 15, 1996 to May 7, 1998, the accused, all high-ranking public officers being then Chairman and President/Presidents and Chief Executive Officers of the BCDA, CDC/CIAC, and PNCC, respectively, while in the performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their positions, confederated and conspired to enter into contracts for the construction of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road without public bidding and at prices higher by 60 to 167% than typical roadway construction costs, causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to their preferred private contractors.

Before arraignment, the accused filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for Reconsideration/Re-investigation. In a Memorandum dated March 26, 2000, Special Prosecution Officer Roberto T. Agagon recommended the withdrawal of the information without prejudice to further preliminary investigation, referring the overpricing issue to the Commission on Audit (COA). Then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto disapproved the recommendation and directed the prosecutor to proceed with trial. Upon arraignment, the three respondents pleaded not guilty.

On August 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-trial Order identifying the issues as: (i) whether the construction projects should have been subjected to public bidding under P.D. 1594; (ii) whether there was overpricing; (iii) whether the government suffered undue injury; (iv) whether the accused acted with evident bad faith and/or manifest partiality; and (v) whether the accused conspired with each other. During trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness, Atty. Emora C. Pagunuran, Legal Counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman, after which the prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their respective motions for leave to file demurrer to evidence on the grounds that: (i) Atty. Pagunuran had no personal knowledge of the transactions and her testimony was hearsay; (ii) the prosecution failed to prove overpricing as Pagunuran merely relied on the DPWH table of "Typical Construction Costs, 1999"; and (iii) the Court of Appeals' ruling in an administrative case (C.A. G.R. SP No. 62084) upholding the validity of the direct negotiated contracts was already the law of the case.

It appears that accused Luis and Basco were also charged administratively in the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0430, based on the same act subject of the criminal indictment. The Office of the Ombudsman found one respondent therein (Isaac Puno III) administratively liable for simple misconduct, but dismissed the complaint against Basco and Luis for lack of jurisdiction. Puno filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which exonerated him on the ground that the failure to conduct public bidding was legally justified as "time was of the essence," and considered the absence of prior written approval from then President Ramos as merely confirmatory rather than curative.

On April 15, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the demurrers to evidence, opining that the prosecution's evidence substantiated the essential elements charged in the Information. On reconsideration, however, the Sandiganbayan granted the motions in a Resolution dated July 23, 2004, dismissing the cases against the accused. In making this turnaround, the Sandiganbayan took into account the Court of Appeals' decision in the administrative case as a "persuasive ruling," reasoning that since the bases for the two proceedings pertain to the same evidence, the principle that dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar criminal prosecution no longer applies. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of overpricing, noting that the Ombudsman itself was not firmly convinced of respondents' culpability as shown by its issuance of two conflicting memoranda and the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Agagon that the contracts be reviewed by the COA.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Appeal: Petitioner argued that the right of the accused against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the issues presented for resolution are purely legal, and there is no need to reevaluate the evidence already adduced before the Sandiganbayan.
• Administrative Case Not a Bar: Petitioner lamented that the Sandiganbayan ignored the legal dictum that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the criminal case, and that under that doctrine, a criminal case already filed must proceed in the normal course of litigation.
• Compliance with P.D. 1594: Petitioner raised the issue of whether the act of the respondents in entering into negotiated contracts was in accordance with the requirements of P.D. 1594.
• Adoption of CA Findings: Petitioner questioned whether the Sandiganbayan can adopt the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals considering that the case before the former is criminal in nature while the latter is administrative.

• Double Jeopardy: Respondents questioned the propriety of resorting to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on the ground that it places them in double jeopardy, as the dismissal of the case upon demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal.

• Procedural Remedy: Whether the prosecution may appeal from the Sandiganbayan's resolution granting the demurrer to evidence through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Nature of Questions Raised: Whether the issues raised by the petitioner are pure questions of law reviewable under Rule 45.
• Adoption of CA Findings: Whether the Sandiganbayan can adopt the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals in the administrative case in resolving the criminal case.

• Procedural Remedy: No. The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, and such appeal violates the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. The proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Nature of Questions Raised: No. The determination of whether the established facts fall squarely within the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 would require reassessment and reexamination of the evidence, which is beyond the province of Rule 45.
• Adoption of CA Findings: No. The second issue posed by petitioner is a question of fact disguised as a question of law, as an affirmative ruling thereon would require review of the factual bases of the Court of Appeals' ruling in the administrative case.

