People vs. Roxas

The exemption from criminal liability under Section 6 of RA 9344 is determined by the accused's chronological age as measured by the anniversary of his birth date, not by his mental age; and a qualifying circumstance of relationship in rape cases must be specifically alleged in the Information as being within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, the bare allegation of "niece" being insufficient.

Accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz was the uncle of the victim AAA, a minor who was nine years old at the time of the first rape and ten years old at the time of the succeeding four rapes. The rapes occurred between September 1997 and August 1998 at the paternal grandparents' house in Quezon City. The prosecution of the case spanned the transition from the old rape provision under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by RA 7659) to the reclassified rape provisions under Article 266-A and 266-B (as amended by RA 8353, effective October 22, 1997), requiring the Court to determine which law governed each count. The accused-appellant also raised the applicability of RA 9344 (the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), as amended by RA 10630, which exempts children fifteen years of age or under from criminal liability.

Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz, charging him with five counts of rape committed against AAA, his niece, who was nine years old at the time of the first incident and ten years old at the time of the succeeding four. The accused-appellant entered a plea of Not Guilty to all charges. All five rapes occurred at the paternal grandparents' house in Quezon City, where AAA was periodically present.

The first rape took place on September 16, 1997. AAA, then nine years old, was at her grandmother CCC's house. While her aunt ZZZ was washing clothes in the dirty kitchen, the accused-appellant overheard that AAA had not yet taken a bath and volunteered to give her one. He brought her upstairs to the bathroom, told her to turn around, and blindfolded her. He turned her around three times, removed her shorts and underwear, sat on a chair, raised both her legs, and moved on top of her. AAA felt his penis enter her vagina, which she found painful. She cried and shouted for her aunt, but the accused-appellant poked a sharp instrument on her neck and threatened to cut her tongue and kill her and her mother if she reported the incident. The second rape occurred on March 20, 1998. AAA was on the terrace of the second floor when the accused-appellant, who was in her grandparents' bedroom, called her. She hesitated because she feared he might rape her again. He went to the terrace, dragged her into the bedroom, blindfolded her, removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, and inserted his penis in her vagina. He was holding a pointed weapon, and there was nobody else in the room. Again, she did not report the incident because of his threats.

The third rape happened on May 11, 1998. AAA was alone in the living room on the second floor when the accused-appellant called her. She did not comply out of fear, but he shouted and demanded that she come near him. He brought her into her grandmother's bedroom, blindfolded her, poked a bladed weapon on her neck, turned her around three times, removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, and inserted his penis in her vagina. The fourth rape took place on July 28, 1998. AAA and the accused-appellant were alone in the living room on the second floor. He asked her to go with him into the bedroom; when she did not get up, he pulled her toward the bedroom and poked a pointed instrument at her. He repeated the same acts as in the previous incidents. The fifth and last rape occurred on August 9, 1998. AAA was at the terrace on the second floor when the accused-appellant pulled her inside the room, blindfolded her, and turned her around three times. She tried to push him and raise her shorts and panty, but he poked a pointed instrument on her neck. He then removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, moved on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. In every instance, the accused-appellant threatened AAA not to tell anyone, and she did not report the incidents because she was scared of his threats.

The defense presented a different account. DDD, AAA's brother, testified that their maternal aunt Tita YYY induced him with toys to tell his father that the accused had raped his sister. DDD, who was eight years old at the time, told his father he saw the accused rape AAA, which led to the filing of the case. DDD further testified that on subsequent days, Tita YYY and other maternal relatives took him and AAA away — AAA was brought to SSDD, a DSWD facility, while DDD was brought to Caloocan and then to a rented house in Muñoz where he stayed for almost a year, forbidden to go outside. EEE, AAA's other brother, testified that he once saw AAA and their maternal uncle Tito XXX enter a bedroom together; when he opened the locked door with a wire, he saw AAA on top of Tito XXX, both naked, and Tito XXX threatened to cut off his tongue if he told anyone. BBB, AAA's mother, denied that her brother-in-law raped her daughter. She testified that AAA had retracted her statements in a prior rape case filed on September 22, 1999, which was dismissed, and that AAA told her she had made false accusations because she did not want to blame her maternal relatives, who had taken care of her since she was three years old. BBB also recounted that her two children went missing and that she filed a kidnapping case against her brother Tito WWW, who promised to return the children if she dismissed the case, which she did. Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, testified that based on her examination, the accused-appellant suffered from mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine to ten years old, and that he consistently denied the allegations against him.

The RTC found AAA's testimony credible and the defense witnesses' testimonies "flimsy," noting that the defense witnesses were not eyewitnesses to the rapes. The Court of Appeals agreed, observing that AAA recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, and that her testimony was unshaken by cross-examination. AAA was fourteen years old at the time she testified.

• Credibility of AAA's Testimony: Accused-appellant argued that AAA's testimony is replete with inconsistencies and narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature, and the natural course of things.
• Exemption from Criminal Liability: Accused-appellant maintained that under RA 9344, minors fifteen years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility, and that since he has a mental age of nine years old, he should likewise be exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age at the time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old.

• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: Whether the testimony of AAA is credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction despite alleged inconsistencies and narrations contrary to common experience.
• Exemption from Criminal Liability: Whether an accused with a mental age of nine to ten years but a chronological age of eighteen at the time of the offense is exempt from criminal liability under Section 6 of RA 9344.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the allegation in the Informations that AAA was the accused-appellant's "niece" sufficiently constitutes the special qualifying circumstance of relationship under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 266-B, as amended.
• Propriety of Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are proper.

• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: Yes. AAA's testimony was found credible, having been recounted in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, unshaken by cross-examination, and consistent with the rule that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit.
• Exemption from Criminal Liability: No. Section 6 of RA 9344 expressly refers to chronological age as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, not mental age; the law is clear and leaves no room for construction.
• Qualifying Circumstances: No. The bare allegation that AAA was the accused-appellant's "niece" is insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstance of relationship, which must specifically allege that the relationship is within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
• Propriety of Penalty and Damages: Reclusion perpetua for each count is proper, the use of a deadly weapon having been established and no other aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proven. Civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 each per count, with exemplary damages of P30,000.00 per count and legal interest at 6% per annum from the date of finality.

• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: The Court carefully examined AAA's testimony and agreed with the assessment of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. AAA recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, without artificialities or pretensions. Her testimony was unshaken by grueling cross-examination, and there was no impression that it was a fabrication. The Court emphasized that AAA was merely fourteen years old at the time she testified. Citing People vs. Araojo, the Court reiterated that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The Court also accorded great respect to the trial court's findings on witness credibility, the trial judge being in a better position to observe demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying. The defense witnesses — AAA's mother and brothers — were not eyewitnesses to the rapes, and any testimony on their part as to whether the acts actually occurred is hearsay, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, which limits testimony to facts of personal knowledge.

• Exemption from Criminal Liability: Section 6 of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, expressly provides that a child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, and that a child is deemed to be fifteen years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his or her birthdate. The provision clearly refers to age as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, not mental age. When the law is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation; courts may interpret or construe its true intent only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The accused-appellant's chronological age at the time of the offenses was eighteen years, which does not fall within the exemption under Section 6. Dr. Aglipay's testimony that the accused-appellant had a mental age of nine to ten years old does not alter the statutory standard.

• Qualifying Circumstances: The first rape incident was committed in September 1997, before the effectivity of RA 8353 on October 22, 1997, making Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 the applicable provision. The succeeding four counts were committed after October 22, 1997, bringing them under Article 266-A and 266-B as amended by RA 8353. Both provisions impose the death penalty when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. While the minority of AAA was sufficiently proven, the allegation of relationship was insufficient. The Informations alleged only that AAA was the accused-appellant's "niece," without specifying that the relationship was within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Citing People vs. Estrada and People vs. Velasquez, the Court held that qualifying circumstances are in the nature of qualifying circumstances that cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information; to impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance not alleged would violate the accused's constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The admission by the accused-appellant that the victim is his niece and AAA's testimony that he is her uncle are immaterial; the circumstance of relationship within the third civil degree must be alleged in the Information. The applicable qualifying circumstance is instead the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no other aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count is proper.

