People vs. Samson

The killing of a child is inherently attended by treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. An extrajudicial confession is admissible if it is voluntary, made in writing, with the assistance of competent and independent counsel, and conforms to the rights guaranteed under custodial investigation. A conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty to the exclusion of all others.

On the evening of October 8, 2014, Jeremias B. Dela Torre left his house in Norzagaray, Bulacan, to fetch his wife, leaving his 11-year-old daughter Abegail at a dance practice. He encountered his neighbor and sometime co-worker, Rossano Samson y Tiongco, and informed him about work the next day. Upon returning home, Jeremias found drops of blood inside the house and his daughter missing. Abegail was later discovered lifeless by the roadside, her blouse lifted and underwear pulled down. A police investigation ensued, leading to accused-appellant’s house and eventually to his father’s house in Navotas, where he was found.

• The Crime and Initial Investigation: On October 8, 2014, around 6:30 p.m., Jeremias Dela Torre left his house in Norzagaray, Bulacan, to fetch his wife. He passed accused-appellant, a neighbor and occasional carpentry co-worker, and mentioned a job for the following day. When Jeremias and his wife returned, they saw blood droplets inside their house. Their 11-year-old daughter, Abegail, was missing. After searching with the Barangay Captain, Abegail was found dead by the roadside, her blouse lifted to her breast and underwear pulled down to her right ankle. SPO3 Dennis R. Diaz and other officers arrived around 8:00 p.m. and invited for questioning all men who had been drinking nearby. Accused-appellant was the only one who had left the drinking group. The officers went to his house, where they noticed a plastic earring pendant on the doorstep. Jeremias identified it as belonging to Abegail. The accused’s son told the police accused-appellant might be at his father’s house in Navotas.

• Arrest, Confession, and Recovery of Evidence: Police proceeded to Navotas and found accused-appellant sleeping. While traveling to the police station, he admitted killing Abegail. At the station, he confessed again, this time with Atty. Mario M. Villegas of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) assisting. The extrajudicial confession was reduced to writing. Accused-appellant stated he used a crowbar, which he hid in his room in Bulacan; police later recovered it there. Atty. Villegas testified he explained accused-appellant’s rights, conferred with him privately, and that accused-appellant repeatedly said, “Nakukunsensya na kasi ako.” The Medico-Legal Report showed Abegail sustained 32 injuries, three of which were fatal head injuries, and a frontal bone skull fracture.

• Defense Version: Accused-appellant denied the charge. He claimed he learned of Abegail’s death on October 9 or 10, 2014, and went to his father’s house in Navotas the next day to get rice and money. He testified that police invited him to the station and detained him. Atty. Villegas allegedly asked him to sign a document he could not read, telling him it would help his case. He maintained he knew nothing about the killing.

• Trial Court Findings: The RTC found the extrajudicial confession voluntary and gave credence to prosecution witnesses. It held that accused-appellant killed Abegail with treachery and abuse of superior strength. The RTC sentenced him to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered payment of civil indemnity, actual damages (PHP 50,570.00), moral damages, and exemplary damages (PHP 100,000.00 each), plus 6% interest per annum from finality.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Accused-appellant argued that his extrajudicial confession was not valid and should have been excluded, contending that he was not fully apprised of its consequences and that he merely signed a document he did not read.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Accused-appellant maintained that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt because no direct evidence linked him to the crime, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support conviction.

• Voluntary and Valid Confession: The People contended that accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession complied with all constitutional and statutory requisites — it was voluntary, express, in writing, and made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel — and thus admissible.

• Circumstantial Evidence Establishes Guilt: The People argued that the combination of proven circumstances — the confession, flight, recovery of the earring pendant and crowbar, intoxication, and the medico-legal findings — formed an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence proving accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s admission of accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession.

• Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction based on circumstantial evidence.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The extrajudicial confession was correctly admitted. It satisfied the requirements of voluntariness, being express, in writing, and made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. Atty. Villegas of the PAO was summoned by the Mayor’s Office, introduced himself, explained accused-appellant’s rights and the consequences of his statement, and conferred with him privately. Accused-appellant repeatedly stated his conscience bothered him and signed the confession in counsel’s presence. The confession complied with Section 2(d) of Republic Act No. 7438 and the constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation — the right to remain silent, to competent and independent counsel, and to be informed that any statement could be used against him.

• Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence: The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for Murder. Direct evidence is not indispensable; circumstantial evidence may suffice if it meets the requisites under the Rules of Court: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which inferences are drawn are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The following proven facts formed an unbroken chain: accused-appellant’s voluntary and detailed confession; the recovery of the victim’s earring pendant at his doorstep; the recovery of the crowbar in his house; his intoxication around the time of the killing; his flight to his father’s house in Navotas while other drinking companions remained; the consistency of his confession with the medico-legal findings; and the absence of ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses. Accused-appellant’s denial and alibi were inherently weak and unsupported by proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis.

• Treachery in the Killing of a Child — The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not specifically shown, because the victim’s tender age, small frame, and inability to offer effective resistance ensure the absence of any risk to the offender. The minor victim’s weakness itself supplies the qualifying circumstance.

• Absorption of Abuse of Superior Strength by Treachery — When both treachery and abuse of superior strength attend a killing, the latter is absorbed by the former and should not be treated as a separate ordinary aggravating circumstance. Treachery subsumes the element of taking advantage of superior strength.

• Requisites for Admissibility of an Extrajudicial Confession — For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, (c) express, and (d) in writing. It must also comply with constitutional rights: (1) right to remain silent; (2) right to independent and competent counsel preferably of one’s own choice; (3) right to be provided with counsel if unable to secure one; (4) in case of waiver, it must be in writing and with the assistance of counsel; and (5) the right to be informed of these rights and that anything said can and will be used against the declarant. Further, under Section 2(d) of RA 7438, the confession must be signed in the presence of counsel or, upon valid waiver, in the presence of any of the enumerated persons.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The proven circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty to the exclusion of all others.

• Weakness of Alibi and Denial — Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail over positive, credible testimony. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was in another place at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity.

• “It is well-settled that the ‘killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown in the Information, as the weakness of the victim due to his [/her] tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.’” — This articulates the rationale for treating the killing of a minor as inherently treacherous.

• “The circumstances, when woven together, lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all the others, as the person who killed the hapless Abegail.” — This captures the standard for evaluating the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence.

• “Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. … For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he [or she] was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime[,] and [that] it was physically impossible for him [or her] to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.” — The Court reiterates the strict requirements for alibi.

• People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Applied to modify the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to PHP 75,000.00 each, because no ordinary aggravating circumstance attended the crime.

• People v. Enojo, 866 Phil. 835 (2019) — Cited for the doctrine that the killing of a child is inherently treacherous.

• People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834 (2002) — Used to state the requisites for circumstantial evidence to support a conviction.

• People v. Fernandez, 826 Phil. 102 (2018) — Relied upon for the requirements of an admissible extrajudicial confession.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defined the elements of Murder and the qualifying circumstances, including treachery and abuse of superior strength. The Court clarified that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength, rendering the crime qualified solely by treachery.

• Section 2(d), Republic Act No. 7438 — Prescribed the formal requirements for the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions: they must be in writing and signed in the presence of counsel or other enumerated persons. Accused-appellant’s confession complied with this provision.

• A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC (Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase “Without Eligibility for Parole” in Indivisible Penalties) — Applied to delete the phrase “without eligibility for parole” from the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as the death penalty was not warranted in the absence of an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Justices Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh concurred.