People vs. Salazar

A baptismal certificate is sufficient to prove the age of the victim in statutory rape cases, and where the victim is established to be already twelve years old (not below twelve), the crime is simple rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) through force, threat, or intimidation, not statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d); a qualifying circumstance such as the offender being the common-law spouse of the victim's mother cannot be appreciated unless alleged in the Information, regardless of whether it is proved at trial, because doing so would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

AAA was the daughter of BBB, with whom accused-appellant Demetrio Salazar was cohabiting as common-law husband in a one-room house in Lavezares, Northern Samar. AAA's biological father, CCC, was incarcerated at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa at the time of the incidents. The Informations charged accused-appellant as AAA's "stepfather," alleging abuse of confidence in the commission of the rapes. At the time of the crimes, the Revised Penal Code provisions on rape had been amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and later by Republic Act No. 8353, reclassifying rape from a crime against chastity to a crime against persons and restructuring the pertinent articles.

AAA was the daughter of BBB, with whom accused-appellant Demetrio Salazar cohabited as common-law husband in a one-room house in Lavezares, Northern Samar. AAA's biological father, CCC, was serving time at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa when the incidents occurred. AAA, BBB, and accused-appellant all lived together in the same dwelling.

The first rape occurred at about 10:00 in the evening of May 18, 1999. AAA, then twelve years old, was sleeping in the house while BBB was out gambling. Accused-appellant, who had been drinking, awakened AAA, placed his hand over her mouth, removed her panty, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA felt pain and tried to scream but was stifled by accused-appellant's hand. She cried instead. Afterwards, accused-appellant stood up and returned to where he had been sleeping. When BBB arrived, AAA told her mother about the rape, but BBB did not believe her and dismissed her claims.

On June 25, 1999, at around midnight, accused-appellant again raped AAA. He first slapped her, then placed a handkerchief inside her mouth, spread her arms, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while kissing her right cheek. After the act, accused-appellant stood up, drank coffee, and went to sleep. AAA again reported the incident to BBB, who had arrived from gambling. BBB confronted accused-appellant, but after a short argument again dismissed her daughter's claims. AAA later informed her aunt, DDD, about the second rape. DDD brought her to the police station to report the incident, and AAA was subsequently examined by the Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares.

Two Informations were filed on September 6, 1999, charging accused-appellant with two counts of statutory rape, alleging that he was AAA's stepfather and had committed the acts through force, intimidation, and superior strength. On December 6, 1999, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. He escaped from detention but was later caught, and hearings began on July 27, 2000. Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating she was not raped and no longer intended to pursue the cases. During the hearing, she explained that her mother had forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm.

The prosecution presented DDD, AAA's aunt, who testified that AAA was her niece and presented a Certificate of Baptism stating that AAA was born on April 10, 1987. Dr. Ethel Parane Simeon, the Municipal Health Officer, testified that she examined AAA on June 28, 1999, and found hematomas on the labia majora and labia minora, as well as lacerations at the 3, 6, and 11 o'clock positions in AAA's vagina, concluding that AAA was raped. The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant himself, who interposed alibi, claiming he was at his farm six kilometers away making copra from May 15 to May 23, 1999, and that on June 25, 1999, AAA was watching a show at the town proper with her brother. He alleged that the cases were instituted by the relatives of AAA's biological father to wrest custody of AAA from BBB and himself.

• Affidavit of Desistance: Accused-appellant argued that the case should have been dismissed because AAA had executed an Affidavit of Desistance exonerating him from the crimes charged.
• Credibility of Testimony: Accused-appellant questioned the trial court's reliance on AAA's testimony, citing People vs. Domogoy for the proposition that testimony in rape cases must be received with caution.
• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant contended that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in giving full faith to the prosecution's version while disregarding the defense.

• Affidavit of Desistance: Whether AAA's Affidavit of Desistance warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases against accused-appellant.
• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: Whether the trial court correctly gave full weight and credence to the testimony of AAA.
• Classification of the Crime: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape or simple rape.
• Proper Penalty: Whether reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty to be imposed.

• Affidavit of Desistance: No. The affidavit cannot cause dismissal because it was executed after the case had already been instituted, and it was not duly sworn to; moreover, AAA testified that her mother threatened her to execute it.
• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: Yes. The testimony of child-victims of rape is given full weight and credence, and the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, sustained by the CA, is binding on the Supreme Court.
• Classification of the Crime: Simple rape, not statutory rape. The victim's age was sufficiently established by baptismal certificate, but she was already twelve years old (not below twelve), so the element "below twelve years of age" for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) was absent; the rape was committed through force and intimidation under Article 266-A(1)(a).
• Proper Penalty: Yes. Reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty for simple rape under Article 266-B, no qualifying circumstance having been properly alleged and proved; the step-parent relationship was not established by marriage, and the common-law spouse relationship was not alleged in the Informations.

