People vs. Rullepa

In statutory rape, the victim’s age below twelve is an element, but the qualifying circumstance of being below seven years old for the death penalty must be proved with certainty under the Pruna guidelines; the victim’s appearance is object evidence, not judicial notice, and cannot supply the required proof where the age is doubtful.

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was the houseboy of AAA’s family and was sometimes left with AAA, then a young child, at home. The governing statute was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which defines rape by carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age as punishable by reclusion perpetua and authorizes the death penalty in specified qualified circumstances, including when the victim is below seven years old. The case also implicated the rules on proof of age and judicial notice because the victim’s exact age determined whether the death penalty could be imposed.

On complaint of AAA, Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for acts allegedly committed on or about November 17, 1995. The complaint alleged that by means of force and intimidation, he removed AAA’s panty, kissed her lips and vagina, rubbed his penis, and inserted it into the inner portion of her vagina; AAA was three years old. Rullepa was the houseboy of AAA’s family and was sometimes left with AAA at home. He pleaded not guilty on January 15, 1996.

On November 20, 1995, as AAA’s mother was about to set the table for dinner at their house in Quezon City, AAA, then only three and a half years old, told her, “Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.” Kuya Ronnie was Rullepa. Asked how many times he did those things, AAA answered many times; asked what else he did, she indicated the room where Rullepa slept and pointed at his pillow. That night Rullepa was out with AAA’s father, and the mother waited until past 11:00 p.m. She then sent Rullepa on an errand and informed her husband about AAA’s plaint. The husband talked to AAA, who repeated what she had told her mother. When Rullepa returned, the spouses verified from him whether what AAA had told them was true; Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. on November 17, 1995, or three days earlier. The mother slapped him several times. Because it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring him to Camp Karingal, where he admitted the imputations against him and was detained; the mother’s sworn statement was then taken.

At trial, AAA recalled what Rullepa did to her: “Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga,” causing her pain and making her cry. She added that Rullepa did these to her twice in his bedroom. Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined AAA, issued a report dated November 21, 1995. The findings stated that there was absence of pubic hair; the labia majora were full, convex, and coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora; on separating the same, an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen were disclosed; and the external vaginal orifice did not admit the tip of the examining index finger. The conclusion stated that the subject was in a virgin state physically and that there were no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination. Dr. Preyra explained that the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis, and she doubted that riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.

The defense’s sole witness was Rullepa, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in AAA’s genitalia and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for AAA, who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer the mother’s queries whether her husband was womanizing, she would always find fault in him, and he suggested that she was behind the filing of the complaint.

The trial court found AAA competent and credible despite her tender age. It noted that her narration of Rullepa’s placing his titi in her pepe was not a common child’s tale; that her responses established her consciousness of the distinction between good and bad; and that her demeanor as a witness was manifested by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses. It also found that Rullepa admitted AAA’s complaint during the confrontation in the house, qualified by his insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only once, at 4:00 p.m. on November 17, 1995, and that he did not deny the admission during trial.

• Admissibility of Admission: Accused-appellant argued that the statements attributed to him were inadmissible since they were made out of fear, having been elicited only after AAA’s parents bullied and questioned him.
• Silence as Implied Admission: Accused-appellant argued that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during trial as an admission of guilt.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that his guilt for the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; he denied involvement, claimed he used to buy medicine for AAA who had difficulty urinating, and suggested the mother filed the complaint because she got mad at him after he refused to answer her queries about her husband.
• Coaching and Imagination: Accused-appellant contended that AAA was coached, citing her testimony that the phrase “sinira niya ang buhay mo” came from her mother, and suggested that AAA merely imagined the things of which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs.
• Self-Inflicted Abrasions: Accused-appellant claimed that even before the alleged incident AAA was already suffering from pain in urinating and surmised that she could have scratched herself, causing the abrasions.
• Acts of Lasciviousness, Not Rape: Alternatively, accused-appellant prayed that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of AAA’s testimony that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina and did not actually penetrate it.
• Death Penalty: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him.

• Admissibility of Admission: Whether the trial court erred in considering as admissible in evidence the accused-appellant’s admission.
• Silence as Implied Admission: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the accused-appellant’s silence during trial amounted to an implied admission of guilt.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Nature of the Crime: Whether the crime committed was statutory rape or merely acts of lasciviousness.
• Proof of Age and Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed, considering the proof of the victim’s age and the qualifying circumstance that she was below seven years old.

