People vs. Relova

The Court held that under the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance bars a subsequent prosecution under a national statute for the same act. Where the acts constituting the offense under the ordinance and the offense under the statute are so related in time, space, and intent as to form an integral whole, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy applies.

On February 1, 1975, police discovered unauthorized electrical wiring and devices installed within the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage, designed to decrease electric meter readings. Private respondent Manuel Opulencia admitted to the installations to lower his electric bill. An information was filed in the City Court of Batangas City for violation of a city ordinance regulating electrical installations. This case was dismissed on April 6, 1976, on the ground of prescription, as the offense was a light felony that prescribes in two months. Fourteen days later, an information for theft of electric power under the Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas for the same period of conduct.

From November 1974 to February 1975, Manuel Opulencia caused the installation of unauthorized electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant to fraudulently decrease electric meter readings. He admitted this purpose in a written statement. A first information charged him with violating a Batangas City ordinance penalizing unauthorized electrical installations. That case was dismissed by the City Court on the ground of prescription. A second information was then filed in the Court of First Instance, charging theft of electric power under the Revised Penal Code for the same period and conduct.

• Petitioner argued that the offense under the city ordinance (unauthorized installation) and the offense under the Revised Penal Code (theft) are distinct offenses with different essential elements.
• The ordinance is a regulatory measure aimed at ensuring safe installations, while theft requires intent to gain and taking of personal property without consent.
• Theft of electricity can be committed without illegal installations, proving the offenses are not identical.
• Therefore, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy for the same offense does not apply.

• Respondent maintained that the dismissal of the first case constituted an acquittal and barred the second prosecution.
• The second sentence of the double jeopardy provision protects against prosecution for the same act under both a law and an ordinance.
• The acts charged in both informations—the unauthorized installations to defraud the city of electric current—constitute the same act or continuous course of conduct.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus was the proper remedy to assail the trial court's order quashing the information.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the filing of the second information for theft placed the accused twice in jeopardy for the same act, in violation of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution.

• Procedural: The Court did not explicitly rule on the propriety of the remedy but proceeded to decide the substantive issue, implicitly treating the petition as properly raising the constitutional question.
• Substantive: The Court ruled in favor of the private respondent. It held that the dismissal of the ordinance violation case, based on prescription, amounted to an acquittal. Applying the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution and the precedent in Yap v. Lutero, the Court found that the acts charged in both informations—the unauthorized installations performed with the continuous intent to defraud the city of electric current from November 1974 to February 1975—constituted the "same act." Therefore, the subsequent prosecution for theft was barred by double jeopardy. The Court remanded the case for determination of civil liability only.

• Double Jeopardy for the "Same Act" (Second Sentence, Article IV [22], 1973 Constitution) — This provision states that if an act is punished by both a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars prosecution for the same act under the other. The Court applied this by examining the identity of the acts charged, not the identity of the offenses. It found that the unauthorized installations and the theft of current were an integral whole, motivated by a single fraudulent intent and occurring within the same time frame, thus constituting the same act.

• "The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts." — This passage clarifies the controlling test under the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision.
• "The 'taking' of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices." — This finding was crucial in determining that the acts formed an inseparable whole for double jeopardy purposes.
• "Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case." — This illustrates the Court's reluctance but strict adherence to constitutional mandate.

• Yap v. Lutero — Cited as controlling authority interpreting the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision. The Court followed its holding that prosecution under a city ordinance for reckless driving barred a subsequent prosecution under a national statute for serious physical injuries arising from the same reckless act.

• Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution — The constitutional provision on double jeopardy, particularly its second sentence prohibiting successive prosecutions under a law and an ordinance for the same act.
• Article 308, in relation to Article 309(1), Revised Penal Code — The statutory basis for the crime of theft charged in the second information.
• Article 89, Revised Penal Code — Cited to establish that prescription of the crime totally extinguishes criminal liability, and a dismissal on this ground operates as an acquittal.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that an order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground of prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.