People vs. Rodriguez

When murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy under P.D. No. 532, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed, and because it is a single indivisible penalty, it must be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

The case arises from the crime of piracy as defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, which amended Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and took effect on August 8, 1974. The decree prescribes graduated penalties for piracy, culminating in the mandatory death penalty when rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof. The four appellants were crew members of M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry owned by Hadji Noria Indasan, which regularly transported traders and crew between ports in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. A separate civil action for breach of contract and damages (Civil Case No. N-85) was pending before the same trial court against the same defendants, which precluded any pronouncement on civil liability in the criminal case.

On August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan, departed from Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel departed for Labuan with several traders and crew members on board. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion erupted inside one of the vessel's cabins.

Three witnesses testified to what they saw and heard. Passenger Clyde Que heard noises inside a cabin followed by gunfire. While rushing to the motor launch to hide, he passed through the engine room and saw appellant Peter Ponce. Appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece, and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, began firing at Que's companions. Que was then brought to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel, later substituted by another passenger named Usman, while Que and other crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan, and Vicente America. At the time, Peter Ponce, armed with an M-14 rifle, stood guard. Passenger Hadji Mahalail Alfad heard commotions from the motor launch followed by gunfire and hid among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez, and Dario Dece descending the stairs while firing, until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit and their bodies fell upon him. When he tried to move, he discovered he had been hit on the right side of his stomach, after which he pretended to be dead until daylight. Skipper Emil Macasaet, Jr. heard the commotion from one of the cabins and ordered his men to open the door, but it would not open. After a while, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them; he hid behind bags of copra until Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and took cover in the bodega of copra, where gunfire from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce continued. About four hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out, and Jaime Rodriguez ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras and dead bodies overboard.

About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four appellants secured pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load nine attaché cases full of money into one of the pumpboats. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunition, gallons of water, some meat, and rifles. On September 2, 1981, the vessel arrived back at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, where Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard and saw ten dead bodies at the wharf, all victims of the sea-jacking.

The four appellants were arrested and detained by Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, National Bureau of Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila, where they executed their respective statements. Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI ₱3,700.00 and ₱1,700.00, respectively, in addition to ₱527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo. The written statements of all appellants (Exhibits "E," "F," "G," "H," "J," and "K") interlocked with each other, each admitting his own participation and that of the other co-accused. The trial court found all four guilty of piracy and sentenced each to suffer the extreme penalty of death, making no pronouncement as to civil liability because of a separate civil action pending before the same court.

• Imposition of Death Penalty Despite Plea of Guilty: Appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez, and Dario Dece argued that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon them despite their plea of guilty, contending that the plea should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance.
• Admissibility of Peter Ponce's Sworn Statements: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in giving weight to the sworn statements of Peter Ponce, identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I" to "I-5," as evidence against him.
• Guilt of Peter Ponce for Piracy: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding Peter Ponce guilty of the crime of piracy.
• Characterization of Peter Ponce's Defense: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that Peter Ponce's defense was merely a denial.
• Entrustment of Money to NBI Counsel: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that Peter Ponce had entrusted ₱1,700.00, his personal money, to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.

• Mandatory Death Penalty Despite Plea of Guilty: Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon appellants who pleaded guilty, notwithstanding the absence of any mitigating effect from such plea.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements: Whether the sworn statements of Peter Ponce (Exhibits "C" to "C-11" and Exhibits "I" to "I-15") were properly admitted in evidence against him.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Piracy Conviction: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Peter Ponce's conviction for the crime of piracy.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the four appellants was sufficiently established.

• Mandatory Death Penalty Despite Plea of Guilty: No. The trial court committed no error. P.D. No. 532 mandates the death penalty when murder or homicide is committed on the occasion of piracy, and Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code requires that a single indivisible penalty be applied regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements: No error. The statements were offered without objection from the defense, and Peter Ponce admitted on cross-examination to the truthfulness of his declarations before the Malaysian authorities in Kudat.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Piracy Conviction: No. The participation of Peter Ponce was positively testified to by the vessel's master Emil Macasaet, Jr. and passenger Hadji Mahalail Alfad, and corroborated by passenger Clyde Que, who saw him armed with an M-14 rifle.
• Conspiracy: Yes. The interlocking written statements of all appellants, each admitting his own participation and that of his co-accused, together with Peter Ponce's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime, established conspiracy beyond doubt.

