People vs. Raymundo

A pharmacy clerk who prepares and dispenses one medicine for another under a false name, whether through negligence, accident, or mistake, is criminally liable under Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code in connection with Section 2676 thereof, and such offense prescribes after four years pursuant to Act No. 3326 as amended by Act No. 3585.

Silvino Belarmino had been suffering from a disease for which Dr. Antonio G. Sison prescribed a formula containing spartein sulphate, phenobarbital, and carbromal. Belarmino initially had the prescription filled at the Universal Drug Store in Manila. When his symptoms recurred, he sought to have the same prescription refilled at the Escudero Drug Store in San Pablo, Laguna, managed by Dr. Leon Castillo, a friend and former classmate of Belarmino. Nena Tanalega Raymundo was employed at the Escudero Drug Store as a pharmacy clerk; she was a pharmacy graduate but had not yet passed the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners. The pharmacist of the drug store, Saturnino Gesmundo Cortes, was absent at the relevant time.

For some time prior to February 18, 1941, Silvino Belarmino had been suffering from a certain disease for which Dr. Antonio G. Sison prescribed a formula consisting of spartein sulphate (1.00), phenobarbital (0.50), and carbromal (5.00), to be divided into fifteen capsules, taken one per day. Belarmino initially had the prescription filled at the Universal Drug Store in Manila, where the medicine was contained in a bottle on which the prescription was written (Exhibit C). After taking the medicine, his health somewhat improved. When the symptoms recurred, following Dr. Sison's instructions to continue taking the medicine, Belarmino copied the prescription (Exhibit 2) and, on the morning of February 18, 1941, presented it to the Escudero Drug Store in San Pablo, Laguna. He asked Dr. Leon Castillo, the manager of the drug store and a friend of the complainant, whether they could prepare the medicine, having failed to secure it at other drug stores in the locality. Doctor Castillo answered in the affirmative, and Belarmino requested that only one-third of the formula be prepared for P1, as the whole formula cost P3. Doctor Castillo wrote "1/3 f." on Exhibit 2. There was some doubt as to the figure appearing after the word "carbromal" on Exhibit 2, and Belarmino asked Doctor Castillo to check it; Castillo corrected the figure by writing "5" in ink over the figure "6" appearing after "carbromal." Belarmino proposed to return in the afternoon with the bottle marked Exhibit C to verify the figure, and he did so at about two o'clock.

The pharmacist of the drug store, Saturnino Gesmundo Cortes, was then in his house. Doctor Castillo sent for Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was employed as a pharmacy clerk. Raymundo was already a pharmacy graduate but had not yet taken and passed the government examination conducted by the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners; she had worked as a pharmacy clerk in different drug stores in Manila before her employment at the Escudero Drug Store. Before Raymundo's arrival, Doctor Castillo took two bottles from the shelves and a cardboard box and placed them on the dispensation table. Raymundo then prepared the balance, computed the formula to reduce it to one-third, and proceeded to compound the medicine, using, among others, the substances contained in the two bottles. The compounded medicine was placed in five capsules and delivered by Doctor Castillo to Belarmino in a cardboard box (Exhibit B), for which Belarmino paid P1.

At about five o'clock that afternoon, Belarmino took one of the capsules with a glass of water and left his house for a walk. About twenty minutes later, he became ill — feeling dizzy, having difficulty in breathing, and finding his knees too shaky to stand. He immediately consulted Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes, the latter advising him to go home and rest. About two hours afterward, Belarmino's legs began to stiffen, his stomach to harden, his lips to draw back, and his tongue to shrink to his throat; he could not talk and believed he was in serious condition. His family sent for Dr. Reyes, who advised rubbing his body with hot water, which produced some relief after he had urinated. The following day, Dr. Reyes returned, and Belarmino showed him the remaining four capsules; Dr. Reyes advised him not to take any more of them.

