People vs. Salas

After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused where he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, and an escapee is deemed to have waived notice with his non-appearance deemed unjustified. Because Abong had been arraigned and then placed himself beyond the reach of the court by escaping, the requisites for trial in absentia were satisfied and proceedings were required to continue.

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Before arraignment, the prosecution moved for reinvestigation, after which an amended information was filed with no bail recommended. Abong pleaded not guilty to the amended charge, and trial commenced.

While trial was in progress, Abong took advantage of the first information for homicide to deceive the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release. He thereafter escaped. Upon learning of the trickery, the respondent judge cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest, but Abong remained at large.

The prosecution then moved that the hearing continue pursuant to the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The December 22, 1983 denial order became the subject of the present certiorari and mandamus proceedings, the material facts for review being that Abong had already been arraigned at the time of his release on the illegal bail bond and had since remained a fugitive.

• Trial in Absentia: Petitioner maintained that the hearing should continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the escape and continued absence of the accused.

• Trial in Absentia: Whether trial may proceed in absentia against an accused who escaped after arraignment, despite the inability to give him actual notice of subsequent hearings.
• Literal Construction: Whether Section 19 requires actual due notice to a fugitive so as to bar trial in his absence.

• Trial in Absentia: Yes. Trial in absentia was proper, all requisites being present where the accused had been arraigned and his escape constituted waiver and unjustified absence.
• Literal Construction: No. A too-literal reading requiring actual notice to a fugitive was rejected, such construction having constricted rather than fulfilled the purpose of Section 19.

• Trial in Absentia: The requisites were stated as: (a) the accused has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Abong had already been arraigned when released on the illegal bail bond. By escaping, he was deemed to have waived notice, including the right to be present except at identification by prosecution witnesses, and to have received due notice; the same escape rendered his failure to appear unjustified, since escape placed him beyond the pale and protection of the law. Continuance in his absence entailed forfeiture of the rights to be notified, to adduce evidence, and to refute the prosecution's evidence, with possible or probable conviction.
• Literal Construction: The purpose of Section 19 was to speed disposition of criminal cases formerly deferred or abandoned because of the defendant's escape, modifying the old rule in People vs. Avancena which had required presence at certain stages and thus rewarded flight. The respondent judge remained tethered to the old doctrine and to a literal view that notice was impossible. Such literalism was admonished as defeating legislative intendment, which resides in the spirit rather than the letter; judges must discern the reason for enactment and apply the law according to its ends.

• Trial in absentia under the 1973 Constitution — After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The requisites are (a) arraignment, (b) due notice of trial, and (c) unjustified failure to appear. Applied here, arraignment had occurred and the remaining requisites were satisfied by legal fiction arising from escape, so trial was required to continue until terminated despite non-reappearance.
• Waiver by escape — An accused's escape is deemed a waiver of the right to be present at trial, except only at the stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused, and a waiver of notice of subsequent hearings, the fugitive being deemed to have received due notice. Applied here, Abong's flight operated to his disadvantage, preventing attendance while allowing continuation of trial and forfeiture of the rights to notice, to present evidence, and to refute the prosecution.
• Escape as unjustified absence — Escape can never be a legal justification for failure to appear, the fugitive having placed himself beyond the pale and protection of the law. Applied here, Abong's non-appearance was unjustified as a matter of law precisely because it resulted from his own escape.
• Spirit over letter in statutory construction — Against a too-literal reading that constricts purpose and defeats intent, intention is found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth, requiring judges to look beyond language to reason and purpose. Applied here to reject the view that impossibility of actual notice to a fugitive barred trial in absentia.

• "However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." — States the controlling constitutional text of Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution from which the requisites for trial in absentia are drawn.
• "Escape can never be a legal justification." — Announces the categorical rule that flight renders non-appearance unjustified and supports deemed waiver of notice.
• "That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive." — Articulates the interpretive principle used to reject literalism requiring actual notice to a fugitive.

• People vs. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713 — Cited as the old doctrine requiring the accused's presence at certain stages, which had forced discontinuance while the defendant remained at large and rewarded escape; held modified by Section 19 allowing trial in absentia.
• Aquino vs. Mil. Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546; People vs. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269 — Cited for the proposition that the right to be present may now be waived except at the stage where prosecution witnesses will identify the accused.
• Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 — Distinguished as a case where trial in absentia was disallowed because the accused had not been previously arraigned, unlike the instant case where arraignment had occurred.

• Section 19, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — Guarantees presumption of innocence and rights to be heard, to speedy impartial public trial, confrontation, and compulsory process, with the proviso allowing trial after arraignment notwithstanding unjustified absence after due notice; applied as the authority compelling continuation of trial against the escaped accused.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.