People vs. Salahuddin

Alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive, categorical, and consistent identification by credible prosecution eyewitnesses who harbor no ill-motive against the accused. The defense of alibi must be supported by clear and convincing evidence showing not only that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the attack is sudden, without provocation, and renders the victim defenseless. The aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm is proven by testimonial evidence that the accused had no license or permit to carry a firearm, even without presenting the weapon itself. The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is employed deliberately to commit the crime or to facilitate escape.

On the late afternoon of 10 February 2004, Atty. Segundo Sotto, Jr., a prominent law practitioner in Zamboanga City, left his law office driving an owner-type jeep with his niece, Liezel Mae Java, seated beside him. As they turned onto Farmer’s Drive, Sta. Maria, a motorcycle carrying two men pulled alongside. The backrider fired at the jeep without warning, striking both occupants. The victim’s jeep crashed into an interlink wire fence. The assailant fired again at the mortally wounded driver before the motorcycle fled. Atty. Sotto was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The prosecution later identified appellant Zaldy Salahuddin as the gunman.

• The Shooting Incident: On 10 February 2004, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Atty. Segundo Sotto, Jr. and his niece Liezel Mae Java left his law office in an owner-type jeep, with Atty. Sotto driving. While nearing Farmer’s Drive, Sta. Maria, Zamboanga City, the jeep slowed. Two gunshots rang out. Java, seated on the right side, felt her shoulder go numb and heard a motorcycle on her right. The backrider fired three more shots into the jeep. After the attack, the motorcycle sped away. Rescuers arrived and transported both victims to Western Mindanao Medical Center aboard tricycles.

• Eyewitness Java: Java, who was about one meter from the assailant, testified that it was not yet completely dark, and she was one hundred percent certain that appellant Zaldy Salahuddin was the man who shot her uncle. While her head was touching her uncle’s abdomen, she cried out for him. She later positively identified appellant at the NBI office.

• Eyewitness Delos Reyes: Security guard Juanchito Vicente Delos Reyes was stationed at the residence of George Camins near the crime scene. He observed a jeep with a male driver and female passenger. He heard two gunshots; the jeep then bumped an interlink wire at the roadside. He saw the driver slumped over the steering wheel. A motorcycle pulled in front of the jeep, and the backrider shot the victim again. Delos Reyes aimed his service gun at the assailant, who made a hand sign with an open palm moving sideward, signaling him not to interfere. As the motorcycle left, the assailant fired once more. Delos Reyes was about four to six meters from the shooter and had eye contact for roughly five seconds. He thereafter identified appellant.

• Investigation and Identification: NBI Agent Vicente Essex Minguez received a complaint from Mayor Sotto, the victim’s brother, and subsequently coordinated with informants. On 22 April 2004, the NBI filed the case with the City Prosecutor’s Office. Appellant was arrested on 22 July 2004 at Barangay Vitali; a .45 caliber pistol was recovered from him. Java and Delos Reyes confirmed appellant as the gunman. Michal Macaya, the victim’s secretary, testified that on the morning of the shooting, four men repeatedly visited the law office looking for Atty. Sotto. After the arrest, she noted the accused had the same facial shape as one of those visitors.

• Medical and Ballistic Evidence: Dr. Melvin Sotto Talaver assisted in examining the cadaver, documenting four entry wounds (neck, chest above left nipple, solar plexus, and abdomen) and corresponding exit wounds from which two slugs were recovered. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemia secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. Ballistic examination showed the two recovered empty shells were fired from the same .45 caliber firearm.

• Firearm License: SPO3 Ronnie Eleuterio certified that appellant had no existing record of any firearms license, permit to transport, or permit to carry firearms outside residence.

• Defense of Alibi: Appellant Zaldy Salahuddin denied involvement and claimed he was on duty as a Barangay Tanod in Barangay Dita from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on 10 February 2004, alongside Barangay Kagawad Jauhari Hussin. He alleged that after duty, he stayed at the house of Barangay Chairman Sarabi Hussin until 9:00 p.m. The defense presented the testimonies of the Barangay Chairman, the Barangay Kagawad, and the Barangay Secretary to corroborate his alibi. The barangay logbook showed appellant timed in at 7:30 a.m. and out at 5:00 p.m.

