People vs. Sabater y Ulan

A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it approves a plea bargain over the prosecution's objection, rendering the resulting judgment void and incapable of lapsing into finality. The consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, and its absence deprives the court of jurisdiction to render conviction on the plea-bargained offense.

Respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan was charged under Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, specifically 0.049 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The case arose in the context of the Supreme Court's issuance of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, which adopted a Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, and the Department of Justice's subsequent issuance of DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26, 2018, providing internal guidelines for prosecutors on acceptable plea bargains depending on the quantity of drugs involved. These two issuances created a tension between the Court's rule-making power and the executive's prosecution discretion that the case required the Court to resolve.

On November 4, 2016, in Naga City, respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan allegedly sold to poseur-buyer PO1 Reimon Joy N. Paaño one small heat-sealed transparent sachet containing 0.049 gram of white crystalline substance later confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. Pursuant to this, the Naga City Prosecutor's Office filed an Information dated December 19, 2016 charging respondent with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Naga City as Criminal Case No. 2016-0935, where respondent pleaded not guilty at arraignment and trial ensued.

Approximately five months after the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, respondent filed a motion for plea bargaining on June 28, 2018, proposing to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 — possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs — citing A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, which had adopted a Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases. The prosecution opposed the motion, invoking DOJ Circular No. 027 dated June 26, 2018, which provides that an accused charged with selling less than five grams of shabu under Section 5 may plead guilty only to the lesser offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), not under Section 12.

By Order dated August 2, 2018, the trial court granted respondent's motion, declared DOJ Circular No. 027 contrary to the Rules of Court and an encroachment on the Supreme Court's rule-making power, and ruled that plea bargaining was allowed. Respondent's not guilty plea was vacated, he was re-arraigned, and he pleaded guilty to violation of Section 12, RA 9165. On September 12, 2018, the trial court rendered a Judgment convicting respondent of that offense, sentencing him to imprisonment of six months and one day as minimum to four years as maximum, a fine of ₱50,000, and submission to a drug dependency test with potential treatment and rehabilitation.

The People elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition by Resolution dated January 28, 2019, finding that the prosecution received the trial court's Order dated August 2, 2018 on August 8, 2018, giving it until October 9, 2018 to file the petition, but the OSG filed only on November 13, 2018 — 35 days late. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on September 17, 2019. The People then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

• Timeliness of Filing: The People argued that government functions in a bureaucracy and certain procedures had to be observed before cases could be elevated to a higher court, which accounted for the delay in the OSG's receipt of the trial court's Order. The People prayed for leniency as regards the period for filing its recourse before the Court of Appeals.
• Resolution on the Merits: The People argued that the Court of Appeals should have resolved the case on the merits rather than focusing on mere technicalities.
• Consensual Nature of Plea Bargaining: The People asserted that while Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo allowed plea bargaining in drug cases, it did not deviate from the consensual nature and essence of plea bargaining. When the trial court granted respondent's motion despite the prosecution's objection, it effectively encroached upon the government's prerogative to prosecute crimes.
• Lesser Offense Not Necessarily Included: The People argued that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed respondent to plead to a lesser offense which is not necessarily included in the offense originally charged.
• Validity of DOJ Circular No. 027: The People contended that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it declared DOJ Circular No. 027 contrary to the Rules of Court and an encroachment into the rule-making power of the Court. Instead of choosing between DOJ Circular No. 027 and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the trial court should have harmonized these issuances.

• Admission of Late Filing: Respondent noted that the People had repeatedly acknowledged its belated filing of its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals without offering cogent justification for the lapse. He also noted that the People did not move for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated August 2, 2018, a condition sine qua non for filing a petition for certiorari.
• Court's Authority to Overrule Prosecution: Respondent argued that courts have authority to overrule the prosecution's objections in plea bargaining, especially when strict adherence to DOJ Circular No. 027 would defeat the principle behind the Court's ruling in Estipona, which nullified the "no-plea bargaining" provision of RA 9165. A contrary view, he contended, is tantamount to a surrender of the court's sole and supreme authority to command the course of the case.
• Policy Considerations: Respondent argued there is wisdom in allowing accused in drugs cases to plea bargain from Section 5 to Section 12 where the quantity of drugs involved is miniscule, for three reasons: (1) to provide a platform for rehabilitation of small-time drug offenders; (2) to curb police operatives' nefarious practice of utilizing buy-bust as a tool for abuse; and (3) to unclog the courts and focus government resources on the real bane of society.
• Prior Adjudication: Respondent invoked Pascua vs. People as having already resolved whether an accused charged with violation of Section 5, RA 9165 may plea bargain to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of the same law.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it dismissed the People's petition for certiorari for belated filing.
• Plea Bargaining Without Prosecution Consent: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent's proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 without the consent and over the objection of the prosecutor.
• Validity of DOJ Circular No. 027: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared DOJ Circular No. 027 an encroachment of the Court's rule-making power.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred because the 60-day period should have been reckoned from the prosecution's receipt of the trial court's Judgment dated September 12, 2018, not the interlocutory Order dated August 2, 2018. The petition was thus only one day late, and the void-judgment exception to immutability of judgment applied.
• Plea Bargaining Without Prosecution Consent: Yes. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it approved the plea bargain over the prosecution's objection, in clear violation of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which requires the prosecutor's consent as a condition precedent. The resulting judgment is void.
• Validity of DOJ Circular No. 027: Yes. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring DOJ Circular No. 027 an encroachment on the Court's rule-making power. DOJ Circular No. 027 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors and does not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for certiorari be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed. The Court of Appeals reckoned the period from the prosecution's receipt of the trial court's Order dated August 2, 2018, which granted the plea-bargaining motion. This was erroneous. Relying on People vs. Majingcar, the Court held that the Order granting plea bargaining is a mere interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari; allowing piecemeal attacks on interlocutory orders would breed undue delay and clog appellate dockets. The proper remedy is a one-time challenge against the court's final judgment on the merits. The 60-day period should therefore have been counted from the prosecution's receipt of the Judgment dated September 12, 2018. Assuming the prosecution received notice on the same day the judgment was promulgated, the deadline was November 11, 2018, which fell on a Sunday, making the petition due on November 12, 2018. Since it was filed on November 13, 2018, it was only one day late. Although the OSG admitted the belated filing, the doctrine of immutability of judgment admits of exceptions, including void judgments. Because the trial court's judgment was void for grave abuse of discretion, the third exception applied, and the petition could not be barred by the lapse of the reglementary period.

• Plea Bargaining Without Prosecution Consent: Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense "with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor." The consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may validly plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions and the duty to prosecute the proper offense supported by the evidence. Where the prosecution withholds consent, there is no meeting of the minds and no plea-bargaining agreement to speak of. If the trial court nevertheless approves the plea bargain over the prosecution's objection, it commits grave abuse of discretion — such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Here, the trial court peremptorily approved respondent's proposal despite the prosecution's vehement objection, in clear violation of Section 2, Rule 116. The resulting Judgment dated September 12, 2018 was thus rendered without or beyond jurisdiction. Pursuant to Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sps. Huang, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is void, produces no legal or binding effect, and can never lapse into finality.

• Validity of DOJ Circular No. 027: The Court relied on its En Banc ruling in Sayre vs. Xenos, which categorically resolved that DOJ Circular No. 027 does not infringe upon the Supreme Court's rule-making power. A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the Court's rule-making power, serving as a framework and guide to trial courts. However, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to court approval. DOJ Circular No. 027 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give consent to proposed plea bargains; it did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework. The trial court should have harmonized the two issuances rather than declaring the DOJ Circular invalid. The trial court's declaration that DOJ Circular No. 027 was contrary to the Rules of Court and an encroachment on the Court's rule-making power thus constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Consent of the Prosecutor as Condition Precedent to Plea Bargaining — Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the consent of the prosecutor (and the offended party) is indispensable before an accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Without such consent, there is no meeting of the minds and no plea-bargaining agreement exists. A trial court that approves a plea bargain over the prosecution's objection commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, rendering the resulting judgment void. The Court applied this doctrine to void the trial court's Judgment dated September 12, 2018, which convicted respondent of Section 12, RA 9165 after accepting his plea over the prosecution's vehement opposition.

• Void Judgments from Grave Abuse of Discretion — A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is void, produces no legal or binding effect, and is deemed non-existent. Such a judgment can never lapse into finality. The Court applied this doctrine through Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sps. Huang to hold that the trial court's judgment was void because it was issued without jurisdiction — the trial court having approved the plea bargain without the prosecution's consent.