Believing something was wrong with the medicine, Belarmino sent two of the four capsules (Exhibits E-2 and E-3) to the Bureau of Science for examination on February 24, 1941. The chemist Eusebio Gutierrez of the Institute of Hygiene analyzed the contents and submitted a report dated March 15, 1941 (Exhibit D), showing that instead of spartein sulphate as called for in the prescription, strychnine sulphate — a highly poisonous substance — had been used, with 50.5 milligrams in one capsule and 61.75 milligrams in the other. On March 26, 1941, Belarmino consulted Dr. Sison in Manila and informed him of the symptoms; Dr. Sison told him he had been a victim of poisoning. Expert testimony established that 50.5 milligrams of strychnine sulphate was sufficient to cause death, had not phenobarbital and carbromal — also present in the mixture — diminished the deadly effect of the strychnine.

On September 12, 1941, Belarmino caused the filing of an information against Dr. Leon Castillo and Nena Tanalega Raymundo. The pharmacist, Saturnino Gesmundo Cortes, was not included because he was not in the drug store at the time the prescription was compounded, although it had been the practice for the pharmacist to be present whenever Raymundo compounded any prescription. The CFI Laguna acquitted Dr. Castillo on the ground of reasonable doubt but found Raymundo guilty of frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence. The Court of Appeals of Southern Luzon modified the conviction to slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence and imposed a fine of P200. Raymundo filed a motion for reconsideration, raising, among other grounds, the defense of prescription — that the information was filed seven months after the alleged offense, exceeding the two-month prescriptive period for slight physical injuries under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Prescription of the Offense: Petitioner argued that even assuming she were guilty of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, the corresponding action should have been instituted within two months as prescribed under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, and since the alleged offense was committed on February 18, 1941, and the information was filed only on September 12, 1941 — seven months afterward — the criminal action had already prescribed.
• Incompatibility of Frustrated Felony with Reckless Imprudence: Petitioner maintained that a frustrated felony cannot be committed through reckless imprudence, as intent is an essential element of frustrated offenses.
• Absence of Proximate Cause and Material Damage: Petitioner contended that no material damage had been caused and that the relation of proximate cause to effect had not been proved, as no specimen had been taken from the contents of the complainant's stomach for chemical examination and analysis.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that it had not been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the ailments suffered by the offended party were due to the capsules purchased from the drug store, and that there was no evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had given strychnine.
• Due Process: Petitioner claimed she had been sentenced without due process of law for an offense not specified in the information.
• Non-Existence of "Correctional Offense": Petitioner asserted that under the law there is no such thing as a correctional offense, and that the light offense found by the Court of Appeals had already prescribed.

• Frustrated Felony Through Imprudence: Whether a frustrated felony can be committed through reckless imprudence.
• Prescription: Whether the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence had prescribed under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Conviction Under a Different Law: Whether the appellant could be convicted of a violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code when the information charged her under the Revised Penal Code.
• Liability Under the Pharmacy Law: Whether the preparation of one medicine for another under a false name constitutes a violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code.

• Frustrated Felony Through Imprudence: No. The offense of frustrated homicide requires the concurrence of intent to kill, which is incompatible with reckless imprudence.
• Prescription: Yes. The offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence had prescribed, as the information was filed seven months after the alleged offense, exceeding the two-month prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Conviction Under a Different Law: Yes. The violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code was deemed necessarily included in the allegations of the information, and the appellant had ample opportunity to defend herself.
• Liability Under the Pharmacy Law: Yes. The preparation of one medicine for another by a pharmacy clerk under a false name, whether through negligence, accident, or mistake, is punishable under Section 751 in connection with Section 2676 of the Revised Administrative Code.

• Frustrated Felony Through Imprudence: The judgment of conviction for frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence was untenable because the essential requisite of intent to kill is incompatible with a charge of reckless imprudence. While a charge for physical injuries — serious or less serious — through reckless imprudence is legally proper, because in that case the act sought to be punished is the material damage or injury actually done, a frustrated offense presupposes intent to bring about the result, which is absent in culpable imprudence. The Court cited Spanish jurisprudence (Sentencia de 15 de diciembre, 1883) for this proposition.