• Inconsistencies in Defense Evidence: The testimonies of the defense witnesses materially conflicted. Appellant claimed he and Barangay Kagawad Jauhari walked home together, while the Barangay Chairman testified he himself rode home with appellant on a motorcycle driven by appellant. Appellant stated they did not eat at the Chairman’s house and only had a long conversation; the Chairman testified they ate dinner there. Appellant also claimed he did not know how to drive a motorcycle, but the Chairman and Kagawad declared appellant drove the motorcycle. The Chairman admitted his signature did not appear on the attendance logbook, contradicting his earlier assertion, while appellant claimed the Chairman was not at the barangay hall that day at all. Barangay Dita was located about 44 kilometers and a 1.5-hour ride from the city proper.

• Alibi and Physical Impossibility: Appellant maintained he was at the Barangay Hall of Dita on 10 February 2004 from 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and afterward at the Barangay Chairman’s house until 9:00 p.m., making it physically impossible for him to have committed the crime 44 kilometers away. He invoked the logbook entries and the corroborative testimonies of the Barangay Chairman, Kagawad, and Secretary.

• Credibility of Defense Witnesses: Appellant argued that the barangay officials who testified for him were credible, categorical, and frank witnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely, and that any discrepancies in their accounts pertained only to minor, unsubstantial details.

• Insufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Appellant contended the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, insisting that the positive identification by Java and Delos Reyes should not prevail over his corroborated alibi.

• Positive Identification: The Office of the Solicitor General underscored that two eyewitnesses—Liezel Mae Java and Juanchito Delos Reyes—categorically and consistently identified appellant as the gunman. Java was only a meter away in daylight conditions; Delos Reyes had an unobstructed view and direct eye contact.

• Treachery: The prosecution established that the victim was caught completely off guard while driving, unarmed, and was given no chance to defend himself or escape. The attack was sudden, deliberate, and ensured execution without risk to appellant.

• Weakness of Alibi: Appellant’s alibi was unworthy of credence because it was corroborated solely by his friends and comrades-in-arms, and was riddled with material inconsistencies. Moreover, it was not physically impossible for him to travel from Barangay Dita to Zamboanga City within the relevant timeframe.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The prosecution proved the use of an unlicensed firearm through certification and testimony that appellant held no license, and the use of a motor vehicle was both to trail the victim and to effect escape.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether appellant’s guilt for murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt in light of the affirmative defenses of denial and alibi.

• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was established.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of use of an unlicensed firearm and use of a motor vehicle were properly appreciated.

• Civil Liability: Whether the award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was justified by the evidence, and whether the amounts of other damages were proper.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The positive and categorical identification by prosecution eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes was accorded greater weight than appellant’s defense of alibi and denial. Affirmative testimony from credible witnesses who had no demonstrated ill-motive is stronger than negative self-serving evidence. Alibi is viewed with suspicion because it is easily fabricated. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene; the distance of 44 kilometers required only about 1.5 hours travel, and the barangay hall was not so remote as to preclude his presence. Instead of corroborating his alibi, the testimonies of defense witnesses were materially contradictory on critical points—whether the Barangay Chairman was present at the hall, whether appellant walked or rode home, whether they ate dinner, and whether appellant could drive a motorcycle. Alibi becomes weaker when supported mainly by the accused’s relatives, friends, or comrades. The trial court’s assessment of credibility, affirmed by the CA, was entitled to great respect absent any overlooked substantial fact.

• Treachery: Treachery was established beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was driving his jeep, unarmed, and wholly unaware of the impending assault when the assailant, from a motorcycle, suddenly fired without warning. The initial volley caused the jeep to crash; the aggressor then fired again at the incapacitated victim. The means of execution gave Atty. Sotto no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and the method was consciously adopted to ensure the killing without risk to appellant. Consequently, the killing constituted murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation was not proven. The prosecution adduced no evidence on the specific time when the accused decided to commit the crime, nor on the interval between that determination and its execution that would show cool thought and reflection. The prosecution established only the overt act indicating appellant clung to his determination; the first and third requisites remained unsubstantiated.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Both the use of an unlicensed firearm and the use of a motor vehicle were properly appreciated.

• Use of Unlicensed Firearm: The testimony of Delos Reyes established that appellant used a short firearm. SPO3 Eleuterio and the FESAGS certification proved appellant had no firearms license, permit to carry, or permit to transport. Jurisprudence permits the existence of the firearm to be shown by testimony without producing the weapon itself; it also requires the prosecution to prove absence of a license—which was done. The burden then shifted to appellant to prove he was authorized to use the firearm, and he failed to do so. The aggravating circumstance was thus satisfied, even assuming arguendo the firearm was licensed but used without authorization. The mismatch between the slugs from the recovered firearm and those from the victim’s body did not negate the aggravating circumstance, because the firearm used in the crime was proven by testimony to be a short gun, and the absence of license was established separately.