• Propriety of Penalty and Damages: The penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape was sustained, the use of a deadly weapon having been established and no other aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proven. For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, as cited in People vs. Manigo, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 each per count. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 per count was maintained as in line with recent jurisprudence. Legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum was imposed upon the amounts of indemnity and damages from the date of finality of the judgment.

• Chronological Age as the Standard for Exemption under RA 9344 — Section 6 of RA 9344 exempts from criminal liability a child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense, and deems a child to be fifteen years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his or her birthdate. The exemption is determined by chronological age, not mental age. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the accused-appellant's claim that his mental age of nine to ten years should exempt him from criminal liability despite his chronological age of eighteen at the time of the offenses.

• Qualifying Circumstances Must Be Alleged in the Information — Circumstances that qualify an offense and mandate the imposition of a higher penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances that cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information. To impose an enhanced penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance not alleged would violate the accused's constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the bare allegation of "niece" in the Informations was insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstance of relationship, which must specifically state that the relationship is within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

• Credibility of Child-Victim Testimony — Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit. When a girl, particularly a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Courts are inclined to give credit to the account of a victim of tender age, considering her relative vulnerability and the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter testified to were not true.

• Trial Court's Assessment of Witness Credibility — Great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses, the trial judge being in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses and to decide who among them is telling the truth.

• Hearsay Rule — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception. Testimony of witnesses who were not present when the alleged acts occurred, as to whether or not the acts actually happened, is hearsay.

• "In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one's birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the mental-age-versus-chronological-age issue under RA 9344, defining the controlling rule that exemption from criminal liability is based on chronological age alone.

• "The allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas's 'niece' in each Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death." — This passage articulates the Court's holding on the insufficiency of the bare allegation of "niece" to qualify the relationship circumstance, while confirming that the use of a deadly weapon supplies the proper qualifying circumstance.

• "We have repeatedly held that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed." — This passage restates the canonical formulation of the doctrine on the credibility of child-victim testimony in rape cases, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• People vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the rule that qualifying circumstances cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the Information, and that the relationship must be specifically alleged as within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, not merely described as "uncle" or "niece."

• People vs. Velasquez — Followed. Cited within People vs. Estrada for the proposition that the qualifying circumstance of relationship must be alleged in the Information as being within the third civil degree, and that the accused's admission or the victim's testimony of the relationship is immaterial.

• People vs. Araojo, 616 Phil. 275 (2009) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, and that youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity.

• People vs. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376 — Followed. Cited for the principle that great respect is accorded to the trial court's findings on witness credibility.

• People vs. Manigo, G.R. No. 194612, January 27, 2014 — Followed. Cited as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and moral damages to P50,000.00 each per count for consistency with prevailing jurisprudence.

• People vs. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006) — Followed. Cited as authority for withholding the real name and identity of the rape victim and using fictitious initials.

• Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378 Phil. 10 (1999) — Followed. Cited for the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), as amended by RA 10630 — Provides that a child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, and that a child is deemed to be fifteen years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his or her birthdate. The Court applied this provision to hold that the exemption is based on chronological age, not mental age, and that the accused-appellant, being chronologically eighteen at the time of the offenses, was not exempt.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 — The applicable rape provision for the first incident committed before October 22, 1997. It provides that rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and that the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The Court applied this provision to the first count but held that the qualifying circumstance of relationship was insufficiently alleged.

• Article 266-A and Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353 — The applicable rape provisions for the four counts committed after October 22, 1997. Article 266-A defines rape as committed through force, threat, or intimidation, among other circumstances. Article 266-B provides that rape under paragraph 1 is punished by reclusion perpetua, and that rape with the use of a deadly weapon is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied these provisions to the four subsequent counts, again holding that the qualifying circumstance of relationship was insufficiently alleged but that the use of a deadly weapon sustained the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, derived from his own perception. The Court applied this rule to hold that the testimony of AAA's mother and brothers, who were not present during the rapes, was hearsay as to whether the acts actually occurred.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concurred.