People vs. Sales

The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.

On September 20, 2002, appellant Noel T. Sales confronted his sons, nine-year-old Noemar and eight-year-old Junior, upon their return home after leaving without permission days prior. Enraged, appellant whipped the children inside the house, then took them outside, tied them to a coconut tree, and continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. Noemar suffered injuries to his head, face, and legs, lost consciousness, and subsequently died without receiving medical attention.

• The Incident: On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior left home to attend a fluvial procession without parental permission. Their mother, Maria, found them the next day in a nearby barangay. Upon their return at around 8:00 in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant whipped them with a stick inside the house until it broke. He then took them outside, tied their hands and feet to a coconut tree, and continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. Maria stayed inside the house during the beating, fearing for her life.
• Aftermath and Death: When the beating stopped, the three walked back to the house, with appellant assisting a staggering Noemar. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries on his legs, as well as injuries on Junior’s head, cheek, and legs. Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. After Maria failed to revive him, appellant called a quack doctor, who advised bringing Noemar to a hospital. Appellant carried Noemar to a junction seven kilometers away to wait for a vehicle. No vehicle arrived, and another quack doctor at the junction declared Noemar dead. Appellant brought the body home. Noemar was buried the following day without a medical examination of his cadaver.
• Defense Version: Appellant claimed he only scolded and hit the boys simultaneously on their buttocks three times with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He asserted that Noemar began chilling and frothing, eventually losing consciousness. Appellant maintained that Noemar died of difficulty in breathing due to a weak heart, not from the beating. Maria testified for the defense, claiming Noemar suffered from epilepsy which caused frothing and loss of consciousness, though she stated he usually regained consciousness after 15 minutes.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged.
• Causation: Petitioner maintained that Noemar died due to a pre-existing medical condition—a weak heart or epilepsy—rather than the physical beating.
• Discipline vs. Intent to Kill: Petitioner contended that he merely intended to discipline his sons and lacked the intent to kill, asserting that no parent could kill his own child.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondent argued that the prosecution successfully established all elements of parricide and slight physical injuries beyond reasonable doubt through positive testimonies and corroborating medical evidence.
• Direct Causation: Respondent maintained that the victim's death was the direct consequence of the beating, rendering appellant criminally liable under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution proved petitioner's guilt for parricide and slight physical injuries beyond reasonable doubt.
• Causation: Whether the victim's death was attributable to the beating or to a pre-existing medical condition.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should be appreciated in favor of petitioner.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Conviction was affirmed. All elements of parricide were present: a person was killed, the deceased was killed by the accused, and the deceased was the legitimate child of the accused. The positive testimonies of the mother and the surviving victim established the identity of the assailant and the nature of the attack. For slight physical injuries, the victim's testimony was corroborated by his mother and the examining physician.
• Causation: Death was the direct consequence of the beating. Petitioner's claim of a pre-existing condition was self-serving and uncorroborated, further undermined by conflicting testimonies attributing the condition to a weak heart (petitioner) versus epilepsy (wife). Pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred for a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that intended, provided the wrong is the direct consequence of the felony committed.
• Mitigating Circumstance: The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was correctly rejected. Petitioner tied his sons to a coconut tree and beat them indiscriminately with a thick piece of wood, causing injuries to the head, face, and legs. The means employed were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. Voluntary surrender, however, was properly appreciated.

• Parricide — Committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Applied to affirm conviction where the father beat his son to death.
• Criminal Liability for a Different Wrong (Art. 4, RPC) — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended, provided (a) a felony was committed and (b) the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Applied to hold the father liable for parricide despite claiming he only intended to discipline the child.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong (Praeter Intentionem) — This mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. Applied to deny the mitigating circumstance because tying the victims to a tree and beating them with a thick piece of wood were means sufficient to cause death.

• "A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them."
• "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim."

• People v. Castro, G.R. No. 172370, October 6, 2008 — Followed for the elements of parricide.
• People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20 (1996) — Followed for the proposition that oral evidence may be considered to prove filial relationship in parricide.
• Oriente v. People, G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007 — Followed for the rule that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated where the means employed were sufficient to cause death.
• People v. Juan, 464 Phil. 507 (2004) — Followed for the application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code regarding indivisible penalties.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide. Applied as the governing law for the killing of a legitimate child by the father.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Governs criminal liability for felonies resulting in a wrong different from that intended. Applied to establish liability for parricide despite the claim of mere disciplinary intent.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua, the lesser penalty, given one mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender) and no aggravating circumstances.
• Article 266, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes slight physical injuries. Applied to the injuries sustained by the second son, which required medical attendance for one week.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.