• Mandatory Death Penalty Despite Plea of Guilty: Presidential Decree No. 532, the Anti-Piracy Law amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribes graduated penalties for piracy: reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods for piracy simpliciter; reclusion perpetua if physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof; and the mandatory penalty of death if rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel. Because the information charged and the evidence established that murder was committed on the occasion of the piracy, the penalty imposable is mandatory death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. A plea of guilty, therefore, could not operate as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the penalty.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements: Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities in Kudat and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation in Manila. When the first statement was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the defense did not object. Moreover, on cross-examination, Ponce admitted that he was investigated by the police authority of Kudat, that he signed the statement, and that what he stated was all the truth. His NBI statement (Exhibit "I") contained a full advisement of his constitutional rights under Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, including the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to free counsel if he could not afford one, to which he responded that he understood his rights and did not need the services of a lawyer. The Court found that he was fully advised of his constitutional rights.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Piracy Conviction: The participation of Peter Ponce was positively testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and by passenger Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Passenger Clyde Que also pointed to having seen Peter Ponce armed with an M-14 rifle. The testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr., who actually saw Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives, and the fact that after the looting and killing Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, left no question that he participated in the commission of the offense. His defense was properly characterized as a mere denial insufficient to overcome the positive identification by multiple eyewitnesses.

• Conspiracy: The written statements of all appellants (Exhibits "E," "F," "G," "H," "J," and "K") interlocked with each other, each admitting his own participation and that of the other co-accused. This interlocking nature of the confessions left no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of Peter Ponce before, during, and after the commission of the crime—standing guard with an M-14 rifle during the hijacking, firing indiscriminately at passengers, and escaping with co-accused Dario Dece on a pumpboat laden with looted items—was a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy. As a consequence, every one of the appellants was responsible for the crime committed.

• Mandatory Indivisible Penalty Doctrine — Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a plea of guilty could not mitigate the mandatory death penalty for piracy with murder under P.D. No. 532, because that penalty is single and indivisible.

• Interlocking Confessions Doctrine — Where the extrajudicial confessions of multiple accused interlock with each other—each admitting his own participation and that of his co-accused—conspiracy is established beyond reasonable doubt, and every conspirator is responsible for the crime committed. The Court relied on the interlocking statements of all four appellants (Exhibits "E," "F," "G," "H," "J," and "K") to confirm conspiracy.

• Admissibility of Unobjected Extrajudicial Statements — Where an extrajudicial statement is offered in evidence without objection from the defense, and the declarant admits on cross-examination to the truthfulness of its contents, the statement is properly admitted and given weight. The Court applied this to Peter Ponce's statement before the Malaysian authorities in Kudat, which was unobjected to and which he affirmed under cross-examination.

• "Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first assigned error: the mandatory death penalty under P.D. No. 532 for piracy with murder is indivisible and cannot be reduced by a plea of guilty.

• "In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed." — This is the Court's quotation of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the statutory basis for disregarding mitigating circumstances when the prescribed penalty is indivisible.

• "Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'J' and 'K'), interlocking as they are with each other as each admits his participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them." — This passage articulates the interlocking confessions doctrine as applied to establish conspiracy among all four appellants.

• "The conduct of appellant Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed." — This defines the Court's application of the principle that conduct before, during, and after the crime demonstrates conspiracy, rendering each conspirator liable for the acts of all.

• People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 — Cited in Justice Teehankee's concurring opinion, not the majority, for the proposition that monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" are insufficient as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to silence and to counsel. The majority did not rely on this precedent.
• Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 — Cited in Justice Teehankee's concurring opinion for the requirement that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel, to assure that the waiver is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. The majority did not rely on this precedent.
• People vs. Itlanas, G.R. No. 60118 (February 28, 1985) — Cited in Justice Teehankee's concurring opinion as the case in which he expressed his separate concurring and dissenting view on the inadequacy of monosyllabic waiver of the right to counsel. The majority did not rely on this precedent.

• Section 3, Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy Law) — Prescribes the penalties for piracy: reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods for piracy; reclusion perpetua if physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof; and the mandatory penalty of death if rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel. The Court applied this provision to impose the mandatory death penalty, as murder was committed on the occasion of the piracy.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. The Court relied on this provision to hold that the plea of guilty could not mitigate the mandatory death penalty.
• Section 20, 1973 Constitution — Guarantees the right to remain silent and the right to counsel during investigation. The Court found that Peter Ponce was fully advised of these rights in his NBI statement (Exhibit "I"), including the right to free counsel if he could not afford one, and that he waived them.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concurred. Fernando, C.J., took no part.

Justice Teehankee concurred separately, agreeing with the judgment of conviction based on sufficient direct evidence and positive identification by eyewitnesses, but took exception to the majority's statement that Peter Ponce "was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel." Teehankee argued that monosyllabic answers of "Yes" and "No" are insufficient as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to silence and to counsel, citing People vs. Caguioa and Morales, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile for the requirement that a waiver of the right to counsel must itself be made with the assistance of counsel.