People vs. Reyes

An amendment to an information changing the date of the alleged commission of the offense by a span of five years, sought after arraignment and plea and only at the start of trial, may be denied as one of substance that prejudices the substantial rights of the accused, notwithstanding that time is not a material ingredient of the crime charged, where the disparity is so great as to surprise the accused and deprive him of the opportunity to defend himself.

Private respondent Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier, was one of four accused charged with qualified theft for the alleged taking and dismantling of a Bedford truck owned by Maria Ignacio-Francisco. The prosecution initially investigated the offense as having been committed in August 1964 and filed a corresponding information in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. A subsequent information was filed in the Circuit Criminal Court charging the same offense but alleging its commission in August 1969. The dispute centers on whether the prosecution could amend that date back to 1964 after the accused had already been arraigned and had pleaded.

Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, charging Narciso Mananing, Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra with the crime of qualified theft allegedly committed in the month of August 1964. The information alleged that Mananing, being the driver of complainant Maria Ignacio-Francisco, together with Alcantara (a repair shop owner), Estrella (a Philippine Constabulary soldier stationed at Bulacan), and Guevarra, all conspiring together, took, stole, and carried away one Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559, Motor No. 2/54/5/6, and Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the amount of ₱23,000.00.

On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City filed a new information (Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Circuit Criminal Court, charging the same four accused with qualified theft but alleging its commission on or about the month of August 1969. This information additionally alleged grave abuse of confidence and that the truck was dismantled. On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned; the court interpreter translated the information into Tagalog for his benefit, and he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the information at that time.

From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the scheduled trial date, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. On May 21, 1970, when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally moved to amend the information so as to change the date of the commission of the offense from August 1969 to August 1964. Private respondent Estrella, having come to court prepared to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in August 1969, vigorously objected. Respondent Judge withheld ruling on the motion and instead required the prosecution to present its first witness, Florentino Alcantara, who had been discharged as a co-accused and testified that the offense was committed in 1964. The defense refused to cross-examine Alcantara, asked that his testimony be stricken off for referring to an offense not mentioned in the information, and demanded a ruling on the motion to amend.

Respondent Judge required both parties to submit memoranda and thereafter issued the contested order of July 10, 1970, denying the prosecution's verbal motion to amend on the ground that the amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, citing People vs. Placido Opemia. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration argued that time was not a material ingredient of qualified theft and that Placido Opemia was inapplicable. The respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration on September 14, 1970, stating that the prosecution's honest mistake in the information could not prevail over the substantial rights of the accused under constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction on September 24, 1970, enjoining further proceedings.

• Time as Non-Material Ingredient: Petitioner argued that the time or date of the commission of the offense is not a material ingredient of the crime of qualified theft, and therefore the amendment changing the date from August 1969 to August 1964 should be allowed as one of form rather than substance.
• Inapplicability of Precedent: Petitioner maintained that the case of People vs. Placido Opemia, relied upon by the trial court for denying the motion to amend, was not applicable to the present case.

• Substantial Rights of the Accused: Respondent judge countered that the amendment could not be made without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused, as the five-year disparity between 1964 and 1969 would surprise the accused who had prepared to defend against a 1969 charge.
• Prosecution's Mistake Cannot Prevail Over Constitutional Rights: Respondent argued that the prosecution's honest mistake in filing the information with the wrong date could not prevail over the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against them.

• Amendment of Information: Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the prosecution's verbal motion to amend the information by changing the date of the alleged commission of the offense from August 1969 to August 1964, on the ground that it would impair the substantial rights of the accused.

• Amendment of Information: No. The respondent court did not abuse its discretion. The five-year disparity between 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense, and permitting the amendment after arraignment and only at the start of trial would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights, contrary to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

• Amendment of Information: Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an information may be amended only as to matters of form after arraignment and plea when the same can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. While it is generally held that the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, this latitude does not license the prosecution to be careless about fixing the date or to make the allegation so indefinite as to prejudice the accused. The prosecution may allege an approximation of time, but it cannot prove any date so remote or far removed from the given approximate date as to surprise and prejudice the accused. In People vs. Placido Opemia, a nearly five-year variance between the date alleged in the information and the date proved at trial was held to be unfair to the accused, violating their constitutional right to be informed of the specific charge and depriving them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The same principle governs here: the disparity of five years between 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation of one and the same offense. Estrella was investigated for a 1964 offense, charged for a 1969 offense, pleaded not guilty to the latter, and was then sought to be tried for the 1964 offense. The prosecution had ample opportunity to correct its error—during arraignment on January 28, 1970, and during the more than three months before the May 21, 1970 trial date—but failed to do so. To permit the verbal amendment at the start of trial would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights.

• Amendment of Information After Arraignment — Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, after the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded, the information may be amended only as to matters of form, and only when the amendment can be made without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. An amendment that changes the date of the alleged commission of the offense by a span of five years is not a mere formal amendment but one of substance, because the disparity is so great as to defy approximation of one and the same offense and would surprise the accused.
• Approximation of Time in Informations — While the precise date of the commission of an offense need not be stated in the information except when time is a material ingredient, the prosecution may not prove a date so remote or far removed from the approximate date alleged as to surprise and prejudice the accused. The prosecuting officer may not be careless about fixing the date or make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to an omission.

• "The disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense." — This passage articulates the core rationale for why the amendment was properly denied: the five-year gap rendered the dates incapable of being treated as approximations of the same transaction.
• "While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing." — This defines the limits of the rule on approximation of time in informations, balancing prosecutorial flexibility against the accused's right to be informed.
• "To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights." — This states the decisive conclusion tying the prosecution's delay and the magnitude of the date change to the constitutional prejudice suffered by the accused.

• People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court applied its holding that a variance of nearly five years between the date alleged in the information and the date proved at trial is unfair to the accused, violating their constitutional right to be informed of the specific charge and depriving them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The trial court relied on this case, and the Supreme Court affirmed its applicability.
• U.S. vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421, 426 — Cited for the proposition that while the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information except when time is a material ingredient, the prosecuting officer may not be careless about fixing the date or make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to an omission.

• Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Governs the amendment of informations after arraignment and plea, permitting amendment only as to matters of form when it can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. Applied to hold that changing the date of the alleged offense by five years after arraignment was not a matter of form but of substance prejudicial to the accused.
• Constitutional Right of the Accused to Be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation — Invoked as the underlying constitutional basis for protecting the accused from being surprised by evidence of an offense committed at a time substantially different from that alleged in the information.

• Fernandez, J. — Concurred. (Designated to sit in the Second Division in lieu of Justice Ramon C. Aquino, who took no part.)
• Abad Santos, J. — Concurred.
• De Castro, J. — Concurred.
• Barredo (Chairman), J. — Concurred separately, noting that the decision cannot bar another prosecution of private respondent under another information charging theft committed in 1964.