• Procedural Remedy: Section 1 of Rule 122 allows "any party" to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. An appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double jeopardy. The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is not absolute, with recognized exceptions: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law, and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence. Such issues are brought to the reviewing court through the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, not through a petition for review under Rule 45. Citing People vs. Laguio, the Court emphasized that appeal is not available in the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy, while certiorari is allowed. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order by appeal without violating the private respondents' right against double jeopardy.

• Nature of Questions Raised: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal. Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and unless the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, its decision to grant or deny the demurrer may not be disturbed. The petitioner did not attribute any commission of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the determination of whether the established facts fall squarely within the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 would require reassessment and reexamination of the evidence, which is beyond the province of Rule 45. A judgment of acquittal, even if seemingly erroneous, is the final verdict.

• Adoption of CA Findings: The second issue posed by petitioner is a question of fact disguised as a question of law. An affirmative ruling thereon would require review of the factual bases of the Court of Appeals' ruling in the administrative case. The same issue of legality or validity of the subject contracts had already been passed upon by the CA, and the Ombudsman did not even attempt to question the CA ruling, which could only mean its adherence thereto. While the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence will be a futile and useless exercise.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution from appealing a judgment of acquittal. An appeal by the prosecution from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused is equivalent to an acquittal and violates this right. The exceptions are: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law, and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which must be assailed through certiorari under Rule 65.

• Demurrer to Evidence — A demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Granting the demurrer results in dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Judicial action on a demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.

• Distinction Between Appeal and Certiorari — Appeal under Rule 45 and certiorari under Rule 65 are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy; certiorari, however, is allowed.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Judicial review under Rule 45 does not envisage a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the respondent court's action was predicated.

• Administrative vs. Criminal Liability — The dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint. However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence will be a futile and useless exercise.

• "The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the court's action is attended with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated." — This opening statement articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the rule that an appeal from a demurrer to evidence is barred by double jeopardy absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• "Although the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such a case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void." — This passage defines the proper remedy for assailing a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence and the standard of review applicable.

• "A judgment of acquittal, 'even if seemingly erroneous,' is the final verdict." — This statement underscores the finality of acquittal judgments and the limited grounds for their review.

• People vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 402 — Controlling precedent establishing that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to evidence via certiorari under Rule 65 based on grave abuse of discretion, and that appeal under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy.
• People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521 — Cited by petitioner but distinguished by the Court; the Court noted that the three requisites for an appeal not to constitute double jeopardy must concur, as indicated by the conjunctive word "and."
• Dayap vs. Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009 — Cited for the proposition that the demurrer to evidence in criminal cases calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 137707-11, December 17, 2004 — Cited for the rule that judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and that a judgment of acquittal, even if seemingly erroneous, is the final verdict.
• Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996 — Cited for the principle that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts.
• Paredes vs. CA, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007 — Cited for the distinct and independent nature of administrative and criminal proceedings.
• Nicolas vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008 — Cited for the proposition that if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, burdening the accused to present controverting evidence would be futile.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended — The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provision penalizing public officers who cause undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The accused were charged with violating this provision.
• Section 1, Rule 122, 1997 Rules of Court — Allows "any party" to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. The Court applied this provision to bar the prosecution's appeal from the Sandiganbayan's dismissal order.
• Section 4, P.D. 1594, as amended — Requires that construction projects shall generally be undertaken by contract after competitive public bidding, with negotiated contracts allowed only in exceptional cases where time is of the essence, where there is lack of qualified bidders, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy and efficiency would be achieved, subject to approval of the President for projects costing P1 Million or more. The Court referenced this provision in the context of the pre-trial issues identified by the Sandiganbayan.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari, which is limited to questions of law. The Court held that the petitioner's resort to this remedy was erroneous because the issues raised involved questions of fact.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action for certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court held that this is the proper remedy to assail a dismissal order granting a demurrer to evidence.

Carpio (Chairperson), Nachura, Brion, and Abad, JJ., concurred with the decision of Justice Mendoza.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.