• Prescription: The Court acknowledged that the legal question raised by counsel for the appellant regarding prescription was "quite plausible" and that the appellant "would appear to be entitled to a judgment of acquittal" under the Revised Penal Code. The offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence prescribes in two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the alleged offense was committed on February 18, 1941, and the information was filed on September 12, 1941 — seven months afterward — the criminal action for that offense had prescribed.

• Conviction Under a Different Law: The Court avoided the bar of prescription by finding the appellant guilty of a violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code in connection with Section 2676 thereof. The Court reasoned that under Rule 116, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a defendant in a criminal case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations made in the information and fully established by the evidence. The information was a detailed one, reproducing the prescription and alleging that the appellant had mixed and compounded a toxic dose of strychnine sulphate instead of the required spartein sulphate. The Court found that the appellant had ample opportunity to defend herself, satisfying the requirements of due process. The offense under Section 751 prescribes after four years pursuant to Act No. 3326, Section 2, as amended by Act No. 3585, and thus had not prescribed.

• Liability Under the Pharmacy Law: The Court held that the offenses penalized under Section 751 may be committed not only by licensed druggists and pharmacists but also by any other person preparing any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name. Although the appellant was only a pharmacy clerk and not a licensed pharmacist, she was a pharmacy graduate who had worked as a pharmacy clerk in several drug stores. The Court emphasized that the profession of pharmacy demands the highest degree of care, and that a druggist's mistake in furnishing one drug for another is negligence of the gravest kind. Citing United States vs. Pineda, the Court declared that the delivery of one drug for another is tantamount to dispensing medicine under a fraudulent name. The prescription called for spartein sulphate, but the medicine compounded by the appellant contained strychnine sulphate — a highly poisonous substance. The Court concluded that the preparation of one medicine for another under a false name, whether through negligence, accident, or mistake, is punishable under the law.

• Incompatibility of Intent with Reckless Imprudence — A frustrated felony cannot be committed through reckless imprudence because the essential requisite of intent is incompatible with imprudence. A charge for physical injuries through reckless imprudence is proper because the act punished is the material damage or injury actually done.

• Included Offense Doctrine — A defendant in a criminal case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations made in the information and fully established by the evidence, pursuant to Rule 116, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this doctrine to convict the appellant of a violation of the Pharmacy Law despite the information having charged her under the Revised Penal Code.

• Druggist's Highest Degree of Care — The profession of pharmacy demands the highest degree of care known to practical men. A druggist's mistake in furnishing one drug for another is negligence of the gravest kind, and such mistake cannot be countenanced or tolerated, whether it be through negligence, accident, or mistake. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved.

• Prescription of Offenses Under Special Laws — The prescriptive period for offenses penalized under special laws is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585. A violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code prescribes after four years, distinct from the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code.

• "The law cannot countenance or tolerate or condone any negligence or act of negligence on their part." — The Court's declaration of the standard of accountability for pharmacists and pharmacy clerks, underscoring that the protection of human life and health demands exacting vigilance in the dispensation of medicine.

• "In reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense." — A canonical formulation of the druggist's strict liability standard, frequently cited for the proposition that a pharmacist's error in dispensing the wrong drug constitutes negligence per se.

• "The Court declares that the preparation of one medicine for another, by a pharmacy clerk, under a false name, whether it be through negligence, accident or mistake, is punishable under the law." — The ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that the substitution of one drug for another is punishable under the Pharmacy Law regardless of the absence of fraudulent intent.

• "It is an elementary rule of criminal jurisprudence that the defendant in a criminal case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations made in the information, and fully established by the evidence." — The Court's invocation of the included offense doctrine as the procedural basis for convicting the appellant under the Administrative Code despite the information charging an offense under the Revised Penal Code.

• United States vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 456 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court held that delivering one drug (barium chlorate) for another (potassium chlorate) was tantamount to selling a drug under a fraudulent name, punishable under Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court applied the same reasoning to the instant case, finding that the substitution of strychnine sulphate for spartein sulphate constituted the same offense.