• Use of Motor Vehicle: The motorcycle was used deliberately to overtake and ambush the victim, and immediately thereafter to flee the scene, both facilitating the crime and the escape. It was not merely incidental.

• Penalty: Under Article 248, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 mandates the greater penalty when one aggravating circumstance attends the crime. Since treachery qualified the killing to murder and two aggravating circumstances (use of unlicensed firearm and use of motor vehicle) were present, the death penalty would have been imposable. Pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in conformity with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.

• Civil Liability: Civil indemnity was increased from P75,000.00 to P100,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. Moral damages were maintained at P100,000.00. Exemplary damages were increased from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 due to the presence of aggravating circumstances. The award of P4,398,000.00 for loss of earning capacity was disallowed because no documentary evidence—such as receipts, income tax returns, or business records—was presented to substantiate the claim that the victim earned P50,000.00 monthly as a lawyer, and no applicable exception applied. Instead, P1,000,000.00 was awarded as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity, as earning capacity was clearly established by undisputed testimony. All damages shall bear legal interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, it is insufficient to show the accused was somewhere else at the time of the crime; it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity. Alibi is inherently weak, easily fabricated, and cannot overcome positive identification by credible eyewitnesses. It becomes even less worthy of credence when corroborated mainly by relatives, friends, or comrades-in-arms.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when two conditions concur: (a) the means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method was deliberately and consciously adopted. An unprovoked, sudden attack on an unarmed, unaware victim driving a vehicle affords no chance for defense and qualifies the killing to murder.

• Evident Premeditation — Three requisites must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow cool thought and reflection on the resolution.

• Use of Unlicensed Firearm as Aggravating — The existence of a firearm may be proved by testimonial evidence without the weapon itself being presented. The prosecution must prove the absence of a license or permit. The term “unlicensed firearm” includes unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of a crime (Section 5, R.A. No. 8294). Once the prosecution shows the accused had no license, the burden shifts to the defense to prove authorization.

• Use of Motor Vehicle as Aggravating — The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. It is not aggravating if it was merely incidental and not deliberately employed for those purposes.

• Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity — Documentary evidence must generally be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. Exceptions apply only when the deceased was self-employed earning less than the minimum wage with no available documentary proof, or was a daily wage worker earning less than minimum wage. In the absence of such documentary evidence, but where earning capacity is clearly established by undisputed testimony, temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual damages.

• “Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.”

• “Between the categorical statements of the prosecution eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.”

• “[F]or the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.”

• “Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants.”

• “The existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even without the presentation of the firearm.”

• People v. Biglete, 690 Phil. 558 (2012) — Applied. The victim, like the jeepney driver in Biglete, was driving, unarmed, and unaware of the impending attack, demonstrating treachery.

• People v. Dulay, 561 Phil. 764 (2007) — Applied. Reiterated that the existence of the firearm and the absence of a license can be proven by testimony even without presenting the actual firearm; ballistic examination results supported the finding.

• People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701 (2009) — Distinguished. In De Leon, the prosecution failed to prove the absence of a firearms license; here, the certification and testimony sufficiently established that fact.

• People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422 (1996) — Applied. Use of a motorcycle to trail, ambush, and flee the scene constitutes the aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle.

• Tan, et al. v. OMC Carrier, Inc., et al., 654 Phil. 443 (2011) — Applied. Temperate damages were awarded in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity where income was not sufficiently documented but earning capacity was plainly established.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defined murder and enumerated its qualifying circumstances; applied to the killing of Atty. Sotto because treachery qualified the act.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of indivisible penalties; applied to impose the greater penalty (death, reduced to reclusion perpetua) due to the presence of aggravating circumstances.

• Section 5, Republic Act No. 8294 — Defined “unlicensed firearm” to include unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of a crime; invoked to cover the possibility that the firearm used was licensed but unauthorized.

• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibited the imposition of the death penalty; the death penalty was therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua.

• A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC — Guidelines for the use of “without eligibility for parole” in indivisible penalties; mandated that when circumstances warrant the death penalty but R.A. 9346 prohibits its imposition, reclusion perpetua shall be qualified with “without eligibility for parole.”

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairman), Mariano C. Del Castillo (designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza), Jose Portugal Perez, Bienvenido L. Reyes.