People vs. Ramos

Relationship and minority of the victim in rape cases under Republic Act No. 7659 are special qualifying circumstances that must be specifically alleged in the information; their non-allegation bars conviction of qualified rape and imposition of the death penalty, limiting the conviction to simple rape punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused, Feliciano Ramos, was the father of complainant Elizabeth T. Ramos, who was 14 years old at the time of the incident. The prosecution arose under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which introduced seven new attendant circumstances that increase the penalty for rape to death, including when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent. The information filed against the accused charged only simple rape through force and intimidation, with the additional allegation that the victim was 14 years old, but did not allege the relationship between the accused and the victim.

The accused, Feliciano Ramos, was the father of complainant Elizabeth T. Ramos, a 14-year-old girl residing with her family at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. One night in April 1995, the family was sleeping in their house. Complainant's mother and youngest sister slept inside the lone bedroom, while complainant, her brother, two other sisters, and her father—the accused—slept outside the room in an adjoining area. Complainant woke up when the accused carried her brother and two sisters and transferred them to another part of the house. After lying down beside complainant, the accused held both her hands, undressed her, removed his own clothes, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Complainant could only wail as the assault occurred, while her siblings continued sleeping nearby. The accused warned her not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill her.

From that night onward, the accused repeated the sexual abuse against his daughter on several occasions. The abuse would not have been discovered had complainant not suffered an abortion of the fetus she was carrying. On the night of September 4, 1995, experiencing profuse vaginal bleeding, complainant went to the clinic of Dr. Feliciano U. Nario, an obstetrician and gynecologist, who found after examination that she was pregnant. Due to heavy bleeding, she was transferred to Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, where after a caesarian section she delivered a dead male fetus.

A criminal complaint for rape was filed by Elizabeth on October 16, 1995. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest, but it was returned unserved because the accused had changed his residence to Tuao, Cagayan. An information for simple rape was filed on February 1, 1996, alleging that the accused, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, had sexual intercourse with Elizabeth, a minor of 14 years, against her will. An alias warrant was issued, and the accused was arrested on March 29, 1996 at Barangay Naruanga, Tuao, Cagayan. He was arraigned on April 19, 1996 and pleaded not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented complainant's testimony narrating the sexual assault. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach complainant by pointing out inconsistencies between her court testimony and her sworn statement during the preliminary investigation: (1) she testified the rape occurred at nighttime but stated in the affidavit it was daytime; (2) she was uncertain who accompanied her to the doctor; and (3) she testified her siblings were present but stated in the affidavit they were at their grandparents' house. The cross-examination was suspended when complainant broke down uncontrollably in court. On the scheduled resumption on November 20, 1996, the accused manifested his desire to change his plea to guilty. After the court explained the consequences of a plea to a capital offense and the information was read and translated to him in Ilocano, he entered a plea of guilty. The defense then presented SPO4 Samuel Aban, the arresting officer, to establish the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Aban testified that he approached the accused, showed him the warrant, confirmed his identity, and the accused "went with him." The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

• Credibility of Complainant: Appellant assailed the credibility of complainant by referring to inconsistencies between her testimony in open court and her sworn statement during the preliminary investigation, arguing that these discrepancies undermined her account of the rape.
• Impossibility Due to Pregnancy Timeline: Appellant contended that the rape could not have happened in April 1995 because the prosecution's expert witness estimated complainant was seven to eight months pregnant at the time of examination, which, according to appellant's calculation, meant conception occurred in January to February 1995.
• Impossibility Due to Presence of Others: Appellant argued that rape could not have occurred because complainant's siblings were sleeping beside them at the time of the alleged crime.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Appellant insisted that his plea of guilty, made after the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, should have been appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it was done out of conscience rather than fear of conviction.
• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating Circumstance: Appellant claimed that the lower court should have considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he voluntarily gave himself up when the police officer showed him the warrant of arrest.
• Non-Allegation of Relationship in Information: Appellant asserted that since the fact of relationship was not alleged in the information, only the penalty prescribed for simple rape could be imposed upon him.