• Admissibility of Admission: No reversible error. The trial court considered the admission merely as an additional ground; even if the admission and the implication of silence were disregarded, the evidence sufficed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Silence as Implied Admission: No reversible error. The conviction does not depend on the failure to deny; independent evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through AAA’s categorical testimony and Dr. Preyra’s medical finding of abrasions on the labia minora, which could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
• Nature of the Crime: Statutory rape, not acts of lasciviousness. The abrasions on the labia minora proved penetration of the vagina, not mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
• Proof of Age and Death Penalty: Only reclusion perpetua. The victim’s age below twelve was established, but her age below seven was not proved with certainty under People vs. Pruna; hence the death penalty could not be imposed.

• Admissibility of Admission: The trial court considered Rullepa’s admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence sufficed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. AAA’s plain, matter-of-fact manner in describing her abuse was an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus, any error in crediting the admission did not affect the conviction.
• Silence as Implied Admission: The trial court treated Rullepa’s failure to deny the admission during trial as making the admission conclusive upon him. The Supreme Court held that even if such admission and the implication of his failure to deny it were disregarded, the evidence sufficed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction therefore did not rest on the implied admission.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution established carnal knowledge beyond reasonable doubt. AAA testified on direct and cross-examination that Rullepa inserted his penis into her vagina, anus, and mouth; she felt pain in her organ and cried. Dr. Preyra found abrasions on the labia minora, which she opined could have been caused by friction with an erect penis, and she ruled out self-inflicted scratching because that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. The absence of external signs of recent trauma did not preclude conviction because the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape. That AAA suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus did not diminish her credibility; it was possible that Rullepa’s penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina. The imputation of ill motive on the part of the mother was puerile; no mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the child’s defilement. The claim that AAA was coached was rejected; her testimony that the phrase “sinira niya ang buhay mo” came from her mother indicated that she was really narrating the truth. The trial court’s assessment of AAA’s competence and credibility was accorded great weight. The alternative claim of acts of lasciviousness was rejected because the abrasions on the labia minora, directly beneath the labia majora, proved penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
• Nature of the Crime: The crime committed was not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. Carnal knowledge was established beyond reasonable doubt through AAA’s testimony and the medical findings. The second element was also established: AAA and her mother testified that she was three years old at the time of the rape, and because of the vast disparity between the alleged age of three and the age sought to be proved of below twelve, the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim’s age from her appearance. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, punishes carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age with reclusion perpetua.
• Proof of Age and Death Penalty: The victim’s age is relevant in rape cases because it may constitute an element of the offense or a qualifying circumstance. Under Article 335, the death penalty may be imposed when the victim is below seven years old. The Court applied the guidelines in People vs. Pruna. No certificate of live birth or similar authentic document was offered in evidence. The victim and her mother testified that AAA was three years old at the time of the rape; her mother stated that AAA was born in Manila on May 10, 1992. Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age of three and the age sought to be proved of below twelve, no reasonable doubt existed that AAA was below twelve years of age. Whether she was below seven years old, however, was another matter. A mature three-and-a-half-year-old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year-old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight, and following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is by itself insufficient. As it was not established with moral certainty that AAA was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the death penalty could not be imposed; only reclusion perpetua could be imposed. The civil indemnity awarded by the trial court was increased to P50,000.00, and AAA was entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

• Statutory Rape Elements — Statutory rape has two elements: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) the woman is below twelve years of age. Both elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, carnal knowledge was established by AAA’s testimony and medical evidence, and her age below twelve was established by her and her mother’s testimony and the vast disparity between her alleged age of three and the threshold of twelve.
• Proof of Age in Rape (Pruna Guidelines) — The Court laid down guidelines for appreciating age as an element or qualifying circumstance: (1) the best evidence is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth; (2) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records showing the date of birth would suffice; (3) if the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree under Section 40, Rule 130 may be sufficient under the following circumstances: (a) if the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; (b) if the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; (c) if the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old; (4) in the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused; (5) it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party, and the failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him; and (6) the trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. Applied: no birth certificate or authentic document was presented; the mother’s testimony sufficed to prove the victim was below twelve, but not that she was below seven; hence the death penalty was barred.
• Appearance as Object Evidence; Not Judicial Notice — The process by which the trier of facts judges a person’s age from appearance is not judicial notice; it is an examination of object evidence under Section 1, Rule 130, because the person’s appearance is addressed to the senses of the court. Appearance is admissible, but its weight varies: it has probative value for marked extremes of age, but as the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, its probative value diminishes, and doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Applied: because the alleged age of three was far from the threshold of twelve, appearance could establish below twelve; but because three and a half could be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year-old, appearance could not establish below seven with certainty.
• Force Immaterial in Statutory Rape — In statutory rape, the infliction of force is immaterial; the absence of external signs of recent trauma does not preclude conviction. Applied: Dr. Preyra’s finding of no external signs of recent application of trauma did not negate rape.
• Credibility of Child Victim and Corroboration — A young child’s plain, spontaneous, and matter-of-fact testimony may be credited, especially when corroborated by medical findings; a child victim’s account of sexual abuse is not to be treated as a mere tale of romance or television fiction. The trial court’s assessment of the child’s competence and credibility is accorded great weight. Applied: AAA’s testimony was corroborated by abrasions on the labia minora; her account was not a common child’s tale; ill motive of the mother was rejected.
• Penetration Distinguishes Rape from Acts of Lasciviousness — Abrasions on the labia minora, directly beneath the labia majora, proved penetration of the vagina, not mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface. Applied: accused-appellant’s alternative prayer for acts of lasciviousness was rejected.

