People vs. Romualdez

The prescriptive period for offenses under RA 3019 is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or initiates its investigation; a preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG, which lacks authority to investigate graft and corruption cases absent prior presidential authorization, is void ab initio and produces no legal effect in tolling prescription. Where the Ombudsman's preliminary investigation commences more than fifteen years after the alleged commission of the offense, the criminal liability has already prescribed.

Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez served as Provincial Governor of Leyte from 1976 to February 1986 and, during that same period, held ambassadorial appointments to the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States of America, appointments secured through his relationship as brother-in-law to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Office of the Ombudsman charged him with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, alleging that he caused undue injury to the government by collecting dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte while concurrently holding incompatible positions. The PCGG had previously attempted to file similar criminal cases against Romualdez in 1989, but those cases were quashed because the PCGG lacked authority to file informations, a deficiency rooted in the limited scope of the PCGG's investigatory power under existing jurisprudence.

Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez served as the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte from 1976 to February 1986. During that period, through his influence as brother-in-law of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he secured appointments as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States of America, positions legally incompatible with his gubernatorial office. While holding these concurrent positions, Romualdez collected compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte — US$276,911.56 from the former and ₱293,348.86 from the latter, equivalent in aggregate to ₱5,806,709.50 in Philippine currency.

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 by information filed on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced on 4 June 2001. The information alleged that Romualdez willfully and with evident bad faith caused undue injury to the government by holding incompatible positions and collecting dual compensation. Romualdez moved to quash on two grounds: first, that the facts alleged did not constitute the offense charged, arguing that Section 3(e) applied only to public officers involved in granting licenses, permits, or concessions, and that receiving compensation for actual services rendered did not constitute damage to the government; and second, that the criminal action had been extinguished by prescription, the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of RA 3019 having lapsed since the preliminary investigation commenced only in 2001 for offenses committed from 1976 to February 1986.

The PCGG had previously attempted to file similar criminal cases against Romualdez on 22 February 1989, but those cases were quashed on the ground that the PCGG lacked authority to file informations — only the Office of the Special Prosecutor or Office of the Ombudsman possessed such authority. This necessitated a new preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman as the competent office before the present charges could be filed. Romualdez argued that the 1989 PCGG proceedings could not have interrupted the prescriptive period because they were null and void, and that the RPC provision tolling prescription during the offender's absence from the Philippines should not apply since the offense was governed by special law, not the RPC.

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute the offense, finding that the information did not sufficiently aver how receiving dual compensation resulted in undue injury to the government, and that any liability would at most be administrative. The Sandiganbayan, however, rejected the prescription argument. The People filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted on 23 July 2008 on the finding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information. Romualdez's motion for reconsideration was denied on 9 September 2008. Romualdez then filed a second motion for reconsideration reiterating the prescription argument, invoking the Court's 2006 ruling in Romualdez vs. Marcelo.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The People argued that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information by considering evidentiary matters and defenses not proper in a motion to quash, and by failing to apply the rule that facts hypothetically admitted in the information should be tested for sufficiency.
• Applicability of Section 3(e): The People countered that Section 2(b) of RA 3019 expressly includes elective and appointive officials within the scope of public officers covered by the law, refuting Romualdez's claim that the provision applied only to officers charged with granting licenses, permits, or concessions.
• Prescription as Technicality: The People argued that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right, and that under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, the State's right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

• Insufficiency of the Information: Romualdez argued that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the cited provision applies only to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, and receiving dual compensation is unrelated to such acts. He also argued that there could be no damage or prejudice to the government since he actually rendered services for both positions.
• Prescription: Romualdez maintained that the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed, as the preliminary investigation commenced only in June 2001 for offenses committed from 1976 to February 1986. He argued that the PCGG proceedings in 1989 were null and void and could not have interrupted the prescriptive period, and that the RPC provision tolling prescription during the offender's absence from the Philippines should not apply to offenses under special laws, as Act No. 3326 contains no similar rule.
• Proper Remedy: Romualdez argued in his Motion to Dismiss that the proper remedy from an order granting a motion to quash is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65, since such an order is final and not merely interlocutory.

