People vs. Roxas

Generic aggravating circumstances, although proven during trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if they are not alleged in the information, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is given retroactive application insofar as it benefits the accused. Where the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is duly proven but no properly alleged generic aggravating circumstance attends the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

PO3 Roger Roxas was a member of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team of the Philippine National Police, residing in Barangay Bagong Pag-asa, San Roque II, Quezon City, approximately one hundred meters from the home of the victim, Lorna Maceda Puno, and her husband Joseph Puno. Lorna and her sister Joelyn B. Maceda were both security guards who were issued caliber .38 service firearms but were not permitted to bring them home. Roxas and Joseph Puno were kumpare, having been acquainted through a "BSDO" seminar that Roxas and his wife managed. The case was tried under Criminal Case No. Q-96-65242 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, which convicted Roxas of murder and imposed the death penalty, triggering automatic review by the Supreme Court.

On the evening of 8 March 1996, Joelyn B. Maceda was washing clothes in front of the house she shared with her sister Lorna Maceda Puno, Lorna's husband Joseph, their five-year-old son Jonas, and a niece, in San Roque, Bagong Pag-asa, Quezon City. The house was a one-storey structure with the front door leading to the kitchen and two steps leading to the sala, illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. Between nine and nine-thirty that evening, Joelyn saw Lorna arriving home from work in her type B uniform and carrying a brown bag. From a distance of four to five meters, Joelyn observed Lorna running away from appellant PO3 Roger Roxas, who appeared drunk, was bare from the waist up, wore shorts, and carried a gun. When Joelyn asked the pale and trembling Lorna why she was running, Lorna replied, "Lyn, Lyn, enter, close the door, a man (is) following me!" Joelyn promptly closed the door, but appellant kicked it open, pushing Joelyn aside when the door hit her forehead. Appellant grabbed Lorna's bag, opened it, and, apparently not finding what he was looking for, hurled it to the floor. He asked Lorna, "Why did you run? Why did you not mind me?" Lorna answered, "I did not hear you." When Joelyn tried to hold appellant's hand, he pushed her hand away and then shot Lorna with a caliber .45 gun, its muzzle just two feet away from Lorna's face. Lorna fell with half her body outside the door and the other half inside the house. A neighbor responded to Joelyn's cries for help, and Lorna was brought to the hospital.

Melinda Taliño, who was fetching water from a nearby artesian well that same evening, heard a gunshot from Lorna's house and saw the bloodied Lorna on the floor just as appellant, holding a gun, was about to run out. Melinda shouted for help, but no one dared respond immediately because appellant remained at the corner of an alley a short distance away, pointing and swaying a gun. Appellant's wife and a certain Jun were seen trying to pacify him; Jun tapped appellant's hand, causing the gun to fall, and appellant's wife picked it up and hid it behind her. The two then pulled appellant away. Lorna's husband Joseph Puno, a security guard at the Broadway Centrum, learned of the incident at five o'clock the following morning when he returned home from work and found bloodstains around the house. He surrendered a caliber .45 empty shell he had found at the house to PO1 Florencio Escobido. The shell was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where P/Inspector Reynaldo Dimalanta de Guzman issued Firearms Identification Report No. FAID-143-96 concluding that the empty caliber .45 shell was fired from a caliber .45 pistol with six lands and six grooves twisted to the left. The pistol itself was never recovered. Lorna, twenty-seven years old, died three days after she was shot. Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, a medico-legal officer, confirmed that Lorna suffered a gunshot wound at the left temporal region with tattooing evident, and opined that the distance between the muzzle and the point of contact could have been barely about two feet.