• Affidavit of Desistance: The affidavit was executed after the criminal cases had already been instituted, at which point the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and control over the proceedings. Pursuant to People vs. Montes and People vs. Ramirez, Jr., a pardon or affidavit of desistance is not a ground for dismissal once the action has been instituted; the pardon must have been made prior to the institution of the criminal action to justify dismissal. Furthermore, the affidavit was not duly sworn to, and AAA testified that her mother threatened to kill her if she refused to execute it. Affidavits of desistance are viewed with suspicion and reservation, being exceedingly unreliable because they can easily be secured through intimidation or monetary consideration.

• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: The contention that AAA's testimony must be received with caution, based on People vs. Domogoy, was rejected because the victim in Domogoy was twenty-one years old, whereas AAA was only twelve at the time of the rapes. Citing People vs. Montes and People vs. Basmayor, the Court reiterated that testimonies of child-victims of rape deserve full credence, as no young woman of tender age would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial if not motivated by the desire to obtain justice. Additionally, the trial court's findings on witness credibility, having been sustained by the CA, are doctrinally binding on the Supreme Court, which is not in a position to observe the witnesses' demeanor firsthand.

• Classification of the Crime: Two elements must concur for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d): (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim, and (2) that the victim is below twelve years of age. The first element was undisputed. As to the second, the CA erred in holding that the victim's age was not established; contrary to the CA's ruling, a baptismal certificate is sufficient to prove the age of the victim in statutory rape cases, as held in People vs. Ramos. The baptismal certificate of AAA, coupled with the testimony of DDD, established that AAA was born on April 10, 1987, making her exactly twelve years, one month, and eight days old at the time of the first rape on May 18, 1999. Because AAA was already twelve (not below twelve), the second element of statutory rape was absent. The rape was instead established as simple rape under Article 266-A(1)(a), committed through force, threat, or intimidation, as AAA's mouth was covered and she was slapped and physically overpowered.

• Proper Penalty: Under Article 266-B, simple rape is punished by reclusion perpetua. The penalty escalates to death when qualified by circumstances including the victim being under eighteen and the offender being a parent, step-parent, guardian, relative within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Informations alleged accused-appellant was AAA's stepfather, but to be a stepfather, accused-appellant must have been legally married to AAA's mother—no such evidence was adduced. Although accused-appellant was the common-law husband of AAA's mother, this qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the Informations. Citing People vs. Negosa and People vs. Lizada, the Court held that a special qualifying circumstance, even if proved during trial, cannot be appreciated if not alleged in the Information, as this would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him. By virtue of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed in lieu of death, and the offender is not entitled to parole.

• Affidavit of Desistance in Criminal Cases — An affidavit of desistance or pardon does not warrant the dismissal of a criminal action once it has been instituted in court. The pardon must have been made prior to the institution of the criminal action to justify dismissal. Affidavits of desistance are viewed with suspicion and reservation, being exceedingly unreliable because they can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness through intimidation or monetary consideration. In this case, AAA's affidavit was executed after the cases were filed, was not duly sworn to, and was obtained under threat from her mother.

• Credibility of Child-Victim Testimony in Rape Cases — Testimonies of child-victims of rape are given full weight and credence. A girl of tender years who barely understands sex and sexuality is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the trial court's reliance on AAA's testimony, distinguishing People vs. Domogoy where the victim was twenty-one years old.

• Proof of Age in Statutory Rape Cases (People vs. Pruna Guidelines) — The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is the original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth. In the absence thereof, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and school records showing the date of birth suffice. If such documents are unavailable, the clear and credible testimony of the victim's mother or a family member qualified to testify on pedigree matters suffices under certain circumstances. The prosecution bears the burden of proving age, and the trial court must always make a categorical finding as to the victim's age. The Court applied this by accepting the baptismal certificate and DDD's testimony as sufficient proof that AAA was born April 10, 1987.

• Qualifying Circumstances Must Be Alleged in the Information — A special qualifying circumstance, even if proved during trial, cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime or increase the penalty unless it is alleged in the Information. Appreciating an unalleged qualifying circumstance would violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Court applied this by refusing to appreciate the common-law spouse relationship, which was proved but not alleged in the Informations, thereby precluding qualification of the rape to warrant the death penalty.