• Prescription of the Offense: Whether the criminal charge against Romualdez had been extinguished by prescription, given that the Office of the Ombudsman commenced its preliminary investigation more than fifteen years after the alleged commission of the offense and the prior PCGG proceedings were void ab initio.
• Tolling Effect of Void Proceedings: Whether a preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG, which lacked authority to investigate graft and corruption cases, could toll the prescriptive period under RA 3019.
• Suppletory Application of RPC Article 91: Whether Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which tolls prescription during the offender's absence from the Philippines, applies suppletorily to offenses punished under special laws such as RA 3019.

• Prescription of the Offense: Yes. The criminal charge had prescribed because the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed before the Office of the Ombudsman commenced its preliminary investigation in June 2001.
• Tolling Effect of Void Proceedings: No. The PCGG's preliminary investigation was void ab initio for lack of authority and could not toll the prescriptive period, as only proceedings initiated by the Office of the Ombudsman can interrupt prescription for violations of RA 3019.
• Suppletory Application of RPC Article 91: Not reached by the majority. The majority did not rule on whether Article 91 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as prescription had already set in on the independent ground that no valid proceedings existed to toll the prescriptive period. This issue was addressed in the dissenting opinions.

• Prescription of the Offense: The offense charged was committed "on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986," while the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced on 4 June 2001. The elapsed time clearly exceeded the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Section 11 of RA 3019. The Court relied on its ruling in Romualdez vs. Marcelo, where it had held on substantially identical facts that the prescriptive period had expired. The Court found that following stare decisis, Romualdez's claim of prescription had merit, as the premises were the same as those in Marcelo.

• Tolling Effect of Void Proceedings: The PCGG had attempted to file similar criminal cases against Romualdez on 22 February 1989, but those cases were quashed because informations filed by the PCGG — rather than the Office of the Special Prosecutor or Office of the Ombudsman — are null and void for lack of authority. Under Cruz, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the PCGG's investigatory power extended only to ill-gotten wealth cases, absent prior presidential authority to investigate graft and corruption cases involving Marcos cronies. The preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG was therefore void ab initio and could not be accorded any legal effect, notwithstanding the general rule that commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. The Court distinguished this situation from SEC vs. Interport, where investigative proceedings by the SEC tolled prescription because no taint of invalidity attached to the SEC's authority. A void proceeding cannot be cured by amendment; a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule that amendment retroacts to the time of filing the original complaint does not apply when the original information is void ab initio. The prescriptive period for RA 3019 violations is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or initiates its investigation, as held in Salvador vs. Desierto.

• Suppletory Application of RPC Article 91: The majority did not address this issue, as it found prescription had already set in on the independent ground that no valid proceedings existed to toll the prescriptive period. The dissenting opinions of Justices Carpio and Brion addressed this question but did not form part of the majority's ratio decidendi.

• Prescription of offenses under special laws — Under Section 11 of RA 3019, all offenses punishable under the Act prescribe in fifteen years. The prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. A preliminary investigation conducted by an entity lacking authority to do so is void ab initio and produces no legal effect in tolling prescription. The general rule that commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period does not apply where the investigating body acted without jurisdiction, as a void proceeding cannot be accorded any legal effect.

• Void ab initio proceedings incurable by amendment — Where an original information is void ab initio for having been filed by an entity without authority, it cannot be cured or resurrected by mere amendment. The rule that amendment retroacts to the time of filing the original complaint does not apply when the original information is void ab initio. A new preliminary investigation must be undertaken, and evidence must again be adduced before a new information can be filed.

• Stare decisis — Where the premises and issues are substantially identical to a prior ruling, the Court is bound to follow its own precedent. The Court applied its ruling in Romualdez vs. Marcelo, which involved the same respondent and substantially the same facts, to conclude that prescription had set in.

• "The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation." — This passage states the controlling rule on what constitutes a valid interruption of the prescriptive period for RA 3019 violations, distinguishing proceedings by the competent office from those conducted by an unauthorized body.

• "After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court." — This establishes the principle that proceedings conducted without authority are legally inexistent and cannot produce any effect, including the tolling of prescription.

• "Clearly, following stare decisis, private respondent's claim of prescription has merit, similar in premises as it is to the situation in Marcelo." — This passage articulates the Court's reliance on stare decisis as the basis for granting the second motion for reconsideration and dismissing the petition.

• Romualdez vs. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, 28 July 2006, 497 SCRA 89 — Controlling precedent. The Court held on substantially identical facts — same respondent, same charges, same void PCGG investigation — that prescription had set in because the PCGG's preliminary investigation was void ab initio and could not toll the prescriptive period. The majority in the present case applied this ruling under stare decisis.
• Cruz, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94595, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 474 — Established that the PCGG's investigatory power extends only to ill-gotten wealth cases, absent prior presidential authority to investigate graft and corruption cases involving Marcos cronies. This ruling underpins the conclusion that the PCGG's preliminary investigation was void ab initio.
• SEC vs. Interport, G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008 — Distinguished. The Court found that SEC investigative proceedings tolled prescription because no taint of invalidity attached to the SEC's authority, unlike the PCGG proceedings which were void for want of authority.
• Salvador vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 135249, 16 January 2004 — Cited for the rule that the prescriptive period for RA 3019 violations is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or initiates its investigation.
• People vs. Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 310 — Cited for the rule on computing prescriptive periods under RA 3019, including the transition from the ten-year to the fifteen-year prescriptive period following the 1982 amendment.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the offense with which Romualdez was charged: causing undue injury to any party, including the government, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Sandiganbayan initially quashed the information for insufficiency, but the Supreme Court's 23 July 2008 Decision found grave abuse of discretion in that quashal. The present Resolution did not revisit this issue, as it resolved the case on prescription.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 3019 — Provides that all offenses punishable under the Act shall prescribe in fifteen years. Applied to determine that the prescriptive period had lapsed, as the Ombudsman's preliminary investigation commenced more than fifteen years after the alleged commission of the offense.
• Section 2, Act No. 3326 — Governs the computation of prescriptive periods for offenses penalized by special laws. Provides that prescription begins to run from the day of commission (or discovery if unknown) and is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. Applied in determining the prescriptive period, though the majority resolved the case on the ground that no valid proceedings existed to interrupt prescription.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. The majority did not rule on its suppletory applicability to special laws; Justice Carpio's dissent argued it should apply suppletorily pursuant to Article 10 of the RPC.
• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the RPC shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter specially provide the contrary. Invoked in Justice Carpio's dissent to argue for the suppletory application of Article 91 to RA 3019 and Act No. 3326.
• Section 15, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the State's right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. The People invoked this provision, but the majority did not rely on it in resolving the prescription issue.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo de Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, and Lucas P. Bersamin concurred in the result. Justices Carpio and Brion filed separate dissenting opinions, dissenting from the majority's reasoning while concurring in the dismissal of the petition — though on different grounds.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Justice Carpio dissented, arguing that prescription had not set in because Article 91 of the RPC, which tolls the prescriptive period when the offender is absent from the Philippines, should apply suppletorily to RA 3019 pursuant to Article 10 of the RPC. He contended that the silence of Act No. 3326 on the effect of the offender's absence should not be interpreted as excluding that tolling rule, but rather as calling for the suppletory application of the RPC. He maintained that an accused should not acquire legal immunity by fleeing the State's jurisdiction, and that allowing the prescriptive period to run while the accused is abroad unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused. He rejected the majority's reliance on People vs. Moran as authority for the proposition that prescription runs while the accused is abroad, noting that the legislature had rejected that approach by enacting Article 91 of the RPC in 1930.

• Justice Arturo D. Brion — Justice Brion dissented on two procedural grounds. First, he argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prescription because it was not raised in the People's Rule 65 petition, which was narrowly confined to the grave abuse of discretion attending the Sandiganbayan's quashal of the information. He maintained that Romualdez's invocation of prescription in his comment on the petition was insufficient to vest jurisdiction over that issue, as the nature of a certiorari action is determined by the petitioner's allegations, not the respondent's defenses. Second, he argued that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52 (made applicable via Section 2, Rule 56) of the Rules of Court, and that the majority failed to provide any valid legal or factual basis for suspending the express prohibition. He warned that the majority's arbitrary admission of the prohibited pleading and disregard of jurisdictional rules undermined the immutability of judgments and the rule of law, and risked eroding public trust in the Court.