People vs. Salamat

The illegal possession of a regulated drug and the illegal sale of a regulated drug are two separate and distinct offenses, each punishable independently, unless the entirety of the drug possessed is the same as that which was the subject of a previously agreed sale. Additionally, life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are distinct penalties — the former is imposed for offenses penalized by special laws and carries no accessory penalties, while the latter is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, entails imprisonment of at least thirty years, and carries accessory penalties.

Accused-appellant Rolando Salamat, alias "Tolits," alias "Mr. T," was charged in three separate informations before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The charges arose from a police operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which combined a buy-bust operation with the service of a search warrant on the accused's residence. The three criminal cases were tried jointly before the trial court.

On July 18, 1991, Cpl. Eddie Regalado of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station received information from a confidential informant that there was shabu in the house of a certain Rolando Salamat. On the basis of this information, Cpl. Regalado, together with Pat. Aberto Nepomuceno, applied for and was issued a search warrant by Judge Amanda Valera-Cabigao on the same day.

Four days later, on July 22, 1991, at around 7:00 A.M., a police team composed of Cpl. Regalado, Pats. Nepomuceno, Guevarra, Galang, Sales, and Olog, accompanied by the confidential informant, proceeded to the house of the suspect at No. 127 Interior Sanciangco Street, Catmon, Malabon, to serve the search warrant. A buy-bust operation was first conducted with Pat. Nepomuceno acting as poseur-buyer in the company of the confidential informant. According to the prosecution, while the two were walking towards the house, they were met by appellant who was coming out. Pat. Nepomuceno, who had on two previous occasions bought shabu from appellant as part of surveillance, told him "tatlong piso lang pare," meaning he was buying P300.00 worth of shabu. Appellant went inside the house, returned minutes later, and handed over the shabu to Pat. Nepomuceno, who paid him with the P300.00 marked bills. After examining the suspected shabu, Pat. Nepomuceno lighted his cigarette as a pre-arranged signal to his companions, then around ten meters away, to move in.

Appellant resisted arrest, ran inside the house, and locked himself in. The raiding team identified themselves as policemen but were met with gunshots from the house. Several men were seen fleeing from the back of the house toward a place called Palmario. When the police ordered appellant to surrender, he came out and threw a gun on the ground; Sgt. Guevarra took the gun while Pat. Nepomuceno handcuffed appellant. The search warrant was shown to appellant, who remained silent. Two houses were searched — the first at 127 Sanciangco Street where appellant was apprehended, and another at 139 Interior Sanciangco Street, about twenty meters away. The search yielded ten packets of shabu in an eyeglass container and several paraphernalia from the first house, and three packets of shabu and additional paraphernalia from the second house. The receipts for the items seized were signed by Barangay Captain Florentino Cruz, who was present during the search, and by appellant's common-law wife, Marilou Salamat, for the items taken from the second house. The confiscated items were turned over to the NBI Forensic Chemist, who confirmed the specimens were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant presented a different version. He testified that on the morning of July 22, 1991, he was in the house of Rolando Cabangis at 127 Interior Sanciangco Street, examining a ring Cabangis was selling to him, when he heard gunshots outside. When he went out, he was suddenly grabbed by Pat. Nepomuceno and later brought to the police station together with Cabangis. He was informed of the charges only after being detained. The following day, only Cabangis was released. Appellant denied selling shabu to Pat. Nepomuceno and suggested the charge was motivated by the fact that Pat. Nepomuceno's father had previously filed a dismissed robbery case against him. He denied owning the confiscated shabu and paraphernalia and contested the authenticity of his wife's signature on the receipt. Marilou Salamat corroborated his testimony, claiming no search warrant was presented to her and denying she signed the receipt. On rebuttal, Cpl. Regalado testified that he was present when the search warrant was shown to Marilou Salamat and when she signed the receipt in the presence of the barangay captain and appellant's father.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Whether the testimony of Pat. Nepomuceno as poseur-buyer is credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction for unlawful sale of shabu, notwithstanding appellant's challenges to his credibility and alleged ill motives.
• Distinction Between Possession and Sale of Dangerous Drugs: Whether the illegal possession of a regulated drug is absorbed in or necessarily included as an element of the offense of unlawful sale of such drug.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of "life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties thereof."

