People vs. Sabalones

The Court held that positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over the defense of alibi, especially where the accused fails to prove the physical impossibility of presence at the locus criminis. Additionally, mistake in the identity of the victim (error in personae) carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on the intended victim; thus, criminal liability is not diminished. Finally, there is no legal basis for awarding a fixed amount as civil indemnity for victims of frustrated murder; they are entitled only to actual damages duly proven.

On June 1, 1985, at approximately 11:45 P.M., a group of individuals in two vehicles—a jeep and a car—arrived at the gate of Stephen Lim's residence in Mansueto Village, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu, to park Lim's car. As they approached, armed men standing behind a concrete wall suddenly fired upon the vehicles. The attack killed Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, who were in the jeep, and injured Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo, and Rogelio Presores, who were in the trailing car. The appellants, Rolusape Sabalones and Artemio Timoteo Beronga, along with two others (one of whom died during trial and another who remained at large), were charged with the crimes. The prosecution theorized that the appellants, anticipating retaliation for the killing of Nabing Velez, mistook the victims for members of Velez's group.

• The Ambush: On June 1, 1985, Edwin Santos, Rogelio Presores, Nelson Tiempo, and others drove two vehicles to Stephen Lim's residence in Mansueto Village. A jeep carrying Glenn Tiempo, Alfredo Nardo, and Rey Bolo led, followed by a car carrying the others. Upon reaching the gate, armed men standing behind a 42-inch concrete wall fired high-powered firearms at the vehicles.
• Identification of Assailants: Survivors Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified that during lulls in the gunfire, they looked toward the source and identified Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga, and Teodulo Alegarbes as the gunmen. They testified the area was illuminated by a lamppost and the vehicles' headlights.
• The Victims: Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo died from multiple gunshot wounds. Nelson Tiempo sustained a gunshot wound to the neck that shattered his trachea; Rogelio Presores suffered a gunshot wound to the chest; Rey Bolo sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the shoulder, hand, and mouth. All survived due to timely medical intervention.
• Defense Version: Sabalones claimed he was at the wake of his brother, Junior Sabalones, located 20-25 meters from the crime scene, and was asleep when the shooting occurred. Beronga claimed he was at his residence in Lapulapu City. The defense also presented evidence that the streetlights in the compound were disconnected at the time.
• Flight: After the incident, Sabalones fled Cebu, assumed the name "Paciano Laput," and hid in various cities. He was arrested in Butuan City in 1988.

• Appellants argued that the prosecution witnesses could not have positively identified them because the witnesses crouched down during the shooting and the crime scene was dark due to disconnected streetlights.
• Appellants contended that the physical evidence (bullet trajectories) contradicted the prosecution's account that the gunmen were standing side by side behind a wall.
• Appellants asserted that the trial court erred in characterizing the incident as aberratio ictus and in disregarding their defense of alibi.
• Appellants claimed that Beronga's extrajudicial statement was obtained through violence and intimidation and was inadmissible against Sabalones under the res inter alios acta rule.
• Appellants maintained that the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• The People argued that the trial court's factual findings, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive.
• The People maintained that the positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over the defense of alibi, which was not substantiated by proof of physical impossibility.
• The People contended that the incident was better characterized as error in personae (mistake in identity) rather than aberratio ictus.
• The People asserted that Beronga's extrajudicial confession was voluntary and corroborated by other evidence, making it admissible as circumstantial evidence against Sabalones.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether Beronga's extrajudicial statement is admissible against Sabalones.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators despite alleged darkness and their crouched positions.
  • Whether the defense of alibi can prevail over positive identification.
  • Whether the incident constitutes aberratio ictus or error in personae and the effect of such mistake on criminal liability.
  • Whether the penalty for frustrated murder was correctly computed and whether victims of frustrated murder are entitled to fixed indemnity.

• Procedural: The Court held that Beronga's extrajudicial statement was admissible. While the general rule is that an extrajudicial confession binds only the declarant, exceptions exist where the confession is corroborated by other evidence or used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-accused's participation. Here, the confession was corroborated by the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. Furthermore, any allegation of violation of constitutional rights during custodial investigation is relevant only when the conviction is based on that extrajudicial admission; here, the conviction was based primarily on positive identification.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellants. The witnesses testified that they looked toward the source of the gunfire during lulls in the shooting. The Court deferred to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court also held that even if the streetlights were disconnected, the headlights of the vehicles provided sufficient illumination. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene. Sabalones was only 20-25 meters away, and Beronga's residence in Lapulapu City was not shown to be so remote as to preclude his presence. Sabalones' flight further indicated guilt. The Court clarified that the incident constituted error in personae (mistake in the identity of the victim), not aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow). However, mistake in identity carries the same gravity as hitting the intended victim; thus, criminal liability is not diminished. The Court affirmed the imposition of reclusion perpetua for murder. For frustrated murder, the correct penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is 8 years of prision mayor (minimum) to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum). The Court deleted the fixed indemnity of P20,000 for frustrated murder victims, holding that there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for a fixed indemnity in frustrated crimes; instead, only actual damages proven during trial may be awarded.

• Positive Identification vs. Alibi — Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time of the crime.
• Error in Personae — Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on the intended victim. It does not diminish criminal liability.
• Admissibility of Co-Accused's Confession — The extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon the declarant and is generally inadmissible against a co-accused. However, it may be admitted as circumstantial evidence against the co-accused when it is corroborated by other evidence pointing to the co-accused's participation.
• Damages in Frustrated Crimes — There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for awarding a fixed amount as civil indemnity for victims of frustrated murder; they are entitled only to actual damages duly proven during trial.

• "Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court."
• "Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses."
• "The Court has held that 'mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.'"
• "There is no basis, statutory or jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of frustrated murder. Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of actual expenses duly proven during the trial."

• People v. Tidula, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998 — Cited for the proposition that allegations of violations of constitutional rights during custodial investigation are relevant only when the conviction is based on the extrajudicial confession obtained therefrom.
• People v. Pinto, Jr., 204 SCRA 9 (1991) — Cited for the principle that mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the intended victim is hit.
• People v. Dolar, 231 SCRA 414 (1994) — Cited for the proposition that the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, imposing the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applied to convict the appellants for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for a frustrated felony as the next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to determine the penalty for the three counts of frustrated murder.
• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides the res inter alios acta rule regarding the admissibility of a conspirator's declaration against a co-conspirator. The Court noted the general rule but applied exceptions based on corroboration.
• Section 13, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Requires the Court of Appeals to refrain from entering judgment and certify the case to the Supreme Court when the imposition of the death penalty or reclusion perpetua is warranted.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ.