People vs. Saltarin

A murder conviction may rest on the positive identification of a lone eyewitness who was beside the victim at arm's length, even if the killing occurred at night, and a sudden, swift, and unexpected knife attack that leaves the victim no chance to defend or retaliate constitutes treachery.

The case is a criminal appeal from a murder conviction under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes killing attended by qualifying circumstances such as treachery. The prosecution's case rested on a lone eyewitness, Gerry Narido, who considered the victim Joval Benitez de Jesus his tatay-tatayan.

Marcelino Saltarin y Talosig was charged with murder for the killing of Joval Benitez de Jesus on or about November 6, 2011 in Manila, with the information alleging intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, and that he stabbed the victim with a bladed weapon three times, hitting him once on the chest and causing a mortal stab wound. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 37, Manila. On arraignment, Saltarin pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the jurisdiction of the RTC, the identity of the accused, and the cause of death of the victim.

At trial, the prosecution presented fifteen-year-old Gerry Narido, who considered the victim his tatay-tatayan. Narido testified that on November 6, 2011, around 11 o'clock in the evening, he and the victim were outside a junk shop when Saltarin asked for coins. The victim obliged but refused to give more when Saltarin asked a second time. After Saltarin left, Narido and the victim sat inside a kuliglig parked nearby. When Saltarin returned, he handed a cigarette to the victim, who responded "mabait ka naman pala." Saltarin stepped back a bit and instantly thrust a knife into the victim's chest. He delivered two more blows but missed, then fled. Narido brought the victim to Gat Andres Hospital, but the victim died that same night due to the stab wound hitting his heart.

On cross, Narido clarified that although it was dark at the locus criminis, he clearly saw Saltarin because the latter was only an arm's length away when he stabbed the victim, and Narido was seated right beside the victim on board the kuliglig. The parties also stipulated on the nature of the testimonies of arresting officer PO1 Christopher Razon, attending doctor Jesille Cui Baluyot, investigating officer SP02 Edmundo Cabal, and the victim's mother, Teresita de Jesus. The prosecution offered documentary exhibits including the Letter-Referral dated November 8, 2011, the victim's Certificate of Death, SPO2 Cabal's Crime Report dated November 7, 2011, the Affidavit of Apprehension executed by PO2 Roman Fajardo and PO1 Christopher Razon, the Booking Sheet, and SPO2 Cabal's Arrest Report.

Saltarin testified as the lone defense witness. According to him, on November 6, 2011, around 11 o'clock in the evening, while he was walking home, the victim blocked his path to ask for a cigarette. He obliged then walked away. The victim followed him and asked for money; he replied he did not have any left. The victim suddenly held him by the arm and forced his hand inside his pocket. He resisted, but the victim held his neck and drew a knife. He then realized the victim had four other companions, including Narido, who all surrounded him and the victim. He grappled for the knife and rolled with the victim on the ground. After getting back on his feet, he immediately ran home. The following morning, the victim's relatives came to his house and accused him of stabbing the victim; the next day, he was arrested in the church.

The RTC found that Saltarin's denial could not prevail over Narido's positive identification of him as the one who fatally stabbed the victim. It appreciated treachery because Saltarin's sudden and unexpected attack caught the victim off guard, but did not appreciate evident premeditation for lack of any showing that Saltarin hatched a plan to kill the victim. The CA likewise gave full credence to Narido's eyewitness account.

• Positive Identification: Appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of murder despite the lack of positive identification because the crime happened around 11 o'clock in the evening along a dark street, making it impossible for Narido to recognize his offender.
• Eyewitness Credibility: Appellant argued that Narido's testimony contained uncertainties: Narido could not answer simple questions on the address of the junkshop where the kuliglig was parked and the exact date of the incident, and although Narido claimed he did not know appellant before the incident, Narido mentioned appellant's complete address when he testified.
• Human Nature: Appellant argued that it was contrary to human nature for Narido not to shout for help despite the presence of other people in the vicinity.
• Ill Motive: Appellant imputed ill motive on Narido, who testified that he would do everything to protect the interest of his tatay-tatayan.

• Eyewitness Credibility: The OSG defended the RTC's verdict of conviction and the credibility of Narido's testimony, arguing that despite the minor gaps in Narido's testimony, the same sufficiently established the killing.
• Treachery: The OSG argued that appellant's sudden and unpredicted attack amounted to treachery.
• Denial: The OSG emphasized that the positive testimony prevailed over appellant's denial.

• Positive Identification: Whether the CA erred in affirming appellant's conviction for murder despite his claim that the lone eyewitness could not positively identify him because the crime occurred around 11 o'clock in the evening along a dark street.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Joval Benitez de Jesus.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the killing.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the CA erred in modifying the penalty and monetary awards, including the phrase "without eligibility for parole" and the amounts of damages.

• Positive Identification: No. Narido positively identified appellant as the assailant; his credible eyewitness account, affirmed by both lower courts, prevailed over appellant's denial.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden, swift, and unexpected knife attack, after appellant pretended to hand a cigarette, rendered the victim unable to defend or retaliate.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to show when the plan to kill was hatched, any overt act of determination, or sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• Penalty and Damages: No. Reclusion perpetua was correct absent an aggravating circumstance; the phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be stated; damages were modified to P13,500.00 actual, P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral, and P75,000.00 exemplary, with 6% interest.

