People vs. Sandiganbayan

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 45, and certiorari will not lie where the petitioner failed to avail of the proper appellate remedy within the reglementary period without justification; additionally, a charge under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for failure to reinstate employees cannot lie where no writ of execution had yet been issued at the time the Information was filed.

Sergio F. Emprese, Sr. succeeded Francisco de Leon, Jr. as Municipal Mayor of San Andres, Quezon, and upon assuming office on 01 July 1998, revoked the appointments of nine employees previously appointed by his predecessor. Those employees filed a complaint for illegal termination with the Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO-IV), which eventually reached the Court of Appeals after divergent rulings from the CSCRO-IV and the CSC Central Office. The dispute centered on whether the revocation of appointments was valid and whether the CSC Central had jurisdiction to review the CSCRO-IV's order. The Office of the Ombudsman subsequently initiated criminal proceedings against Emprese for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.

On 22 June 1998, then Mayor Francisco de Leon, Jr. of the Municipality of San Andres, Quezon, appointed nine individuals — Ariel A. Castro, Ramon B. Lustanas, Julia F. Avelino, Butche P. Reyes, Jurly L. Reta, Jr., Rene L. Dadace, Ramon Isidro U. Reyes, Jr., Judith B. Montero, and Anastacia V. Edar — to various positions in the municipal government. On 01 July 1998, Sergio F. Emprese, Sr. assumed office as the new Municipal Mayor and forthwith revoked the appointments of all nine employees.

The aggrieved employees filed a complaint for illegal termination and nonpayment of salaries with the Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO-IV). On 05 March 1999, the CSCRO-IV issued an order in their favor, directing Emprese to reinstate them with payment of back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of their illegal termination until actual reinstatement. Emprese filed a notice of appeal with the CSC Central Office, which on 29 February 2000 issued a resolution reversing the CSCRO-IV order and declaring the terminations valid. The employees' motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals.

On 31 July 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the CSC Central resolution and reinstated the CSCRO-IV order, finding that the CSC Central had acted without jurisdiction because the CSCRO-IV order had already become final and executory due to Emprese's failure to appeal seasonably. On 18 October 2001, the employees filed complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman charging Emprese with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Grave Misconduct. On 22 October 2001, Emprese filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the CA decision, but the petition was denied for being filed beyond the prescriptive period and for failure to pay the prescribed legal fees and deposit for costs.

On 22 October 2001, the employees filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of the CA decision with the CSC Central. On 28 January 2002, while that motion remained pending, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan charging Emprese with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, alleging that he failed to reinstate the complainants and pay back wages despite the finality of the CA decision, thereby causing undue injury. The CSC Central granted the Urgent Motion for Execution on 20 February 2002; Emprese's motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 April 2002.

On 09 May 2002, Emprese filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan, contending that the acts charged did not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and that the Information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form. On 13 June 2002, he manifested before the Office of the Ombudsman that the complainants had been reinstated and were receiving partial back wages, as evidenced by an Allotment and Obligation Slip dated 23 May 2002 and the May 2002 payroll. On 19 June 2002, the employees executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance, and on the same date the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case for lack of interest to prosecute. On 25 June 2002, Emprese informed the Sandiganbayan of the affidavit of desistance.

On 02 August 2002, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed the Information, observing that it strained reason to charge the accused criminally for failure to enforce a decision the execution of which the complainants themselves had sought, and noting the accused's good faith in reinstating the employees upon receipt of the CSC order denying his motion for reconsideration. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied on 11 September 2002, a copy of which was received on 13 November 2002. On 10 January 2003, the People filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 — forty-three days after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner asserted that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it quashed the Information on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance signed by only one of the eight complaining witnesses, which could not serve as a basis for dismissing the case insofar as the remaining witnesses were concerned.
• Lack of Evidentiary Basis: Petitioner alleged that the Sandiganbayan's resolution concluding that private respondent had acted in good faith was made without any evidence on record to support such conclusion and without giving petitioner the opportunity to present contrary evidence.

• Improper Remedy: Private respondent contended that the petition should be dismissed because the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan's resolution — a final order — was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a special civil action under Rule 65, and petitioner failed to file an appeal within the reglementary period.
• Merits of the Quashal: Private respondent argued that the Information was quashed not primarily on the basis of the Affidavit of Desistance but on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Mootness: Private respondent contended that the charges were rendered moot and academic because the complainants had been duly reinstated pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the CSC.

• Propriety of Remedy: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan's resolution quashing the Information.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information.