• Exceptions to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment — The principle that final judgments become immutable and unalterable admits of four exceptions: (1) correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice; (3) void judgments; and (4) circumstances transpiring after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable. The Court applied the third exception — void judgments — to justify reviewing the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the one-day late filing of the certiorari petition.

• Interlocutory Orders Not Subject of Certiorari — Plea-bargaining orders are mere interlocutory orders that cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy is a one-time challenge against the court's final judgment on the merits. Allowing piecemeal attacks on interlocutory orders would breed undue delay and clog appellate dockets. The Court applied this doctrine in People vs. Majingcar to hold that the 60-day certiorari period should be reckoned from receipt of the final judgment, not from the interlocutory order granting plea bargaining.

• "Verily, the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may validly plead guilty to a lesser offense." — This passage states the controlling rule on plea bargaining: the prosecutor's consent is indispensable, and its absence renders any plea-bargaining approval void for lack of jurisdiction.

• "Where the prosecution withholds its consent, the trial court cannot proceed to approve a plea bargain. There is no meeting of the minds, hence, there can be no plea bargaining 'agreement' to speak of." — This defines the consensual essence of plea bargaining and explains why a court cannot impose a plea bargain over the prosecution's objection without committing grave abuse of discretion.

• "DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains." — This clarifies the relationship between DOJ Circular No. 027 and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, resolving the tension between executive prosecution discretion and the Court's rule-making power by characterizing the DOJ Circular as an internal executive guideline rather than a procedural rule.

• "To clarify, the Plea Bargaining Resolutions dated August 6, 2018 and September 1, 2018 are mere interlocutory orders which cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Majingcar, establishes that the certiorari period runs from the final judgment, not from interlocutory orders granting plea bargaining, preventing piecemeal appellate review.

• People vs. Majingcar, G.R. No. 249629, March 15, 2021 — Controlling precedent on the reckoning point for the 60-day certiorari period in plea-bargaining cases. The Court followed this case to hold that the period runs from receipt of the final judgment, not from the interlocutory order granting the plea bargain.

• Sayre vs. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020 — Controlling En Banc precedent on the validity of DOJ Circular No. 027 and the consensual nature of plea bargaining. The Court relied on this case to hold that DOJ Circular No. 027 does not encroach on the Court's rule-making power and that plea bargaining requires mutual agreement of the parties.

• Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 739 (2017) — Cited as the landmark ruling that allowed plea bargaining in drug cases by nullifying the "no-plea bargaining" provision of RA 9165. The People invoked this case to argue that it did not deviate from the consensual nature of plea bargaining.

• Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sps. Huang, 817 Phil. 452 (2017) — Followed for the doctrine that judgments rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction are void, produce no legal or binding effect, and are deemed non-existent.

• People vs. Villarama, 285 Phil. 723 (1992) — Cited for the proposition that the consent of the prosecutor is a condition precedent before an accused may validly plead guilty to a lesser offense.

• Pascua vs. People, G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020 — Invoked by respondent as having already resolved whether an accused charged with violation of Section 5, RA 9165 may plea bargain to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of the same law.

• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the period and manner for filing a petition for certiorari, requiring filing within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed, with no extension except for compelling reasons not exceeding 15 days. Applied to determine that the certiorari period should be reckoned from receipt of the final judgment, not the interlocutory order.

• Section 2, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Embodies the rule on plea of guilty to a lesser offense, requiring the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor before the accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. Applied as the textual basis for holding that the prosecutor's consent is a condition precedent and that its absence renders the plea-bargaining approval void.

• Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, and transportation of dangerous drugs. This was the original offense charged against respondent.

• Section 12, Republic Act No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. This was the lesser offense to which respondent pleaded guilty and for which he was convicted by the trial court.

• A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC — The Supreme Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, adopted as a rule of procedure serving as a framework and guide to trial courts. Held to coexist with DOJ Circular No. 027, which serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors.

• DOJ Circular No. 027, dated June 26, 2018 — Department of Justice circular providing internal guidelines for prosecutors on acceptable plea bargains in drugs cases, specifying that an accused charged with selling less than five grams of shabu under Section 5 may plead guilty only to Section 11(3), not Section 12. Held valid and not an encroachment on the Court's rule-making power.

Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), Justice Mario V. Lopez, Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, and Justice Jose Midas P. Lopez concurred.