People vs. Rama

Act No. 3397 is constitutional, and prior convictions occurring more than ten years before the commission of the present offense may be taken into account in determining habitual criminality, provided they are followed at a greater or lesser interval within ten years by any of the crimes mentioned in the law, down to the offense at bar. The ten-year period fixed by section 1 of Act No. 3397 is measured from the date of the defendant's release or his last conviction, not from the date of the present offense backward.

Felipe Rama was convicted of theft in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and the trial court imposed an additional penalty for habitual criminality pursuant to Act No. 3397, based on the appellant's prior convictions in 1918, 1920, and 1927. Act No. 3397, the habitual criminality law, authorizes the imposition of an additional penalty upon offenders who have been previously convicted of certain crimes enumerated therein. The appellant appealed solely the portion of the judgment imposing the additional penalty for habitual criminality.

Felipe Rama was charged with and convicted of theft in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The trial court, in addition to the penalty for the crime of theft, imposed an additional penalty upon the appellant for habitual criminality under Act No. 3397, based on his prior convictions in 1918, 1920, and 1927, which were evidenced by Exhibits D, E, F, and G.

The exhibits of prior convictions were presented as evidence during the hearing. While the transcript of stenographic notes does not show that they were expressly admitted in evidence, there is no indication that any objection was made to them or that they were rejected by the trial court. The trial court specifically cited these exhibits in its decision as evidence that had been presented and based the additional penalty upon them.

The appellant's prior convictions of 1918 and 1920 had taken place more than ten years before the commission of the crime here prosecuted. The appellant appealed solely the portion of the judgment imposing the additional penalty for habitual criminality, raising three grounds: the unconstitutionality of Act No. 3397, the alleged lack of proof of the prior convictions, and the contention that convictions of 1918 and 1920 should not be counted because they occurred more than ten years before the present offense.

• Constitutionality of Act No. 3397: Appellant contended that Act No. 3397 is unconstitutional.
• Proof of Prior Convictions: Appellant argued that his convictions of 1918, 1920, and 1927 (Exhibits D, E, F, and G) should not be taken into account because they have not been proved.
• Ten-Year Period: Appellant maintained that, at any rate, no notice should be taken of his convictions of 1918 and 1920 (Exhibits D, E, F) as they took place ten years before the commission of the crime here prosecuted.

• Proper Penalty Classification: The Attorney-General called attention to the fact that the present theft falls within subsection 6 of article 518 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244, and that the penalty should be imposed in its medium degree, there being no modifying circumstance.

• Constitutionality: Whether Act No. 3397 is unconstitutional.
• Admissibility of Prior Convictions: Whether the appellant's prior convictions (Exhibits D, E, F, and G) were properly taken into account despite not being expressly admitted in evidence.
• Ten-Year Period Computation: Whether prior convictions occurring more than ten years before the commission of the present offense may be considered in determining habitual criminality under Act No. 3397.
• Discrimination: Whether Act No. 3397 is discriminatory.

• Constitutionality: No. The constitutionality of Act No. 3397 has been repeatedly recognized by the Court, as settled in People vs. Salinas, 54 Phil. 39.
• Admissibility of Prior Convictions: No error found. The exhibits were presented as evidence without objection, and the trial court cited them specifically in its decision as evidence upon which the additional penalty was based.
• Ten-Year Period Computation: No. The law does not exclude prior convictions from the computation of habitual criminality, provided they be followed within ten years by any of the crimes mentioned in the law, down to the offense at bar. The ten-year period under section 1 of Act No. 3397 is measured from the date of the defendant's release or last conviction.
• Discrimination: No. The law equally punishes all offenders who are in the same circumstances and is therefore not discriminatory.

• Constitutionality: The constitutionality of Act No. 3397 had been repeatedly recognized by the Court in People vs. Salinas (54 Phil. 39), which foreclosed the appellant's challenge on this ground.

• Admissibility of Prior Convictions: While the transcript of stenographic notes did not show that Exhibits D, E, F, and G were expressly admitted in evidence, it appeared that they were presented as evidence and that no objection was taken to them nor were they rejected by the trial court. The trial court specifically cited them in its decision as evidence presented and based the additional penalty upon them. In the absence of any objection, the exhibits were properly considered.

• Ten-Year Period Computation: Section 1 of Act No. 3397 fixes the period of ten years and mentions the date of the defendant's release or his last conviction as the starting point. If the defense's interpretation were correct, the text of the Act would have expressly excluded from the computation all convictions prior to the ten-year period. The law does not punish the accused again for the crimes that gave rise to prior convictions, but merely considers them in ascertaining whether the accused is a habitual criminal, with a view to correcting such criminality upon the occasion of his committing another crime. The Legislature has full power to determine in what cases such persistence in evil should be corrected. This doctrine is implied in People vs. Villafuerte and De la Cruz (G.R. No. 31805), where the Court took into account all six prior convictions, though four had taken place more than ten years before the crime in question.

• Discrimination: The law cannot be attacked as discriminatory because it equally punishes all offenders who are in the same circumstances.

• Habitual Criminality under Act No. 3397 — The law does not punish the accused again for crimes which gave rise to prior convictions, but merely considers them in ascertaining whether the accused is a habitual criminal, with a view to correcting such criminality upon the occasion of his committing another crime. The Legislature has full power to determine in what cases such persistence in evil should be corrected. The ten-year period fixed by section 1 of Act No. 3397 is measured from the date of the defendant's release or his last conviction, and prior convictions occurring more than ten years before the present offense may still be counted, provided they are followed at a greater or lesser interval within ten years by any of the crimes mentioned in the law, down to the offense at bar.

• Constitutionality of Habitual Criminality Laws — A habitual criminality statute is not discriminatory inasmuch as it equally punishes all offenders who are in the same circumstances. The Legislature has full power to determine in what cases persistence in criminal behavior should be corrected.

• "The law does not punish the accused again for crimes which gave rise to such prior convictions, but merely considers them in ascertaining whether or not the accused is an habitual criminal, with a view to correcting such criminality upon the occasion of his committing another crime; and the Legislature has full power to determine in what cases such persistence in evil should be corrected." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the Court's interpretation of the ten-year period and the constitutional validity of habitual criminality laws, distinguishing punishment for prior crimes from consideration of prior convictions for sentencing enhancement.

• "The law (section 1, Act No. 3397) fixing the period of ten years, mentions the date of the defendant's release or his last conviction." — This passage establishes the critical interpretive rule that the ten-year period runs forward from the date of release or last conviction, not backward from the present offense.

• People vs. Salinas, 54 Phil. 39 — Controlling precedent on the constitutionality of Act No. 3397; the Court relied on it to reject the appellant's constitutional challenge.
• People vs. Villafuerte and De la Cruz, G.R. No. 31805 (November 11, 1929, not reported) — Followed as implied precedent for the proposition that prior convictions occurring more than ten years before the present offense may still be taken into account for habitual criminality; the Court in that case considered all six prior convictions, though four had occurred more than ten years before.

• Section 1, Act No. 3397 — The habitual criminality law. The Court interpreted the ten-year period mentioned therein as running from the date of the defendant's release or his last conviction, and held that the law does not exclude prior convictions occurring more than ten years before the present offense from the computation, provided they are followed within ten years by any of the crimes mentioned in the law.
• Article 518, subsection 6, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Act No. 3244) — Defines the crime of theft committed by a recidivist. The Attorney-General noted that the present theft falls within this provision.
• Article 520, case No. 3, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree for the theft in question, to be imposed in its medium degree.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concurred.