Appellant did not deny his presence in the vicinity but presented a different version. He testified that on the late afternoon of 8 March 1996, he played basketball in Barangay Bagong Pag-asa until about seven o'clock, after which he had dinner and then visited his comadre Yolanda Daraman with his wife. On their way home, he noticed a suspicious-looking man who appeared to be high on drugs, with a bulge on his waist that looked like a tucked gun. Appellant approached the man to verify and conduct a body search, but the man ran away. Appellant gave chase and, along the way, passed two barangay tanods, Inocencio Datu and Rudy Limbaga, whom his wife asked to meet the man on the other side of the area. Appellant saw the man enter a house by kicking open its door and fired his service .38 caliber gun. He pushed the half-open door, but Lorna Puno sprayed tear gas on him, hitting both his eyes and causing him to momentarily lose his sight. He then heard a gunshot from inside the house and dove face down for cover, losing control of his firearm in the process. He shouted for help and heard the voices of his wife and the two barangay tanods, who brought him back to his house. His wife administered first aid to his eyes, and the following morning he was taken to the Quezon City General Hospital. From the hospital, appellant proceeded to Camp Karingal to clear his name after hearing he was being implicated. He was disarmed by his commanding officer and instructed to submit to investigation. He came back the next day and restricted himself to camp, and was later presented to the inquest fiscal on 15 March 1996.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and rejected the defense version, convicting appellant of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since both prosecution and defense evidence showed that Lorna was fatally shot inside her house. The trial court described appellant as a "big hulk of a man," 5'7" in height and muscularly bulky, while the victim Lorna stood only about 5'5" and was unarmed when shot.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant assailed the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Joelyn B. Maceda and Melinda Taliño, contending that their testimony should not have been credited over his defense.
• Suppression of Evidence: Appellant argued that the prosecution suppressed evidence by failing to present Melinda Taliño's affidavit, invoking the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
• Ballistics Evidence: Appellant contended that the trial court disregarded the law on ballistics by ignoring the fact that the recovered slug was from a caliber .45 gun, not from a .38 caliber handgun like his service revolver, thereby undermining the prosecution's case.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Appellant argued that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not proven, premising his argument on the claim that the victim had used tear gas to immobilize him.

• Retroactive Application of Rule 110, Section 9: The Solicitor General, supporting the trial court's appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance despite its absence from the information, urged the Court to reconsider its ruling in People vs. Mauricio and decline to retroactively apply Section 9, Rule 110 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that prosecutors and trial judges had relied in utmost good faith on the former rule allowing appreciation of unalleged generic aggravating circumstances.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court's assessment of the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Joelyn B. Maceda and Melinda Taliño should be disturbed on appeal.
• Suppression of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's failure to present Melinda Taliño's affidavit warrants an adverse presumption against the prosecution.
• Ballistics and Non-Recovery of Weapon: Whether the non-presentation of the murder weapon and the discrepancy between the caliber of the recovered shell and appellant's service revolver are fatal to the prosecution's case.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the prosecution proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength beyond reasonable doubt.
• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be appreciated despite not being alleged in the information, in light of Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The issue of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to resolve, and nothing in the records justified deviation from the trial court's assessment.
• Suppression of Evidence: No. Ex-parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate and will not prevail over credible testimony on the stand, especially where the defense had full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
• Ballistics and Non-Recovery of Weapon: No. With positive identification of the appellant by an eyewitness, the non-presentation of the weapon used is not fatal; the ballistics evidence only shows that appellant's service revolver was not the weapon used, not that appellant was not the perpetrator.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. The qualifying circumstance was duly proven: appellant, an armed, muscularly bulky man 5'7" in height, shot an unarmed woman 5'5" in height at close range while she was trying to escape.
• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: No. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be appreciated because it was not alleged in the information, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is given retroactive application insofar as it benefits the accused.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The rule that credibility of witnesses is a question for the trial court is logical and well founded because the trial judge has the opportunity to observe witnesses firsthand and draw the line between fact and falsehood. An appellate court relies mostly on the trial court's assessment in this respect. The records disclosed no reason to deviate from this settled doctrine. Joelyn witnessed the killing of her sister at close range, and her eyewitness account was found credible by the trial court. Her relationship to the victim would not discredit her testimony; it would be unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit, and nothing showed she was impelled by improper motive.

• Suppression of Evidence: The contention that the prosecution suppressed Melinda Taliño's affidavit was a futile attempt at exoneration. Ex-parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate and are scarcely depended upon; they will not prevail over credible statements of a witness on the stand, particularly when the defense had the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

• Ballistics and Non-Recovery of Weapon: The ballistics evidence showing that the recovered shell was fired from a caliber .45 pistol, not from appellant's .38 caliber service revolver, only established that appellant's service weapon was not the one used. It did not negate his identity as the perpetrator. With the positive identification by eyewitness Joelyn of appellant as the person who shot Lorna, the non-presentation of the murder weapon was not fatal to the prosecution's case.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Abuse of Superior Strength: Appellant's claim that the victim used tear gas on him was unsupported by convincing proof. The hospital record showing treatment for eye irritation and abrasions was not attested to by any attending physician; the records officer who presented it had no personal knowledge of its contents and could not attest to its truth. A medical certificate is hearsay and inadmissible without the affirmation of the physician who prepared it. The trial court described appellant as a "big hulk of a man," 5'7" in height and muscularly bulky, while Lorna was only 5'5" and unarmed. The Court drew analogy to People vs. Quesada, where abuse of superior strength was appreciated when a robust man stabbed a young woman while she was trying to escape. The Court also cited the principle that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes abuse of superiority afforded by his sex and the weapon used.

• Appreciation of Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: The trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, but it was not alleged in the information. The Solicitor General urged reconsideration of People vs. Mauricio, arguing that prosecutors and trial judges had relied in good faith on the old rule. The Court declined to reconsider Mauricio, which has been reiterated in several cases. Section 9, Rule 110 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word "must," indicating the requirement is mandatory; failure to comply means generic aggravating circumstances, although proven, cannot be appreciated if not stated in the information. Rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused, consistent with the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. While the Court acknowledged that the prosecutor and trial judge acted in good faith, this was insufficient to abandon the standing tenet that procedural rules favorable to the accused must be given retroactive effect. With no generic aggravating circumstance properly attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed under Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Trial Court's Prerogative on Witness Credibility — The issue of credibility of witnesses is primarily a question for the trial court to resolve, as the trial judge has the opportunity to observe witnesses testify and distinguish fact from falsehood. Appellate courts rely on the trial court's assessment absent any reason to deviate. The Court applied this doctrine by affirming the trial court's crediting of Joelyn's eyewitness testimony and rejecting appellant's challenge to her credibility.

• Relationship of Witness to Victim as Not Discrediting — The relationship of a witness to the victim does not discredit the witness or disbelieve testimony; it would be unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The absence of improper motive further enhances credibility. Applied to affirm Joelyn's testimony despite her being the victim's sister.

• Hearsay Medical Certificate — A medical certificate is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence without the affirmation or confirmation on the witness stand of the physician who prepared it, corroborated by the testimony of the physician who examined the patient. Applied to exclude the hospital record presented by the records officer to rebut the claim that the victim used tear gas on appellant.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of superior strength afforded by his sex and the weapon used, from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Applied to qualify the killing as murder where appellant, an armed, muscularly bulky man 5'7" tall, shot an unarmed woman 5'5" tall at close range while she was trying to escape.

• Mandatory Allegation of Aggravating Circumstances in the Information (People vs. Mauricio Doctrine) — Under Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in the information. The use of "must" indicates the requirement is mandatory. Generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at trial, cannot be appreciated if not alleged in the information. Rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused, grounded on the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Applied to bar appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• "The use of the word `must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused." — This passage, quoting from People vs. Mauricio, articulates the ratio decidendi for refusing to appreciate the unalleged aggravating circumstance of dwelling and forms the canonical formulation of the retroactive application of Section 9, Rule 110.

• "In several cases, we have held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. This is the exact scenario in this case." — This passage states the controlling formulation for appreciating abuse of superior strength where a male armed assailant attacks an unarmed female victim, directly applied to qualify the killing as murder.

• "A medical certificate would be hearsay and inadmissible in evidence without the affirmation or confirmation on the witness stand of the physician who prepared it and corroborated by the testimony of the physician who had examined the patient." — This passage defines the doctrinal requirement for the admissibility of medical certificates, applied to exclude the hospital record offered to support appellant's tear gas defense.

• People vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 133695, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 114 — Controlling precedent on the retroactive application of Section 9, Rule 110, requiring aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information. The Court declined the Solicitor General's invitation to reconsider it and applied its holding to bar appreciation of dwelling.
• People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446 (1935) — Cited as analogous authority for appreciating abuse of superior strength where a robust man attacked a young woman while she was trying to escape, supporting the Court's finding that the qualifying circumstance was established.
• People vs. Salalima, 415 Phil. 414 (2001) — Cited as the case in which the Court, taking a hard look at the issue, concluded that the new rules must be given retroactive effect, reinforcing the Mauricio doctrine.
• People vs. Mitra, 385 Phil. 515 (2000) — Cited as a case where the Court had previously considered aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information, but distinguished as having been superseded by Salalima and subsequent cases.
• People vs. Espina, 383 Phil. 656 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 130205, 5 July 2000, 335 SCRA 100 — Cited for the principle that ex-parte affidavits are scarcely depended upon and will not prevail over credible testimony on the stand.
• People vs. Padao, 334 Phil. 726 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that non-presentation of the murder weapon is not fatal when there is positive identification by an eyewitness.

• Article 248(1), Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, including when committed by taking advantage of superior strength, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to classify the killing as murder and to determine the range of penalties.
• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attends, the lesser penalty is imposed. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death, since no generic aggravating circumstance was properly appreciated.
• Section 9, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000) — Requires that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in the information. Applied retroactively to bar appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling not alleged in the information.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Cited as the overriding constitutional principle supporting the retroactive application of Section 9, Rule 110.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Puno and Azcuna, JJ., were abroad on official business.