People vs. Salle, Jr.

A pardon, whether full or conditional, may not be granted to an accused during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment of conviction, as the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires "conviction by final judgment" before the President may exercise the pardoning power.

Following their conviction for the compound crime of murder and destructive arson by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, accused-appellants Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of this appeal, both were granted conditional pardons by the President and released from the New Bilibid Prison. Salle subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, which was granted. Mengote, however, did not file a similar motion, prompting the Court to address the enforceability of his pardon.

• Nature of the Case: The case originated from a criminal conviction for murder and destructive arson. The central issue shifted to the validity of executive clemency granted during appellate review.
• The Conviction and Appeal: The RTC convicted both appellants. They seasonably appealed to the Supreme Court.
• The Conditional Pardons: During the pendency of the appeal, the President granted conditional pardons to both appellants on 9 December 1993. They were released from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993.
• Divergent Actions of Appellants: Appellant Salle, misunderstanding the nature of a motion, filed a motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. Appellant Mengote left for his province without consulting his counsel and did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal.
• Government Explanation: The Presidential Committee's Secretariat explained that Mengote's prison records did not show a pending appeal, leading to an erroneous recommendation for pardon. It cited an agreement with human rights organizations that counsel would file withdrawal motions for pardoned convicts with pending appeals.

• Implied Admission of Guilt: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, argued that by accepting the conditional pardon, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, warranting the dismissal of the appeal.
• Unenforceability Due to Lack of Finality: In its Memorandum, the OSG maintained that the pardon granted to Mengote was unenforceable because the judgment of conviction was not yet final due to the pending appeal.

• Abandonment of Appeal: The Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), counsel for accused-appellants, contended that Mengote's acceptance of the conditional pardon operated as an abandonment of his appeal, thereby rendering his conviction final and making the pardon valid and enforceable. It cited Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. in support.

• Enforceability of Pardon During Pendency of Appeal: Whether a conditional pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction is valid and enforceable under the 1987 Constitution.
• Effect of Acceptance on Appeal: Whether the acceptance of a conditional pardon during the pendency of an appeal amounts to an abandonment of that appeal.

• Enforceability of Pardon During Pendency of Appeal: The pardon is unenforceable. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the President may grant pardon "after conviction by final judgment." A judgment on appeal is not final. The constitutional history shows a deliberate restoration of this "final judgment" requirement to prevent executive derogation of judicial power. Accordingly, any pardon granted before the withdrawal of an appeal violates the Constitution.
• Effect of Acceptance on Appeal: The acceptance of a pardon does not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal. The obiter dictum in Monsanto suggesting otherwise was made under the 1973 Constitution (as amended in 1981), which did not require final conviction, and is not a guiding rule under the present Constitution. The proper procedure is for the appellant to first withdraw his appeal, bringing the conviction to finality, before the pardon can take effect.

• Pardon After Final Judgment — Under the 1987 Constitution, the presidential power to grant pardon may be exercised only "after conviction by final judgment." This means the judgment of conviction must have become final and executory, which occurs when no appeal is perfected, the right to appeal is waived, the sentence is commenced, or probation is applied for. This requirement reinstates a limitation removed by the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution and is intended to uphold the separation of powers by preventing executive interference with the judicial process while a case is sub judice.
• Separation of Powers in Executive Clemency — The "conviction by final judgment" requirement safeguards the exclusive jurisdiction of appellate courts over cases on appeal. Granting clemency before finality would usurp judicial authority and risk a failure or frustration of justice, as the appellate court could later acquit a person already pardoned.

• "Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is 'final conviction'... or 'conviction by final judgment'... In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final."
• "The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable."

• People v. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 (1984) — Distinguished. The ruling that commutation ends the appeal was based on the 1973 Constitution (as amended), which allowed pardon before final conviction, and is inapplicable under the 1987 Constitution.
• Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989) — Distinguished. The statement that accepting a pardon abandons an appeal was an obiter dictum made under the 1973 Constitution's pardoning power provision and is not controlling under the current constitutional framework.

• Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the President may grant pardon "after conviction by final judgment." This provision was interpreted as the controlling limitation that prohibits the grant of pardon while an appeal is pending.

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florentino P. Feliciano, Teodoro R. Padilla, Regalado E. Romero, Jose C. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Jose A.R. Mendoza, Francisco, Ricardo J. Hermosisima, Jr., and Artemio V. Panganiban.

• Justice Bellosillo — Concurred but wrote separately to argue that the majority's remedy of deferring the pardon's effectivity until withdrawal of the appeal was "too lenient." He emphasized that processing a pardon application during a pending appeal is a clear constitutional violation that must be "immediately abated," and advocated for a firmer sanction to prevent the "continuous and unmitigated diminution if not derogation of judicial prerogative."