• Step-Parent Relationship Requires Legal Marriage — To qualify as a step-parent under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be legally married to the victim's parent. A common-law relationship does not constitute a step-parent relationship. No evidence of legal marriage between accused-appellant and BBB was adduced, so the step-parent allegation in the Informations was not established.

• "To justify the dismissal of the Complaints, the pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions." — This passage articulates the rule that an affidavit of desistance or pardon cannot cause dismissal of a criminal case once instituted, a principle drawn from People vs. Montes and central to the rejection of accused-appellant's first contention.

• "Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true." — This formulation from People vs. Montes, adopted in the decision, encapsulates the doctrine granting full credence to child-victim testimony in rape cases and distinguishes it from cases involving adult victims.

• "When the two circumstances of minority and relationship concur, then the proper imposable penalty shall be death--now qualified by Republic Act No. 9346." — This passage explains the interplay between the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 266-B and the effect of R.A. No. 9346 in prohibiting the death penalty, substituting reclusion perpetua.

• "Even if such special qualifying circumstance was proved, it cannot be appreciated against the appellant in order to qualify the crime; otherwise, the appellant would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him." — Drawn from People vs. Negosa, this passage states the constitutional rationale for requiring qualifying circumstances to be alleged in the Information, the doctrine that precluded appreciation of the common-law spouse relationship in this case.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 — Controlling procedural precedent providing for intermediate review by the CA of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; basis for the transfer of the case from the Supreme Court to the CA.
• People vs. Montes, G.R. Nos. 148743-45, November 18, 2003 — Followed on two points: (1) an affidavit of desistance executed after institution of the criminal action cannot cause dismissal, and (2) testimonies of child-victims of rape deserve full weight and credence.
• People vs. Ramirez, Jr., G.R. Nos. 150079-80, June 10, 2004 — Followed for the proposition that affidavits of desistance are viewed with suspicion and reservation and are exceedingly unreliable, and that once a case has been instituted, the complainant loses the privilege to decide whether the charge should proceed.
• People vs. Domogoy, G.R. No. 116738, March 22, 1999 — Distinguished; cited by accused-appellant for the proposition that rape testimony must be received with caution, but distinguished on the ground that the victim in Domogoy was twenty-one years old, whereas AAA was twelve.
• People vs. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009 — Followed; reinforces the doctrine that testimonies of young and immature rape victims deserve full credence.
• People vs. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007 — Followed; establishes that the trial court's findings on witness credibility, when sustained by the CA, are doctrinally binding on the Supreme Court.
• People vs. Tampos, G.R. No. 142740, August 6, 2003 — Followed; sets forth the two elements of statutory rape: (1) carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) the woman is below twelve years of age.
• People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 179030, June 12, 2008 — Followed; holds that a baptismal certificate is sufficient to prove the age of the victim in statutory rape cases, directly contradicting the CA's contrary finding.
• People vs. Pruna — Cited within People vs. Ramos for the guidelines on proving the age of the victim in statutory rape cases, including the hierarchy of evidence from certificate of live birth to baptismal certificate to family testimony.
• People vs. Negosa, G.R. Nos. 142856-57, August 25, 2003 — Followed; holds that a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated even if proved, and that a common-law spouse relationship does not establish step-parent status.
• People vs. Lizada — Followed; holds that where the common-law spouse qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the Informations pursuant to Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the accused is guilty only of simple rape even if the qualifying circumstance was proved.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 8353) — Defines rape as committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or unconscious; (c) by fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented. Paragraph (a) was applied to convict accused-appellant of simple rape; paragraph (d) was found inapplicable because AAA was already twelve, not below twelve.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes reclusion perpetua for simple rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, and the death penalty (now reclusion perpetua per R.A. No. 9346) when qualified by circumstances including the victim being under eighteen and the offender being a parent, step-parent, guardian, relative within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent. No qualifying circumstance was properly alleged and proved, so reclusion perpetua was imposed.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, effective June 24, 2006. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in lieu of the death penalty, and the offender is not entitled to parole under R.A. No. 4180 (Indeterminate Sentence Law).
• Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires that qualifying circumstances be alleged in the Information. Given retroactive effect because favorable to the accused, this rule precluded appreciation of the common-law spouse relationship not alleged in the Informations.

Corona, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concurred.