• Tombari vs. Connors, 85 Conn. 235 [1912] — Persuasive American authority cited for the proposition that druggists must exercise the highest practical degree of prudence and vigilance, so that human life may not be exposed to the danger of substituting deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

• Fleet vs. Hollenkemp, 56 Am. Dec. 563 [1852] — Persuasive authority cited for the rule that a druggist who sends one drug for another cannot escape responsibility on the pretext of an accidental or innocent mistake; the mistake is negligence of the gravest kind.

• Smith's Admrx. vs. Middelton, 56 L.R.A. 484 [1902] — Persuasive authority cited for the proposition that one who holds himself out as competent to handle dangerous drugs cannot be heard to say that furnishing a deadly drug for a harmless one is not gross negligence.

• Tessymond's Case, 1 Lewin C.C. 169 [1828] — Persuasive authority cited for the rule that apothecaries guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues may be held guilty of manslaughter.

• Section 751, Revised Administrative Code (1940 ed.) — Provides that every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale, and makes it unlawful for any person to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug. The Court applied this provision to hold the appellant liable for preparing strychnine sulphate instead of spartein sulphate.

• Section 2676, Revised Administrative Code — Penalizes violations of the Pharmacy Law with a fine not exceeding P500, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. The Court imposed a fine of P200 pursuant to this section.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the periods for prescription of penalties. The Court found that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence prescribes in two months under this article, and since the information was filed seven months after the offense, the action had prescribed.

• Act No. 3326, Section 2, as amended by Act No. 3585 — Governs the prescription of offenses penalized under special laws. The Court held that a violation of Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code prescribes after four years under this Act, and thus the defense of prescription could not be successfully raised.

• Rule 116, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that a defendant may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations of the information and established by the evidence. The Court relied on this rule to convict the appellant of a Pharmacy Law violation despite the information charging an offense under the Revised Penal Code.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concurred.

Hilado, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, adopting by reference his clarification on the validity of judicial proceedings held in Japanese-sponsored courts during the Japanese occupation, as set forth in his concurring opinion in De Castro vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 49158, 75 Phil. 824), and concurred in the result of the majority opinion.

• Paras, J., with whom concurs Ozaeta, J. — Justice Paras argued that the point on prescription was well taken and that the majority, having acknowledged the appellant "would appear to be entitled to a judgment of acquittal" under the Revised Penal Code, circumvented the prescription issue by finding her guilty of a violation of the Pharmacy Law. He expressed serious doubt that the appellant could be convicted of an offense under a different law than that relied upon in the information, characterizing it not as a mere variance under Rule 116 but as a conviction under an entirely different statute. On the facts, Justice Paras argued that the appellant was merely an apprentice, not even a pharmacy clerk, who had no dealings with the offended party; that Dr. Castillo had gathered the ingredients and ordered her to compound them; that the error likely lay in the labeling of the drugs, for which the pharmacist Gesmundo Torres and the manager Dr. Castillo should be held responsible rather than the appellant; and that the appellant's participation was limited to the mechanical act of mixing ingredients already placed on the table by Dr. Castillo.

• Perfecto, J. — Justice Perfecto dissented on two grounds. First, he argued that the appellant was not guilty of violating Section 751 because the essential element of the offense requires that the preparation or sale be made "under any fraudulent name, direction, pretense," and "fraudulent" necessarily implies willful mistake, voluntary error, purposeful falsehood, or malice — antonymous with honesty and good faith. He found absolutely no scintilla of evidence showing any fraudulent act by the appellant, who acted in good faith in complying with Dr. Castillo's orders. He distinguished "false name" from "fraudulent name," the former being merely what is not true, while the latter requires malicious intent. Second, Justice Perfecto argued that the conviction violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy (Article III, Section 1:20, Constitution of the Philippines), as the appellant had already been placed in jeopardy of punishment for frustrated murder, then frustrated homicide, then slight physical injuries, and now for a violation of the Administrative Code — all for the same act. He invoked his participation in the Constitutional Convention to assert that the framers intended that no person be punished more than once for the same criminal act, whether punishable by one or more provisions of law. He further argued that the appellant was the weakest party in the chain of responsibility and was being made a scapegoat while the pharmacist Gesmundo (found guilty by the Board of Pharmacy) and Dr. Castillo (acquitted by the trial court) remained unpunished.