• "The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age." — This states the controlling elements of statutory rape, which the Court used to affirm the conviction.
• "The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party." — This is the first Pruna guideline on proof of age, which the Court applied in finding that the prosecution failed to prove the victim was below seven years old.
• "The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice." — This clarifies that appearance-based age determination is object evidence, not judicial notice, and explains the limits of using appearance to prove age.
• "As it has not been established with moral certainty that AAA was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him." — This is the ratio for reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002 — Controlling precedent; established the guidelines for proving the victim’s age in rape cases. Applied to reduce the penalty to reclusion perpetua because the victim’s age below seven was not proved with certainty.
• People vs. Tipay, 329 SCRA 52 (2000) — Cited in the discussion of whether courts may take judicial notice of the victim’s appearance; it qualified People vs. Javier by stating that the minority of a victim of tender age below ten may be manifest. The Court ultimately clarified that appearance-based age determination is object evidence, not judicial notice.
• People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 122 (1999) — Cited as requiring the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victim’s age; qualified by People vs. Tipay.
• People vs. Tundag, 342 SCRA 704 (2000) — Cited among cases holding that courts cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age without the requisite hearing under Section 3, Rule 129; also quoted for the definition of judicial notice as cognizance of facts without proof.
• Braca vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 930 (1917) — Cited to support the admissibility of a person’s appearance as evidence of age; the Court noted that customs authorities may determine an immigrant’s age from personal appearance.
• United States vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 246 (1917) — Cited for the rule that a trial court may judge age by appearance, but doubt as to age must be resolved in favor of the accused when the age approaches the threshold.
• People vs. Samodio, G.R. Nos. 134139-40, February 15, 2002 — Cited for the rule that the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape and that the absence of external signs of recent trauma does not preclude conviction.
• People vs. Bato, 325 SCRA 671 (2000) — Cited for the two elements of statutory rape.
• People vs. Perez, 319 SCRA 622 (1999) — Cited for rejecting the imputation of ill motive on the mother; no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma of a rape prosecution.
• People vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105 (1999) — Cited for the same principle and for the anatomy that the labia minora is directly beneath the labia majora; abrasions there proved penetration.
• People vs. Rafales, 323 SCRA 13 (2000) — Cited for the award of civil indemnity and moral damages.
• People vs. Quezada, G.R. No. 135551-58, January 30, 2002 — Cited for the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt of the victim’s age for the death penalty.
• People vs. Baygar, 318 SCRA 358 (1999) — Cited for the credibility of a child victim; the Court cannot believe that a victim of AAA’s age could concoct a tale of defloration.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines rape and provides that carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age is statutory rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. It also authorizes the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen years of age with a qualifying relationship or when the victim is below seven years old. Applied: accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape under Article 335(3), but the death penalty could not be imposed because the victim’s age below seven was not proved with certainty; reclusion perpetua was imposed.
• Section 3, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Provides for judicial notice when a hearing is necessary. Cited in the discussion that courts cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age without the requisite hearing. The Court clarified that appearance-based age determination is not judicial notice.
• Section 1, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Defines object as evidence; objects addressed to the senses of the court, when relevant, may be exhibited to, examined, or viewed by the court. Applied: a person’s appearance is object evidence of age.
• Section 40, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence — Governs pedigree testimony. Mentioned in the Pruna guidelines as the basis for allowing a family member qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree to prove the victim’s exact age or date of birth under specified circumstances. Applied: the mother’s testimony sufficed to prove the victim was below twelve, but not that she was below seven.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, amending the Revised Penal Code. Cited as the amendment to Article 335 that supplied the statutory rape and death penalty provisions applied in this case.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., were on leave.