• Propriety of Remedy: No. The proper remedy from a final order of the Sandiganbayan is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a special civil action under Rule 65; certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. At the time the Information was filed, no writ of execution had yet been issued by the CSC ordering reinstatement, making it impossible for the accused to have committed the crime charged; the Sandiganbayan's quashal was therefore not gravely abusive.

• Propriety of Remedy: The Sandiganbayan's resolution quashing the Information was a final order that finally disposed of the case. Under Section 1 of Rule 45 and Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law. The fifteen-day reglementary period, reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, expired on 28 November 2002. Petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 65 on 10 January 2003 — forty-three days late. Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Petitioner offered no valid reason for its failure to observe the rules, and no exceptional circumstances justified relaxation. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, rendering the questioned resolution final and executory and depriving the Court of jurisdiction to alter it.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Grave abuse of discretion requires a showing that the respondent court acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction — an abuse so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The material dates established that the CA decision ordering reinstatement was promulgated on 31 July 2001 and became final, but the employees' Urgent Motion for Execution was filed only on 22 October 2001 and granted only on 20 February 2002. The Information was filed on 28 January 2002 — before the writ of execution was issued. Without any writ or order from the CSC directing reinstatement at the time the Information was filed, Emprese could not have committed the crime alleged, i.e., failure to reinstate and pay back wages despite the finality of the CA decision. The Sandiganbayan's observation that it strained reason to charge the accused criminally for failure to enforce a decision the execution of which the complainants themselves had sought was well-founded, and its resolution was far from gravely abusive of its discretion.

• Certiorari as Improper Substitute for Appeal — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be used to substitute for an appeal that the party has lost through failure to file within the reglementary period. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the petition, finding that petitioner resorted to Rule 65 only after failing to file a Rule 45 petition within the fifteen-day period, without offering any justification for the delay.

• Jurisdictional Nature of the Period to Appeal — The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, so that failure to do so renders the questioned resolution final and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final order. The right to appeal is not part of due process but a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The Court invoked this principle to hold that the Sandiganbayan's resolution had become final and executory, precluding any further review.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Defined — Grave abuse of discretion exists where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court found that the Sandiganbayan's quashal did not approach this standard, given the absence of a writ of execution at the time the Information was filed.

• "The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost." — This passage states a fundamental remedial-law principle central to the disposition: that Rule 65 certiorari is not available where the party failed to perfect a timely appeal under Rule 45.

• "It strains reason how could accused (sic) be charged criminally in this Court for failure to enforce a decision, the execution of which the private complainants asked in the Civil Service Commission." — This is the Sandiganbayan's reasoning, quoted and adopted by the Supreme Court, explaining why the Information was properly quashed: at the time it was filed, no writ of execution had yet been issued, making the charge of failure to reinstate logically untenable.

• "The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned resolution final and executory, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction to alter the final order, much less to entertain the appeal." — This passage articulates the jurisdictional character of the appellate period, a principle frequently cited in subsequent procedural jurisprudence.

• People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145951, August 12, 2003 — Cited for the proposition that the proper remedy from a final order of the Sandiganbayan is a petition for review under Rule 45.
• Africa vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 124478, March 11, 1998 — Cited alongside People vs. Sandiganbayan to establish that Sandiganbayan final orders are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
• Dr. Alberto Nidoy, et al. vs. CA, G.R. No. 146017, February 18, 2004 — Cited for the rule that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
• Heirs of Lourdes Potenciano Padilla vs. CA, G.R. No. 147205, March 10, 2004 — Cited both for the mutual exclusivity of appeal and certiorari and for the requirement that a party invoking liberality must explain its failure to comply with the rules.
• Pedrosa vs. Hill, G.R. No. 120804, June 14, 1996 — Cited for the jurisdictional nature of the period to appeal.
• Borre vs. CA, G.R. No. L-57204, March 14, 1988 — Cited for the principle that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, not part of due process.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a party may appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court by filing a verified petition for review on certiorari raising only questions of law. Applied to establish that Rule 45, not Rule 65, was the proper remedy.
• Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that the petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or from denial of a motion for reconsideration. Applied to compute the reglementary period, which expired on 28 November 2002.
• Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7975 — Provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45. Applied to confirm the proper appellate route from the Sandiganbayan.
• Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 — Prohibits a public officer from causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Information charged Emprese with violating this provision by failing to reinstate the complainants despite the finality of the CA decision; the Court found the charge untenable because no writ of execution existed at the time of filing.
• Section 3(d), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Emprese invoked this ground in his Motion to Quash, alleging that the Information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

Puno (Acting C.J.), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.