• Positive Identification: Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code requires (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance under Article 248; and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide, as stated in People vs. Villanueva. The SC focused on the second and third elements. Narido recounted in detail how appellant asked for coins, left after the victim refused to give more, returned, handed a cigarette, and then suddenly thrust a knife into the victim's chest. Both the RTC and the CA gave full credence to Narido's eyewitness account; he was physically present at the locus criminis, positively identified appellant, and his testimony conformed with the death certificate stating that the victim died due to a "stab wound [on] the anterior thorax hitting the heart." The SC reiterated that assessment of credibility is best undertaken by the RTC because it observes the witness's deportment, and its factual findings are binding on the reviewing court especially when affirmed by the CA, as in People vs. Ocdol. The darkness did not preclude recognition because Narido and the victim were together the whole time, appellant was only an arm's length away, and Narido was seated beside the victim. Narido's failure to shout for help was not unusual given his shock, appellant's swift attack, and Narido's age; there is no standard reaction to a shocking experience. The alleged uncertainties on the exact date, the address of the junk shop, and prior knowledge of appellant were trivial matters that did not affect Narido's credibility, as held in People vs. Appegu. Appellant's bare denial was inherently weak and could not prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witness, as ruled in People vs. Peteluna; it further crumbled because appellant admitted being at the locus criminis on the same date and time.

• Treachery: The SC agreed with the RTC and the CA that treachery attended the killing. Narido testified that after the victim refused to give appellant more coins, appellant left but returned shortly, approached the parked kuliglig where Narido and the victim were seated, handed a cigarette to the victim, and then, without warning, stepped back for momentum and instantly thrust a knife into the victim's chest. The sudden, swift, and unexpected attack rendered the victim totally unable to retaliate or defend himself, and the means employed ensured the commission of the crime without exposing appellant to any risk from the victim's retaliation or defense. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape, as stated in People vs. Orozco. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, as held in People vs. Pulgo.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts, as stated in People vs. Kalipayan. The prosecution must show how or when the plan to kill was hatched and how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish evident premeditation, and the SC agreed. The killing was more spontaneous than planned: after the victim refused to give appellant more coins, appellant left but returned shortly, and the events indicated that he armed himself with a knife and stabbed the victim in a sudden, swift, and unexpected manner. There was no showing that appellant plotted to kill the victim early on; the circumstances established that he only decided to finish off the victim after the latter refused to give him more coins. There was no evidence that he had enough time to reflect on the consequences of killing his victim before carrying it out, and no other overt act showing his determination to kill was shown.

• Penalty and Damages: The CA did not err in affirming appellant's conviction for murder. In the absence of any aggravating circumstance, appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Under A.M. 15-08-02, the phrase "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua only if the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346. Here, reclusion perpetua was the correct penalty in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that would have otherwise warranted the death penalty, so the phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be borne in the decision. On the monetary awards, the SC affirmed the award of actual damages of P13,500.00 as the stipulated funeral expenses incurred by the victim's mother. The CA properly increased civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Exemplary damages should be increased from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, as held in People vs. Jugueta.

• Murder under Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder requires (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance under Article 248; and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide. The SC applied it because Saltarin killed the victim with treachery.
• Treachery — The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape; what is decisive is that the execution made defense or retaliation impossible and ensured commission without risk to the aggressor. The SC applied it to the sudden knife thrust after Saltarin handed a cigarette.
• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision and execution enough to allow reflection. The SC did not appreciate it because the killing was spontaneous after the victim refused to give more coins.
• Credibility of Witnesses — The RTC's assessment of credibility is best undertaken because it observes the witness's deportment, and its factual findings are binding on the reviewing court especially when affirmed by the CA. The SC relied on this to uphold Narido's eyewitness account.
• Denial as Defense — Denial is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the assailant's positive identification by a prosecution witness; it further crumbles when the accused admits being at the locus criminis at the time of the killing. The SC rejected Saltarin's denial.
• Parole Qualification under A.M. 15-08-02 — The phrase "without eligibility for parole" is used to qualify reclusion perpetua only if the accused should have been sentenced to death but for R.A. No. 9346. The SC held it need not be stated because reclusion perpetua was the correct penalty absent an aggravating circumstance.
• Damages in Murder — Actual damages require proof; civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are awarded in murder, with exemplary damages set at P75,000.00 under prevailing jurisprudence. The SC affirmed actual damages of P13,500.00 and increased civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages to P75,000.00 each.

• "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape." — This defines treachery and supports the SC's finding that the sudden knife attack qualified the killing as murder.
• "What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or herself or retaliate, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor." — This states the decisive test for treachery, which the SC applied because the victim was caught off guard.
• "For alibi and denial are inherently weak and courts have been viewed with disfavor by the courts. It cannot prevail over the assailant's positive identification by the prosecution witness." — This explains why Saltarin's denial failed against Narido's positive identification.
• "Thus, the phrase “without eligibility for parole” shall be used to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua only if the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for RA 9346." — This sets the rule for when the parole qualification must be included in the sentence.

• People vs. Villanueva, 807 Phil. 245, 252 (2017) — Cited for the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Ocdol, 741 Phil. 701, 710-711 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the RTC's assessment of credibility is best undertaken by the trial court.
• People vs. Appegu, 429 Phil. 467, 477 (2002) — Cited for the rule that uncertainties on trivial matters do not affect eyewitness credibility.
• People vs. Peteluna, 702 Phil. 128, 141 (2013) — Cited for the rule that denial cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Orozco, G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017 — Cited for the essence of treachery.
• People vs. Pulgo, 830 SCRA 220, 234 (2017) — Cited for the decisive test of treachery.
• People vs. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 839 (2016) — Cited for the prevailing jurisprudence on exemplary damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder when the killing is attended by qualifying circumstances such as treachery; the SC applied it because Saltarin killed the victim with treachery.
• A.M. 15-08-02 — Provides guidelines on the use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in indivisible penalties; the SC applied it by holding that the phrase need not qualify the reclusion perpetua sentence because the death penalty was not warranted.
• R.A. No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty; the SC referred to it in explaining that "without eligibility for parole" is used only when the accused should have been sentenced to death but for this law.