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Yes. The testimony of Pat. Nepomuceno was found credible, the trial court's assessment of witness credibility being entitled to the highest degree of respect and no clear showing existing that it overlooked or misapplied facts of weight and substance.
• Distinction Between Possession and Sale of Dangerous Drugs: No. Illegal possession and illegal sale of a regulated drug are two separate and distinct offenses, each punishable independently, unless the entirety of the drug possessed is the same as that which was the subject of a previously agreed sale.
• Proper Penalty: Yes, the trial court erred. Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are distinct and different penalties; the phrase "or reclusion perpetua, together with all accessory penalties thereof" was deleted from the dispositive portion.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: The issues raised by appellant were factual and involved the credibility of witnesses, a matter addressed to the trial court, which is in a better position to decide such questions having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment. The trial court's findings on credibility are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of weight and substance — an absence evident in this case. Appellant's defense consisted merely of denials, which are negative and self-serving and deserve no weight in law when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, and cannot prevail over the positive declarations of credible prosecution witnesses. The alleged failure of Pat. Nepomuceno to remember the exact dates of his prior test-buy purchases was too trivial to impair credibility, as discrepancies on minor details do not undermine testimony and may even enhance it. Credence is accorded to testimonies of law enforcement officers, who are presumed to have performed their duties regularly. The fact that appellant knew Pat. Nepomuceno as a policeman was not a deterrent, as drug pushers sell to any buyer with the price, and the prior test-buy operations were intended to gain appellant's confidence. The imputed ill motive was a desperate effort at exculpation; motive is important only when the identity of the accused is in doubt, and here appellant was positively identified.

• Distinction Between Possession and Sale of Dangerous Drugs: Although the acquittal for illegal possession was not appealed, the Court found the trial court's reasoning for acquittal absurd and illogical. The trial court held that a trader cannot be held liable for possession of stocks of merchandise ready for sale. The Court reiterated the holding in U.S. vs. Look Chaw (1911): illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs are two isolated acts, each punishable in itself. Only when the entirety of the drug possessed is the same as that which was the subject of a previously agreed sale could possession be deemed a necessary means to effect delivery by reason of the sale. Here, the thirteen packets of shabu seized were distinct from the shabu sold in the buy-bust operation, making them separate offenses. The Court directed trial courts to take note of this clarification to avoid miscarriages of justice.

• Proper Penalty: The trial court imposed "life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties thereof," evidently treating the latter as the English translation of the former. The Court clarified, citing People vs. Baguio and earlier cases, that the Revised Penal Code does not prescribe life imprisonment for any felony; that penalty is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years and carries accessory penalties such as perpetual special disqualification, while life imprisonment carries no accessory penalty and has no definite extent or duration. Since a violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 carries a penalty of life imprisonment, the reference to reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties was erroneous and was deleted.

• Credibility of Trial Court's Findings on Witness Testimony — Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result. Applied here to uphold the trial court's credence in the poseur-buyer's testimony over appellant's bare denials.

• Denial as a Defense — Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence deserving no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between positive declarations of prosecution witnesses and negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — Credence is generally accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers, as they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, absent any evidence to the contrary.

• Distinction Between Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs — Illegal possession and illegal sale of a regulated drug are two separate and distinct offenses, each punishable independently. Possession may be deemed a necessary means to effect delivery by reason of sale only when the entirety of the drug possessed is the same as that which was the subject of a previously agreed sale. (Derived from U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 19 Phil. 343 (1911).)

• Distinction Between Life Imprisonment and Reclusion Perpetua — Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are different and distinct penalties. Life imprisonment is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, carries no accessory penalties, and has no definite extent or duration. Reclusion perpetua is prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, entails imprisonment for at least thirty years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, and carries accessory penalties such as perpetual special disqualification.

• "Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio, (April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 459), this Court held: The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special law." — This passage articulates the canonical distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua, a recurring error corrected by the Court in numerous decisions.

• "They are two isolated acts, punishable each of them, in themselves. Only in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agreed upon, could it be said, in the opinion of this court, that the possession of the opium was a necessary means to effect the delivery by reason of the sale, and that the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for the possession of the opium seized." — This quotation from U.S. vs. Look Chaw, reproduced verbatim by the Court, defines the doctrinal boundary between possession and sale of dangerous drugs as separate offenses.

• "denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters." — This is the standard formulation of the doctrine on denial as a weak defense, frequently cited in subsequent criminal jurisprudence.

• U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 19 Phil. 343 (1911) — Controlling precedent on the distinction between illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs as separate offenses. The Court reproduced its pertinent pronouncements verbatim and criticized the trial court and the Solicitor General for glossing over it.

• People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 (1991) — Followed for the proposition that life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are distinct penalties, the former being imposed for offenses under special laws and the latter under the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Mobe (1948), PP vs. Pilones, and People vs. Sumadic — Cited as early authorities establishing that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment.

• People vs. Catan, 205 SCRA 235 (1992) and People vs. Angeles, G.R. Nos. 95761-62, Feb. 2, 1993 — Cited as recent reiterations of the holding in U.S. vs. Look Chaw.

• Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) — Penalizes the unlawful sale of a regulated drug. The accused was convicted under this provision and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00.

• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 — Penalizes illegal possession of a regulated drug. The accused was charged under this provision but was acquitted by the trial court on the erroneous ground that possession of stock merchandise is absorbed in the offense of sale.

• Administrative Circular No. 6-92, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 — Issued by the Supreme Court on October 12, 1992 and June 21, 1993, respectively, enjoining all RTC judges to be more circumspect in the proper imposition of the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon, and Puno, JJ., concurred.