• Relationship as Aggravating Circumstance: The Solicitor General argued, consistent with the trial court's reasoning, that relationship in rape cases is a generic aggravating circumstance that does not alter the nature of the crime, and therefore could be appreciated even without being alleged in the information, justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

• Credibility of Testimony: Whether the inconsistencies between complainant's testimony and her sworn affidavit affect her credibility and warrant acquittal.
• Pregnancy Timeline: Whether the expert witness's estimate of the pregnancy timeline renders the rape charge implausible as to the date alleged.
• Possibility of Rape with Others Present: Whether the presence of complainant's siblings nearby makes the rape impossible or incredible.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating: Whether appellant's plea of guilty, entered after the prosecution presented its evidence, qualifies as a mitigating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating: Whether appellant's act of going with the arresting officer upon being shown the warrant constitutes voluntary surrender warranting appreciation as a mitigating circumstance.
• Qualifying Nature of Relationship and Minority: Whether the death penalty may be imposed when the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority of the victim were not alleged in the information.

• Credibility of Testimony: No. The inconsistencies refer only to minor matters and do not touch upon the elements of rape or the identification of the accused; testimony in open court prevails over ex parte affidavits.
• Pregnancy Timeline: No. The doctor was not certain of his estimate, basing it solely on physical examination without obtaining complainant's last menstrual period; what is material is the occurrence of the rape, not the precise date of conception.
• Possibility of Rape with Others Present: No. It is common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred by the presence of people nearby, and rape can be committed in a house where other occupants are sleeping.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating: No. A plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance; a plea made after trial has begun does not entitle the accused to such appreciation.
• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating: No. Appellant did not spontaneously present himself to the authorities; he was arrested pursuant to an alias warrant, and his passive act of going with the officer does not constitute voluntary surrender.
• Qualifying Nature of Relationship and Minority: No. Relationship and minority are special qualifying circumstances under Republic Act No. 7659 that must be alleged in the information; their non-allegation bars conviction of qualified rape and limits the penalty to reclusion perpetua for simple rape.

• Credibility of Testimony: The inconsistencies pointed out by the defense—whether the rape occurred at daytime or nighttime, who accompanied complainant to the doctor, and whether her siblings were present—do not advert to the elements of rape or the identification of the accused. The detailed narration by complainant in court of how she was sexually assaulted overshadows the minor lapses in her sworn statement. An affidavit taken ex parte is generally considered inferior to testimony given in open court because affidavits are usually incomplete and often inaccurate, being prepared by another person who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement. The crying of the victim during testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge, a matter of judicial cognizance.

• Pregnancy Timeline: The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that the doctor was not sure of his estimate when asked to give the date of conception. His answer was based only on physical examination, and he did not obtain from complainant her last menstrual period prior to the pregnancy. What is material in a rape case is the occurrence of the rape committed by the accused against complainant, not the precise date of conception.

• Possibility of Rape with Others Present: It is common judicial experience that rapists are not deterred from committing their act by the presence of people nearby. The Court has accepted that it is neither impossible nor incredible for family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. Rape has been held not impossible even if committed in the same room while the rapist's spouse was sleeping, or in a small room where other family members also slept.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating: To effectively alleviate criminal liability, a plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. A plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial has begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. Appellant's plea was entered only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and after complainant's cross-examination had begun.

• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating: Surrender is voluntary when done spontaneously and showing the intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. There is no indication that appellant, on his own volition, came forward and presented himself to the authorities. To the contrary, he changed his residence after the incident, preventing service of the subpoena and enforcement of the first warrant. When shown the alias warrant at his new residence, he simply went with the arresting officer. When an accused surrenders only after the warrant of arrest is served upon him, the surrender is not mitigating. The return on the warrant categorically states that appellant was arrested, confirming he was taken into custody under authority of law.

• Qualifying Nature of Relationship and Minority: In People vs. Garcia, the Court held that the seven new attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances, not merely aggravating circumstances, because they increase the penalties by degrees. A qualifying circumstance gives the crime its proper and exclusive name and imposes the penalty specially prescribed by law for said crime, whereas a generic aggravating circumstance merely increases the penalty to the maximum period without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender gives a different character to the rape, raising the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information, the accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape, as he was not properly informed that he was being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the facts stated in the information determine the crime of which the accused stands charged. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the information to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged. Although qualifying circumstances not pleaded but duly proven without objection may be considered as aggravating circumstances, such aggravating circumstance of relationship becomes inconsequential in view of the nature of reclusion perpetua as a single indivisible penalty prescribed for simple rape, which must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Qualifying vs. Aggravating Circumstances — A qualifying circumstance gives the crime its proper and exclusive name and imposes on the author no other penalty but that specially prescribed by law for said crime, whereas a generic aggravating circumstance, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, increases the penalty to the maximum period without exceeding the limit prescribed by law. The seven new attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code—including the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender—partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances because they increase the penalties by degrees. They must be specifically alleged in the information to qualify the crime and warrant the corresponding penalty.

• Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation — The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the information to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the information. It would be a denial of due process if an accused charged with simple rape is convicted of its qualified form punishable with death when the qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the indictment.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance — To be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, a plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. A plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial has begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.

• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating Circumstance — Surrender is voluntary when done spontaneously by the accused, showing intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expense of search and capture. When the accused surrenders only after the warrant of arrest is served upon him, the surrender is not mitigating. The fact that the accused did not resist but went peacefully with the lawman does not mean he voluntarily surrendered.

• Credibility of Testimony vs. Affidavit — An affidavit taken ex parte is generally considered inferior to testimony given in open court. Discrepancies and inconsistencies between statements in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit a witness, because testimonies given during trial are more exact and elaborate, while ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete and often inaccurate due to the influence of the person preparing the affidavit.

• Single Indivisible Penalty — Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. Thus, even if relationship is proven as an aggravating circumstance, it becomes inconsequential when the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• "A rape by a father of his minor daughter is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death, as the lower court erroneously believed." — This passage clarifies that qualified rape under R.A. No. 7659 carries a single indivisible penalty, not a range, correcting the trial court's erroneous application of Article 63's rules on divisible penalties.

• "As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information to sustain a conviction for qualified rape, grounded on the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

• "It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for the information requirement, linking it to the accused's ability to prepare a defense and the constitutional guarantee of due process.

• "Now, it is accepted that qualifying circumstances not pleaded in the indictment but duly proven without objection during the trial may be considered as aggravating circumstances." — This passage establishes the rule that unpleaded qualifying circumstances may still be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances if proven during trial without objection, though in this case the aggravating circumstance was inconsequential due to the indivisible nature of the penalty for simple rape.

• People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 120093, Nov. 6, 1997 — Controlling precedent establishing that the seven new attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. No. 7659 in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are qualifying, not merely aggravating, circumstances, and that charging an accused with simple rape and convicting him of qualified rape without alleging the qualifying circumstance in the information constitutes a denial of due process. The Court relied on and applied this ruling directly.

• People vs. Bayot, 64 Phil. 269 (1937) — Followed for the distinction between qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances: a qualifying circumstance gives the crime its proper name and imposes the specially prescribed penalty, while a generic aggravating circumstance merely increases the penalty to the maximum period.

• People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998 — Followed to sustain the award of moral damages in rape cases even without specific proof of the basis therefor, as a recent ruling of the Court.

• People vs. Derilo, G.R. No. 117818, Apr. 18, 1997 — Followed for the rule that a plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Deopante, G.R. No. 102772, Oct. 30, 1996 — Followed for the definition of voluntary surrender and the rule that surrender after service of a warrant is not mitigating.

• People vs. Quinevista, Jr., G.R. No. 110808, May 31, 1995 — Followed for the principle that rapists are not deterred by the presence of people nearby and rape can be committed in a house with other occupants.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and punishes the crime of rape. The original provision prescribes reclusion perpetua for simple rape through force or intimidation. The amendatory provision introduced by R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, among other attendant circumstances. The Court held these attendant circumstances are qualifying circumstances that must be alleged in the information.

• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code — Provides that voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution is a mitigating circumstance. The Court applied this provision to deny appreciation of the mitigating circumstance because appellant's plea was made after the prosecution had already presented its evidence.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision to hold that even if relationship were appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, it would be inconsequential because reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty for simple rape.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court held that convicting appellant of qualified rape when the information charged only simple rape would violate this constitutional right.

• Sections 1(b), Rule 115; Sections 3, 4, 6-14, Rule 110; Rules 116, 117; Sections 3, 4, 5, 11, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Implementing provisions of the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation. The Court cited these rules as amplification and implementation of the constitutional guarantee.

• Articles 2230 and 2234, Civil Code — Authorize the award of exemplary damages in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. The Court applied these provisions to sustain the award of exemplary damages.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concurred. Mendoza, J., was on leave.