People vs. Remollino

Successive acts of shooting different victims at short intervals constitute as many separate homicides as there are victims, not a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, where each death results from a distinct shot and not from a single act.

Trizon Remollino alias Eming was accused under an information charging multiple murder committed on the evening of March 13, 1958 in Barrio Bacag, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan. Armed with a carbine, Serial No. 6791173, he willfully fired at and shot successively and at short interval Isabelo Nozuelo, Carlos Nozuelo, Francisco Sepnio, Jacinto Sepnio, Santos Moreno and Epifanio Bascos, inflicting mortal wounds on different parts of their bodies and causing their deaths.

Before arraignment, the accused through counsel offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of multiple homicide. The trial court permitted the plea and, on that basis, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sextuple homicides. For each and every one of three homicidal acts, an indeterminate penalty of not less than eight years of prision mayor to not more than fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal was imposed, with the proviso that in no case would the accused suffer more than the maximum total of forty years under paragraph 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. The heirs of each of the six deceased were awarded P4,000.00 indemnity, with costs against the accused, the trial court refraining from imposing further penalties for the three other deceased in view of the prohibition in paragraph 4, Article 70.

The record as admitted by the plea established that appellant alone killed all six victims, one after the other, with one shot each, through six separate acts.

• Complex Crime: Appellant argued that Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code on penalty for complex crimes should have been applied, such that only the penalty for the most serious crime in its maximum period would be imposed.
• Separate Penalties: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in imposing three separate penalties for the several homicides charged in the information.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Appellant contended that, had the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and obfuscation been appreciated, the penalty should have been reduced by one degree pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Complex Crime: Whether successive shootings killing six persons at short intervals constitute a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Separate Penalties: Whether three, and ultimately six, separate penalties for homicide may be imposed instead of a single penalty for a complex crime.
• Mitigation of Penalty: Whether plea of guilty and obfuscation required reduction of the penalty by one degree under Article 64, paragraph 5.

• Complex Crime: No. Article 48 was inapplicable because the six deaths resulted from six separate acts, not from a single act constituting two or more felonies.
• Separate Penalties: Yes. Each distinct homicidal act directed against a different victim constituted a separate crime punishable separately, subject to the forty-year maximum under Article 70, paragraph 4.
• Mitigation of Penalty: No. No reduction by one degree was warranted, the imposed penalty already being within the minimum and no evidence having been offered to prove obfuscation aside from the plea of guilty.

• Complex Crime: Article 48 applies only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the other. From the admitted allegations, appellant shot six persons successively and at short intervals, with each death the result of a separate shot. A single shot killing several victims, such as killing two persons at the same moment with a single stroke of the bolo or with a single shot, was absent. Accordingly, the killings could not plausibly be characterized as one act.
• Separate Penalties: Where acts are wholly different and directed against different persons, as when firing twice in succession to kill one and wound another, or killing two persons one after the other by different acts even from a single criminal impulse, distinct crimes are committed. The cited jurisprudence uniformly sustained separate punishment for successive shots, successive wounds, and successive killings, including firing at a crowd producing multiple deaths. The Lawas ruling imposing only a complex crime for about fifty deaths was treated as an exception resting on peculiar circumstances — killings under a leader's order to fire and to stop, with no evidence of the number killed by each appellant and no means of ascertaining individual responsibility — inapplicable where appellant alone killed all six victims one after the other with one shot each.
• Mitigation of Penalty: The maximum of fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal imposed for each homicide was within the minimum of the penalty fixed for the crime, there being no aggravating circumstance, logically indicating appreciation of the plea of guilty. Obfuscation was not established because appellant offered no evidence to prove any other mitigating circumstance than the plea of guilty.

