People vs. Ronquillo

Where conspiracy is established among armed perpetrators who act in concert to shoot residents of a compound, each conspirator is liable as a co-principal for the resulting death, even if the specific person who fired the fatal shot cannot be individually identified, provided the killing is qualified by treachery.

The case arose from a violent incident on January 6, 1991 at Barangay Manresa, Quezon City, involving a housing project dispute between residents and members of the Federation of Concerned Citizens of the Philippines (FOCCOS). The Manresa Compound, bounded by Sto. Domingo, Mauban, Dagot, and Biak-na-Bato Streets, was the site of the confrontation. Seventeen persons were charged with multiple arson, attempted murder, and double murder with multiple frustrated and attempted murder; only four were arrested and tried jointly. The case proceeded on appeal solely as to the conviction of Yamashito Ronquillo for the murder of Feliciana Bacolongan, his three co-accused having been acquitted by the trial court.

On January 6, 1991, at about 6:00 in the evening, a loud explosion was heard inside the Manresa Compound in Barangay Manresa, Quezon City, setting several houses on fire. Thereafter, several men going out of the compound fired shots inside the compound for approximately one hour, stopping only when Quezon City Councilors Calalay and Tamayo arrived. Five houses were burned, two persons were killed, and several others were injured. The Quezon City police initially investigated, but residents, claiming some of those involved were Quezon City policemen, sought the assistance of the Commission on Human Rights and executed affidavits there. The affidavits were forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City, which endorsed the case to the Department of Justice for preliminary investigation. Seventeen persons were charged with multiple arson, attempted murder, and double murder with multiple frustrated and attempted murder. Only Yamashito Ronquillo, Juan Tagalog, Voltaire Ayate, and Orlando Abis were arrested; the rest remained at large. The four pleaded not guilty and were tried jointly.

The prosecution's principal witness was Baltazar Bacolongan, husband of victim Feliciana Bacolongan. He testified that at about 6:00 in the evening of January 6, 1991, he and his wife were walking along Sto. Domingo Street on their way home when they heard a loud explosion. They ran to their house inside the Manresa Compound and saw it on fire. As his wife was about to climb the stairs, she fell down and he saw blood on her stomach. He placed her on his lap and looked toward the direction where the shot came from — beside their fence along Mauban Street — and saw Yamashito Ronquillo, Juan Tagalog, Voltaire Ayate, Saturnino Paras, Roberto Tayag, Roberto Feliciano, and others firing their guns. The victim died on the way to the hospital. Another prosecution witness, Mely de Guzman, testified that she saw Jose Malasa, Jose Ofilan, Roger Ofilan, Ronquillo, Ayate, Tagalog, and others firing guns, but she did not identify any of the four accused in open court. SPO2 Rosito Calabucal, the principal investigator, testified that he interviewed Bacolongan at the United Doctors Medical Center where Feliciana was brought dead on arrival, but Bacolongan was not able to name the assailants at that time.

Ronquillo raised the defense of alibi. He testified that he was an awardee and member of the awards committee of a housing project in Manresa. In the morning of January 6, 1991, members of FOCCOS, which opposed the housing project, constructed a fence along Mauban and Biak-na-Bato Streets. The barangay captain requested police assistance and invited the group's head for dialogue. A policeman and Pastor Ofilan ordered the fence's removal, and Ronquillo helped in the demolition. At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he saw a person nailing something behind his house, asked him to stop, and a scuffle ensued. Thereafter, he went home. After about one hour, he heard a loud explosion from the place of Opriasa along Sto. Domingo and Mauban Streets, about fifty meters from his house, followed by successive shots lasting about one hour. When the shooting stopped, he went out and saw media men and policemen along Mauban Street.

The trial court found that Bacolongan positively identified Ronquillo as one of those firing guns immediately after his wife was shot. Although Bacolongan also named Juan Tagalog, Voltaire Ayate, and others, the trial court noted that Bacolongan's affidavit subscribed on January 17, 1991 did not identify Ayate, Tagalog, and Abis, and only mentioned Ronquillo, Roberto Feliciano, Jose Ofilan, Saturnino Paras, Sofronio Atienza, and Pat. Jose Malasa. The trial court found that Bacolongan would not have failed to recognize Tagalog, Ayate, and Abis, who were his long-time neighbors, had they truly been present. The trial court held that although Bacolongan did not actually see Ronquillo fire the fatal shot, conspiracy existed between Ronquillo and his armed companions, making the act of each the act of all. Treachery qualified the killing to murder. Ronquillo was convicted; his three co-accused were acquitted on reasonable doubt.

• Positive Identification: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding that Baltazar Bacolongan positively identified him, arguing that Bacolongan's view must have been hampered by the crowded houses inside the compound, rendering recognition impossible.
• Contradictory Testimony: Appellant argued that Bacolongan's testimony was contradictory, as he stated during direct examination that appellant was in front of his house firing at them, while during cross-examination he testified that appellant and his companions were positioned at the back of their fence along Mauban Street.
• Insufficient Illumination: Appellant maintained that the place of the incident was dark, noting that while Felicisimo Opriasa testified there was light from OTALCO across Sto. Domingo Street, the street on the other side of Mauban Street where Bacolongan's house was situated had no light, and that electricity in the whole block would automatically shut off during a fire.
• Delayed Identification: Appellant pointed out that Bacolongan did not implicate him when first interviewed by the police investigator at the hospital, and only named him in an affidavit executed eleven days after the incident, and in a joint affidavit where ten more accused were added.
• Conspiracy: Appellant faulted the trial court for ruling that conspiracy existed between him and his armed companions.
• Conviction on Lone Testimony: Appellant argued that his conviction beyond reasonable doubt on the lone, materially weak testimony of Baltazar Bacolongan was erroneous, disregarding the evidence and circumstances proven in the case.

• Consistency of Testimony: The Solicitor General argued that Bacolongan's testimony on direct examination that appellant was in front of his house firing was not inconsistent with his cross-examination testimony that appellant was beside the fence along Mauban Street, as the fence fronted the house.
• Sufficient Visibility: The prosecution presented witness Severina Navoa, who testified that while the compound darkened because the lights went off due to the fire, there were lights outside the compound, and Mely de Guzman testified that the area near Mauban Street was well-lighted because of the burning houses.
• Physical Consistency: The Solicitor General pointed out that Feliciana Bacolongan's stomach wound was consistent with Bacolongan's testimony that the assailants were beside the fence along Mauban Street.
• Conjectural Objections: The Solicitor General branded as mere conjectures the appellant's allegations that it was improbable Bacolongan incurred no wound and that appellant escaped arrest despite the presence of seventy-five policemen.

• Positive Identification: Whether the trial court erred in finding that Baltazar Bacolongan positively identified accused-appellant Yamashito Ronquillo as one of the perpetrators of the killing.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy existed in the commission of the offense.
• Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Yamashito Ronquillo beyond reasonable doubt on the lone testimony of Baltazar Bacolongan, which was allegedly materially weak.

• Positive Identification: No. The trial court did not err; Bacolongan's testimony was not inconsistent, visibility was sufficient, and the delay in naming the appellant was adequately explained.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was established by the concerted conduct of the appellant and his armed companions, whose simultaneous firing of guns inside the compound disclosed a common understanding to harm the residents.
• Reasonable Doubt: No. The conviction was sustained, the credibility of the eyewitness having been properly assessed by the trial court and the defense of alibi having failed for want of proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.

• Positive Identification: The contention that Bacolongan's testimony was contradictory was rejected. When Bacolongan said the appellant was "in front of their house," he meant the fence along Mauban Street fronting their house. Appellant himself testified that his house was the first house near the fence, about three meters away. Bacolongan and his companions were about five meters from the house. The fence, made of wood and galvanized iron, was only half the height of the house, enabling Bacolongan to see outside. The contention that the area was dark was belied by prosecution witness Severina Navoa, who testified that while the compound darkened, there were lights outside, and by Mely de Guzman, who testified the area near Mauban Street was well-lighted by the burning houses. Regarding the failure to name the appellant during the initial police interview, the trial court correctly noted that SPO2 Calabucal's Initial Investigation Report contained no statement that he interviewed or even saw Bacolongan at the hospital, unlike his explicit mention of interviewing other victims. The appellant's allegations about the improbability of Bacolongan escaping injury and of appellant evading arrest were dismissed as conjectures that cannot prevail over positive identification.