• Complex crime under Article 48 — A complex crime exists only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, in which case the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Applied here, successive shots killing different victims at short intervals did not satisfy the single-act requisite and therefore did not constitute a complex crime.
• Separate offenses for distinct homicidal acts — When homicides result from wholly different acts directed against different persons, even if committed successively or impelled by a single criminal impulse, each killing is a distinct and separately punishable crime. Applied here, six successive shootings producing six deaths yielded six separate homicides, illustrated by precedents involving successive revolver shots, successive bolo wounds, and firing into a crowd.
• Lawas exception — Where multiple killings result from a single impulse in obedience to an order to fire, firing ceases on order to stop, and the individual deaths caused by each accused cannot be ascertained, the accused may be found guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide punished in the maximum. The exception was distinguished and not applied where the lone appellant demonstrably killed each of the six victims with a separate shot.
• Three-fold rule — Under paragraph 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum total penalty for multiple penalties shall not exceed forty years. Applied here, separate penalties for each homicide were imposed but capped so the accused would not suffer more than forty years, with the trial court's limitation to three stated penalties corrected to cover all six homicides.

• "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period" — States the statutory text of Article 48, as amended, against which the claim of complex crime was measured and rejected.
• "But when the acts are wholly different, not only to themselves, but also because they were directed against two different persons, as when one fires his revolver twice in succession, killing one person and wounding another (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil., 56), or when two persons are killed one after the other, by different acts, although these killing were the result of a single criminal impulse (People vs. Alfinado, 47 Phil., 1), the different acts must be considered as distinct crimes." — Articulates the controlling distinction between a single act and diverse acts directed at different victims.
• "According to said Article in order that the crime may be considered double homicide it is necessary that it be the result of a single act, as in the case of killing two persons at the same moment with the single stroke of the bolo or with a single shot." — Gives the canonical illustration of the single-act requirement for double or multiple homicide as a complex crime.
• "So even if we were induced to hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by him, it is impossible to ascertain the individual death caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the appellants guilty of only one offense, that of multiple homicide, for which penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum" — Explains why People vs. Lawas was confined to its peculiar facts and not extended to successive killings by a single identified gunman.

• People vs. Jose Pardo, et al., 79 Phil. 568 — Cited as authority that two murders by different shots, evidenced by separate bullet trajectories and wounds, do not constitute a complex crime.
• People vs. Layos, 60 Phil. 232 — Followed for the rule that double homicide requires a single act such as one bolo stroke or one shot killing two persons at the same moment; successive killings are two separate murders.
• People vs. Meliton Buyco, 80 Phil. 58 — Cited, including Spanish Supreme Court judgments, for the principle that successive pistol shots directed at different persons are diverse acts punishable separately.
• People vs. Basarain, G.R. No. L-6690, May 24, 1955 — Cited for holding that firing at a crowd and continuing to fire, killing two and wounding one, produced three separate crimes.
• People vs. Ordonio, 82 Phil. 324 — Cited for the rule that victims killed by different and separate sets of shots through independent acts aimed exclusively at each victim give rise to separate murders.
• People vs. Lawas, G.R. Nos. L-7618-7620 — Distinguished as an exception based on a single impulse under orders and inability to attribute particular deaths to particular appellants.
• U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56 — Cited for the proposition that firing twice in succession to kill one person and wound another constitutes distinct crimes.
• People vs. Alfinado, 47 Phil. 1 — Cited for the proposition that killing two persons one after the other by different acts remains distinct crimes despite a single criminal impulse.
• People vs. Matela, 58 Phil. 718 — Cited for the proposition that raping and thereafter killing the victim are two distinct offenses punishable separately.
• People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 — Cited through People vs. Layos as concluding guilt for two separate crimes of murder rather than a complex crime.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for complex crimes where a single act constitutes two or more felonies or one offense is a necessary means for another; held inapplicable because six deaths came from six separate shots.
• Article 70, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Limits the total of multiple penalties to a maximum of forty years; applied to cap the separate homicide penalties and to explain the trial court's initial limitation to three stated penalties.
• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Governs application of penalties with mitigating circumstances; invoked by appellant for a one-degree reduction based on plea of guilty and obfuscation, but reduction was denied for lack of proof of obfuscation and because the penalty imposed was already within the minimum.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ., concur.