• Conspiracy: Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not necessary; conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of the commission of the felony, disclosing a common understanding for the perpetration of the offense. The evidence showed that after Feliciana Bacolongan was hit, Bacolongan looked toward the direction of the shot and saw the appellant, together with Saturnino Paras, Jose Ofilan, Jose Malasa, and others, firing their guns beside the fence along Mauban Street. The successive firing caused the death of Feliciana Bacolongan, among others. The appellant and his companions acted in concert in pursuit of a common goal to harm the people inside the compound. Even though Bacolongan did not actually see the appellant fire the fatal shot, where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and all conspirators are liable as co-principals.

• Reasonable Doubt: The credibility of witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial court, which has the advantage of observing their demeanor. On appeal, the trial court's evaluation is accorded great respect and finality in the absence of any indication that it overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and influence that would alter the result. A careful review of the records revealed no reason to alter the trial court's conclusion. The appellant's alibi was the weakest of all defenses. For alibi to prosper, one must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene. Appellant testified that he remained in his house along Mauban Street, near the squatter's area and in the vicinity of the crime scene; hence, he failed to prove physical impossibility. The defense of alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive identification by a prosecution witness who testified that he saw the accused at the scene and participating in the felony. Treachery was present because the attack was sudden and unexpected, the victim was not in a position to offer effective defense, and the assailants positioned themselves behind a fence, insuring their safety from retaliation. Abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men were absorbed by treachery. The killing was qualified to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

• Conspiracy; Inference from Conduct — Direct proof of a previous agreement among the accused to commit the crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused at the time of the commission of the felony, disclosing a common understanding among them for the perpetration of the offense. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all, and all conspirators are liable as co-principals, even if the specific person who fired the fatal shot cannot be identified. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the concerted firing of guns by the appellant and his companions beside the fence along Mauban Street, resulting in the death of Feliciana Bacolongan, established a common design to harm the residents, rendering each participant liable.

• Treachery; Requisites — Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The Court found treachery present despite a frontal attack, because the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was not in a position to offer effective defense. The assailants' positioning behind a fence of wood and galvanized iron insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act, demonstrating deliberate adoption of the means of execution.

• Alibi; Requisites for Prosperity — For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. The Court rejected the appellant's alibi because he testified that he remained in his house along Mauban Street, near the crime scene, thus failing to prove physical impossibility of presence. Alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive identification by a prosecution witness.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Appellate Review — The credibility of witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial court, which has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. On appeal, the trial court's evaluation of testimony is accorded great respect and finality in the absence of any indication that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if reconsidered, would alter the result.

• Absorption of Aggravating Circumstances by Treachery — The qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men are absorbed by treachery and cannot be appreciated separately.

• "Direct proof of previous agreement of the accused to commit the crime is not necessary. Proof of the conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused, at the time of the commission of the felony, disclosing a common understanding among them for the perpetration of the offense." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on conspiracy, articulating the canonical formulation that conspiracy may be established by inference from concerted conduct rather than direct evidence of prior agreement.

• "Hence, even if Baltazar Bacolongan did not actually see appellant fire the shot that hit his wife, where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all." — This passage applies the conspiracy doctrine to the facts, establishing that individual identification of the person who fired the fatal shot becomes immaterial once concerted action is proven.

• "For alibi to prosper, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime." — This passage restates the two-pronged test for the defense of alibi, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Although the attack was frontal, treachery was present since the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim, Feliciana Bacolongan, was not in a position to offer an effective defense." — This passage clarifies that treachery may obtain even in a frontal attack when the assault is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unable to mount an effective defense.

• People vs. Geguira, 328 SCRA 11 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that direct proof of conspiracy is not necessary and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused.
• People vs. Realin, 301 SCRA 495 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine that the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court's discretion and that its evaluation is accorded great respect and finality on appeal.
• People vs. Juan, 322 SCRA 598 (2000) — Cited for the principle that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and for the two-pronged test requiring proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.
• People vs. Barona, 323 SCRA 239 (2000) — Cited for the two requisites of treachery: employment of means giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself, and deliberate adoption of such means.
• People vs. Sespeñe, 102 Phil. 199 (1957) — Cited for the doctrine that abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men are absorbed by treachery.
• People vs. Lagnas, 222 SCRA 745 (1993) — Cited for the principle that identification of the malefactors is the testimonial linchpin of a criminal prosecution.

• Article 14, Paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as an aggravating circumstance; applied by the Court to qualify the killing of Feliciana Bacolongan to murder, as the sudden and unexpected attack from behind a fence insured execution without risk to the assailants.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; applied to classify the killing as murder qualified by treachery, punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, with reclusion perpetua imposed in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred.